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IMPLEMENTING THE U.N. TORTURE
CONVENTION
IN U.S. EXTRADITION CASES1
2
WILLIAM M. COHEN

The United Nations
Inhuman or Degrading
tion) 3 entered into force
Article 3.1 of the Torture

Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Treatment or Punishment (Torture Convenin the United States on November 20, 1994.
Convention provides that:

No State Party shall expel, return, ("refouler") or extradite a person
to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that
he would be in danger of being subjected to torture. 4
The U.S. Senate's Resolution of Advice and Consent to ratification
of the Torture Convention included the "understanding" that the term
"substantial grounds for believing" in Article 3 means "more likely than
5
not that he would be tortured."
"Torture" is defined by Article 1 of the Torture Convention to mean:
[AIny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes
as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on
discrimination of any king, when pain or suffering is inflicted by
or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence6 of a
public official or other person acting in an official capacity.

1. An earlier version of this article was presented and discussed at a workshop on
Implementation of the UN Convention on Torture at the University of Denver College of
Law Sutton Colloquium and McDougal Lecture Commemorating the 501h Anniversary of
the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, April 17-18, 1998.
2. President and Chief Counsel, The Center for Human Rights Advocacy, Boulder,
Colorado. Mr. Cohen teaches courses in International Human Rights in Criminal Justice
and in Immigration Law as a member of the part-time faculty at the University of Denver
College of Law. He wishes to thank Cathleen Hopfe for research assistance with this paper.
3. Opened for signature Feb. 4, 1985, G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 51,
at 197, U.N. Doc. AJRES/39/708(1984), reprintedin 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984), modified in 24
I.L.M. 535 (1985).
4. Id. at art. 3(1) (emphasis added).
5. 136 Cong. Rec. S17486, S17492 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990).
6. Torture Convention, art 1.1. The last sentence of Article 1.1 states that torture
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Article 3.2 of the Torture Convention further sets forth the scope of
the inquiry by the "competent authorities" necessary to determine
whether an individual is likely to be tortured if he or she is extradited
to the demanding country:
For the purpose of determining whether there are such grounds,
the competent authoritiesshall take into account all relevant considerations including, where applicable, the existence in the State concerned
of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant, or mass violations of human
7
rights.
All of the elements necessary to assert and adjudicate a claim under Article 3 are spelled out explicitly in the Torture Convention: the
mandatory prohibition on extradition of someone likely be tortured in
the demanding country, the standard of proof to establish such a claim,
the definition of torture, and the scope of the inquiry. Nothing else is
required by way of legislation to flesh out the requirements for asserting rights under Article 3.
In contrast, several other articles of the Torture Convention, either
expressly or by implication, require each State Party to the convention
to take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures
to prevent and to punish torture in any territory under its jurisdiction.
Such measures include provisions for criminal liability and for civil re8
dress and compensation for torture victims.
Article 3, on the other hand, does not appear to require any implementing legislative or administrative action to effectuate its provisions.
Instead, in mandatory terms, Article 3 absolutely prohibits the United
States, as a State Party to the convention, from extraditing any person
to another country "where there are substantial grounds for believing
that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture."
Although there is no statute or published regulation implementing
the United States' obligation under Article 3 in the extradition context,
the Secretary of State has adopted procedures for evaluating an alleged
fugitive's claim that he or she would be tortured by the country seeking
his or her extradition. 9 By assuming this responsibility, the Secretary
"does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful
sanctions."
7. Torture Convention, art. 3.2.
8. See, e.g., Article 2.1 ("Each State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction.'); Article 4.1 ("Each State Party shall ensure that all acts of torture are offenses under it criminal law"); Article 14.1 ("Each State Party shall ensure in its legal
system that the victim of an act of torture obtains redress and has an enforceable right to
fair and adequate compensation, including the means for as full rehabilitation as possible').
9. See Letter Brief of the United States Department of Justice (Feb. 10, 1998), In the
Matter of the Extradition of Chee Fan Chen, No. 97-15609 (9th Cir. Dec. 12, 1997) (on file
with author) [hereinafter Letter Brief], submitted in In the Matter of the Extradition of
Chee Fan Chen, No. 97-15609, pending before the Ninth Circuit [hereafter "Letter Brief']
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of State has effectively implemented Article 3 in extradition cases. No
additional administrative or legislative act is necessary since the
United States government, in seeking ratification of the Torture Convention recognized that Article 3 is binding as a limitation on the
United States' authority to extradite without the necessity of implementing legislation or regulations.' 0
Nevertheless, the United States maintains that the Secretary's procedures are the exclusive remedy available to fugitives to prevent their
being surrendered to a country where they are likely to be tortured.
The government asserts this exclusive authority, pursuant to the Secretary of State's statutory authority to actually extradite fugitives, 1 and
under the "rule of non-inquiry" adopted by federal courts, which precludes judicial inquiry in most extradition cases into the human rights
12
practices of U.S. extradition treaty partners.
at 2 (' The Secretary of State has taken steps to ensure United States Government compliance with our obligation under the Torture Convention").
10. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829); Rainbow Navigation, Inc. v.
Dep't of Navy, 686 F. Supp. 354, 357 (D.D.C. 1988).
' There is no doubt that Article 3 places an obligation upon the competent authorities of
the United States not to deliver an individual to a country where he would be tortured."
Prepared Statement of Mark Richard, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice, Hearing on Convention Against Torture [Hearing], Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, S. Hrg. 101-718 (Jan. 30, 1990) at 18. "Article 3 forbids
a State Party form forcibly returning a person to a country where there are "substantial
grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture." Sen. Exec.
Rep. 101-30 (August 30, 1990) at 10.
The Senate's resolution of ratification of the Torture Convention does include a "declaration" that "the provisions of Articles 1 through 16 of the Convention are not selfexecuting." However, the State Department made it clear that in proposing that declaration that it was intended to require that "[any prosecution (or civil action) in the United
States for torture will necessarily be pursuant to existing or subsequently enacted Federal
or State law." Letter from Janet G. Mullins, Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs, Department of State, to Senator Pressler, dated April 4, 1990, Sen. Exec. Rep. 101-30, at
App. B, p. 41.
A recent analysis under the four judicial approaches for determining whether provisions
of a treaty are self-executing, concludes that despite the absence of implementing legislation, "Article 3 should be held to be enforceable by individuals in U.S. courts." Kristen B.
Rosati, The United Nations Convention Against Torture: A Self-Executing Treaty that Prevents the Removal of Persons Ineligible for Asylum and Withholding of Removal, 26 Deny.
J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 533 (Summer 1998). It is worth noting that the Government did not argue in the Chen case that the Torture Convention was not self-executing in the context of
extradition cases.
11. 18 U.S.C. § 3186 ("The Secretary of State may order the person committed under
Section 3184 ... to be delivered to any authorized agent of such foreign government, to be
tried for the offense of which charged.").
12. "Under the rule of non-inquiry, courts refrain from 'investigating the fairness of a
requesting nation's justice system,' -.. , and from inquiring 'into the procedures or treatment which await a surrendered fugitive in the requesting country."' United States v.
Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 110 (Is' Cir. 1997). "It is the function of the Secretary of State to
determine whether extradition should be denied on humanitarian grounds." Ahmad v.
Wigen, 910 F.2d 1063, 1067 (2d Cir. 1990). However, some courts have left "open the possibility" that a case where the extraditee "would be subject to procedures so antipathetic
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However, these traditional extradition statutes and rules pre-date
the entry into effect in the United States of Article 3 of the Torture
Convention. This paper will explore whether Article 3's mandatory
prohibition against the extradition of any persons to another country
where they are likely to be tortured modifies the judicial rule of noninquiry, thereby affording some measure of judicial review of the Secretary of State's heretofore near exclusive authority to decide whether to
extradite someone facing such severe human rights violations.
U.S. EXTRADITION AUTHORITY IS SOLELY A CREATURE OF STATUTE AND
TREATY. ARTICLE 3 MODIFIES AND LIMITS THAT EXTRADITION

AUTHORITY.
Under U.S. law, absent a statute or treaty, the United States government lacks authority and any duty to surrender any person on its
territory to a foreign country for purpose of prosecution for an alleged
criminal offense.13 Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that the Constitution forbids U.S. officials from surrendering a fugitive to a foreign
government for criminal prosecution absent statutory authority or a
treaty obligation to do SO. 14 As stated in Valentine v. United States ex
rel. Neidecker:
[T]he Constitution creates no executive prerogative to dispose of
the liberty of the individual. Proceedings against him must be
authorized by law. There is no executive discretion to surrender
him to a foreign government, unless that discretion is granted by
law. It necessarily follows that as the legal authority does not
exist save as it is given by act of Congress or by the terms of a
treaty, it is not enough that statute or treaty does not deny the
power to surrender.
It must be found that statute or treaty con15
fers the power.
A fortiori, a treaty provision, such as Article 3, which prohibits extradition under certain circumstances clearly stays the government's
authority to act otherwise.
Current U.S. extradition statutes authorize extradition only pursuant to extradition treaties.1 6 Federal magistrate judges currently deto a federal court's sense of decency" might cause those courts to develop a "humanitarian
exception" to the rule of non-inquiry. Emami v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for N.D. Cal., 834 F.2d
1444, 1453 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77, 78 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 851 (1960). For a comprehensive review of the rule of non-inquiry predating the entry into effect of the Torture Convention in the U.S., see J. Semmelman,
Federal Courts, the Constitution,and the Rule of Non-Inquiry in InternationalExtradition
Proceedings,76 CORNELL L. REV. 1198 (1991).
13. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933); United States v. Howard, 996
F.2d 1320, 1329 (1st Cir. 1993); Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 782 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986).
14. Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 9 (1936).
15. Id. (Emphasis added.)
16. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (Judicial officers authorized to determine extraditability of any
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termine whether the requirements of the particular treaty have been
met and so certify those facts to the Secretary of State, who is empowered, in her discretion, to deliver the accused to the agents of the requesting country for trial of the offense charged. The legality of the
magistrate judge's certification of extraditability, but generally not the
Secretary of State's decision to extradite, is judicially reviewable only by
17
writ of habeas corpus.
Under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, 18 all treaties are
the "Supreme Law of the Land," on a par with statutes. In particular,
extradition treaties are self-executing; they require no implementing
legislation to be binding as law. 19 Also, an extradition treaty and general extradition statutes can be modified by a subsequent treaty, such
as the Torture Convention, which creates or limits authority to extra20
dite and which is inconsistent with existing authority.
Therefore, pursuant to Article 3, all existing extradition treaties
must now be considered to contain a limitation prohibiting the extradition by the United States of any person facing the likelihood of being
tortured. As so incorporated into these extradition treaties, Article 3
should also be considered self-executing and enforceable by the individual fugitives who assert that they will be subject to torture if rendered
over to the requesting States.
Moreover, any future bilateral extradition treaties, absent Congressional legislation or express treaty language abrogating the Torture
Convention's prohibition on extraditing fugitives likely to be tortured,.
should also be construed as incorporating the terms of Article 3.21
22
The Secretary of State recognizes this limitation on her powers.
The issue remains whether the Secretary's decision to extradite a person seeking to enforce an Article 3 claim under the Torture Convention
is judicially reviewable.
fugitive "[wihenever there is a treaty or convention for extradition between the United
States and any foreign government. . ."); 18 U.S.C. § 3186 (see note 11, supra); 18 U.S.C. §
3181(a)(authority to surrender persons "who have committed crimes in foreign countries
shall continue in force only during the existence of any treaty of extradition with such foreign government"). 18 U.S.C. § 3181(b) contains the only statutory authority to extradite
persons in the absence of a treaty, "in the exercise of comity, . . . other than citizens, nationals, or permanent residents of the United States, who have committed crimes of violence against nationals of the United States in foreign countries," subject to conditions
specified.
17. 28 U.S.C. § 2241; see Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364, 369 (1920).
18. Article VI, § 2, U.S. Constitution.
19. United States v. Balsys, 119 F.3d 122, 138 n.14 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 1998
U.S. LEXIS 460 (Jan. 16, 1998).
20. Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 463 (1913)(statutory extradition requirements
superseded by subsequent treaty in conflict with the statutory procedures).
21. Mississippi Poultry Ass'n, Inc. v. Madigan, 992 F.2d 1359, 1365 (5th Cir.
1993)("Congress may abrogate a treaty or international obligation entered into by the
United States only by a clear statement of its intent to do so.").
22. Letter Brief at 1-2.
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Who Decides Whether an Article 3 ProhibitionApplies?
Article 3 is silent on the question of who should make the determination of whether there are substantial grounds for believing that a
particular fugitive would be in danger of being subjected to torture if
delivered for prosecution to the requesting country. 23 Normally the Secretary does not consider the exercise of her authority to extradite until
after a federal magistrate judge has certified the fugitive's eligibility for
extradition under the applicable treaty, and, where sought, that certifi24
cation has been tested in the courts in a habeas corpus proceeding.
However, no statutory or treaty provision exists restricting the jurisdiction of the federal courts from considering an Article 3 claim, either prior or subsequent to the Secretary's review of such a claim.
Not surprisingly, the Secretary of State has asserted that "the obligation imposed by the [Torture] Convention with regard to extradition
is vested with [her] as the United States official with ultimate responsibility for determining whether a fugitive will be extradited." 25 However,
the legislative history of the Senate ratification of the Torture Convention does not support an interpretation which would reserve to the Secretary of State the exclusive role in determining the fate of fugitives
who allege they are likely to be tortured in a requesting country.
In a letter dated May 20, 1988, transmitting the Torture Convention to the Senate for its "advice and consent," President Reagan recommended ratification subject to "certain reservations, understandings,
and declarations." Included was a recommendation that "the United
States declares that the phrase 'competent authorities,' as used in Article 3 of the Convention, refers to the Secretary of State in extradition
cases and to the Attorney General in deportation cases." 26 The Bush
Administration, in resubmitting the Convention for ratification, omitted
this declaration while recognizing its implicitness, because it considered
it "not necessary to include.., in the formal instrument of ratifica27
tion."
Clearly, under United States statutes, the Secretary of State would
23. Article 3.2 simply states that "the competent authorities" should take into account all relevant considerations without specifying whether those authorities should be
administrative or judicial or both. The Justice Department's witness at the hearings on
ratification of the Torture Convention, Mark Richard, acknowledged this fact: "Article 3
does not require that such determinations be made subject to judicial review. The determiners and the degree of review, if any, are left by the Convention to internal domestic
law." Hearing at 18.
24. See In re the Extradition of Howard, 996 F.2d 1320, 1324-25 (1 S Cir. 1993). "Decisions on extradition are presented to the Secretary only after a fugitive has been found
extraditable by a United States judicial officer and given an opportunity to challenge the
finding by seeking a writ of habeas corpus." Letter Brief at 2.
25. Letter Brief at 2.
26. Semmelman, suora at 1225 n. 203.
27. Sen. Exec. Rep. 101-30, App. A, at 35, 37.
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be the "competent authority" to determine in the first instance whether
her authority to extradite a person has been barred by Article 3. However, that authority does not resolve the issue of whether the Secretary's decision to extradite is subject to judicial review.
Hence, there is no support in the ratifying document or its legislative history for a conclusion that the Secretary of State was intended to
have the exclusive authority and that the judiciary should play no role
in implementing Article 3.
Indeed, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) expressly provides
that a "person suffering legal wrong because of agency action ...is entitled to judicial review thereof."28 In the absence of specific statutory review authority, the APA recognizes the right to seek judicial review of
agency action by writ of habeas corpus in a court of competent jurisdic29
tion.
HABEAS CORPUS JUDICIAL REVIEW

Under Article 3 of the Torture Convention, the Secretary's decisions
do not involve the exercise of her discretion as to whether to extradite
in a given case. An Article 3 decision is pursuant to a mandatory treaty
prohibition against extraditing anyone likely to be subjected to torture
in the demanding country. No statute or treaty gives the Secretary the
30
power to override that prohibition in the exercise of her discretion.
As noted earlier, the Habeas Corpus Statute 3l grants jurisdiction to
the federal courts to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a person in custody
"in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States." 32 Should the Secretary of State purport to exercise her discretion to override substantial grounds for believing an extraditee would
be tortured, such a decision would violate a treaty, i.e., Article 3 of the
Torture Convention. It would, therefore, be subject to being challenged
by a fugitive in custody by writ of habeas corpus.
The United States government's position asserting exclusive
authority under the Torture Convention amounts to a claim that the
availability of Section 2241 habeas corpus relief to test the Secretary's
decision to extradite despite an Article 3 claim has implicitly been repealed. However, the Supreme Court has made it clear that congressional intent to repeal habeas corpus jurisdictional statutes must be ex-

28. 5 U.S.C. § 702. Since no federal statute expressly precludes judicial review of Article 3 decisions by the Secretary of State and the relief afforded by Article 3 is mandatory
not discretionary, those exceptions to judicial review under the APA are inapplicable. 5
U.S.C. § 701(a).

29.
30.
31.
32.

5 U.S.C. § 703.
Valentine, 299 U.S. at 9.
28 U.S.C. § 2241.
28 U.S.C. § 2 2 41(c)(3). (Emphasis added.)
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press and that "[r]epeals by implication are not favored." 33
A contrary interpretation, granting sole authority to the executive
branch to make an unreviewable determination under Article 3, would
raise serious constitutional issues under the Suspension Clause of the
Habeas Corpus provision, 34 the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, and the concept of Separation of Powers enshrined in
America's Constitutional structure.3 5 In the absence of any other clear
avenue for judicial review in Article 3 cases, the unavailability of at
least habeas corpus review of the Secretary's decision would clearly
amount to an unconstitutional suspension of the writ. 36
DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS IN ARTICLE 3

DECISIONMAKING.

Freedomfrom Torture Is a Liberty Interest of theHighest Order.
Among the most important issues federal courts must consider in
reviewing the Secretary's Article 3 decisions under habeas corpus jurisdiction is: What elements of procedural due process are required to preserve fugitives' Article 3 interests not to be wrongly extradited to countries where they are likely to be tortured? Under the U.S. Constitution,
the Torture Convention, and customary international law, 37 freedom
33. Felker v. Turpin, 116 S.Ct. 2333, 2338 (1996); accord Ex Parte Yerger, 75 U.S. 85,
105 (1868). Legislation currently pending in the Senate to implement the Torture Convention, which incorporates the language of Article 3, currently contains jurisdictionremoving language precluding judicial "review" of "claims raised under the convention" or
the proposed identical statutory policy. The Survivors of Torture Support Act ["STSP"I, S.
1606, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess., § 4(d)(1998). (Other pending bills in both the House and Senate, known as the 'Torture Victims Relief Act," contain no such jurisdiction-limiting provisions. S. 1606 and H.R. 3161, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1998).) Similar jurisdiction-limiting
language in 1996 immigration legislation has been held not to repeal by implication access to habeas corpus for aliens in custody facing removal from the United States. Goncalves v. Reno, _

F.3d

__

1998 WL 236799 (1s

'

Cir. May 15, 1998) ("Felker re-

garded Ex parte Yerger as adopting a general rule of construction that any repeal of the
federal courts' historic habeas jurisdiction ... must be explicit and make express reference specifically to the statute granting jurisdiction.")
Therefore, absent an explicit, unambiguous directive in jurisdiction-modifying language
specifically abrogating Section 2241 habeas corpus jurisdiction in Article 3 extradition
claims, a jurisdiction-limiting statute, if enacted, would likely be held to limit only direct
judicial review of the Secretary's decision, not review by habeas corpus.
34. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2 provides:
The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases
of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.
35. Goncalves v. Reno, __ F.3d at _

36. See, e.g., Kolster v. INS, 101 F.3d 785, 790-91(1st Cir. 1996) (availability of constitutional habeas review makes repeal of direct review constitutional).
37. ' The public law of nations was long ago incorporated into the common law of the
United States." Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1453 (11th Cir. 1986)(citing The
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)). 'To the extent possible, courts must construe
American law so as to avoid violating principles of public international law." Garcia-Mir,
788 F.2d at 1453 (citing Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64,
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from torture is among the highest and weightiest liberty interests rec38
ognized in America, as well as worldwide.
Article 1 of the Torture Convention defines torture as:
Any act by which severe pain and suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes
as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity....
The Torture Convention requires each State Party, including the
United States, to prevent and punish torture committed on its territory
and prohibits any State Party from extraditing any person to another
State, whether or not a party to the Convention, where that person is
likely to be tortured. The Convention definition of torture has been incorporated virtually verbatim into United States implementing criminal
and civil liability legislation. 39 Also, the extraterritorial interest of the
United States in preventing and punishing torture in other countries
has been codified with respect to both aliens and U.S. citizens who are
40
the victims of official torture abroad.
The Eighth Amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual
punishments" has long been recognized by the Supreme Court as "pro41
scribing 'tortures' and other 'barbarous' methods of punishments."
Additionally, "the right to be free from official torture is fundamental and universal, a right deserving of the highest status under international law," i.e., "a jus cogens norm." 42 Also, "a jus cogens norm is subject to modification or derogation only by a subsequent jus cogens
43
norm."
Moreover, the United States would violate international law by encouraging or condoning torture by other countries, if it should extradite

102, 118 (1804).
38. See, e.g., Chahal v. United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights, (1997) 23
EHRR 413 (15 Nov. 1996), at 11 79-80 (Article 3 of the European Convention on Human
Rights, which prohibits torture in absolute terms "enshrines one of the most fundamental
values of democratic society." Its prohibition "is equally absolute in expulsion cases.")
39. 18 U.S.C. § 2340(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (Section 3(b)).
40. The Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note; The
Alien Tort Act (ATA), 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
41. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169-70 (1976).
42. Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 717 (9th Cir. 1992).
43. Id. at 715. See Chahal v. United Kingdom, at 1 79 ("Article 3 [of the European
Convention on Human Rights] makes no provision for exceptions and no derogation from
it is permissible under Article 15 even in the event of a public emergency threatening the
life of the nation").
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44
someone to a country where he or she would likely be tortured.

Therefore, freedom from torture and from being turned over to another country to be tortured is a liberty interest in the United States of
the highest order. As such it is protected by the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment. 45 The question remains: can the interest involved, considering its importance, be adequately protected by a purely
administrative decisionmaking process without any opportunity for judicial review?
What ProcessIs Due?
The U.S. government contends that "because the Secretary [of
State] follows a principled decision-making process with appropriate
concern for the treatment a requested person will receive if returned to
a requesting country," the federal courts, despite Article 3, should not
46
recognize any exception to the rule of judicial non-inquiry.
The Secretary recognizes the "there is no statute or published
regulation applicable to the Secretary's decision-making process in determining whether to sign an extradition warrant or whether to impose
conditions on an extradition," even where an Article 3 claim has been
raised by the alleged fugitive. 47 Nevertheless, the Secretary asserts she
"has taken steps to ensure United States Government compliance with
48
[its] obligation under the Torture Convention."
The informal procedures adopted by the Secretary are spelled out
in a Letter Brief filed in the Chen extradition case currently under advisement in the Ninth Circuit. According to that Letter Brief:
All bureaus in the Department and all posts abroad have been advised that, in order to implement this obligation, the Secretary will consider in all extradition cases whether a person facing extradition "is
more likely than not" to be tortured in the country requesting extradition. All Department bureaus and posts abroad have been requested to
provide any information relevant to the issue of torture in a particular
extradition case to the Office of the Legal Advisor and the Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor.
In each case where allegations relating to torture are made or
the issue is otherwise brought to the Department's attention,
appropriate policy and legal offices review and analyze all
available information relevant to the case in preparing a rec44. See Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 371 (E.D.La.
1997)(quoting Restatement (3rd), Foreign Relations Law of the United States, § 702(d): "A
state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages, or
condones ... torture...")
45. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976).
46. Letter Brief, at 3.
47. Id. at 1.
48. Id. at 2.
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ommendation to the Secretary. If the person wanted for extradition has attempted to raise this issue during judicial proceedings, any relevant information provided to the court is reviewed. The fugitive, on his own or through counsel, and other
interested parties may also submit additional written documentation to the Department of State for consideration in reaching
the decision on extradition. The review also considers other information available to the Department concerning judicial and
penal conditions and practices of the requesting country, including the information contained in the State Department's
annual Human Rights Reports, and the possible relevance of
that information to the individual whose surrender is at issue.... The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor,
which drafts the Human Rights Reports and provides advisory
opinions on asylum requests in deportation proceedings under
section 207 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, is a key
participant in this process.
Based on the resulting analysis of all relevant information, the
Secretary may decide to surrender the fugitive to the requesting
state, to deny surrender of the fugitive, or to surrender the fugitive subject to conditions or after receiving assurance she deems

appropriate.

....

49

Absent from this process is any requirement for a hearing or that
the Secretary make written findings, attach weight to any of the facts
and reports she considers, balance that information and provide reasons
in compliance with a specific legal standard for her decision. Such fundamental elements of due process and the rule of law in administrative
proceedings are essential to prevent arbitrary decisions and to afford
the Article 3 claimant meaningful judicial review of the administrative
decision in a habeas corpus proceeding. 50 By adhering to the rule of
non-inquiry with respect to Article 3 claims, the Secretary has failed to
recognize or provide these due process rights, including judicial review
in any form, to an Article 3 claimant.
In Mathews v. Eldridge, the Supreme Court summarized the criteria for determining whether the administrative process afforded an individual whose liberty interest was at risk was sufficient to satisfy the
Due Process Clause:
[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally
requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute proce-

49. Id. at 2-3. This supplemental briefing was requested sua sponte by the Ninth Circuit panel at oral argument in the Chen case.
50. See Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force, 591 F.2d 852, 857 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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The Private Interest At Stake
As already demonstrated, the right to be free from official torture is
of the highest order, a interest which cannot be derogated under international law by ordinary legal norms. The Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment raises freedom from torture to the status of a fundamental constitutional right.
The
mandatory injunction in a multinational treaty against extraditing
someone facing torture and the protection afforded torture victims at
home and abroad by United States statutes which impose civil and
criminal liability on torturers are designed to comprehensively protect
this vital liberty interest.
The Risk of Erroneous Deprivationof Such Interest By the Procedures
Provided.
At stake for the potential torture victim is, by definition, severe
physical or mental pain or suffering, possibly even death; likely conviction based on a confession coerced by torture, and punishment by universally condemned methods or under torturous and inhumane conditions.
Since "the degree of potential deprivation that may be created by a
particular decision is a factor to be considered in assessing the validity
of any administrative decisionmaking process," 52 the potential deprivation here would support a need for much greater procedural protection
than that afforded by the Secretary of State. 53 At a minimum, it would
require an evidentiary hearing comparable to that constitutionally required to be afforded to those on the "very margin of subsistence," such
54
as those facing loss of welfare benefits.
The "fairness and reliability of the existing.., procedures, and the
probable value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards," are additional factors to be weighed. 55 Central to that evaluation "is the nature
of the relevant inquiry." 56
As illustrated by the process outlined by the Secretary, the inquiry

51. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35.
52. Id. at 341.
53. See Chahal, at 1 151 ("Given the irreversible nature of the harm that might occur
if the risk of ill-treatment materialized and the importance the Court attaches to Article 3
[of the European Convention on Human Rights], the notion of an effective remedy under
Article 13 [of that Convention] requires independent scrutiny of the claim that there exist
substantial ground for fearing a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3").
54. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970); Mathews, 424 U.S. at 340.
55. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 343.
56. Id.
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into an Article 3 claim is both broad in scope and complex in nature.
Article 3.2 requires "the competent authorities" to "take into account all
relevant considerations, including, where applicable, the existence in
the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass
violations of human rights." Such an inquiry into the practices of a foreign country requires substantial research, consideration of many
sources of information, the opinion of recognized and independent experts, and objective evaluation free from political, economic and foreign
policy considerations.
The Secretary places significant reliance in this process on reports
by, and the evaluation of, the State Department's Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights and Labor. This Bureau is staffed by career State Department officers subordinate to the Secretary. Its reports are filtered
through and edited by numerous political officers representing differing
interests in dealing with the relevant country. The Secretary herself
must deal regularly on numerous foreign policy, political and economic
issues with the highest officials of the requesting country. The risk,
therefore, of decisionmaking based on factors unrelated to the merits of
an Article 3 claim is significant in the process currently employed by
57
the government.
During the Secretary's Article 3 process, the fugitive's testimony
and the testimony of corroborating witnesses and experts may be presented only in writing, without any opportunity for the Secretary, as
decisionmaker, to evaluate their credibility and to compare the credibility and substance of opposing sources. Neither does the fugitive have
any opportunity to test the credibility of opposing sources. It is not
even clear whether the fugitive has knowledge of or access to all of the
information considered by the Secretary in reaching a decision or is
provided with any opportunity to rebut that information.
Since the Secretary is not required to render a reasoned decision
specifying the weight applied to any fact or opinion, there is no way to
57. See Chahal, at 11 80, 151 (Improper for British Home Secretary and expulsion
review bodies to consider "what the person may have done to warrant expulsion or to any
perceived threat to the national security of the expelling state").
"International collaboration in criminal prosecutions has intensified admirably in recent
years." Balsys, 119 F.3d at 130-1. With this increased "cooperative internationalism" in
law enforcement, the risk that the interests in preserving and nurturing the relationships
established will override the objective judgment about human rights practices and torture
in specific cases involving some cooperating countries becomes significant. See transcript
of hearing in Alexandre Konanykhine v. William J. Carroll, Civ. Action No. 97-449-A
(E.D.Va. July 22, 1997)(former KGB agent testified that in the interest of international
law enforcement cooperation INS attorneys ignored evidence that Russian officials sought
extradition or removal of fugitive in a fabricated criminal case in which the fugitive faced
torture). The State Department and the Justice Department frequently cooperate in international law enforcement matters. Hence, political interests of other agencies may influence the Secretary of State's decision in an extradition case with a particular country.
Cf. Kyles v. Whitley, 131 L.Ed. 2d 490 (1995)(all agencies are part of the same government).
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evaluate the validity of any given decision or to root out any arbitrary,
discriminatory, or irrational action by the agency. Nor can decisions to
override the likelihood of torture because of political, economic or foreign policy interests be detected and corrected. Finally, there is no provision for administrative appeal.
Under comparable conditions, where "a wide variety of information
may be deemed relevant, and issues of witness credibility and veracity
often are critical to the decisionmaking process," the Supreme Court
has required an evidentiary hearing before a potentially life-sustaining
statutory interest, i.e., welfare benefits, could be terminated.58 The
same procedural protection would appear to be imperative where the
risk of torture is at issue.
The GovernmentalInterest Involved.
The final factor, the government's interest in retaining the procedures chosen, is perhaps the most difficult to assess. Prior to the entry
into force of the Torture Convention, the rule of non-inquiry was based
on several considerations: the assumption that the United States would
not enter into an extradition treaty with a country whose criminal justice system it deemed unfair; the need to honor the interest in comity of
nations in mutually enforcing extradition treaties; and the desire to afford the Secretary of State flexibility in exercising discretion in dis59
charging her statutory authority to extradite.
However, none of these considerations rises to the level of a constitutional mandate. In the extradition case of In re Howard,60 the First
Circuit rejected the government's suggestion that "the Constitution
mandates the rule of noninquiry."
We disagree. The rule did not spring from a belief that courts, as
an institution, lack either the authority or the capacity to evaluate foreign legal systems. Rather, the rule came into being as judges, attempting to interpret particular treaties, concluded that, absent a contrary indication in a specific instance, the ratification of an extradition
61
treaty mandated noninquiry as a matter of international comity.
Moreover, the entry into force of Article 3 and the requirement that
58. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 269; see also Mathews, 424 U.S. at 343-44 ("Goldberg-noted
that in such circumstances 'written submissions are a wholly unsatisfactory basis for decision."')
59. See Ahmad, 910 F.2d at 1067 (comity); Glucksman v. Henkel, 221 U.S. 508, 512
(1911)(extradition treaty assumes the trial will be fair); Semmelman, at 1229-36 (policy
considerations). But see Emami, 834 F.2d at 1453(leaving open the possibility of a "humanitarian exception" to the rule of non-inquiry, quoting dicta in Gallina v. Fraser, 278
F.2d 77, 78 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 851 (1960). While the Ninth Circuit appears to
adhere to the possibility of a humanitarian exception, the Second Circuit appears to have
rejected the Gallina dictum. See Ahmad, 910 F.2d at 1067.
60. 996 F.2d 1320 (1st Cir. 1993).
61. Id. at 1330 n.6.
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it be enforced undermines those governmental interests considerably.
First, Article 3 provides an express mandatory prohibition against extradition of likely torture victims which modifies all existing extradition
treaties and all future ones not inconsistent with its terms. Such a
"specific" exception to the right of the United States to extradite anyone
62
has been held to be reviewable and enforceable by the federal courts.
Second, the interests of comity are substantially diminished since
Article 3 emanates from a multilateral Convention signed by dozens of
countries codifying a universally recognized customary international
law of the highest order. Hence, any country's complaint that a United
States court refused to extradite based on substantial grounds that the
person sought would be tortured should fall on deaf ears.
Third, the flexibility and discretion normally afforded the Secretary
in exercising ultimate authority to extradite has been removed by Article 3's mandatory prohibition on extradition of anyone likely to be tortured. The Secretary simply lacks any discretion to extradite such a
person. Also, conditions negotiated by the Secretary to prevent the infliction of torture may in some cases be both reasonable and enforceable, thus reducing the likelihood of actual torture being inflicted.
However, the ultimate determination of whether the standard prohibiting extradition has been met or not should still, to insure independ63
ence of this momentous and irreversible decision, be made by a court.
Finally, the Secretary of State's interests are not the only governmental interests involved in extradition decisions. The federal courts
have habeas corpus jurisdiction to test the legality of detaining a fugitive under the Constitution, statutes and "treaties" of the United
States. The courts cannot faithfully exercise that jurisdiction simply by
rubber-stamping the decision of the executive branch to extradite someone who claims under Article 3 to be facing torture. Such a process,
wherein the courts are complicit in violating both the Eighth Amendment and international law of the highest order, would clearly "shock
64
the conscience."
This fundamental concept of due process was inherent in the Gallina exception in which the Second Circuit at that time recognized that
there could be "situations where the [fugitive], upon extradition, would
be subject to procedures or punishment so antipathetic to a federal
court's sense of decency as to require reexamination of the principle" of
65
noninquiry.
62. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 781-83 (9th Cir. 1986)(political offense exception
in treaty); Howard, 996 F.2d at 1325 (fair trial and discrimination exception in treaty).
63. See Chahal, at 1 105 (Assurances of protection by Indian government to prevent
torture of Sikh separatist leader, accepted by Home Secretary but rejected by European
Court of Human Rights as inadequate guarantee of safety.)
64. U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987); see also Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165 (1952).
65. Gallina, 278 F.2d at 79; accord Emami, 834 F.2d at 1453; Arnbjornsdottir-
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On balance, the extraordinarily weighty liberty interest of the fugitive, the need for an evidentiary hearing and judicial review to prevent
arbitrary or politically motivated erroneous decisionmaking, and the
requirement that the courts not participate in a process which would
condone torture, in combination, substantially outweigh whatever interest remains in the Secretary of State under Article 3 to be the sole
arbiter of fate in such critical human rights decisions mandated by
treaty.
CONCLUSION

Article 3 of the Torture Convention requires, as a minimum, judicial review in habeas corpus proceedings of any administrative determination to extradite a fugitive to a country in which it is claimed the
fugitive is likely to be tortured. 66 That judicial review should consider
both whether the process adopted by the Secretary of State conforms to
the constitutional requirements of due process dictated by the interests
at stake, and whether the decision by the Secretary is fair and reasonable under the circumstances and in conformity with the standards set
forth in the Torture Convention.
It is only through such an independent judicial review of a claim
under Article 3 of the Torture Convention that the internationally recognized and constitutionally protected right to be free from torture
anywhere in the world can be effectively implemented.

Mendler v. United States, 721 F.2d 679, 683 (9th Cir. 1983).
66. The details of that judicial review, including the scope of the hearing, the standards of proof, the nature of the review of the Secretary of State's decision under Article 3
are beyond the scope of this article.

The United Nations Convention Against
Torture: A Self-Executing Treaty That
Prevents the Removal of Persons Ineligible
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The crack of the whip, the clamp of the thumb screw, the crush of the
iron maiden, and, in these more efficient modern times, the shock of
the electric cattle prod are forms of torture that the international order
will not tolerate. To subject a person to such horrors is to commit one
of the most egregious violations of the personal security and dignity of
a human being.***

Despite the horrors of persecution that many refugees face if returned to their home countries, United States (U.S.) immigration law
has become increasingly restrictive in granting relief to these individuals. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
of 1996 (IIRIRA)I, which amended the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA), is the latest salvo in the anti-immigration battle and has erected
yet another set of barriers to relief for legitimate refugees through such
methods as expedited removal, strict filing deadlines, and restrictions
on eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal 2 for an increasing
*A previous version of this article originally appeared in Immigration Briefings (Federal
Publications, december 1997). Reprint permission granted.
**Coppersmith Gordon Schermer Owens & Nelson, P.L.C. Ms. Rosati it a 1990 graduate
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Rosati litigated the first Torture Convention case considered for relief by the Immigration
& Naturalization Service. A member of the Board of Directors of the Florence Immigrant
& Refugee Rights Project in Arizona, Ms. Rosati has also served as a Legal Counselor at
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
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Vizquez, Professor Fernando Tes6n, Regina Germain, Elisa Massimino, William Cohen,
Andrew Painter and Rebecca Story.
Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina 965 F.2d 699, 717 (9th Cir. 1992).
1. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 Pub. L.
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 [hereinafter IIRIRA] (enacted as Division C of the Omnibus
Appropriations Act of 1996) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. (Supp. 1996)).
2. The IIRIRA replaced the concepts of "deportation" and "exclusion" with "removal."
Accordingly, this article will use the term "withholding of removal," although "withholding of deportation" may still apply to individuals put into deportation proceedings before

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

26:4

number of persons convicted of "aggravated" felonies.
In fact, even convictions for non-violent crimes such as theft, illegal
gambling, fraud, forgery, and tax evasion are now classified as aggravated felonies and can result in the denial of asylum and withholding of
removal for individuals who face severe persecution at home. 3 The following examples illustrate the harshness of these restrictions.
* An Amerasian refugee was convicted nine years ago of forging a
check in the amount of $19.53. She was sentenced to six years in prison
but served only six months. Despite the fact that this woman came to
the U.S. when she was only four years old and her entire family (including three children) are U.S. citizens, she is ineligible for asylum or
withholding because of her "aggravated" felony conviction.
* A teenager who threw a rock through a window of an abandoned
building and merely reached into the window, but took nothing, was
convicted of burglary and sentenced to five years. Although he served
only nine months of his sentence, an immigration judge found him ineligible for asylum or withholding.
* A man, who had been severely tortured by Bulgarian security
forces because of his political activities, entered the U.S. as a refugee in
1990. He was later convicted of a robbery involving $10 and possession
of drug paraphernalia. He was sentenced to just over five years, served
three years and four months, and later was found ineligible for asylum
or withholding.
While some avenues of relief are thus closing to refugees, another
may be opening for individuals, such as the Bulgarian national, who
fear torture if returned to their home country. Claims based on the
United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (the Torture Convention) 4 may
be a viable alternative for refugees ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal: Article 3 of the Torture Convention prohibits the U.S.
from expelling, returning, or extraditing "a person to another State
where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in
5
danger of being subjected to torture."
While there is currently no legislation or regulation implementing
the obligations of the U.S. to prevent the removal or extradition of indi-

the IIRIRA took effect. Id. §§ 308(e)(10), 308(e)(1)(F).
3. See Immigration & Nationality Act of 1990 § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(43)
(1994) [hereinafter INA] (defining "aggravated felony").
4. United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Feb. 4, 1985, G.A. Res. 39/46, 39
U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/708 (1984), reprinted in 23 I.L.M.
1027 (1984), modified in 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985) [hereinafter Torture Convention]. The Torture Convention is reproduced in Appendix I.
5. Torture Convention, supranote 4, art. 3.
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viduals who are likely to be tortured upon return to their countries of
origin, there is an informal administrative procedure exists to grant
temporary relief to them under the Torture Convention. If informal
administrative relief is not granted, however, advocates can pursue direct enforcement of the Torture Convention in immigration or federal
court by demonstrating that Article 3 of the Torture Convention is a
"self-executing" treaty provision enforceable in U.S. courts.
This is an important issue for two reasons. First, with the increasing restrictions on relief to legitimate refugees under U.S. immigration law, the Torture Convention, if found self-executing, would provide relief for many individuals otherwise facing the most abhorrent
persecution upon return to their country of origin. Whether Article 3 of
the Torture Convention is a self-executing treaty provision is an issue of
first impression that has neither been addressed by the Board of Immigration Appeals (the "BIA"), nor the federal courts.
Second, whether a treaty provision is self-executing causes extensive confusion in the courts, which have been struggling - largely unsuccessfully - to apply the self-execution concept since it was developed in the nineteenth century. 6 The question, of whether individuals
directly may enforce the Torture Convention in court, promises to provide an excellent opportunity for the courts to clarify the self-execution
doctrine.
Part I explores the relevant provisions of the Torture Convention,
discussing the standards for relief from removal and international case
law interpreting the Convention. The article then examines the present
implementation of Article 3 in the U.S. Part II discusses the informal
administrative procedure under which the Immigration & Naturalization Service (the "INS") is considering Torture Convention claims. This
part also explores legislation pending in Congress which, if enacted, will
mandate the promulgation of formal Torture Convention regulations,
but which has the potential for creating exceptions to relief that are inconsistent with the treaty. Part III examines the limited relief granted
to date by immigration trial courts to prevent the return of individuals
to torture, even where relief under the domestic immigration laws is
unavailable.
The article's final section examines whether Article 3 of the Torture
Convention is a self-executing treaty provision which may be applied by
U.S. courts to prevent the return of an individual to torture. The article
discusses four distinct approaches to the self-execution issue that have
developed in the federal courts, arguing that under each approach, Arti-

6. See Carlos M. Vizquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AMER.
J. INT'L L. 695, 695 (1995) [hereinafter The Four Doctrines) (noting that "more than one
lower federal court has pronounced the [self-executing doctrine] to be the 'most confounding' in the United States law of treaties").
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cle 3 of the Torture Convention is enforceable in domestic courts at the
behest of individuals. Moreover, the article advocates for the federal
courts to use the Torture Convention to resolve the confusion regarding
the self-execution doctrine and to return to the original understanding
of the doctrine initially articulated by the Supreme Court.
I.

THE TORTURE CONVENTION

The Torture Convention is a multilateral United Nations (U.N.)
treaty which has provisions designed to prevent torture, prosecute torturers, and to compensate victims of torture. 7 The U.S. signed the
treaty on April 18, 1988, and the Senate adopted its resolution of advice and consent to ratification on October 27, 1990.8 The U.S. did not
become a full party to the treaty until November 1994, one month after
President Clinton deposited the ratification with the United Nations
Secretary General. 9
Article 3 of the Torture Convention prohibits the return of any person to a country where there are substantial grounds for believing that
he or she would be in danger of being tortured:
(1) No State Party shall expel, return ("refouler') 1° or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing
that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.
(2) For the purpose of determining whether there are such grounds,
the competent authorities shall take into account all relevant considerations, including, where applicable, the existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of
human rights.
A. "SubstantialGrounds"for Believing a Person Would Be Tortured
Article 3 prohibits the return of a person "where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected
to torture." Under the Senate "understandings" to its resolution of advice and consent to ratification,11 the Senate stated that "substantial

7. Torture Convention, supra note 4.
8. 136 CONG. REC. S17, 486-501 (daily ed., Oct. 27, 1990).
9. U.N. Doc. 571 Leg/SER. E/13. IV.9 (1995); Torture Convention, supra note 4, art.
27(2) (mandating "the Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after the date
of the deposition of [a State's] instrument of ratification or accession.").
10. "Refouler" is a French term which means exclusion or expulsion from a country.
See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 180-82 (1993).
11. See infra notes 134-142 and accompanying text for a discussion of Senate "reservations," "declarations," and "understandings" to its resolutions of advice and consent to
ratification of treaties.
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grounds for believing" means that a person must demonstrate that it is
"more likely than not that he would be tortured,"'12 equivalent to the
standard for withholding of removal.
The anticipation of "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment" does not prevent a person's return. While Article 16 of the
Torture Convention provides that "[e]ach State Party shall undertake to
prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture as defined in article 1," the Article 3 protection against refoulement
applies only where an individual is likely to be tortured.
B.

The Definition of "Torture"
Article 1 of the Torture Convention defines torture as:
[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining
from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him
for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any
reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.
It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or
incidental to lawful sanctions.

Accordingly, three elements are needed to establish "torture."
First, it must be severe pain or suffering, either physical or mental.
The inclusion of mental pain and suffering in the definition of torture is
essential: many of the most barbaric and damaging tortures are psychological, such as mock executions or prolonged detention with sensory
deprivation. In the understandings to its resolution of advice and consent to ratification, the Senate clarified the meaning of these terms:
[Mlental pain or suffering refers to prolonged mental harm caused by
or resulting from: (1) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction
of severe physical pain or suffering; (2) the administration or application, or threatened administration or application, of mind altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses
or the personality; (3) the threat of imminent death; or (4) the threat
that another person will imminently be subjected to death, severe
physical pain or suffering, or the administration or application of mind
altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality. 13

12. 136 CONG. REC., supra note 8, at S17492.
13. 136 CONG. REC., supra note 8, at S17491.
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Second, to fall within the torture standard, the act must be inflicted
intentionally. "[A]n action that results unintentionally or unforeseeably
14
in severe pain or suffering does not qualify as torture."
Third, the torture must be sanctioned, in some way, by a public official. To qualify as torture, an act must be inflicted "[b]y or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or
other person acting in an official capacity." 15 In the Senate's resolution,
the Senate expressed its understanding that, in order for an act to be
taken with the "acquiescence" of a public official, the official must "prior
to the activity constituting torture, have awareness of such activity and
thereafter breach his legal responsibility to intervene to prevent such
activity."'16 While the Senate report clarified that "awareness" includes
"both actual knowledge and 'willful blindness,"' 17 it did not explain what
the Senate intended by a "legal responsibility to intervene to prevent
such activity."' 8 The Office of the INS General Counsel takes the position that "[iun order to acquiesce in an act of torture, a public official
must know about the specific act of torture before it occurs and must
breach a legal duty to prevent the act. Such duty may arise under either domestic or international law but in no case shall it be less than
what is required by international law."1 9 To the extent that the INS position excludes a public official's willful blindness or actual knowledge
of general torture practices by requiring a public official to have actual
knowledge about a specific act of torture, the INS position is inconsistent with the Senate understanding of the treaty obligations.
The requirement that a public official be somehow involved in the
torture is perhaps the most significant limitation on Torture Conven-

tion relief, particularly when private groups such as organized private
militias or "death squads" are engaged in torture as a political weapon.
Of course, if these private groups operate with the consent or acquies-

14. Internal Memorandum from the Office of the General Counsel, Compliance with
Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture in the Cases of Removable Aliens, at 4 (May
14, 1997) [hereinafter Compliance with Article 3] (internal memorandum released to nongovernmental organizations in March 1998) (on file with the author).
15. Torture Convention, supra note 4, art. 1. See also S. EXEC. REP. No. 101-30, at 6
(1990) (recommending ratification and limiting the scope of the Torture Convention, "The
Convention deals only with torture committed in the context of governmental authority;
acts of torture committed by private individuals are excluded ...[t]he Convention applies
only to torture that occurs in the context of governmental authority, excluding torture
that occurs as a wholly private act or, in terms more familiar in U.S. law, it applies to torture inflicted 'under color of law."'). id. at 14.
16. 136 CONG. REC., supra note 8, at S17491-92.
17. See S. EXEC. REP. No. 101-30 at 9 (explaining 'The purpose of this condition is to
make it clear that both actual knowledge and 'willful blindness' fall within the -definition
of the term 'acquiescence' in article 3.").
18. The Torture Convention's requirement that State Parties criminalize torture and
train government officials to recognize torture may provide such a legal duty to intervene.
19. Office of the General Counsel, Compliance with Article 3, supra note 14, at 4.
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cence of the government, torture by these private groups clearly falls
within the Torture Convention. Moreover, if the government is aware
that private groups practice torture, but the government is unable or
unwilling to control that activity, the government has breached its legal
responsibility to protect its nationals from torture, and could be treated
as acquiescing to that torture under the Senate's understanding. Alternatively, if there has been a breakdown of governmental authority,
the private groups practicing torture may have been acting "in an official capacity" in the region in which the victim was tortured.
Finally, the Convention provides that torture "does not include pain
or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions." 20 In its understandings, the Senate provided:
[T]he United States understands that "sanctions" includes judicially imposed sanctions and other enforcement actions
authorized by United States law or by judicial interpretation
of such law. Nonetheless, the United States understands that
a State Party could not through its domestic sanctions defeat
the object and purpose of the Convention to prohibit torture. 21
Under this understanding, the death penalty in the U.S. does not
constitute torture under the Convention. It also makes more difficult
the argument that the death penalty in another country constitutes torture, unless the method in which the execution is conducted is particularly barbarous and causes extreme pain and suffering, or unless the
imposition of death is not proportional to the crime committed.2 2 The
sanction must be lawful, however. Any sanction imposed for impermissible reasons, such as retaliation for political activity that does not legitimately constitute treason, would not be lawful and thus not fall
within this exception.

20. Torture Convention, supra note 4, art. 1.
21. 136 CONG. REC., supra note 8, at S17491. See also S. EXEC. REP. NO. 101-30 at 6
(emphasizing "It is imperative that other States Parties be prevented from using the 'lawful sanctions' exemption to justify actions which are clearly torture by declaring them
lawful under domestic law").
22. In its internal memorandum, the INS General Counsel took the position that
Lawful sanctions include not only penalties imposed to punish a violation of
law, but also legitimate acts of law enforcement. Thus, imposition of the
death penalty by a country where an alien has committed a crime proportionate to such a punishment and where there are adequate procedural safeguards would not in and of itself constitute torture. Moreover, failure to
comply with relevant procedural safeguards does not make an act torture.

However, a state cannot legitimize torture merely by providing for it in its
domestic law. Whether a sanction provided for in domestic law or an act of
domestic law enforcement is legitimate will ultimately depend on whether it
conforms with international legal standards."
Office of the General Counsel, Compliance with Article 3, supra note 14, at 4.
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C. No Exceptions to Relief for Persons Convicted of Crimes or Others
Statutorily Ineligible for Asylum and Withholding of Removal
Article 3 of the Torture Convention is a powerful tool for immigration advocates, because there are no exceptions to granting relief under
the Convention if a person can show that it is more likely than not that
he or she would be subjected to torture. The U.S. may not return such a
person, even if the person has been convicted of an aggravated felony or
other "particularly serious crime" in the U.S. This aspect of the Torture
Convention is of utmost importance because there are numerous exceptions to granting asylum and withholding for persons convicted of
23
crimes.
At least three immigration courts have found that Article 3 protection cannot be denied to individuals who have committed crimes or who
have engaged in conduct that renders them ineligible for asylum or
withholding. 24 As immigration judge (IJ) John W. Richardson concluded:
Under the terms of the Torture Convention, a person cannot be returned to a country in which he will be tortured even if he himself is a

former torturer. In addition, a person cannot be denied the protection
of non-refoulement and returned to face torture because he committed
'25
either an "aggravated felony" or a "particularly serious crime.
The INS General Counsel has also recognized that "[t]here are no
exclusion grounds in Article 3 or elsewhere in the Torture Convention.
Therefore, an alien who satisfies the standard of proof outlined above
may not be excluded from the scope of Article 3 for criminal, national
26
security or other reasons."
Moreover, the Committee Against Torture, 27 the U.N. organization
23. See INA, supra note 3, § 208(b)(2) (prohibiting a grant of asylum where person
participated in the persecution of others, has been convicted of a particularly serious
crime, has committed a serious nonpolitical crime outside the U.S., is a danger to the security of the U.S., is inadmissible or removable for terrorist activities, or was firmly resettled in another country before arriving in the U.S.); INA, supra note 3, § 243(b)((3)(B)
(withholding or removal may not be granted where person participated in the persecution
of others, has been convicted of a particularly serious crime, has committed a serious nonpolitical crime outside the U.S., or is a danger to the security of the U.S.).
24. Neither the'BIA nor the federal courts have addressed this issue.
25. Matter of Abu, A29 499 143, at 13 (IJ Feb. 19, 1997) (Phoenix) (pending on crossappeal to the BIA); see also Matter of Diakite, A74212 940 at 11 (IJ Dec. 11, 1997) (noting
"the Torture Convention does not bar any person from protection compared to the statutory bars to asylum and withholding of deportation precluding aggravated felons, former
persecutors, and others from relief"); Matter of N-L- [file number redacted] (IJ Nov. 17,
1997) (refusing to enter order of deportation under Article 3, where respondent denied
asylum and withholding of removal because he participated in the persecution of others).
26. See Office of the General Counsel, Compliance with Article 3, supranote 14, at 5.
27. Torture Convention, supra note 4, arts. 17-24. In addition to its monitoring re-

1998

A SELF-EXECUTING TREATY

that monitors compliance with Torture Convention, has found in every
case where there were substantial grounds for believing that a person
would be subjected to torture upon return to a country, that Article 3
absolutely prohibits that person's removal. 28 This included one case in
which the claimant had been convicted of a crime that would likely be
considered a "particularly serious crime" in the U.S.29
The European Court of Human Rights has held that a similar
treaty provision is an absolute bar to the return of an individual to torture, regardless of the State's compelling interest in deporting the person. That court held that Article 3 of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which states
that no "one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment," prohibited Great Britain from deporting a
Sikh to India where he faced torture. 30 The fact that this man was a security risk to Great Britain because of his terrorist activities did not
justify his deportation. The Court opined:
Article 3 enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic
society.... The Court is well aware of the immense difficulties faced
by States in modern times in protecting their communities from terrorist violence. However, even in these circumstances, the Convention
prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment, irrespective of the victim's conduct. . . . Article 3 makes
sponsibilities, the Committee Against Torture hears complaints by individuals against
States allegedly failing to comply with the Convention. Although the Committee may not
hear complaints by individuals against the U.S. because the U.S. has not recognized the
jurisdiction of the Committee, the case law of the Committee remains a useful tool in interpreting the Convention. Id.
28. See Committee Against Torture, Communication No. 43/1996, U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/17/D/41/1996 (1996) (prohibiting Sweden from returning Kaveh Yaragh Tala to
Iran, where he had been tortured as a member of the Mojahedin organization); Committee
Against Torture, Communication No. 41/1996, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/16[D/41/1996 (1996)
(obliging Sweden to refrain, under Article 3, from returning petitioner Pauline Muzonzo
Paku Kisoki to Zaire, where as a member of a political opposition party she was detained
without trial for one year, raped and severely beaten); Committee Against Torture, Communication No. 21/1995, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/161D/21/1995 (1996) (determining that Switzerland would violate Article 3 of the Convention if it returned petitioner Ismail Alan to
Turkey, where he had been arrested and tortured due to his affiliation with a Kurdish
Marxist-Leninist organization); Committee Against Torture, Communication No. 15/1994,
U.N. Doc. CAT/C/131D/15/1994 (1994) (prohibiting Canada from returning petitioner Tahir Hussain Khan to Pakistan, where Khan had been arrested and tortured on two occasions for being a member of a political opposition organization); Committee Against Torture, Communication No. 13/1993, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/12/D/13/1993 (1994) (prohibitin
Switzerland from returning petitioner Balabou Motombo to Zaire, who was a member of a
political opposition group and arrested, tortured, and found guilty of conspiracy against
the State for his political activities).
29. See Communication No. 15/1994, supra note 28, at 5 (deciding that Canada's return of claimant to Pakistan would violate Article 3 of the Convention, even though Khan
had been convicted in Canada of assault causing bodily injury).
30. See Chahal v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. of H. R, 22441/93, at 22-33 (1996).
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no provision for exceptions and no derogation from it is permissible...
even in the event of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation.
[Wlhenever substantial grounds have been shown for believing that an
individual would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 if removed to another State, the responsibility of the
Contracting State to safeguard him or her against such treatment is
engaged in the event of expulsion .... In these circumstances, the activities of the individual in question, however undesirable or dangerous, cannot be a material consideration. The protection afforded by Article 3 is thus wider than that provided by Articles 32 and 33 of the
31
United Nations 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees.
Article 3 of the Torture Convention, because of its similarity to the
European provision, should be construed in the same manner.
D.

No "On Account Of"Requirement

In establishing eligibility for relief under the asylum and withholding of removal provisions of the INA, an applicant must establish
that he or she has been persecuted or fears persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion.32 Relief under the Torture Convention is broader,
however, because a person need not show that he or she fears torture
because of these factors. 33 The Torture Convention may thus be an extremely useful tool where a person has a non-traditional claim that does
not easily fit within the INA definition of "refugee".
While the Torture Convention does state that the torture be inflicted "for such purposes" as obtaining information or confessions,
punishment, intimidation, coercion, or discrimination, this list is not
exclusive. 34 Moreover, "intimidation" and "coercion" are such broad

31. Id. at 22-23.
32. See INA, supra note 3, § 208(b) (permitting a grant of asylum to a "refugee"); INA,
supra note 3, § 101(a)(42)(A) (defining refugee as "any person who is outside any country
of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside of
any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling
to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that
country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion."); INA,
supra note 3, § 241(b)(3)(A) (prohibiting removal if that person's "life or freedom would be
threatened in that country because of the alien's race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion").
33. See S. EXEC. REP. No. 101-30 at 16 (explaining that "Article 3 would extend the
prohibition on deportation under existing U.S. law to cases of torture not involving persecution on one of the listed impermissible grounds [in section 241(b)(3)].").
34. Id. at 14 (explaining that 'The requirement of intent is emphasized in Article 1 by
reference to illustrate motives for torture: obtaining information of a confession, intimida-
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concepts that almost any reason for intentional torture would fall
within these definitions.
E. Relief Applies to Prevent Future Torture Only
Torture Convention relief is more narrow than in asylum or withholding, however, in that an individual must fear future torture: no
country may return a person to another country "where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture."35 If a person has been tortured in the past and is being returned to the same country, however, that past torture is
certainly strong evidence that the individual will be tortured again if
the human rights conditions in the country have not changed appreciably. 36
II.

ADMINISTRATIVE AND LEGISLATIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 3
IN THE UNITED STATES

While proposed legislation to implement Article 3 of the Convention
is currently before Congress, there is to date no legislation or regulation
implementing the obligations of the U.S. to prevent the removal or extradition of individuals who are likely to be tortured upon return to
their countries of origin. The INS has recognized its non-refoulement
obligation under the Torture Convention, however, 37 and the General
tion and coercion, or any reason based on discrimination of any kind. The purposes given
are not exhaustive, as is indicated by the phrasing 'for such purposes as.' Rather, they
indicate the type of motivation that typically underlies torture, and emphasize the requirement for deliberate intention or malice.").
35. Torture Convention, supra note 4, art. 3 (emphasis added).
36. See, e.g., Committee Against Torture, Communication No. 41/1996, supra note 28
(advising that claimant's "history of detention and torture, should be taken into account
when determining whether she would be in danger of being subjected to torture upon her
return").
37. See Office of the General Counsel, Compliance with Article 3, supra note 14 (instructing its regional and district counsel regarding compliance with the Torture Convention.) (Its instructions are generally consistent with the discussion in Part I, except where
noted, supra.); see also 62 Fed. Reg. 10312 (Mar. 6 1997) (supplemental information) (explaining the Attorney's General position:
Although Article 3 of the Torture Convention is not self-executing, the Attorney General has sufficient administrative authority to ensure that the
United States observes the limitations on removal required by this provision.
In fact, the Service has received and considered individual requests for relief
under the Torture Convention since November 1994 and has arranged for
relief where appropriate. For the present, the Department intends to continue to carry out the non-refoulement provision of the Torture Convention
through its existing administrative authority rather than by promulgating
regulations. The Service is, however, developing thorough guidelines to address Article 3 issues and intends to issue those guidelines soon. These
guidelines generally, and the expedited removal process in particular, will be
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Counsel's Office of the INS therefore has developed an informal proce38
If
dure under which Torture Convention claims will be considered.
the General Counsel's Office finds that a person may be eligible for relief it will agree to a stay of removal, although no final relief to Torture
Convention claimants will be provided until formal regulations are
promulgated. The General Counsel's Office is presently finalizing such
regulations, drafts of which have not yet been released.
Article 3 implementing legislation has been proposed, but the prospects for passage are uncertain. In February 1998, three separate bills
were introduced in Congress to implement Article 3. At the time of this
writing, all bills have been referred to committee but no hearings have
been held.
Representative C. Smith and Senator Wellstone, along with numerous co-sponsors, introduced the Torture Victims Relief Act. 39 These
identical bills establish a comprehensive program for the treatment and
support of torture victims, call for the expedited processing of refugee,
asylum, and withholding of removal applications for torture victims,
create a presumption in favor of parole in lieu of detention for torture
40
victims, and exempt claimed torture victims from expedited removal.

implemented in accordance with Article 3.
38. The following information was obtained by the author in conversations with the
General Counsel's Office. In order to raise a claim under this interim administrative procedure, advocates should write to the INS district counsel with jurisdiction over the client,
and send a copy to the General Counsel of the INS in Washington, D.C. It is advisable to
include a detailed statement by the client regarding why he or she will be tortured upon
return, and include any corroborating evidence demonstrating that the client has been
tortured or will be tortured, including documentation from human rights organizations.
Because the General Counsel's Office usually will not entertain Torture Convention
claims unless a person has exhausted all other avenues for relief and has a final order of
deportation, include an explanation of the procedural status of the case.
In addition, asylum officers conducting "credible fear" interviews as part of the expedited
removal process are apparently inquiring whether an individual may be entitled to relief
under the Torture Convention.
To receive a useful packet of information regarding the Torture Convention (including
immigration court and Committee Against Torture decisions and a sample brief raising
the Torture Convention before the BIA), contact the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) at 1775 K Street, N.W., Suite 300, Washington, D.C. 20006. See
also Elisa C. Massimino, Relief from Deportation under Article 3 of the United Nations
Convention Against Torture, published in 1997-98 IMMIGRATION & NATIONALITY LAW
HANDBOOK (AILA 1997).
39. Torture Victims Relief Act, H..R. 3161, 105th Cong. (1998); Torture Victims Relief
Act, S. 1606, 105th Cong. (1998).
40. In relevant part, the Torture Victims Relief Act provides:
SEC. 4. PROHIBITION ON INVOLUNTARY RETURN OF PERSONS
FEARING SUBJECTION TO TORTURE.
(a) PROHIBITION - Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the
United States shall not expel, remove, extradite, or otherwise return
involuntarily an individual to a country if there is substantial evidence that a reasonable person in the circumstances of that individual
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Most significantly, the proposed legislation prohibits the removal of an
4
individual to a country where he or she fears torture. ' Because the
legislation does not require the promulgation of regulations to prevent
such removal, however, it is unclear whether individuals challenging
removal to torture would be required to make such a claim in the context of a refugee, asylum or withholding of removal application, in
which case they may be faced with the statutory exceptions to such applications. However, the INS will likely promulgate separate Torture
Convention regulations.

would fear subjection to torture in that country.
(b) DEFINITION - For purposes of this section, the term "to return
involuntarily," in the case of an individual, means(1) to return the individual without the individual's consent,
whether or not the return is induced by physical force and
whether or not the person is physically present in the United
States; or
(2) to take an action by which it is reasonably foreseeable that
the individual will be returned, whether or not the return is induced by physical force and whether or not the person is physically present in the United States.
SEC. 5. IMMIGRATION PROCEDURES FOR TORTURE VICTIMS.
(a) COVERED ALIENS - An alien described in this section is any
alien who presents a claim of having been subjected to torture, or
whom there is reason to believe has been subjected to torture.
(b) CONSIDERATION OF THE EFFECTS OF TORTURE - In considering an application by an alien described in subsection (a) for
refugee status ... , asylum . . . , or withholding of removal . . . , the
appropriate officials shall take into account(1) the manner in which the effects of torture might affect the
applicant's responses in the application and in the interview
process or other immigration proceedings, as the case may be;
(2) the difficulties torture victims often have in recounting their
suffering under torture; and
(3) the fear victims have of returning to their country of nationality where, even if torture is no longer practiced or the incidence of torture is reduced, their torturers may have gone unpunished and may remain in positions of authority.
(c) EXPEDITED PROCESSING OF REFUGEE ADMISSIONS [R]efugees who have been subjected to torture shall be considered to
be refugees of special humanitarian concern to the United States and
shall be accorded priority for resettlement at least as high as that accorded any other group of refugees.
(d)
PROCESSING FOR ASYLUM AND WITHHOLDING OF
REMOVAL -[setting forth special expedited procedures for victims of
torture]
(e) PAROLE IN LIEU OF DETENTION - The finding that an alien
is a person described in subsection (a) shall be a strong presumptive
basis for a grant of parole... in lieu of detention.
(f) EXEMPTION FROM EXPEDITED REMOVAL - [exempting aliens described in subsection (a) from expedited removal.]

41. See id. § 4(a).
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The third bill introduced by Senator Grams, the Survivors of Torture Support Act, is substantially similar to legislation proposed last
session. 42 This bill states that it "shall be the policy" of the U.S. not to
return persons to torture, and requires the promulgation of regulations
within 120 days of enactment to implement Article 3.43 The Survivors
42. Survivors of Torture Support Act, S. 1603, 105th Cong. (1998). Cf. The Foreign
Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1997, S. 903, 105th Cong. (1997) (originally designating Article 3 implementation as § 1606); Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal
Years 1998 & 1999, H.R. 1757, 105th Cong. (1997)(renumbering Article 3 implementation
designated as § 1702 as § 1272). Section 1272 was withdrawn from the legislation by the
Senate-House Conference Committee, and inserted into the District of Columbia appropriations bill. See An Act Making Appropriations for the Government of the District of
Columbia and Other Activities, H.R. 2607, 105th Cong. § 2242 (1997) (The relevant language was later folded into the Commerce-State-Justice appropriations bill, but was deleted with other foreign affairs provisions before passage); Departments of Commerce,
Justice and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1998, H.R.
2267, 105th Cong. (1997), Pub. L. No. 105-119.
43. The relevant portions of the Survivors of Torture Support Act provide:
SEC. 4 UNITED STATES POLICY WITH RESPECT TO THE
INVOLUNTARY RETURN OF PERSONS IN DANGER OF SUBJECTION
TO TORTURE.
(a) POLICY - It shall be the policy of the United States not to expel,
extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary return of any person to a
country in which there are substantial grounds for believing that the
person would be in danger of subjection to torture, regardless of
whether the person is physically present in the United States.
(b) REGULATIONS - Not later than 120 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the heads of the appropriate agencies shall prescribe regulations to implement the obligations of the United States
under Article 3 of the United Nations Convention Against Torture and
Other Forms [sic] of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, subject to any reservations, understandings, declarations,
and provisos contained in the United States Senate resolution of ratification of the Convention.
(c) EXCLUSION OF CERTAIN ALIENS - To the maximum extent
consistent with the obligations of the United States under the Convention, subject to any reservations, understandings, declarations, and
provisos contained in the United States Senate resolution of ratification of the Convention, the regulations described in subsection (b)
shall exclude from the protection of such regulations aliens described
in section 241(b)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8
U.S.C. 1231(b)(3)(B)).
(d) REVIEW AND CONSTRUCTION - Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, and except as provided in the regulations described
in subsection (b), no court shall have jurisdiction to review the procedures adopted to implement this section, and nothing in this section
shall be construed as providing any court jurisdiction to review claims
raised under the Convention or this section, or any other determination made with respect to the application of the policy set forth in subsection (a), except as part of the review of a final order of removal pursuant to section 242 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.
1252).
(e) AUTHORITY TO DETAIN - Nothing in this section shall be con-
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of Torture Support Act also tracks the Torture Victims Relief Act in establishing a program for the treatment and support of torture victims,
calling for the expedited processing of refugee, asylum, and withholding
of removal applications for torture victims, creating a presumption in
favor of parole in lieu of detention for torture victims, and exempting
claimed torture victims from expedited removal.
strued as limiting the authority of the Attorney General to detain any
person under any provision of law, including, but not limited to, any
provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
() DEFINITIONS (1) CONVENTION DEFINED - In this section , the term
"Convention" means the United Nations Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, done at New York on December 10, 1984.
(2) SAME TERMS AS IN THE CONVENTION - Except as
otherwise provided, the terms used in this section have the
meanings given such terms under the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, subject to any reservations, understandings, declarations, and provisos contained in the United
States Senate resolution of advice and consent to ratification of
the Convention.
SEC. 5. IMMIGRATION PROCEDURES FOR TORTURE VICTIMS
(a) COVERED ALIENS - An alien described in this section is any
alien who presents a claim of having been subjected to torture, or
whom there is reason to believe has been subjected to torture.
(b) CONSIDERATION OF THE EFFECTS OF TORTURE - In considering an application by an alien described in subsection (a) for
refugee status . . . , asylum. . . , or withholding of removal . . . , the
appropriate officials shall take into account(1) the manner in which the effects of torture might affect the
applicant's responses in the application and in the interview
process or other immigration proceedings, as the case may be;
(2) the difficulties torture victims often have in recounting their
suffering under torture; and
(3) the fear victims have of returning to their country of nationality where, even if torture is no longer practiced or the incidence of torture is reduced, their torturers may have gone unpunished and may remain in positions of authority.
(c) EXPEDITED PROCESSING OF REFUGEE ADMISSIONS [R]efugees who have been subjected to torture shall be considered to
be refugees of special humanitarian concern to the United States and
shall be accorded priority for resettlement at least as high as that accorded any other group of refugees.
(d)
PROCESSING FOR ASYLUM AND WITHHOLDING OF
REMOVAL - [setting forth special expedited procedures for victims of
torture]
(e) PAROLE IN LIEU OF DETENTION - The finding that an alien
is a person described in subsection (a) shall be a strong presumptive
basis for a grant of parole ... in lieu of detention.
(f) EXEMPTION FROM EXPEDITED REMOVAL - [exempting aliens described in subsection (a) from expedited removal.]
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Unfortunately, the Survivors of Torture Support Act also calls for
the required regulations to exclude individuals ineligible for withholding of removal, "to the maximum extent consistent with the Torture
Convention. 44 As discussed above, however, no exceptions are allowed
to the prohibition against return under the Torture Convention, 45 so
regulations attempting to exclude persons otherwise eligible for relief
would not be "consistent with the Torture Convention."
If the resulting regulations do, in fact, contain such exceptions, it
would still be possible to raise a claim in immigration or federal court
directly under Article 3, as discussed, infra, in Parts III and IV. While
legislation that is passed after the ratification of a treaty may "trump" a
treaty's provisions under the "last in time doctrine," 46 the proposed legislation explicitly states that it is intended to be consistent with the
treaty. 47 Accordingly, any regulations inconsistent with the treaty
would exceed the scope of the implementing statute. 48 Alternatively, if
the proposed legislation does not pass and the INS promulgates regulations that are inconsistent with the treaty, the treaty supersedes the
49
regulations under the Supremacy Clause.
III.

IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE

3

IN THE IMMIGRATION TRIAL COURTS

At least four immigration judges to date have prohibited the removal of individuals who meet the criteria for Article 3 relief.50 While
none concluded that Article 3 is a self-executing treaty provision, these
judges held that either the customary international law of nonrefoulement to torture, or their obligations as officers of the Executive

44. See Survivors of Torture Support Act, § 4(c).
45. See text accompanying notes 23-31.
46. See The Head Money Cases (Edye v. Robertson), 112 U.S. 580, 596 (1884) (determining that a congressional act "must prevail in all the judicial courts in this country" if it
is in conflict with a treaty).
47. See Survivors of Torture Support Act, § 4(c) (mandating "To the maximum extent
consistent with the obligations of the United States under the Convention, subject to any
reservations, understandings, declarations, and provisos contained in the United States
Senate resolution of ratification of the Convention, the regulations" shall exclude those
aliens ineligible for withholding of removal).
48. See Loma Linda Univ. v. Schweiker, 705 F.2d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir. 1983) (stating
that "regulations must be consistent with and in furtherance of the purposes and policies
embodied in the congressional statutes that authorize them"); United States v. Doe, 701
F.2d 819, 823 (9th Cir. 1983) (noting that where INS regulation conflicts with a statute,
the statute controls).
49. See, e.g., Alaska Fish & Wildlife Federation & Outdoor Council, Inc., v. Dunkle
829 F.2d 933, 940-41 (9th Cir. 1987) (concluding that regulations must be consistent with
treaties governing migratory bird hunting).
50. The BIA has not addressed the application of Torture Convention relief in immigration courts, although it did agree to stay at least one appeal pending development of
the new administrative procedure to process Torture Convention claims. See Matter of RN-G-, [file number redacted] (BIA April 1, 1996).
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Branch to follow the treaty obligations of the U.S., prohibited the return
of the individuals to their countries of origin. This section briefly explains customary international law,5 1 and discusses these administrative judge decisions.
A body of human rights law, called "customary international law,"
has grown out of the principles contained in numerous international
52
This law rehuman rights treaties and the United Nations Charter.
by States
followed
are
that
character
universal
of
a
norms
basic
flects
53
Cusregardless of whether those obligations are reflected in treaties.
of
conflicting
absence
in
the
law
U.S.
of
is
part
law
international
tomary
domestic law, 54 and accordingly, the government must act consistently
55
with it.
The prohibition against removing a person who faces torture upon
return constitutes customary international law with which the U.S.
must comply. Torture has long been condemned by international law,
as evidenced by the number of multilateral treaties and declarations
prohibiting torture.56 Indeed, the prohibition against torture is one of
51. For a more complete discussion of customary international law and its utilization
in court on behalf of individuals see Hoffman & Strossen, Enforcing InternationalHuman
Rights in the United States, in L. HENKIN & J.L. HARGROVE, HUMAN RIGHTS: AN AGENDA
FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 477 (1994); Ann Bayefsky & Joan Fitzpatrick, InternationalHuman Rights Law in United States Courts:A Comparative Perspective, 4 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1
(1992); Michael L. Bazyler, Litigating the International Law of Human Rights: A "How
To" Approach, 7 Whittier L. Rev. 713 (1985); Gordon A. Christenson, Using Human
Rights Law to Inform Due Process and Equal Protection Analyses, 52 U. CINC. L. REV. 3
(1983).

52. For a straightforward discussion of customary international law, see THOMAS
BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS (West 1995).
53. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW], § 102(2) (1986) (defining customary

international law is the "general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a
sense of legal obligation').
54. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (declaring "International law
is part of our law.., where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative
act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations ...").
55. See RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 53, § 111, cmt. c (explaining 'That international law and. agreements of the United States are law of the
United States means also that the President has the obligation and the necessary
authority to take care that they be faithfully executed.").
56. See American Convention on Human Rights, 1977, art. 5(2), O.A.S. Treaty Ser.
No. 36, Off Rec. OEAJSer. I/V/II. 23 doc 21 rev. 6; International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, ar. 4, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52,
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967); Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, 25
I.L.M. 519 (1986); 1987 European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Eur.T.S. No. 126, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 1152
(1988); Declaration of the Protection of all Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and
Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 34/52, U.N.
GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, at 91, U.N. Doc. A/10408 (1976); see also Torture Convention, supra note 4.
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the handful of norms of international law that have attained the status
of jus cogens ("compelling law"), and from which no57derogation is permitted by any country, regardless of its domestic law.
In addition, the principle of non-refoulement of refugees is a wellaccepted and fundamental tenet of customary international law. 58 In
fact, there is an emerging consensus that this principle has achieved
the status of jus cogens, as well, so that international law creates a
binding obligation with which every country must comply, regardless of
its domestic law. 59 This is particularly true when a country seeks to re57. See Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 714, 717 (9th Cir.
1992) (explaining "[A] jus cogens norm, also known as a peremptory norm of international
law, is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of states as a
whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by
a subsequent norm of general international having the same character."; concluding in
light of "extraordinary consensus" that "the right to be free from official torture is fundamental and universal, a right deserving of the highest status under international law, a
norm of jus cogens") (internal quotations omitted); Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in
Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (listing the prohibition of torture
among the few norms which meet the criteria for jus cogens); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, T., concurring) (noting that
"[C]ommentators have begun to identify a handful of heinous actions - each of which
violates definable, universal and obligatory norms" including bans on governmental torture); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980) (concluding after "Having
examined the sources from which customary international law is derived - the usage of
nations, judicial opinions and the works of jurists - we conclude that official torture is
now prohibited by the law of nations.") (footnote omitted); see also RESTATEMENT OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 53, § 702(d) & cmt. n (identifying the practice of torture as a violation ofjus cogens).
58. See, e.g., Conclusion No. 15 (XXX) of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme on "Refugees Without a Country of Asylum," 34 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. No. 12A, at 17, 18 U.N. Doc. A/34112/Add.1 (1979) (urging observance of "the recognized principle of non-refoulement"); see also GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 97-100 (1983); THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
HUMANITARIAN Norms AS CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 95-98 (1989); Scott M. Martin, Non-Refoulement of Refugees: United States Compliance with International Obligations, 23 HARV. INT'L L. J. 357 (1983).
59. See Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 40 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. No. 12 at 6, U.N. Doc. A/40/12 (1985) (noting that "Due to its repeated reaffirmation at the universal, regional and national levels, the principle of non-refoulement
has now come to be characterized as a peremptory norm of international law"); Cartagena
Declaration on Refugees, 1984-85 Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, at 177-82, Conclusion 5 (characterizing non-refoulement as "a cornerstone of the
international protection of refugees. This operative principle concerning refugees should
be recognized in the present state of international law, as a principle of jus cogens."); see
also Karen Parker & Lyn Beth Neylon, Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of Human
Rights, 12 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 411, 435-36 (1989) (discussing that 'The principle of non-refoulement, usually referred to only in its refugee law application, is also
part of human rights law and humanitarian law, and is acknowledged as a jus cogens
norm.... [I]n all its applications, the right of non-refoulement, like all jus cogens norms,
exists outside of treaties, and is non-derogable, binding and judicially enforceable.') (internal citations omitted); see also Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Non-Refoulement and the New
Asylum Seekers, in THE NEW ASYLUM SEEKERS: REFUGEE LAW IN THE 1980's 104-106 (D.
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turn a person to a nation with a record of egregious human rights violations. 60 Federal courts have increasingly allowed litigants to make
61
claims based on customary international law.
Based on customary international law, IJ John Richardson in
Phoenix refused to enter an order of deportation in Matter of Abu 62 for a
Nigerian man who faced arrest and murder in Nigeria if returned.
Judge Richardson held that he did not have authority under the INA to
order relief from deportation under Matter of Medina,63 which had held
that an immigration judge could not grant voluntary departure under
customary international law where the INA did not provide for such relief. Judge Richardson, however, reasoned that there is "an important
distinction between the grant of relief, which is limited specifically to
the [INA], and the decision of the Immigration Judge to not enter an illegal order of deportation." 64 Moreover, because the immigration judges
are empowered under the regulations to "take any other action consistent with applicable law and may not enter an order of deportation
which directly contravenes the obligations of the U.S. under international law," 65 and because "international law remains binding on this
Court, as on every Court in the U.S., and prohibits the U.S. from returning a person to a country where they will be tortured," an order deporting the claimant would have been illegal. 66 The Immigration Judge
thus held Mr. Abu's case in abeyance pending a change in circumstances in Nigeria that would allow Mr. Abu to return safely, or until
Torture Convention legislation is enacted "and relief can be granted to
the respondent under such legislation." 67 Judge Richardson later terminated the removal proceedings. 68
IJ James R. Fujimoto did not utilize customary international law,
Martin ed., 1988) (discussing the principle of non-refoulement in customary international
law unambiguously encompasses a prohibition against the deportation of persons with a
well-founded, particularized fear that their lives or freedom would be threatened if they
returned to their homeland).
60. See Karen Parker, The Rights of Refugees under International Humanitarian
Law, in REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY: INTERNATIONAL AND U.S. RESPONSES 3 (Ved P.

Nanda ed., 1989) (explaining that "When torture is alleged under human rights law, the
right of non-refoulement arises when the country of origin tortures or is a gross violator of
human rights.").
61. See, e.g., Filartiga, 630 F.2d 876.
62. Matter o,f Abu, A29 499 143 (IJFeb. 19, 1997) (Phoenix) (on cross-appeal to the
BIA).
63. Matter of Medina, 19 1. & N. Dec. 734, 746 (BIA 1988).
64. Matter of Abu, A29 499 143, at 15.

65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 19.
68. See also Matter of A-H, [file number redacted] (IJJuly 14, 1997) (Arlington) (IJ
Milo Bryant) (staying deportation of an alien accused of involvement in terrorist activities
until person's claim could be considered by the INS under future Torture Cconvention
regulations).
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but similarly refused to enter an order of deportation where a Liberian
man would be tortured upon return. In Matter of Diakite,69 the court
held that while the respondent was ineligible for asylum and withholding of deportation due to aggravated felony convictions, the Torture
Convention prevented his deportation to Liberia:
Immigration Judges are not free to violate international law which
most obviously includes treaties to which the United States is a signatory in the absence of contrary domestic legislation. It is well recognized that treaties entered into by the United States have authority
70
tantamount to that of statutes enacted by Congress.
Judge Fujimoto did not discuss whether Article 3 is self-executing.
Using similar reasoning, IJ Jack Staton held that as an officer of
the Executive Branch he was bound to follow international law, including Article 3 of the Torture Convention, whether or not it was selfexecuting:
An immigration judge cannot act in violation of a treaty obligation....
An immigration judge is without authority to order an alien removed
where the government, through its attorney of the INS, concedes the
alien will more likely than not be tortured upon return to his native
land. The Convention Against Torture is binding on the officers of the
government, who must see that the honor of the nation is not sullied by
failing to follow our treaty obligation. I therefore have no jurisdiction
to enter an order of removal.

71

In short, these immigration judges held that as officers of the Executive Branch they have the duty to follow the treaty obligations of the
U.S., even if those obligations have not been incorporated into domestic
law. This is a defensible position: while present domestic immigration
laws make asylum and withholding of removal unavailable for certain
individuals, no present domestic law explicitly conflicts with Article 3 of
the Torture Convention by requiring their removal. The IIRIRA thus
does not prevent the enforcement of Article 3 under the last-in-time
72
doctrine.
Litigating an Article 3 claim in the immigration or federal courts in
the absence of implementing legislation or regulations raises difficult

69. Matter of Diakite, A74 212 940 at 10-12 (IJ Dec. 11, 1997) (Chicago).
70. Id. at 10. Moreover, the court distinguished Matter of Medina as holding , inter
alia, that an immigration judge did not have the authority to create a new form of relief:
in this instance, the court did not create a new form of relief, "rather [it] only [sought] to
comply with the mandate of international law." Id. at 11-12.
71. Matter of N-L, [file number redacted] at 9-10 (IJ Nov. 12 1997) (Imperial, Cal) (IJ
Jack W. Staton).
72. See Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 596 (noting that a congressional act passed
after a treaty prevails if it is in conflict with a treaty).
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and complex problems, because courts in the U.S. have traditionally
been hesitant to apply international law if that law has not already
been "incorporated" into U.S. domestic law by legislation or regulation.
While at least a few immigration judges have overcome this hesitancy
and applied the customary international prohibiting return to torture,
or have directly applied the Torture Convention without discussing
whether Article 3 is self-executing, many courts may not. The alternative is enforcing Article 3 of the Torture Convention in U.S. courts as a
self-executing treaty provision, as discussed extensively in the next section.
IV. ARTICLE 3 OF THE TORTURE CONVENTION: A SELF-EXECUTING
TREATY PROVISION

The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution declares that treaties
73
The federal courts, howare of equal stature to other federal laws.

ever, have long held that an individual may not enforce a treaty in U.S.
courts unless the treaty provision being applied is "self-executing," so
74
that legislation is not required to implement the treaty rights.
Whether a treaty provision is self-executing is an exceedingly confusing
area in federal law which has spurred inconsistent cases and a great
75
deal of academic commentary.
Professor Carlos Vtzquez has explained that the concept of selfexecution does not have a static definition and means different things to
different courts. 76 In fact, Professor Vfzquez has identified four distinct
ways in which federal courts have looked at whether a treaty provision
is self-executing, the application of which could lead to different conclusions about whether Article 3 of the Torture Convention is selfexecuting. First, some courts - including the Supreme Court in the

73. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (declaring that "All Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
74. See, e.g., Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 373 (7th
Cir. 1985) (concluding that 'Treaties made by the United States are the law of the
land .. , but if not implemented by appropriate legislation they do not provide the basis
for a private lawsuit unless they are intended to be self-executing").
75. See, e.g., Vizquez, The Four Doctrines,supra note 6; Carlos Vizquez, The "SelfExecuting" Characterof the Refugee Protocol'sNonrefoulement Obligation, 7 GEO. IMMIGR.
L. J. 39 (1993); Jon H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy
Analysis, 86 AMER. J. INT'L L. 310 (1992); Carlos Vizquez, Treaty-Based Rights and
Remedies of Individuals, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1082 (1992) [hereinafter Vizquez, Treaty
Based Rights]; Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AMER. J. INT'L L. 760 (1988)
[hereinafter Paust, Self-Executing Treaties]; Yuji Iwasawa, The Doctrine of Self-Executing
Treaties in the United States: A CriticalAnalysis, 26 VIR. J. INT'L L. 627 (1986) [hereinafter Iwasawa, A CriticalAnalysis].
76. See Vizquez, The Four Doctrines,supra note 6.
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cases which originated the self-execution doctrine-look at whether the
parties to the treaty intended to give substantive rights to individuals
that can be enforced by a court without domestic implementing legislation (the "treaty interpretation" approach).
Other courts look at
whether the treaty provision is justiciable by a court. Next, some courts
examine whether the treaty provision provides a right of action to an
individual. And finally, courts may examine whether the treaty makers
77
had the constitutional power to undertake the subject of the treaty.
To make matters even more complicated, many courts have used different analytical methods in different cases, or have even used different
approaches in the same case, largely due to the confusion about what it
means for a treaty provision to be self-executing. 78 Still other courts
79
have decided the issue without any analysis whatsoever.
This Part examines each of these analytical methods in detail and
discussea whether Article 3 of the Torture Convention should be held to
be self-executing under each approach. It also argues that in deciding
whether Article 3 is a self-executing treaty provision, the federal courts
should use this opportunity to clarify the meaning of the self-execution
doctrine and return to the original understanding of the doctrine. As
explained below, only the treaty interpretation approach adequately reflects the presumption under the Constitution that treaties are selfexecuting, and that this method of treaty enforceability analysis should
be adopted by the federal courts.
A.

The Treaty InterpretationApproach
1.

Determining the Mutual Intent of the Treaty Parties

Since the introduction of the self-execution doctrine in the nineteenth century, many courts have looked at whether treaty-makers intended to give individuals immediately enforceable rights without the
need for implementing legislation. Some courts - including the Supreme Court in the cases originating the self-execution doctrine looked solely at the language of the treaty to determine the intent of the
treaty parties. More recently, however, some courts have departed from
this approach, examining evidence of the unilateral intent of the U.S. to
determine whether the treaty-makers in the U.S. intended to give individuals immediately enforceable rights. This section explores the difference in these approaches and the application of each to Article 3 of
the Torture Convention.
77. Id.
78. See United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 876 (5th Cir. 1979) (commenting that
'The self-execution question is perhaps one of the most confounding in treaty law.").
79. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 928 F.2d 1060, 1066 (11th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Bent-Santana, 774 F.2d 1545, 1550 (11th Cir. 1985).
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The self-execution doctrine originated in Foster v. Neilson,80 a case
concerning whether, under a treaty transferring sovereignty of the
Louisiana territory to the U.S., certain Spanish subjects had valid title
to land granted to them by the King of Spain. To answer the question,
Chief Justice Marshall looked at the language of the treaty to determine whether the parties to the treaty intended that the treaty itself
confirm the plaintiffs' title, or whether the parties to the treaty intended that the domestic legislatures first enact implementing legislation to confirm such rights.8'
In the first expression of the concept of self-execution (but without
using those words)8 2 the Chief Justice stated:
Our constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of
the legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any
legislative provision. But when the terms of the stipulation import a
contract, when either of the parties engages to perform a particular act,
the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department;
and the legislature must execute the contract before it can become a
83
rule for the Court.
The English version of the treaty stated that the Spanish grants
"shall be ratified and confirmed to the persons in possession of the
lands."8 4 The Court held that this language contemplated future action
by the legislature and therefore did not operate "of itself without the aid
of any legislative provision."8 5 Only four years later, the Court reversed
itself in United States v. Percheman when it examined the Spanish version of the same treaty, which stated that the grants "shall remain ratified and confirmed."86 This language demonstrated that the treaty did
not "stipulat[e] for some future legislative act" and thus "operated by
87
rhe force of the instrument itself."
The Court's conclusion, that the treaty "operated of itself' if the
treaty did not "stipulate for some future legislature act,"8 8 reflected the
constitutional presumption under the Supremacy Clause that treaties
are self-executing. This constitutional presumption arises from the
language of the Supremacy Clause and the constitutional history leading up to the ratification of the Constitution.
80. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
81. Id. at 314-15.

82. The first case to use the language "self-executing" was Bartram v. Robertson, 122
U.S. 116, 120 (1887) (Field, J.).
83. Foster, at 314-15.
84. Id. at 314.
85. Id. at 314-15.
86. United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 88-89 (1833) (Marshall, C.J.).
87. Id.
88. Id.
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Before the Constitution was drafted, the U.S. was plagued by its
inability to enforce its treaties, in part because of state legislatures' refusal to follow the treaties of the Continental Congress and their refusal
to enact the laws required by those treaties. The U.S. was, at that time,
operating under the same system of treaty law as Great Britain, where
treaties were not enforceable in court unless the legislature implemented the treaty through legislation. In other words, all treaties were
treated in Great Britain as non-self-executing. This reflected concerns
in Great Britain with the allocation-of-powers: because treaties were
concluded by the Crown without the participation of Parliament, treaties would not be treated as municipal law until Parliament had acted
to incorporate the treaties into domestic law.8 9
Because the British law of treaties was causing severe problems for
the new country, however, when the Constitution was drafted the
Framers ensured that treaties would be immediately enforceable as
U.S. law rather than dependent for their execution on the legislature. 90
The historical evidence surrounding the Constitutional Convention
makes it absolutely clear that the Framers expected that all treaties
would be self-executing, reversing the British presumption that all treaties would be non-self-executing. 91 Congress adopted John Jay's report,
for instance, that a treaty "made, ratified and published by Congress .... immediately [became] binding on the whole nation, and superadded to the laws of the land.... Hence [it was to be] ... received
and observed by every member of the nation .... " 9 2 Recommendations
that treaties be ratified by congressional legislation were defeated. 93
Moreover, the Federal papers and debates on the ratification of the
Constitution reveal that the framers had an expectation that treaties
would be enforceable by individuals: Alexander Hamilton, for instance,
wrote that "treaties of the United States, to have any force at all, must
be considered as part of the law of the land. Their true import, as far as
respects individuals, must, like all other laws, be ascertained by judicial
determinations." 94 The historical record is replete with evidence that
the Framers intended treaties to be self-executing and enforceable by
95
individuals.
Moreover, early cases reflected the intent of the Framers that treaties be immediately enforceable, and they applied treaties without dis89. See Vizquez, The FourDoctrines, supra note 6, at 697.
90. See id. at 699.
91. See Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, supra note 75 (discussing historical evidence
that Framers intended treaties to be self-executing).
92. Id. at 760-61 & 782 n.3 (quoting Jay, Report to Congress, Oct. 13, 1786, in 1 C.
BUTLER, THE-TREATY MAKING POWER OF THE UNITED STATES 268 n.4, 270, 389 (1902).

93. Id. at 761 & 783 n.10 (citing J. MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION of 1787, at 520, and citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, at 421-24 (Jay)).
94. Id. at 762, & 783 n.13 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 197 (Hamilton)).
95. Id. at 760-764.
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cussion of whether the treaty was self-executing or non-self-executing
(i.e. whether legislation was required to implement the treaty rights).
Chief Justice Marshall, for instance, wrote,"if [a treaty] be constitutional, ... I know of no court which can contest its obligation." 96 The
Chief Justice also noted: "Whenever a right grown out of, or is protected
by, a treaty .... it is to be protected.... The reason for inserting that
clause [Art. III, sec. 2, cl. 1] ... was, that all persons who have real
claims under a treaty should have their causes decided. . . ."9 In fact,
until Foster and Percheman, courts enforced treaties without discussion
of whether they were enforceable in the absence of implementing legislation: it was assumed that under the Supremacy Clause, treaties were
98
to be treated as law of the land.
Given the Supremacy Clause's directive that treaties are law of the
land, the Framers' intent that treaties be immediately enforceable in
domestic courts as law, and the early cases enforcing treaties without
examination of whether the treaties were enforceable in the absence of
domestic legislation, at least one commentator has noted that the Supreme Court's distinction in Foster "between 'self-executing' and 'nonself-executing' treaties is a judicially invented notion that is patently
inconsistent with express language in the Constitution affirming that
'all Treaties ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land."' 99 "Indeed, it is
difficult to imagine that something shall be supreme federal 'law of the
land' but not operate directly as 'law' except by believing in one of the
most transparent of judicial delusions." 100 To the extent, however, that
the treaty itself reflects the intent of the treaty parties that the treaty
be enforceable only through domestic legislation, Foster and Percheman
deviate not at all from the language of the Supremacy Clause and the
intent of the Framers: those cases simply call for the direct application
of the treaty along with any limitations contained in the treaty.1 01 In
other words, Foster and Percheman are more about treaty interpretation, and less about the creation of a new doctrine of when treaties become law of the U.S.
Moreover, whether or not the self-executing distinction is completely consistent with the Constitution, it is clear that the selfexecution doctrine as formulated in Foster and Percheman did not re96. Id. at 765 & 783 n.34 (quoting United States v. The Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 103, 110 (1801).
97. Id. at 765 & 783 n.35 (quoting Owings v. Norwood's Lessee, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 344,
348-49 (1809).
98. Id. at 764-766 (citations omitted).
99. Id. at 760.
100. Id. at 766.
101. See Vizquez, The Four Doctrines, supra note 6, at 705 (discussing the Court's
analysis in Foster and Percheman: "As noted, the Court in Foster and Percheman relied on
the treaty's terms, which reflect the intent of the parties to the treaty, not just that of the
United States.").
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verse the constitutional presumption that treaties would be immediately enforceable as law. The Court in Foster made that clear by contrasting the system of treaty law in Great Britain with that in the U.S.
After discussing the British rule of treaties, the Court noted:
In the United States a different principle is established. Our constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to
be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any legislative
102
provision.
Moreover, the Court in Percheman clarified that the presumption
was in favor of self-execution when it enforced a treaty that did not
"stipulate for some future legislative act" and thus "operated of itself."10 3 Foster and Percheman established that unless a treaty itself
states that it is to be enforced through future domestic legislation, that
treaty is immediately enforceable in domestic courts in the U.S.104
After Foster and Percheman, however, courts have struggled to determine when a treaty provision "operates of itself without the aid of
any legislative provision." 105 Some courts, appropriately following the
methodology of Foster and Percheman, have looked to the language of
the treaty to determine whether the treaty-makers contemplated future
legislation to enact those rights. 10 6 This approach also squares with the
basic rule of treaty interpretation that a court must first look to the
107
language of a treaty to determine its meaning.

102. Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 314 (emphasis added).
103. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 88-89.
104. Vizquez, The Four Doctrines,supra note 6, at 704.
The Court's reversal of its Foster holding in Percheman, and its statement in
the latter case that a treaty is self-executing if its 'stipulates for [a] future
legislative act,' is probable best understood as a recognition that the standard applied in Foster took inadequate account of the Founders' establishment of a 'different principle' in the United States. Percheman, in other
words, should be interpreted to require a clear statement - a stipulation that, whatever the case might be for the other states parties, implementing
legislation is not required to make the treaty cognizable by the courts of the
United States.
Id.
105. Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 314-15.
106. See Frolova, 761 F.2d at 373 (acknowledging that "Of course, if the parties' intent
is clear from the treaty's language courts will not inquire into the remaining factors.");
Cardenas v. Smith, 733 F.2d 909, 918 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (examininf the language of a treaty
which stated explicitly that its restrictions "shall not give rise to a right of any person
to... obtain judicial relief').
107. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 653, 663 (1992) (articulating the
rule that a court must "first look to [a treaty's] terms to determine its meaning"); see also
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. AIConf. 39/27 (1969), entered into
force Jan. 27, 1980, art. 31(1) (establishing that treaties are to be interpreted "in good
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in
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Turning to Article 3 of the Torture Convention, the language of the
provision indicates that it was intended to grant substantive rights to
individuals whether or not domestic legislation was enacted. There is
no language in Article 3 indicating that future legislation is contemplated to enact the right to non-refoulement. This absence triggers the
presumption that the treaty provision is self-executing.10s
Interpreting Article 3 as granting immediately enforceable rights is
especially appropriate in view of many other provisions of the Torture
Convention that explicitly call for further legislative action by the
State Parties in order to comply with their obligations under the Convention, 10 9 and for which Congress has passed implementing legislation. 110 In stark contrast to these other provisions, 111 Article 3 calls for
no legislative or other action by the States to comply with their nonrefoulement obligations, simply providing that States "shall not" return
individuals to torture.
Indeed, Article 3's direct prohibition that States "shall not" return
individuals to torture indicates that these rights are immediately effective as domestic law. Other treaties containing such direct prohibitory
language have been judged to be self-executing. In Rainbow Navigation, Inc. v. Department of Navy, 112 for instance, the court held that a
treaty between the U.S. and Iceland regarding military cargo operations was self-executing due to the presence of its mandate that cargo
transportation services "shall be provided" in a certain manner. The

their context and in the light of its object and purpose") [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
108. See Rainbow Navigation, Inc. v. Department of Navy, 686 F. Supp 354, 357
(D.D.C. 1988) (noting presumption of self-execution unless the language of the treaty
"manifests an intention that it shall not become effective as domestic law without the enactment of implementing legislation. . .
109. See Torture Convention, supra note 4, art. 2(1) (mandating that "Each State
Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent
acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction."); supra note 4, art. 4 ("1. Each State
Party shall ensure that all acts of torture are offenses under its criminal law.... '2. Each
State Party shall make these offences [sic]punishable by appropriate penalties which take
into account their grave nature."); supra note 4, art. 5 ("1. Each State Party shall take
such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences [sic] referred to in Article 4. . . ."); supra note 4, art. 14(i) ("Each State Party shall ensure in its
legal system that the victim of an act of torture obtains redress. .. .'.
110. To implement Article 14 of the Convention, Congress created a civil cause of action for individuals who have been tortured when it passed the Torture Victim Protection
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992), codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
More recently, Congress implemented Articles 2, 4, and 5 of the Torture Convention by
including criminal penalties for torture in the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-236, 108 Stat. 463, and amended Pub. L. No. 103-322,
108 Stat. 1979, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2340 et seq (Supp. 1996).
111. "Some provisions of an international agreement may be self-executing and others
non-self-executing." United States v. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. 791, 797 n. 8 (S.D. Fla. 1992)
(citing RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 53, § 111 cmt. h).
112. 686 F. Supp. at 357.
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court stated that this "language of the treaty itself suggests that it was
1' 13
intended to operate of its own force upon ratification."
Significantly, the BIA has recognized that the Protocol relating to
the Status of Refugees, which contains almost identical language in Article 33 prohibiting non-refoulement of refugees, 114 is self-executing.' 1 5
While a recent BIA decision may throw this holding into doubt, 1 6 and
17
some federal courts have held that the Protocol is not self-executing,"
the Supreme Court has recently refused to decide whether the nonrefoulement provision of the Protocol is self-executing in a case in which
the issue was squarely presented and forcefully urged by the Executive
1 18
Branch.

113. Id.
114. Article 33 of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees provides, in part,
that "[n]o Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on
account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion." The U.S. acceded to Articles 2-34 of the Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees when it ratified the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees.
115. See Matter of Dunar, 14 I. & N. Dec. 310, 313 (BIA 1973) (concluding that the
Convention, "being self-executing, has the force and effect of an act of Congress").
116. See Matter of Q-T-M-T-, Int. Dec. # 3300 (BIA 1996) (implying in deciding
whether aggravated felony bar complied with the Protocol, that the Protocol is non-selfexecuting: "Congress has plenary authority under the Constitution to enact implementing
legislation which defines the United States' obligations under a non-self-executing international treaty to which the country is a signatory.").
117. See e.g. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Baker, 949 F.2d 1109, 1110 (11th Cir.
1991) (concluding 'The language of the Protocol and the history of the United States' accession to it leads to the conclusion that Article 33 is not self-executing and thus provides
no enforceable rights to the Haitian plaintiffs in this case.'); Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d
204, 218-19 (2d Cir. 1982) (determining that the Protocol's provisions "were not themselves a source of rights under our law unless and until Congress implemented them by
appropriate legislation"); Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Gracey, 600 F. Supp. 1396, 140506 (D.D.C. 1985) (concluding that the Protocol not self-executing), aff'd on other grounds,
809 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1987). But see Nicosia v. Wall, 742 F.2d 1005, 1006 n. 4 (5th Cir.
1971) (applying Protocol to extradition proceedings, but not deciding self-execution issue);
Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 539 F. Supp. 925, 935 n. 25 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (inclining toward
view that Protocol is self-executing, but not deciding issue); Sannon v. United States, 427
F. Supp. 1270, 1274, 1277 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (holding regulations invalid where they conflicted with the Protocol), vacated & remanded on other grounds, 566 F.2d 104 (5th Cir.
1978).
118. See Sale, 504 U.S. 155, 113 S. Ct. 2549 (not reaching the self-execution issue, although the district and circuit courts had dismissed the challenge to the Haitian interdiction program on that ground). Moreover, the Supreme Court's dicta in INS v. Stevic, 467
U.S. 407, 428 n. 22 (1984), that Article 34 of the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees is not self-executing should not affect an analysis of Article 3 of the Torture Convention, because Article 34 of the Protocol does not contain prohibitory language and clearly
calls for further steps to be taken to implement that provision.
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A SELF-EXECUTING TREATY
Determining the Unilateral Intent of the U.S. Treaty Makers

While the Supreme Court's self-execution formula in Foster and
Percheman clearly requires a court first to examine the language of a
treaty to determine whether it gives individuals immediately enforceable rights, this approach does not always yield clear results, as evidenced by the Supreme Court reversal of Foster four years later in
Percheman.119 Many courts, thus, have gone outside of the treaty language to determine the intent of the parties. 120 Because determining the
mutual intent of the parties is exceedingly difficult from international
instruments accompanying a treaty,1 21 however, some courts have
looked to the ratification instruments of the U.S. to determine the unilateral intent of the U.S. treaty-makers regarding self-execution. Some
courts have even considered the unilateral intent of government officials.
As Professor Vizquez points out, however,
This modification of the self-execution doctrine is problematic given the
apparent purposes of the Supremacy Clause. The clause was made applicable to treaties to avert conflicts with other nations that could be
expected to result from violations of treaties attributable to the United
States ... Permitting the "different principle" established in the Supremacy Clause to be altered through the unilateral acts of U.S. officials is a greater inroad on the clause's purposes, and thus requires an
extension of the "intent-based" category of non-self-executing treaty
beyond what was recognized in Foster and Percheman.122

Utilizing the unilateral intent of the U.S. treaty makers to determine whether a treaty provision is self-executing does not adequately
reflect the Constitutional presumption that treaties are self-executing.
Article 3 of the Torture Convention is an excellent example of that in119. See Vizquez, The Four Doctrines,supra note 6, at 703-04 (acknowledging that:
The Fosterholding is easier to describe than to apply.... [Inferring an intent to require legislation in the absence of unambiguous language to that effect is a hazardous enterprise, given the multiplicity of national constitutional rules regarding the domestic effect of treaties. As noted above, for
some nations treaties always require implementing legislation. It is thus
possible that the language chosen by the parties simply reflects the possibility that the treaty will require implementing legislation for certain parties
no matter what the parties intended. Under the Supremacy Clause, however, a treaty can be 'self-executing' in the United States even if it is 'nonself-executing' for other nations by virtue of their constitutions").
120. Arguably, some courts have ignored the clear language of a treaty. See Postal,
589 F.2d 877-78 (reasonsing that "On its face, this language [of the treaty] would bear a
self-executing construction .... We are admonished, however, to interpret treaties in the
context of their promulgation, and we think the context of article 6 compels the conclusion
that it is not self-executing.").
121. Iwasawa, A CriticalAnalysis, supra note 75, at 656 n.1 2 2 .
122. Vizquez, The FourDoctrines,supra note 6, at 705-06 (footnotes omitted).
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adequacy. Under the mutual intent approach articulated by the Supreme Court, Article 3 is undoubtedly self-executing, as discussed
23
above.1
On the other hand, if a court looks past the language of Article 3 to
determine the unilateral intent of the U.S., it may be tempted to conclude that Article 3 is not self-executing, as has one immigration
judge, 124 because the Senate included a "declaration" in its resolution of
advice and consent to ratification of the treaty that Articles 1-16 of the
Torture Convention are not self-executing .125
This Senate declaration, however, need not preclude a court from
concluding that an individual may enforce Article 3 in court. First, it is
quite possible that the Senate intended this declaration to mean only
that Article 3 does not provide a federal cause of action, but that the
Senate did not intend to prevent individuals otherwise before a court
from relying on Article 3 for substantive rights. The Senate appended a
similar non-self-executing declaration to its resolution of advice and
consent to ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the "Covenant"). 126 In the Report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee recommending ratification of the Covenant to the
full Senate, the Committee stated that the self-executing declaration
was designed to ensure that a private cause of action could not be based
127
on the Covenant.
While the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report on the ratification of the Torture Convention contains mixed messages regarding
the meaning of the self-executing declaration in the Torture Convention, the Report does indicate that the Senate did not contemplate that

123. See id. at 706 (noting that "[I]n the absence of the declarations attached to the
Convention by the United States, Article 3 would undoubtedly have been considered judicially enforceable.').
124. See Matter of Abu, A29 499 143 at 14 (concluding that Article 3 is not selfexecuting).
125. See 136 CONG. REC., supra note 8, at $17492 (declaring that the provisions of Articles 1-16 of the Convention are not self-executing."); RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW, supra note 53, § 314 cmt. d (concluding that Senate declaration is binding on U.S. courts).
126. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 entered into
force Mar. 23, 1976 (guaranteeing certain rights in criminal proceedings). See 138 CONG.
REC. S4784, (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992) (setting forth the Senate's non-self-executing declaration).
127. See John Quigley, The Rule of Non-Inquiry and Human Rights Treaties, 45 CATH.
U. L. REV. 1213, 1230 (1996) [hereinafter Quigley, The Rule of Non-Inquiry] (citing
SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 102nd CONG., REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, SEN. EXEC. REP. 102-30 (1992) reprinted in

31 I.L.M. 645, 657 (1992) (providing that "[tihe intent is to clarify that the Covenant will
not create a private cause of action in U.S. courts")).
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implementing legislation would be required for Article 3 relief. 128
Moreover, the Senate later stated that it intended its non-self-executing
declaration for the Covenant to be "virtually identical" to that in the
Torture Convention; that is, to prevent that treaty from providing a
cause of action.129

Additionally, in light of the real confusion in the courts regarding
the meaning of self-execution and the contemporaneous judicial opinions equating self-execution with whether treaties provided a federal
cause of action, 130 it is even more likely that the Senate declaration was
simply intended to prevent the Torture Convention from providing a
federal cause of action. Construing the self-executing declaration as
addressing only whether Article 3 creates a cause of action-and allowing individuals to defend against removal or extradition to torture131-would allow the U.S. to maintain its treaty compliance. Courts
should construe laws in such a way to maintain the U.S.'s treaty com-

128. See S. EXEC. REP. No. 101-30 at 10 (1990) (noting that 'The administration proposed a declaration that the Convention is not self-executing for articles 1 through 16.
Since the majority of the obligations to be undertaken by the United States pursuant to
the convention are already covered by existing law, additional implementing legislation
will be needed only with respect to article 5, dealing with areas of criminal jurisdiction.
The effect of the proposed declaration is to clarify that further implementation of the
Convention will be through implementing legislation. In keeping with past practice, upon
enactment of this legislation, the President will deposit the instrument of ratification.") ;
id. at 12 (non-self-executing declaration recommended "to clarify that the provisions of the
Convention would not of themselves become effective as domestic law," but containing no
further explanation of what is meant by "effective as domestic law"); id., at 41, app. B,
Letter from Janet G. Mullins, Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs, Department of
State, to Senator Pressler (April 4, 1990) (announcing "We have proposed a formal declaration that the Convention is not 'self-executing.' Any prosecution (or civil action) in the
United States for torture will necessarily be pursuant to existing or subsequently enacted
Federal or State law. In fact, as indicated in the original Presidential transmittal, existing Federal and State law appears sufficient to implement the Convention; thus, the Convention will not itself provide an independent cause of action U.S. courts....") (emphasis
added).
129. SEN. EXEC. REP. 102-23 (1992) reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 645, 657 (recommending,
"For reasons of prudence, 0 [the inclusion of] a declaration that the substantive provisions
of the Covenant are not self-executing. The intent is to clarify that the Covenant will not
create a private cause of action in U.S. courts. As was the case with the Torture Convention, existing U.S. law generally complies with the Covenant; hence, implementing legislation is not contemplated. We recommend the following declaration, virtually identical
to... the one adopted by the Senate with respect to the Torture Convention.
) (emphasis added)).
130. See Tel-Oren, 716 F.2d 774. See discussion of Tel-Oren and the "cause of action"
approach to self-executing treaties, infra.
131. As explained below, when an individual is in removal proceedings, no independent cause of action is required: the individual is already before the court and is using Article 3 as substantive law in defense to removal. Alternatively, if the Article 3 claim is
raised in federal court through habeas corpus jurisdiction, the cause of action is in habeas
and Article 3 merely provides the substantive law to be applied by the court.
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pliance. 132
Moreover, even if the Senate declaration was intended to prevent
individuals from relying on Article 3 as substantive law in removal proceedings, there has been considerable debate regarding whether courts
must defer to such declarations.13 3 Many courts have recognized that it
is the province of the judiciary to determine whether a treaty provision
13 4
is self-executing.
In fact, a Senate "declaration" may not be a part of the treaty at all,
and, thus, would not be part of U.S. law under the Supremacy Clause.
The Senate commonly includes "reservations," "declarations" and "understandings" in its resolutions of advice and consent to ratification of
human rights treaties. A "reservation" modifies the terms of the treaty
between the State making the reservation and the States accepting the
reservation, and changes the international obligations of these
States. 135 "Understandings" and "declarations," on the other hand, are
unilateral statements by a State concerning its interpretation of a
treaty provision and do not modify the State's international obliga6
tions.13
In the only published case to address the affect of a Senate resolution, declaration or understanding on the operation of a treaty, the District of Columbia Circuit held in 1957 that a Senate statement that does
not affect the U.S.'s international obligations, but has only domestic ef-

132. See e.g. Macleod v. United States, 229 U.S. 416, 434 (1913) ("[An act of Congress]
should be construed in the light of the purpose of the government to act within the limitation of the principles of international law,... and it should not be assumed that Congress
proposed to violate the obligations of this country to other nations'); Murray v. The
Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (urging that "[Ain act of congress ought
never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possible construction remains... ');The Over The Top, 5 F.2d 838, 842 (D. Conn. 1925) (concluding that
"[Unless it unmistakably appears that a congressional act was intended to be in disregard of a principle of international comity, the presumption is that it was intended to be
in conformity with it.'); see also RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note
53, § 114 (advising that "Where fairly possible, a United States statute is to be construed
so as not to conflict with international law or with an international agreement of the
United States.').
133. See e.g. Stefan A. Risenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, The Scope of U.S. Senate Control over the Conclusion and Operation of Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 571 (1991)
[hereinafter Risenfeld & Abbot]; Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Role of the United States Senate Concerning "Self-Executing" and "Non-Self-Executing" Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
515, 532 (1991) [hereinafter Damrosch]; Charles H. Dearborn, III, Note, The Domestic Effect of Declarations That Treaty Provisions Are Not Self-Executing, 57 TEX. L. REV. 233
(1979) [hereinafter Dearborn].
134. See e.g. Frolova, 761 F.2d at 373 (concluding that "Whether a treaty is selfexecuting is an issue for judicial interpretation.'); Postal, 589 F.2d 876 (asserting
"[W]hether a treaty is self-executing is a matter of interpretation for the courts ....").
135. Vienna Convention, supra note 107, art. 2(1)(d) (defining reservation as a statement made by a state purporting to modify the effect of the treaty).
136. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 53, § 313 cmt. g.
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fect, is not part of a treaty and thus is not binding on courts as U.S.
law. 137 In that case, involving a treaty between the U.S. and Canada
regarding the production of power from the Niagara River, the Senate
had included in its resolution of advice and consent to ratification of the
treaty a "reservation" that an act of Congress was necessary to designate the use of the U.S.'s share of the power.' 38 The court held that because the U.S.'s internal use of the Niagara power was of no consequence to Canada, the reservation did not change the international
obligations of the U.S., was thus not a true "reservation" to the treaty,
and was thus not a part of the treaty. 139 The reservation was thus not
40
applied by the court.'
The Senate declaration that Article 3 of the Torture Convention is
not self-executing is similarly a matter of purely domestic concern, because it deals with whether an individual can raise such a claim in domestic courts. Under Power Authority, the Senate declaration that Article 3 of the Torture Convention is not self-executing is not a part of the
treaty, and is thus not a part of U.S. law.
Finally, it is possible that a Senate declaration that a treaty provision is non-self-executing is unconstitutional, although that discussion
is beyond the scope of this article.' 4 ' While the Constitution granted
the Senate the power to withhold consent to a treaty, it "does not contemplate a power in the Senate to impose terms not contained in the
treaty as negotiated by the President. The Senate enjoys a veto power,
not a power of revision.142 Moreover, because this non-self-executing

137. See Power Authority of New York v. Federal Power Comm'n, 247 F.2d 538, 542544 (D.C. Cir.), vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss as moot, 355 U.S. 64
(1957).
138. Id. at 539.
139. Id. at 542 (noting that "A party to a treaty may presumably attach to it a matter
of purely municipal application, neither affecting nor intended to affect the other party.
But such matter does not become part of the treaty") (emphasis in original).
140. Moreover, the Senate itself has stated that its declarations "have no legal effect
on the treaty." See Genocide Convention: Hearing on Executive Order Before a Subcomm.
of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 106 (1971) ("[S]o long as
[the language of declarations or understandings] does not substantively affect the terms
or international obligations of the treaty, or relates solely to domestic matters, there
would be no legal effect on the treaty").
141. For an examination of the constitutionality of such declarations and other issues
concerning Senate declaration and understandings, see Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of
Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AMER. J. INT'L L. 341, 34648, 49 (1995); John Quigley, The InternationalCovenant on Civil and PoliticalRights and
the Supremacy Clause, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1287 (1993); Jordan J. Paust, Avoiding
FraudulentExecutive Policy: Analysis of Non-Self-Execution of the Covenant on Civil and
PoliticalRights, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1257 (1993); Risenfeld & Abbott, supra note 132; Michael J. Glennon, The Constitutional Power of the United States Senate to Condition Its
Consent To Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 533 (1991); Dearborn, supra note 133.
142. See Quigley, The Rule of Non-Inquiry, supra, note 127, at 1234; see also Vizquez,
supra note 6, at 708 & 723 n. 60 (stating "Nor does the truism that the greater power in-
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declaration concerns the domestic effect of a treaty, it may be, in effect,
domestic legislation without the participation of the House of Represen143
tatives.
In summary, a court using the mutual intent approach articulated
by the Supreme Court in Foster v. Neilson and United States v. Percheman would conclude that Article 3 of the Torture Convention is selfexecuting: its direct prohibitory language that an individual "shall not"
be returned to torture creates immediately enforceable rights and contemplates no implementing legislation. Moreover, a court should not
look to the unilateral intent of the Senate to determine whether Article
3 is self-executing, because looking to such unilateral intent is fundamentally inconsistent with the constitutional presumption that a treaty
is self-executing. In any event, the Senate declaration that Article 3 is
not self-executing should not prevent an individual from relying on Article 3 for substantive rights: the Senate likely intended its declaration
to mean only that Article 3 does not create a federal cause of action, and
there are strong arguments that courts need not defer to Senate declarations on self-execution.
B.

The JusticiabilityApproach

Other courts have determined whether a treaty provision is selfexecuting by examining whether it raises a "justiciable" issue capable of
court resolution. This method of analysis arises from the Supreme
Court opinion in the Head Money Cases, in which the Court held that a
treaty may be enforced by individuals when it "prescribes a rule by

cludes the lesser lend support to the notion that the treaty makers have the power unilaterally to make a treaty judicially enforceable. The power not to enter into a treaty at all
does not include the power to enter into a treaty but make it judicially unenforceable.").
143. See Power Authority, 247 F.2d at 543 (stating "No court has ever said ... that the
treaty power can be exercised without limit to affect matters which are of purely domestic
concern and do not pertain to our relations with other nations."); see also Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176, 184 (1901) (J. Brown, concurring) (opining
that the resolution of Senate after ratification of treaty had no legal effect on treaty and
could not be treated as domestic legislation without the assent of the House of Representatives); New York Indians v. United States, 170 U.S. 1, 23 (1898) (concluding Senate
proviso regarding treaty "cannot be considered as a legislative act since the power to legislate is vested in the [P]resident, [Slenate and [H]ouse of [R]epresentatives.").
In Professor Vizquez's work in progress, Treaties as Law of the Land, he suggests that a
Senate non-self-executing declaration may be constitutional because "if the U.S. treaty
makers possess the constitutional power to abrogate a treaty for purposes of domestic law,
even when such abrogation is not permitted by international law, they must also possess
the constitutional power to enter into a treaty but unilaterally deny it domestic force."
Vizquez, The Four Doctrines, supra note 6, at 708 & 723 n.61 (discussing work in progress). However, while the U.S. Congress as a whole constitutionally can abrogate a treaty
by passing inconsistent domestic legislation, it is debatable whether the U.S. treaty makers alone have such power to abrogate a treaty without the participation of the House of
Representatives.
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which the rights of the private citizen or subject may be determined."' 4 4
A number of lower courts have taken this language to mean that a
treaty must have definite and specific standards to be enforced by a
45
court.1
The Ninth Circuit takes such an approach, examining four factors
to determine whether a treaty provision is self-executing, including: the
purpose of the treaty provision; the existence of domestic procedures
appropriate for direct implementation of the treaty provision; the availability and feasibility of alternative enforcement methods of the treaty
provision; and the immediate and long-range social consequences of a
finding of self- or non-self-execution. 146 Other courts have added such
factors as the circumstances surrounding the execution of the treaty,
the nature of the obligations imposed by the treaty, and, generally, "the
capability of the judiciary to resolve the dispute."' 47 Still other courts
have determined whether treaty language is precatory, and thus unen148
forceable by courts.

144. Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 598-99.
145. See Vizquez, The Four Doctrines, supra note 6, at 713-14 & 723 nn.82-85 (citing
cases determining whether a treaty is "too vague for judicial enforcement," or "provides
specific standards," or is "phrased in broad generalities," or has "language of a broad and
eneral nature.") (citations omitted); see also RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW,
supra note 53 § 111 n.5 (instructing that a treaty is self-executing if it "can be readily
given effect... without further legislation.').
146. People of Saipan v. United States Dep't of Interior, 502 F.2d 90, 97 (9th Cir. 1974)
(applying these factors, holding that the Trusteeship Agreement under which the U.S.
administered the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (Micronesia) established "direct,
affirmative, and judicially enforceable rights").
147. See Frolova, 761 F.2d at 373 (describing the analysis used to determine intent:
"[Clourts consider several factors in discerning the intent of the parties to the agreement:
(1) the language and purposes of the agreement as a whole; (2) the circumstances surrounding its execution; (3) the nature of the obligations imposed by the agreement; (4) the
availability and feasibility of alternative enforcement mechanisms; (5) the implications of
permitting a private right of action; and (6) the capability of the judiciary to resolve the
dispute.") (citing, inter alia, Saipan); see also Postal, 589 F.2d 877 (referring to Saipan
factors "[iun the specific context of determining whether a treaty provision is selfexecuting"); Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1976); American Baptist
Churches v. Meese, 712 F. Supp. 756, 770 (S.D. Cal. 1989) (concluding that treaty was not
self-executing where the "language used does not impose any specific obligations," depriving the court of "any intelligible guidelines for judicial enforcement"); Greenpeace
U.S.A. v. Stone, 748 F. Supp. 749, 767 (D. Haw. 1990) (determining treaty provision not
enforceable where it lacked "standards and procedures to judicially enforce the treaty").
148. See, e.g., Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 809 (Bork, J., concurring) (indicating that "Articles
1 and 2 (of the United Nations Charter] .. . contain general 'purposes and principles,'
some of which state mere aspirations and none of which can sensibly be thought to have
been intended to be judiciallly enforceable at the behest of individuals.").
Professor Vizquez argues that determining whether a treaty provision is "precatory," and
thus, unenforceable, is an appropriate exercise to determine which treaty provisions are
more appropriately left to implementation by the political branches of government under
separation of powers. See Vizquez, The Four Doctrines, supra note 6, at 712-13 ("Complying with an obligation to 'use our best efforts' or to 'cooperate' to accomplish certain
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Because this approach is not tied to the language of the treaty itself
(although the purpose of a treaty can certainly be derived from such
language), this method of analysis allows judges to evaluate - without
any fixed standards - whether a treaty should be enforceable by individuals. This "free-wheeling inquiry into [a] treaty's enforceability...
appears to ask the courts to engage in an open-ended inquiry to determine on a case-by-case basis whether judicial enforcement of a particular treaty is a good idea."'14 9 It also allows a court to determine the issue without any reference whatsoever to the intent of the treaty parties
regarding whether the treaty provision should be immediately enforceable in court. This method accordingly does not reflect adequately the
constitutional presumption that treaties are self-executing. Indeed, because of the federal judiciary's discomfort with enforcement of treaties,
the "justiciability" approach is likely to result in many courts holding
treaty provisions unenforceable where the language of the treaty reflect
a clear intent by the treaty parties that the treaty be enforceable without implementing legislation. 150
Despite the difficulties with the justiciability approach, if a court
employs this method of analysis Article 3 of the Torture Convention
clearly would be self-executing. The purpose of Article 3 indicates that
it is self-executing. Article 3 creates a right that inures to individuals,
not to the State Parties.' 5 ' The Supreme Court has held that where inends, or to ' promote' or 'encourage' them, requires the consideration and balancing of
numerous disparate demands on our resources to determine what the 'best' we can do under the circumstances is. The conclusion that, in our system of separated powers, this
determination is not for the judiciary to make is so intuitive as to make the propriety of
this category of judicially unenforceable treaties seem self-evident. It is nonetheless important to recognize that such treaties are judicially unenforceable not because of the intent of the parties (or anyone), but for domestic separation-of-powers reasons.") (footnotes
omitted). However, because a precatory treaty provision - having language that calls for
the parties to take actions in the future to enforce the treaty provision - would be judged
to be non-self-executing under the treaty interpretation approach, there is really no need
for a court to evaluate whether a precatory treaty provision is "justiciable." That analysis
is subsumed in the decision of whether a treaty "stipulates for [a] future act" under the
Foster and Percheman analysis.
149. Vzquez, The Four Doctrines,supranote 6, at 715.
150. Id. at 717 (reasonsing that "[B]ecause the lower courts are less accustomed to enforcing treaties and tend to regard foreign relations questions as the province of the other
branches, they have typically been exceedingly timid in enforcing treaties, particularly
when individuals have sought to enforce them against the executive branch of the federal
Government. A doctrine that effectively asks the courts to decide on a treaty-by-treaty
basis whether treaties should be 'judicially enforceable' and provides little guidance on
the question is thus likely to result in a far more restricted judicial role than the Constitution contemplates.") (footnote omitted).
151. As recognized by the drafters of the Torture Convention, the purpose of Article 3
is to prohibit States "[f]rom exposing an individual to serious risks outside its territory by
handing him or her over to another State from which treatment contrary to the Convention might be expected." J. HERMAN BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE: A HANDBOOK ON THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE
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dividual rights are conferred pursuant to treaty provisions, they are
self-executing. 152 As one court noted in concluding that the Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War was selfexecuting:
[I]t is inconsistent with both the language and spirit of the treaty and
with our professed support of its purpose to find that the rights established therein cannot be enforced by the individual POW in a court of
law. After all, the ultimate goal of Geneva III is to ensure humane
treatment of POWs-not to create some amorphous, unenforceable code
of honor among the signatory nations. "It must not be forgotten that
the Conventions have been drawn up first and foremost to protect indi153
viduals, and not to serve State interests.
It similarly would be "inconsistent with both the language and
spirit of the treaty and with [the U.S.'s] professed support of [Article
3's] purpose"'154 to find that the rights established by Article 3 cannot be
enforced by an individual in removal or habeas proceedings.
Moreover, there are domestic procedures available for direct implementation of Article 3 relief. 155 Article 3's command is simple: it
prohibits the removal of a person "where there are substantial grounds
for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture."
156 Such fact-finding is well within the province of immigration and district court judges, and procedures for withholding of removal are available to implement those findings.
Additionally, if a person is not eligible for asylum or withholding of
removal, there is currently no other feasible alternative available to
prevent that person's removal from the U.S. While the INS is currently
AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT, at 125 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers) (1988) (original emphasis omitted).

152. See The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 598-99 (explaining that "A treaty, then,
is a law of the land as an act of congress is, whenever its provisions prescribe a rule by

which the rights of the private citizen or subject may be determined. And when such
rights are of a nature to be enforced in a court of justice, that court resorts to the treaty
for a rule of decision for the case before it as it would to a statute."); cf. Diggs, 555 F.2d at
851 (finding United Nations Security Council Resolutions non-self-executing where
"[they do not by their terms confer rights upon individual citizens; they call upon governments to take certain action").
153. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. at 794 (quotation omitted). But see Tel-Oren, 716 F.2d 774
(J. Bork, concurring) (concluding that the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners is not self-executing).
154. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. at 794.
155. People of Saipan, 502 F.2d at 97.
156. Torture Convention, supra note 4, art. 3; c.f. People of Saipan, 502 F.2d at 97, 99
(determing that substantive rights for the U.S. to "promote the economic advancement
and self-sufficiency" of Micronesian people and to protect them "against the loss of their
lands and resources," held not to be too vague for judicial enforcement: the court can look
"to the relevant principles of international law ... which ha[s] achieved a substantial degree of codification and consensus").
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granting temporary stays of removal for individuals eligible for Torture
Convention relief, the INS will not provide any final relief to Torture
Convention claimants unless formal regulations are promulgated. Even
in the event procedures for final relief are promulgated pursuant to the
pending legislation, that fact alone should not preclude a finding of selfexecution: courts should balance all of these factors to determine the issue. Moreover, if the final regulations attempt to exclude individuals
not eligible for withholding of removal as discussed above, those individuals will find relief from removal to torture only through application
of Article 3 in U.S. courts.
Finally, the "immediate and long-range social consequences"'157 favor a finding of self-execution. The standard under the Torture Convention is not an easy one to meet: it requires a demonstration that
there are substantial grounds for believing that the person would be
tortured upon return, or in other words, that it would be "more likely
than not" that he would be tortured. 158 The social consequences of providing relief to the individuals who can meet this standard do not militate against finding Article 3 to be self-executing. Particularly where
an individual does not constitute a danger to the community, there is no
adverse consequence to the U.S. for granting such relief.
In summary, while courts should not utilize the justiciability approach in determining self-execution because it fails to reflect the Constitutional presumption of self-execution, a claim under Article 3 is indeed a "justiciable" issue that compels a finding that Article 3 is selfexecuting: the purpose of Article 3 is to create an individual right to
avoid removal to torture; there are domestic procedures appropriate for
direct implementation Article 3; there are presently no alternative avenues to obtain final relief under Article 3; and the immediate and longrange social consequences weigh in favor of finding Article 3 selfexecuting.
C.

The PrivateRight of Action Approach

The third approach courts have used to determine self-execution
looks at whether a treaty provision provides a cause of action to an individual. This approach is best illustrated in Tel-Oren v.Libyan Arab
Republic, 15 9 in which a group of Israeli plaintiffs sued the Libyan government, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and other organizations for the PLO's kidnapping, torturing, and killing a number
of persons taken as hostage in exchange for Israel's release of PLO prisoners. The district court dismissed the case, and the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the dismissal. Each circuit judge, however, filed a
157. People of Saipan, 502 F.2d at 97.
158. See 136 CONG. REC., supra note 8, at S17492.
159. 716 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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separate concurring opinion, each expressing widely divergent reasons
for affirmance. Judge Bork's concurring opinion - including his holding that a self-executing treaty must provide a cause of action - has
160
become very controversial.
Judge Bork first concluded that the Alien Tort Act, 28 U.S.C. §
1350, which provides subject matter jurisdiction to the federal courts to
hear claims by aliens for torts "committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States," did not confer a cause of action
on the plaintiffs. 161 Rejecting that statutory basis for a cause of action,
Judge Bork then examined whether the treaties cited by the plaintiffs
created a cause of action, and found that they did not.162
Judge Bork stated: "Absent authorizing legislation, an individual
has access to courts for enforcement of a treaty's provisions only when
the treaty is self-executing, that is, when it expressly or impliedly provides a private right of action." 63 To the extent this holding requires
plaintiffs to assert a federal cause of action to have access to the federal
courts, it is uncontroversial. However, Judge Bork's statement that a
treaty is only self-executing if it provides a private right of action is erroneous, and the Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit cases on which he re16
lied do not stand for that proposition. 4

160. See Anthony D'Amato, What Does Tel-Oren Tell Lawyers? Judge Bork's Concept
of the Law of Nations is Seriously Mistaken, 79 AMER. J. INT'L L. 92 (1985); Michael C.
Small, Enforcing InternationalHuman Rights in Federal Courts: The Alien Tort Statute
and the Separationof Powers, 74 GEO. L. J. 163 (1985).
161. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 801-808 (J. Bork, concurring).
162. These treaties included the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Articles 1 and 2 of the United Nations Charter, the Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, the Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, and the Convention to Prevent and Punish
the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Forms of Crime Against Persons and Related Extortion
That Are of International Significance. See id. at 808-809. Judge Bork did not address
the self-execution of the treaties cited by plaintiffs that had not at that time been ratified
by the U.S., including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
163. Id. at 808.
164. In The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 598-99, the Court noted that a treaty may:
[C]ontain provisions which confer certain rights upon the citizens or subjects of one of the
nations residing in the territorial limits of the other, which partake of the nature of municipal law, and which are capable of enforcement as between private parties in the courts
of the country.... A treaty, then, is a law of the land as an act of congress is, whenever
its provisions prescribe a rule by which the rights of the private citizen or subject may be
determined."
(Emphasis added). But at no point did the Court hold that the cause of action was required to be found in the treaty. The prior D.C. Circuit decision cited by Judge Bork
similarly did not require a treaty to provide a cause of action to be self-executing. See
Diggs, 555 F.2d at 851 (holding that provisions of a United Nations Security Council
Resolution was not self-executing because they did "not by their terms confer rights upon
individual citizens; they call upon governments to take certain actions.") (citing People of
Saipan, 502 F.2d at 101).
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Judge Bork's analysis reveals that, initially, he simply determined
whether the treaties created enforceable rights for individuals by looking at such traditional self-execution factors as whether the language of
the treaties explicitly contemplated implementing legislation.' 65 However, because the plaintiffs in Tel-Oren had no other source for a cause
of action other than the treaties, Judge Bork then examined whether
the treaties granted individuals the right to seek damages for a violation of the treaty provisions, but labeled this second step as determining
"self-execution," as well.' 66 Judge Bork thus erroneously conflated the
issue of self-execution and a cause of action. 167 A number of other
courts have been similarly confused by this equation of the selfexecution issue with whether a treaty provides a cause of action, often
where the only possible cause of action in the case is a treaty. 168
These decisions holding that a treaty must provide a cause of action
should, therefore, be confined to cases in which there is no other cause
of action for plaintiffs in a civil action. None of these decisions hold that
a treaty provision must provide a cause of action in order to be enforceable in court as substantive law if the plaintiffs can demonstrate a distinct cause of action to gain access to the federal courts. In fact, the

165. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 809-810.
166. Id. at 810.
167. See RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 53, § 111 cmt. h (providing "Whether a treaty is self-executing is a question distinct from whether the treaty
creates private rights or remedies.").
168. See Goldstar (Panama), S.A. v. United States, 967 F.2d 965, 968-69 (4th Cir.
1992) (declaring that "Courts will only find a treaty to be self-executing if the document,
as a whole, evidences an intent to provide a private right of action"; holding that the
Hague Convention Respecting the Law and Customs of War on Land is "not self-executing
and, therefore, does not, by itself, create a private right of action for its breach."); Columbia Marine Servs. v. Reffet Ltd., 861 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1988) (providing that "An action
arises under a treaty only when the treaty expressly or by implication provides for a private right of action. The treaty must be self-executing; i.e. it must 'prescribeo rules by
which private rights may be determined."'); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.,
595 F.2d 1287, 1298 (3d Cir. 1979) (requiring that "[U]nless a treaty is self-executing, it
must be implemented by legislation before it gives rise to a private cause of action.");
Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 886 F. Supp. 306, 311 n. 6 (E.D.N.Y.
1995) (noting that "A treaty is self-executing when it expressly or impliedly provides private right of action."), affd on other grounds 101 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 1997); Noriega, 808 F.
Supp. at 798 (noting that "Essentially, a self-executing treaty is one that becomes domestic law of the signatory nation without implementing legislation, and provides a private
right of action to individuals alleging a breach of its provisions"; concluding that the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War is self-executing due to its
purpose of protecting individual rights, and thus enforceable in habeas); Greenpeace USA,
748 F. Supp. at 767 (conflating self-execution with providing a cause of action, but then
deciding that a Convention relating to the disposal of hazardous waste was not selfexecuting because there were "no standards or procedures to judicially enforce the
treaty"); Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F. Supp. 1421, 1425 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (holding that a
treaty is self-executing when it provides a private right of action, but using the "justiciability" factors of People of Saipan to determine whether treaties are self-executing).
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adjudication of constitutional claims provides a useful parallel: the
source of the substantive rights (the Constitution) does not itself create
a cause of action - some other source must be found to assert federal
jurisdiction - but that does not make the Constitution unenforce-

able. 169
While Article 3 is not self-executing under the "private right of action" approach to the issue, that should not prevent individuals from
relying on Article 3 as substantive law to be applied by the court, where
those individuals are in removal proceedings, have been sued, or are
being prosecuted and thus need not demonstrate a cause of action, 170 or
where those individuals have a cause of action in another source, such
as common-law forms of action, habeas corpus, 18 U.S.C. § 1983, or the
Administrative Procedure Act. 171 In removal proceedings, where people
are already before the court and need not demonstrate a cause of action,
Article 3 may be used as substantive law by courts.
Because of the confusion created by Judge Bork's approach to the
self-execution issue, however, the courts should abandon any conflation
between self-execution and whether a treaty provides a cause of action.
Where an individual has no other federal cause of action and brings a
claim under a treaty, it is, of course, appropriate for a court to examine
whether a treaty provides a cause of action. But, where an individual
has an independent cause of action or is already before the court, the
court should not demand that the treaty, also, provide a cause of action
72
in addition to providing enforceable individual rights.
In fact, to the extent that the "private right of action" cases look for
169. See Vizquez, The FourDoctrines,supra note 6, at 719-20 (conceding that "private
parties may maintain an action in court to enforce a treaty provision only if they possess a
right of action. It is a mistake, however, to assume that a treaty may be enforced in court
by private parties only if it confers a private right of action itself. Instead, they typically
impose primary obligations on individuals (including government officials) without expressly addressing matter of enforcement. A treaty that does not itself address private
enforcement is not less judicially enforceable by individuals than constitutional or statutory provisions that do not themselves address private enforcement. The 'private right of
action' to enforce a treaty may have its source in laws other than the treaty itself.") (footnotes omitted).
170. See Vizquez, The Four Doctrines, supra note 6, at 720 & 723 n.117 (citing
Kolovrat v. Oregon, 336 U.S. 187, 187 (1961); Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 145
(1914)).
171. Id. at 723 n.121 (citing, e.g., United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886) (extradition treaty enforced in federal habeas corpus action); Florida v. Furman, 180 U.S.
402, 428 (1901) (treaty enforced in action to remove cloud on legal title); Jordan v.
Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123, 125 (1928) (state mandamus action); see also Vizquez, TreatyBased Rights and Remedies ofIndividuals, supra note 75, at 1143-1156 (discussing § 1983
and the APA as sources for rights of action to enforce treaties).
172. See Vizquez, The Four Doctrines, supra note 6, at 710 (arguing that "Even if a
treaty does not confer a remedy, an otherwise justiciable treaty obligation is, by virtue of
the Supremacy Clause, enforceable in court at the behest of individuals, either defensively
by persons who have standing or offensively by persons who have a right of action.").
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an intent to make treaties enforceable by U.S. courts, rather than look
for the intent not to make them enforceable without implementing legislation, this approach turns the constitutional presumption that treaties are self-executing on its head. 173 Such an approach should be
abandoned.
*D. The ConstitutionalPower Approach
Still other courts have examined whether the subject of a treaty

provision is within the constitutional power of the treaty-makers, and
label the exercise "self-execution," as well. This approach holds that a
treaty is not self-executing if it attempts to do what the Constitution
otherwise relegates to Congress as a whole or to the House of Representatives.174 For instance, treaties that attempt to raise revenue or appropriate money or attempt to make conduct criminal have been held to
be non-self-executing because those subjects are not within the constitutional power of the U.S. Senate. 175 Article 3 does not involve a subject
outside of the constitutional ability of the Senate, however, and would
be held self-executing under this approach.
While it is appropriate for courts to determine whether a treaty
provision is within the constitutional power of the treaty makers before
enforcing such a provision,176 the labeling of this exercise as determining whether a treaty is "self-executing" is misleading. A treaty provision can be "self-executing" in the sense that the provision grants individuals immediately enforceable rights without the need for
implementing legislation, yet not be within the constitutional power of
the treaty makers to grant. The constitutionality of a treaty provision
should thus be an analytically distinct step in enforcing a treaty provision and should not be labeled "self-execution."

173. Id.
174. See Postal, 589 F.2d at 877 (noting that "[Tireaties cannot affect certain subject
matters without implementing legislation. A treaty cannot be self-executing to the extent
that it involves governmental action that under the Constitution can be taken only by the
Congress.") (internal quotations and citation omitted).
175. Vizquez, The Four Doctrines, supra, note 6, at 718, 723 n.108 (citing Hopson v.
Krebs, 622 F.2d 1375, 1380 (9th Cir. 1980) ("Treaty regulations that penalize individuals .... [a]re generally considered to require domestic legislation before they are given any
effect."); Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (raising revenue).
176. As Professor Vizquez notes:
The Supremacy Clause does not eliminate every possible obstacle to a litigant relying on a treaty might face, [such as a challenge to the constitutionality of the treaty,] but it does eliminate one: without the clause, the nation's
treaties would merely have possessed the status of international law enforceable only by states and only in international fora; the Supremacy Clause
gives treaties the character of municipal law enforceable in domestic courts
at the behest of private individuals.
Vizquez, The FourDoctrines,supra, note 6, at 700.
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• E. Conclusion Regarding Self-Execution
In evaluating whether Article 3 of the Torture Convention is selfexecuting, courts should return to the treaty interpretation approach
articulated by the Supreme Court in Foster v. Neilson and United States
v. Percheman. Under that original articulation of the doctrine, a treaty
provision may be enforced by individuals in U.S. courts unless the
treaty language itself demonstrates that the treaty "stipulate[s] for
some future legislative act."177 This is the only approach to the selfexecution problem that adequately reflects the constitutional presumption that a treaty be immediately enforceable as domestic law in the
U.S.
Each of the other analyses articulated by courts to determine selfexecution have substantial flaws that render the doctrine difficult to
apply and inconsistent with the constitutional presumption that treaties are immediately enforceable in U.S. courts. Determining whether a
treaty is self-executing from the unilateral intent of the U.S. treaty
makers, for instance, does not honor that constitutional presumption.
The justiciability approach, as articulated by the Ninth Circuit in People of Saipan, is unprincipled because it largely depends on the judges'
opinions of whether the treaty provision should be enforceable by individuals, and may result in treaties being held unenforceable where the
treaty language clearly calls for immediate enforceability.The right of
action approach, as illustrated by Judge Bork's concurring opinion in
Tel-Oren, erroneously conflates the concept of self-execution with
whether a treaty provides a cause of action, and turns the constitutional
presumption on its head by looking for an explicit intent to make a
treaty enforceable (indeed, for a treaty to provide a cause of action).
And the final approach, in which courts determine whether the
treaty provision is within the constitutional power of the treaty makers
is distinct from the issue of whether a treaty provides enforceable rights
to individuals. The courts should thus return to the original understanding of the self-execution doctrine.
Because of the considerable confusion in the federal courts over
what it means for a treaty provision to be "self-executing," however, it is
advisable for advocates litigating a Torture Convention claim to demonstrate to a court that, under each distinct approach to the problem, Article 3 of the Torture Convention provides individual rights that are
immediately enforceable by U.S. courts. And one important principle
must be kept in mind: regardless of whether Article 3 of the Torture
Convention is found to be self-executing, the U.S. must comply with
it.178

177. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 88-89.
178. See Matter of N-L, [file number redacted] at 8-9 (IJ Nov. 21, 1997) (Imperial, Cal.)
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V. CONCLUSION
Article 3 of the Torture Convention provides a viable alternative to
prevent the removal of an individual who is otherwise ineligible for
asylum or withholding of removal under the domestic immigration
laws. The INS will agree to temporary stays of removal for those individuals who can demonstrate that there are "substantial reasons" to
believe that they will be tortured upon return. Moreover, formal regulations governing final relief under the Torture Convention are being
finalized by the INS, and proposed implementing legislation may be
passed as well.
In addition, it is possible, though substantially more complex, to
raise a claim in immigration or federal court that Article 3 prohibits a
person's removal to a country in which he or she faces torture. The use
of the "customary international law" prohibiting return to torture has
recently met with success in the immigration courts.
Moreover, there are strong arguments available that Article 3 of
the Torture Convention is a "self-executing" treaty provision so that an
individual can raise an Article 3 claim in U.S. courts even if there is no
legislation or regulation implementing Article 3. Under each of the four
approaches to determining self-execution that have developed in the
federal courts, Article 3 should be held to be enforceable by individuals
in U.S. courts. Most significantly, under the original doctrine articulated by the Supreme Court in the early nineteenth century, Article 3
demonstrates an intent of the treaty parties that Article 3 be immediately enforceable in the domestic courts of the treaty parties. Its language indicates that it was intended to grant substantive rights to individuals whether or not domestic legislation was enacted, and, in fact,
there is no language in Article 3 indicating that future legislation is
contemplated to enact the right to non-refoulement. Indeed, Article 3's
direct prohibition that States "shall not" return individuals to torture
(a treaty that is non-self-executing "[ius not a nullity. Even where the Congress has failed
to plainly enact legislation dealing with the treaty, the treaty remains an obligation of the
United State[s] and the supreme law of the land.... An immigration judge cannot act in
violation of a treaty obligation"); see also RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra, note 53, § 111, cmt. h (explaining "If an international agreement or one of its provisions is non-self-executing, the United States is under an international obligation to adjust its laws and institutions as may be necessary to give effect to the agreement.'); Louis
Henkin, Treaties in a Constitutional Democracy, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 406, 425 (1989)
(noting that "The international obligation of the United States under a treaty is immediate, whether a treaty is self-executing or not .... [T]he United States has an obligation to
enact necessary legislation promptly so as to enable it to carry out its obligations under
the treaty."); Damrosch, supra note 132, at 532 (explaining that "U.S. courts generally
follow a rule of attempting to construe domestic sources of law harmoniously with international obligations ....
Even though a non-self-executing declaration purports to tell
courts not to give direct effect to the treaty, it does not go so far as to instruct them to
violate it.").
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indicates that these rights are immediately effective as domestic law.
While Article 3 should be treated as a self-executing treaty provision under the other approaches to determining self-executing, as well,
the federal courts should take this opportunity to clarify the selfexecution doctrine and return to the original understanding of the concept. None of the other approaches adequately reflect the presumption
of the Constitution that treaties are self-executing, and thus must be
abandoned.

578
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APPENDIX I
CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL,
INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT
The States Parties to this Convention,
Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in
the Charter of the United Nations, recognition of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of
freedom, justice and peace in the world,
Recognizing that those rights derive from the inherent dignity ofthe
human person,
Considering the obligation of States under the Charter, in particular Article 55, to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms,
Having regard to article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, both of which provide that no one may be subjected to torture or
to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,
Having regard also to the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by the General Assembly
on 9 December 1975 (resolution 3452 (XXX)),
Desiring to make more effective the struggle against torture and
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment throughout the world,
Have agreed as follows:
Part I
Article 1
1. For the purposes of this Convention, torture means any act by
which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or
a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he
or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or
intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based
on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted
by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public
official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include
pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful
sanctions.
2. This article is without prejudice to any international instrument
or national legislation which does or may contain provisions of wider
application.

1998

A

SELF-EXECUTING TREATY

Article 2
1. Each State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative,
judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction.
2. No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of
waror a threat or war, internal political instability or any otherpublic
emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.
3. An order from a superior officer or a public authority may not be
invoked as a justification of torture.
Article 3
1. No State Party shall expel, return ("refouler") or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing
that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.
2. For the purpose of determining whether there are such grounds,
the competent authorities shall take into account all relevant considerations including, where applicable, the existence in the State concerned
of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human
rights.
Article 4
1. Each State Party shall ensure that all acts of torture are offences
under its criminal law. The same shall apply to an attempt to commit
torture and to an act by any person which constitutes complicity or participation in torture.
2. Each State Party shall make these offences punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account their grave nature.
Article 5
1. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary
to establish its jurisdiction over the offences referred to in article 4 in
the following cases:
(a) When the offences are committed in any territory under its jurisdiction or on board a ship or aircraft registered in that State;
(b) When the alleged offender is a national of that State;
(c) When the victim is a national of that State if that State considers it appropriate.
2. Each State Party shall likewise take such measures aa may be
necessary to establish its jurisdiction over such offences in cases where
the alleged offender is present in any territory under its jurisdiction
and it does not extradite him pursuant to article 8 to any of the States
mentioned in Paragraph .1 of this article.
3. This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with internal law.
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Article 6
1. Upon being satisfied, after an examination of information available to it, that the circumstances so warrant, any State Party in whose
territory a person alleged to have committed any offence referred to in
article 4 is present, shall take him into custody or take other legal
measures to ensure his presence. The custody and other legal measures
shall be as provided in the law of that State but may be continued only
for such time as is necessary to enable any criminal or extradition proceedings to be instituted.
2. Such State shall immediately make a preliminary inquiry into
the facts.
3. Any person in custody pursuant to paragraph 1 of this article
shall be assisted in communicating immediately with the nearest appropriate representative of the State of which he is a national, or, if he
is a stateless person, to the representative of the State where he usually
resides.
4. When a State, pursuant to this article, has taken a person into
custody, it shall immediately notify the States referred to in article 5,
paragraph 1, of the fact that such person is in custody and of the circumstances which warrant his detention. The State which makes the
preliminary inquiry contemplated in paragraph 2 of this article shall
promptly report its findings to the said State and shall indicate whether
it intends to exercise jurisdiction.
Article 7
1. The State Party in territory under whose jurisdiction a person
alleged to have committed any offence referred to in article 4 is found,
shall in the cases contemplated in article 5, if it does not extradite him,
submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.
2. These authorities shall take their decision in the same manner
as in the case of any ordinary offence of a serious nature under the law
of that State. In the cases referred to in article 5, paragraph 2, the
standards of evidence required for prosecution and conviction shall in
no way be less stringent than those which apply in the cases referred to
in article 5, paragraph 1.
3. Any person regarding whom proceedings are brought in connection with any of the offences referred to in article 4 shall be guaranteed
fair treatment at all stages of the proceedings.
Article 8
1. The offences referred to in article 4 shall be deemed to be included as extraditable offences in any extradition treaty existing between States Parties. States Parties undertake to include such offences
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as extraditable offences in every extradition treaty to be concluded between them.
2. If a State Party which makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition from another State
Party with which it has no extradition treaty, it may consider this Convention as the legal basis for extradition in respect of such offenses. Extradition shall be subject to the other conditions provided by the law of
the requested State.
3. States Parties which do not make extradition conditional on the
existence of a treaty shall recognize such offences as extraditable offences between themselves subject to the conditions provided by the law
of the requested state.
4. Such offences shall be treated, for the purpose of extradition between States Parties, as if they had been committed not only in the
place in which they occurred but also in the territories of the States required to establish their jurisdiction in accordance with article 5, paragraph 1.
Article 9
1. States Parties shall afford one another the greatest measure of
assistance in connection with civil proceedings brought in respect of any
of the offences referred to in article 4, including the supply of all evidence at their disposal necessary for the proceedings.
2. States Parties shall carry out their obligations under paragraph
1 of this article in conformity with any treaties on mutual judicial assistance that may exist between them.
Article 10
1. Each State Party shall ensure that education and information
regarding the prohibition against torture are fully included in the
training of law enforcement personnel, civil or military, medical personnel, public officials and other persons who may be involved in the
custody, interrogation or treatment of any individual subjected to any
form of arrest, detention or imprisonment.
2. Each State Party shall include this prohibition in the rules or instructions issued in regard to the duties and functions of any such persons.
Article 11
Each State Party shall keep under systematic review interrogation
rules, instructions, methods and practices as well as arrangements for
the custody and treatment of persons subjected to any form of arrest,
detention or imprisonment in any territory under its jurisdiction, with a
view to preventing any cases of torture.
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Article 12
Each State Party shall ensure that its competent authorities proceed to a prompt and impartial investigation, wherever there it reasonable ground to believe that an act of torture has been committee in any
territory under its jurisdiction.
Article 13
Each State Party shall ensure that any individual who alleges he
has been subjected to torture in any territory under its jurisdiction has
the right to complain to and to have his case promptly and impartially
examined its competent authorities. Steps shall be taken to ensure that
the complainant and witnesses are protected against all ill-treatment or
intimidation as a consequence of his complaint or any evidence given.
Article 14
1. Each State Party shall ensure in its legal system that the victim
of an act of torture obtains redress and has an enforceable right to fair
and adequate compensation including the means for as full rehabilitation as possible. In the event of the death of the victim as a result of an
act of torture, his dependents shall be entitled to compensation.
2. Nothing in this article shall affect any right of the victim or other
person to compensation which may exist under national law.
Article 15
Each State Party shall ensure that any statement which it established to have been made as a result of torture shall not be invoked as
evidence in any proceedings, except against a person accused of torture
as evidence that the statement was made.
Article 16
1. Each State Party shall undertake to prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment which do not amount to torture as defined in article 1,
when such acts are committed by or at the instigation of or with the
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an
official capacity. In particular, the obligations contained in articles 10,
11, 12 and 13 shall apply with the substitution for references to torture
or references to other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment.
2. The provisions of this Convention are without prejudice to the
provisions of any other international instrument or national law which
prohibit cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment or
which relate to extradition or expulsion.
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Part II
Article 17
1. There shall be established a Committee against Torture (hereinafter referred to as the Committee) which shall carry out the functions
hereinafter provided. The Committee shall consist of 10 experts of high
moral standing and recognized competence in the field of human rights,
who shall serve in their personal capacity. The experts shall be elected
by the States Parties, consideration being given to equitable geographical distribution and to the usefulness of the participation of some persons having legal experience.
2. The members of the Committee shall be elected by secret ballot
from a list of persons nominated by States Parties. Each State Party
may nominate one person from among its own nationals. States Parties
shall bear in mind the usefulness of nominating persons who are also
members of the Human Rights Committee established under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and are willing to serve
on the Committee against Torture.
3. Elections of the members of the Committee shall be held at biennial meetings of States Parties convened by the Secretary-General of
the United Nations. At those meetings, for which two thirds of the
States Parties shall constitute a quorum, the persons elected to the
Committee shall be those who obtain the largest number of votes and
an absolute majority of the votes of the representatives of States Parties
present and voting.
4. The initial election shall be held no later than six months after
the date of the entry into force of this Convention. At least four months
before the date of each election, the Secretary-General of the United
Nations shall address a letter to the States Parties inviting them to
submit their nominations within three months. The Secretary-General
shall prepare a list in alphabetical order of all persons thus nominated,
indicating the States Parties which have nominated them, and shall
submit it to the States Parties.
5. The members of the Committee shall be elected for a term of four
years. They shall be eligible for re-election if renominated. However, the
term of five of the members elected at the first election shall expire at
the end of two years; immediately after the first election the names of
these five members shall be chosen by lot by the chairman of the meeting referred to in paragraph 3.
6. If a member of the Committee dies or resigns or for any other
cause can no longer perform his Committee duties, the State Party
which nominated him shall appoint another expert from among its nationals to serve for the remainder of his term, subject to the approval of
the majority of the States Parties. The approval shall be considered
given unless half or more of the States Parties respond negatively
within six weeks after having been informed by the Secretary-General
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of the United Nations of the proposed appointment.
7. States Parties shall be responsible for the expenses of the members of the Committee while they are in performance of Committee duties.
Article 18
1. The Committee shall elect its officers for a term of two years.
They may be re-elected.
2. The Committee shall establish its own rules of procedure, but
these rules shall provide, inter alia, that
(a) Six members shall constitute a quorum;
(b) Decisions of the Committee shall be made by a majority vote of
the members present. 3 . The Secretary-General of the United Nations
shall provide the necessary staff and facilities for the effective performance of the functions of the Committee under this Convention.
4. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene the
initial meeting of the Committee. After its initial meeting, the Committee shall meet at such times as shall be provided in its rules of procedure.
5. The State Parties shall be responsible for expenses incurred in
connection with the holding of meetings of the States Parties and of the
Committee, including reimbursement of the United Nations for any expenses, such as the cost of staff and facilities, incurred by the United
Nations pursuant to paragraph 3 above.
Article 19
1. The States Parties shall submit to the Committee, through the
Secretary- General of the United Nations, reports on the measures they
have taken to give effect to their undertakings under this Convention,
within one year after the entry into force of this Convention for the
State Party concerned. Thereafter the States Parties shall submit supplementary reports every four years on any new measures taken, and
such other reports as the Committee may request.
2. The Secretary-General shall transmit the reports to all States
Parties.
3. Each report shall be considered by the Committee which may
make such comments or suggestions on the report as it considers appropriate, and shall forward these to the State Party concerned. That
State Party may respond with any observations it chooses to the Committee.
4. The Committee may, at its discretion, decide to include any
comments or suggestions made by it in accordance with paragraph 3,
together with the observations thereon received from the State Party
concerned, in its annual report made in accordance with article 2 . If so
requested by the State Party concerned, the Committee may also include a copy of the report submitted under paragraph 1.
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Article 20
1. If the Committee receives reliable information which appears to
it to contain well-founded indications that torture is being systematically practised in the territory of a State Party, the Committee shall invite that State Party to co-operate in the examination of the information and to this end to submit observations with regard to the
information concerned.
2. Taking into account any observations which may have been
submitted by the State Party concerned as well as any other relevant
information available to it, the Committee may, if it decides that this is
warranted, designate one or more of its members to make a confidential
inquiry and to report to the Committee urgently.
3. If an inquiry is made in accordance with paragraph 2, the Committee shall seek the co-operation of the State Party concerned. In
agreement with that State Party, such an inquiry may include a visit to
its territory.
4. After examining the findings of its member or members submitted in accordance with paragraph 2, the Committee shall transmit these
findings to the State Party concerned together with any comments or
suggestions which seem appropriate in view of the situation.
5. All the proceedings of the Committee referred to in paragraphs 1
to 4 of this article shall be confidential, and at all stages of the proceedings the co-operation of the State Party shall be sought. After such
proceedings have been completed with regard to an inquiry made in accordance with paragraph 2, the Committee may, after consultations
with the State Party concerned, decide to include a summary account of
the results of the proceedings in its annual report made in accordance
with article 24.
Article 21
1. A State Party to this Convention may at any time declare under
this article 3 that it recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications to the effect that a State Party
claims that another State Party is not fulfilling its obligations under
this Convention. Such communications may be received and considered
according to the procedures laid down in this article only if submitted
by a State Party which has made a declaration recognizing in regard to
itself the competence of the Committee. No communication shall be
dealt with by the Committee under this article if it concerns a State
Party which has not made such a declaration. Communications received
under this article shall be dealt with in accordance with the following
procedure:
(a) If a State Party considers that another State Party is not giving
effect to the provisions of this Convention, it may, by written communication, bring the matter to the attention of that State Party. Within
three months after the receipt of the communication the receiving State
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shall afford the State which sent the communication an explanation or
any other statement in writing clarifying the matter which should include, to the extent possible and pertinent, references to domestic procedures and remedies taken, pending, or available in the matter.
(b) If the matter is not adjusted to the satisfaction of both States
Parties concerned within six months after the receipt by the receiving
State of the initial communication, either State shall have the right to
refer the matter to the Committee by notice given to the Committee and
to the other State.
(c) The Committee shall deal with a matter referred to it under this
article only after it has ascertained that all domestic remedies have
been invoked and exhausted in the matter, in conformity with the generally recognized principles of international law. This shall not be the
rule where the application of the remedies it unreasonably prolonged or
is unlikely to bring effective relief to the person who is the victim of the
violation of this Convention.
(d) The Committee shall hold closed meetings when examining
communications under this article.
(e) Subject to the provisions of subparagraph (c), the Committee
shall make available its good offices to the States Parties concerned
with a view to a friendly solution of the matter on the basis of respect
for the obligations provided for in the present Convention. For this purpose, the Committee may, when appropriate, set up an ad hoc conciliation commission.
(f) In any matter referred to it under this article, the Committee
may call upon the States Parties concerned, referred to in subparagraph
(b), to supply any relevant information.
(g) The States Parties concerned, referred to in subparagraph (b),
shall have the right to be represented when the matter is being considered by the Committee and to make submissions orally and/or in writing.
(h) The Committee shall, within 12 months after the date of receipt
of notice under subparagraph (b), submit a report.
(i) If a solution within the terms of subparagraph (e) is reached,
the Committee shall confine its report to a brief statement of the
facts and of the solution reached.
(ii) If a solution within the terms of subparagraph (e) is not
reached, the Committee shall confine its report to a brief statement of the facts; the written submissions and record of the oral
submissions made by the States Parties concerned shall be attached to the report. In every matter, the report shall be communicated to the States Parties concerned.
2. The provisions of this article shall come into force when five
States Parties to this Convention have made declarations under paragraph 1 of this article. Such declarations shall be deposited by the
States Parties with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who
shall transmit copies thereof to the other States Parties. A declaration
may be withdrawn at any time by notification to the Secretary-General.
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Such a withdrawal shall not prejudice the consideration of any matter
which is the subject of a communication already transmitted under this
article; no further communication by any State Party shall be received
under this article after the notification of withdrawal of the declaration
has been received by the Secretary-General, unless the State Party concerned has made a new declaration.
Article 22
1. A State Party to this Convention may at any time declare under
this article that it recognizes the competence of the Committee to re
eive and consider communications from or on behalf of individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by a State
Party of the provisions of the Convention. No communication shall be
received by the Committee if it concerns a State Party to the Convention which has not made such a declaration.
2. The Committee shall consider inadmissible any communication
under this article which is anonymous, or which it considers to be an
abuse of the right of submission of such communications or to be incompatible with the provisions of this Convention.
3. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 2, the Committee shall
bring any communication submitted to it under this article to the attention of the State Party to this Convention which has made a declaration
under paragraph 1 and is alleged to be violating any provisions of the
Convention. Within six months, the receiving State shall submit to the
Committee written explanations or statements clarifying the matter
and the remedy, if any, that may have been taken by that State.
4. The Committee shall consider communications received under
this article in the light of all information made available to it by or on
behalf of the individual and by the State Party concerned/
5. The Committee shall not consider any communication from an
individual under this article unless it has ascertained that:
(a) The same matter has not been, and is not being examined under
another procedure of international investigation or settlement;
(b) The individual has exhausted all available domestic remedies;
this shall not be the rule where the application of the remedies it unreasonably prolonged or is unlikely to bring effective relief to the person
who is the victim of the violation of this Convention.
6. The Committee shall hold closed meetings when examining
communications under this article.
7. The Committee shall forward its views to the State Party concerned and to the individual.
8. The provisions of this article shall come into force when five
States Parties to this Convention have made declarations under paragraph 1 of this article. Such declarations shall be deposited by the
States Parties with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who
shall transmit parties thereof to the other States Parties. A declaration
may be withdrawn at any time by notification to the Secretary-General.
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Such a withdrawal shall not prejudice the consideration of any matter
which is the subject of a communication already transmitted under this
article; no further communication by or on behalf of an individual shall
be received under this article after the notification of withdrawal of the
declaration has been received by the Secretary-General, unless the
State Party concerned has made a new declaration.
Article 23
The members of the Committee, and of the ad hoc conciliation
commissions which may be appointed under article 21, paragraph 1 (e),
shall be entitled to the facilities, privileges and immunities of experts
on missions for the United Nations as laid down in the relevant sections
of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.
Article 24
The Committee shall submit an annual report on its activities under this Convention to the States Parties and to the General Assembly
of the United Nations.
Part III
Article 25
1. This Convention is open for signature by all States. 2. This Convention is subject to ratification. Instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Article 2
This Convention is open to accession by all States. Accession shall
be effected by the deposit of an instrument of accession with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Article 27
1. This Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after
the date of the deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the twentieth instrument of ratification or accession.
2. For each State ratifying this Convention or acceding to it after
the deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification or accession, the
Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after the date of
the deposit of its own instrument of ratification or accession.
Article 28
1. Each State may, at the time of signature or ratification of this
Convention or accession thereto, declare that it does not recognize the
competence of the Committee provided for in article 20.
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2. Any State Party having made a reservation in accordance with
paragraph 1 of this article may, at any time, withdraw this reservation
by notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Article 29
1. Any State Party to this Convention may propose an amendment
and file it with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The Secre
tary-General shall thereupon communicate the proposed amendment to
the States Parties to this Convention with a request that they notify
him whether they favour a conference of States Parties for the purpose
of considering and voting upon the proposal. In the event that within
four months from the date of such communication at least one third of
the State Parties favours such a conference, the Secretary-General shall
convene the conference under the auspices of the United Nations. Any
amendment adopted by a majority of the States Parties present and
voting at the conference shall be submitted by the Secretary-General to
all the States Parties for acceptance.
2. An amendment adopted in accordance with paragraph 1 shall enter into force when two thirds of the States Parties to this Convention
have notified the Secretary-General of the United Nations that they
have accepted it in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.
3. When amendments enter into force, they shall be binding on
those States Parties which have accepted them, other States Parties
still being bound by the provisions of this Convention and any earlier
amendments which they have accepted.
Article 30
1. Any dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the
interpretation or application of this Convention which cannot be settled
through negotiation, shall, at the request of one of them, be submitted
to arbitration. If within six months from the date of the request for arbitration the Parties are unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration, any one of those Parties may refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice by request in conformity with the Statute of the
Court.
2. Each State may at the time of signature or ratification of this
Convention or accession thereto, declare that it does not consider itself
bound by the preceding paragraph. The other States Parties shall not
be bound by the preceding paragraph with respect to any State Party
having made such a reservation.
3. Any State Party having made a reservation in accordance with
the preceding paragraph may at any time withdraw this reservation by
notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
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Article 31
1 A State Party may denounce this Convention by written notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Denunciation becomes effective one year after the date of receipt of the notification by
the Secretary- General.
2. Such a denunciation shall not have the effect of releasing the
State Party from its obligations under this Convention in regard to any
act or omission which occurs prior to the date at which the denunciation
becomes effective. Nor shall denunciation prejudice in any way the continued consideration of any matter which is already under consideration by the Committee prior to the date at which the denunciation becomes effective.
3. Following the date at which the denunciation of a State Party
becomes effective, the Committee shall not commence consideration of
any new matter regarding that State.
Article 32
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall inform all members of the United Nations and all States which have signed this Convention or acceded to it, or the following particulars:
(a) Signatures, ratifications and accessions under articles 25 and
26;
(b) The date of entry into force of this Convention under article 27,
and the date of the entry into force of any amendments under article 29;
(c) Denunciations under article 31.
Article 33
1. This Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French,
Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in
the archives of the United Nations.
2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit certified copies of this Convention to all States.
On February 4, 1985, the Convention was opened for signature at
United Nations Headquarters in New York. At that time, representatives of the following countries signed it: Afghanistan, Argentina, Belgium, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Finland,
France, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Senegal,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Uruguay. Subsequently, signatures
were received from Venezuela on February 15, from Luxembourg and
Panama on February 22, from Austria on March 14, and from the
United Kingdom on March 15, 1985.

Redressing Impunity for Human Rights
Violations: The Universal Declaration and the
Search for Accountability
CHRISTOPHER C. JOYNER

I. INTRODUCTION

This year celebrates the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,' a document that is regarded both as the
wellspring and cornerstone of modern international human rights law.
The Universal Declaration, though not intended to be legally binding,
aims to set "a common standard of achievement for all peoples and nations."2 And that it surely does. Its thirty articles cover a raft of human
rights and fundamental freedoms, ranging from the liberty and security
of the person, equality before the law, due process, prohibitions against
torture and arbitrary interference with privacy, to civil and political
rights that protect freedom of movement, asylum, expression, conscience and religion, and assembly. There are in addition economic and
social rights, such as the rights to work and equal pay and to social security and education.
The Universal Declaration clearly is not an enforceable international instrument. Yet, the fact remains that its contents have subsequently become regarded as binding customary international law, 3 or as
embodying general principles of law, 4 or as conventional law by virtue
of being codified through specific provisions in specific international
treaty instruments. 5
Nevertheless, underpinning the proclaimed rights in the Universal
Declaration is a critical provision that tends to be passed over in most
treatments of human rights law. This provision is Article 8, which in
1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III 1948), Dec. 10, 1948.
2. Id. preamble.
3. See RICHARD B. LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW,

POLICY AND PRACTICE 86-163 (1991).
4. Hurst Hannum, Human Rights, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 138 (Christopher C. Joyner ed., 1997).
5. See OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 1002 (R.Y. Jennings & A.D. Watts eds.,
9th ed. 1992); MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 248-49 (1993).
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full emphatically asserts the following: "Everyone has the right to an
effective remedy by the competent national tribunal for acts violating
6
the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law."
This is the effective remedies provision that explicitly intends to protect
the rights of the victim. Each person therefore possesses and can exercise the right to obtain redress for harm done by public or private
agents to him or her. The premise here is that no person is above the
law. Every person should have recourse to protection under the law, to
equal protection against discrimination of his or her fundamental human rights, and to justice in seeking juridical remedies under the law.
Furthermore, in the event that the fundamental human rights of a person are violated, there remains the overarching right to justice. States
are obligated to investigate those violations, take appropriate measures
against the perpetrators, ensure that they are prosecuted, and furnish
the victims with effective remedies.
Such remedies for victims have not, in fact, often been attained.
Human rights have been grossly violated, on massive scales, usually
leaving as stark legacies the scars of profound suffering for victims and
scabs of impunity for perpetrators. This realization points up the main
purpose of this paper, namely, to examine the notion of allowing impunity for serious violators of fundamental human rights as opposed to
the obligation of obtaining effective remedies for victims as affirmed
under Article 8 of the Universal Declaration. To address this theme,
Part II section briefly treats the scope of impunity, as it appraises the
contemporary system of international criminal law that prohibits impunity for human rights violations and supplies the legal basis for governments to comply with and enforce the obligation for juridical redress
in Article 8 of the Universal Declaration. Part III deals with the nature
of impunity, specifically by exploring the rationales concerning why
governments do so little in prosecuting and punishing persons who have
committed the most horrendous of crimes. The availability under national and international law of various accountability mechanisms for
bringing alleged perpetrators to justice is treated in Part IV, as is how
the need for justice squares with the need for national reconciliation.
Part V appraises the prospects for obtaining Article 8 effective remedies
through competent tribunals (inclusive of international courts), as
guided by principles designed to ensure restitution, compensation and
rehabilitation for victims of gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the final section proffers some conclusions for
reflective consideration.

6. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 1, art. 8.
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II.

THE SCOPE OF IMPUNITY

In the last half century, violent internal conflicts and tyrannical regimes have victimized millions of people throughout the world. 7 One
authoritative report estimates that from World War II through 1996, at
least 220 non-international conflicts involving civil war or oppressive
regimes may have killed as many as 86 million people. 8 That victimization has included the most serious violations of fundamental human
rights - genocide, crimes against humanity, non-juridical executions,
torture, arbitrary arrests and unlawful detentions.
The scope of these high crimes is monstrous indeed. Yet, there
have been relatively few prosecutions and only scarce accountability,
either nationally or internationally for these grave violations of human
rights and the resultant pervasive suffering. In fact, only a handful of
remedies for these massive human rights violations have been attempted, and these have come as piecemeal and ad hoc offerings mainly
during the past decade. 9 Two international investigatory commissions o
7. Rudolph Rummel has recently calculated that during the present century, civil
wars, internal conflicts and tyrannical regimes have caused some 170 million deaths, as
compared to 33 million persons killed in international military conflicts. RUDOLPH J.
RUMMEL, DEATH BY GOVERNMENT 9 (1994).
8. Jennifer Balint, An Empirical Study of Conflict, Conflict Victimization, and Legal
Redress, REINING IN IMPUNITY FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES AND SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF
FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS, 14 NOUVELLES ETUDES PENALES 1998 101, 107 (Christopher C. Joyner ed. 1998) [hereinafter REIGNING IN IMPUNITY]. See also M. Cherif Bassiouni, Considerationson Peace and Justice and the Imperative of Accountability for International Crimes and Consistent and Widespread Violations of Fundamental Human
Rights, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, at 10 (Autumn 1996) [hereinafter Bassiouni], reprinted in REINING IN IMPUNITY, at 45, 46.
9. See Cherif Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The Need
to Establish a PermanentInternationalCriminal Court, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 11 (1997).
10. For Bosnia, see Report of the Special Rapporteur to the Commission on Human
Rights of 28 August 1992, U.N. Doc. EICN.4/1992/S-1/9; Report of the Special Rapporteur
to the Commission on Human Rights of 27 October 1992, U.N. Doc. ECN.411992/S-10; Report of the Special Rapporteur to the Commission of Human Rights to the Forty Seventh
Session of the GeneralAssembly of 17 November 1992, U.N. Doc. A147/666-S/24809; Report
of the Special Rapporteur to the Commission on Human Rights to the Economic and Social
Council of 10 February 1993, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1993/50. See The Final Report of the
Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992),
U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (1994) [hereinafter Final Report of
the Commission of Experts]; Final Report, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., Annexes, U.N. Doc.
S/1994/674/Add.2 (1994). See also M. Cherif Bassiouni, The United Nations Commission
of Experts EstablishedPursuantto Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), 88 AM. J. INT'L
L. 784-805 (1994); M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Commission of Experts EstablishedPursuant
to Security Council Resolution 780: Investigating Violations of InternationalHumanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia, 5 CRIM. L. F. 279-340 (1994). For Rwanda, see Letter
Dated 1 October 1994 from the Secretary-GeneralAddressed to the President of the Security Council, S/1994/1125, transmittingthe Commission of Experts' Preliminary Report
(Oct. 1, 1994); Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda, UN Doc.
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and two special tribunals were respectively established for the former
Yugoslavia 1 and Rwanda. 12 An international truth commission was
13
held for El Salvador, although it failed to produce any prosecutions.
Two national prosecution programs were undertaken following the civil
conflicts in Ethiopia 14 and Rwanda. 15 Certain national prosecutions
were undertaken in Argentina, 16 and a national inquiry commission
was set up in Chile. 17 In South Africa, a special body known as the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission was established, which may yet
produce some prosecutions.' 8 Finally, some East and Central European
countries adopted special "lustration" laws to preclude select people in
the former communist regimes from holding public office, or participating in politics.' 9 Ideally, impunity for these most heinous of acts -

E/CN.411995/7 (June 28, 1994); Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda, UN
Doc. E/CN.4t1995/12 (Aug. 12, 1994).
11. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
adopted at New York, May 25, 1993, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg.,
at 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), 32 I.L.M. 1159 [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
12. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, adopted at New York,
Nov. 8, 1994, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955
(1994), 33 I.L.M. 1598 [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
13. See FROM MADNESS TO HOPE: THE 12-YEAR WAR IN EL SALVADOR, REPORT OF
THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON THE TRUTH FOR EL SALVADOR, U.N. Doc. S/25500
(1993).

14. See Girma Wakjira, National Prosecution: The Ethiopian Experience, in REINING
IN IMPUNITY, supra note 8, at 189.

15. See generally United Nations Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda Status
Report, The Administration of Justice in Post-Genocide Rwanda (June 1996). See also
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Prosecuting Genocide in Rwanda: The ICTR and
National Trials 47-66 (1997).
16. See NUNCA MAS, INFORME DE LA COMISION SOBRE LA DESAPARICION DE PERSONAS

(1985); CAROLOS SANTIAGO NINO, RADICAL EVIL ON TRIAL (1996).
17. See

REPORT

OF

THE

CHILEAN

NATIONAL

COMMISSION

ON

TRUTH

AND

RECONCILIATION (Philip E. Berryman trans., 1993). See Edward C. Snyder, The Dirty Legal War: Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Chile 1973-1995, 2 TULSA J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 253 (1995).
18. See Ziyad Motala, The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, the
Constitution and InternationalLaw, 28 COMP. & INT. L. J. S. AFRICA 338 (1995); Lynn
Berat & Yossi Shain, Retribution or Truth-telling in South Africa? Legacies of the TransitionalPhase, 20 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 163 (1995).
19. See generally TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: How EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON

WITH FORMER REGIMES (Neil J. Kritz ed., Vol. III. Law, Rulings and Reports 1995); Maria
Lon, Lustration and Truth Claims: Unfinished Revolutions in Central Europe, 20 L. &
SOC. INQUIRY 1, 117 (1995); Adrenne M. Quill, To Prosecute or Not to Prosecute:Problems
Encountered in the Prosecutionof Former Communist Officials in Germany, Czechoslovakia, and the Czech Republic, 7 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 165 (1996); Mark S. Ellis,
Purging the Past: The Current State of Lustration Laws in the Former Communist Bloc,
59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 181 (1996); Ved Nanda, Civil and Political Sanctions as an
Accountability Mechanism for Massive Violations of Human Rights, in REINING IN
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war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity - should not be tolerated under any circumstances. In an ideal world, governments would
adopt international agreements in which they pledge not to use impunity from prosecution by international tribunals as a bargaining chip in
negotiations to facilitate a transfer of power from one government to a
successor regime. But, we do not live in an ideal world. Political considerations are inevitable - indeed, they are inescapable - and will affect
the international response to high crimes involving human rights violations.
The rather modest efforts at fact-finding, prosecution and punishment hardly measure up to the massive human rights victimization
that has occurred since World War II. Indeed, the vast extent of human
rights deprivations that has taken so many millions of lives profoundly
violates the inherent dignity and the equal and inalienable rights of
persons affirmed for protection in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. 20 No less egregious, though, is that nearly all the persons who
perpetrated these gross violations of human rights have gone unpunished. This situation personifies the pervasive practice of impunity, of
letting the guilty get away with murder, literally, scot-free.
III. THE NATURE OF IMPUNITY
One authoritative United Nations rapporteur has defined impunity
as "the impossibility, de jure or de facto, of bringing the perpetrators of
human rights violations to account - whether in criminal, civil, administrative or disciplinary proceedings - since they are not subject to
any inquiry that might lead to them being accused, arrested, tried and
if found guilty, convicted." 21 Impunity, then, means exemption or free-

IMPUNITY, supra note 8, at 313.

20. To wit, relevant provisions in the Universal Declaration that were grossly violated would, inter alia, include the following: "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and
security of person." (article 3); "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment." (article 5); "Everyone has the right to recognition
everywhere as a person before the law." (article 6); "All are equal before the law and are
entitled without discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal
protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination." (article 7); and, "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
arrest, detention or exile." (article 9). Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note
1.
21. Question of the Impunity of Perpetratorsof Violations of Human Rights (civil and
political rights): Revised final Report prepared by Mr. Joinet, Pursuant to SubCommission Resolution 1996/119, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities, 49th Sess., Item 10, (June 26, 1997) UN Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20, at 3, reprinted in REINING IN IMPUNITY, supra note 8, at 501-24.
[hereinafter the Joinet Principles] (subsequent citations refer to the reprinted text).
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dom from punishment and connotes the lack of effective remedies for
victims of crimes. Within the context of human rights law, impunity
implies the lack of or failure to apply remedies for victims of human
22
rights violations.
In the grand scheme of things, one might be tempted to ask, "So
what? Why should the international community care about impunity
and its relevance for the human rights situation in a particular state?
Why should that situation involving the internal affairs of a some state
be a grave concern of other peoples, in other states?" The answers to
these queries are bound up in the kinds of crimes and the degree of
violations that escape prosecution. Usually these acts are the vilest of
human rights deprivations. They include violations of the right to life,
i.e., extralegal executions, "disappearances," and massacres; violations
of personal integrity, including torture and other physical injuries; and,
unlawful restrictions on personal liberty, such as arbitrary detention,
illicit search and seizure, and unwarranted arrest.
In short, these are acts that violate the principles and protections
most sacred to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. No less repugnant is that the perpetrators of these depredations often go unpunished. If contemporary international society is to be governed by the
rule of law, rather than by the savagery of men, those who perpetrate
these gross violations of human rights must be held personally accountable for their unlawful acts. Article 8 of the Universal Declaration
mandates this action, and subsequent international instruments of
modern human rights law have codified the demand alleged offenders
22. See Progress Report on the Question of Impunity of Perpetratorsof Human Rights
Violations, prepared by Mr. Guisse and Mr. Joinet, pursuant to Sub-Commission Resolution 1992/23, Sub-Commission on Prevention and Protection of all Minorities, 45th Sess.,
Item 10(a), (July 19, 1993) EICN.4/Sub.2/1993/6; PreliminaryReport on Opposition to the
Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights Violations (economic, social and cultural
rights), prepared by Mr. Guisse and Mr. Joinet, pursuant to Sub-Commission Resolution
1993/37, Sub-Commission on Prevention and Protection of all Minorities, 46th Sess., Item
10(a), (June 22, 1994) E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/ll; ProgressReport on the Question of the Impunity of Perpetratorsof Violations of Human Rights (civil and political rights), prepared
by Mr. Joinet, pursuant to Sub-Commission Resolution 1994/34, Subcommission on Prevention and Protection of all Minorities, 47th Sess., Item 10, (June 28, 1995)
E/CN.4ISub.2/1995/18; Question of the Impunity of Perpetratorsof Violations of Human
Rights (civil and political rights): Final Report prepared by Mr. Joinet, Pursuant to SubCommission Resolution 1995/35, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities, 48th Sess., Item 10, (June 29, 1996) UN Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/18, at 8; Joinet Principles, supra note 21. For analyses that call for
combating impunity, see generally IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

AND PRACTICE 14 (Naomi Roht-Arriaza ed., 1995); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Combating Impunity: Some Thoughts on the Way Forward,59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 93 (Autumn 1996)
[hereinafter Roht-Arriaza, Combating Impunity]; Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts:
The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537
(1991) [hereinafter Orentlicher, Settling Accounts].

1998

REDRESSING IMPUNITY

be prosecuted.

IV. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR ACCOUNTABILITY
The corpus of international law that has evolved since 1945 clearly
imposes obligations upon government parties to investigate and prosecute suspected violators of humanitarian law (i.e., the laws of war) and
other high human rights crimes (including genocide, torture, and crimes
against humanity). In this way, these international treaty instruments
establish a legal framework designed to combat impunity, as they prohibit certain offenses that violate human rights norms and obligate either the national or international prosecution of offenders.

A. The Nuremberg Precedent
International codification and consensus since the Second World
War have confirmed war crimes as international criminal acts, thus
permitting states to define and punish those extraterritorial crimes
wherever, and by whomever, they are committed. 23 Governments have
seen fit to allocate to the international community legal competence to
deal with crimes designated to have an international character, perpetrated by certain persons, during a specified time period, in a given territory.
The legal competence to deal with high crimes involving human
rights violations evolved from the precedent set down by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, 24 the Article VI provisions of its
Charter, 25 and the Nuremberg Trials that followed in 1945. This legal

23. See Christopher C. Joyner, Enforcing Human Rights Standards in the Former
Yugoslavia: The Case for an International War Crimes Tribunal, 22 DENV. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 235 (1994) [hereinafter Joyner, Enforcing Human Rights].
24. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, Charter of the International Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, E.A.S.
No. 472, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter Charter of the International Tribunal]. See also 13
DEP'T OF STATE BULL. at 222 (1945). For the relevance of the Nuremberg Court to the
International Tribunal for war crimes in Bosnia, see the discussion in Joyner, Enforcing
Human Rights, supranote 23, at 237-255.
25. Key among the Nuremberg Charter's central provisions was its Article VI, which
defined the jurisdiction of the court in these terms:
The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within the jurisdiction
of the Tribunal for which there shall be individual responsibility:
(a) Crimes against the Peace: Namely, planning, preparation, initiation, or
waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties,
agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy
for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing;
(b) War crimes: Namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such viola-
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legacy has been reaffirmed during the 1990s in the statutes of two special international tribunals created by the United Nations Security
Council to prosecute and try alleged offenders for high crimes and hu27
26
man rights violations in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
Persons may be prosecuted under contemporary international law
for four groups of high human rights criminal offenses, namely: (1)
grave breaches of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949;28 (2) violations
of the laws or customs of war; (3) acts of genocide; 29 and (4) crimes
against humanity. 30 These acts have been stipulated by the interna-

tions shall include, but shall not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or from any other purpose of civilian population of or
in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons
on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton
destruction of cities, town or villages, or devastation not justified by military
necessity;
(c) Crimes against Humanity: Namely, murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of
the country where perpetrated.
Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any persons in
execution of such plan ....
Charter of the International Tribunal at Nuremberg, supra note 24, art. VI.
26. ICTY Statute, supra note 11.
27. ICTR Statute, supra note 12.
28. The Four Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949 are the: Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and the Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva Convention No. 1]; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention No. II]; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention No. III]; Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 28 [hereinafter Geneva Convention No. IV] [hereinafter collectively Geneva Conventions of 1949].
29. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 1 U.N. GAOR Res. 96 (Dec. 11, 1946) 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. See also ICTY Statute, supra note 12, art. 4; ICTR Statute, supra note 12, art.
2.
30. See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of
the European Axis (London Charter), signed at London, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82
U.N.T.S. 279, 3 Bevans 1238, entered into force Aug. 8, 1945; Control Council Law No. 10
(Punishment of Persons Guilty of War crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity), adopted at Berlin, Dec. 20, 1945, Official Gazette of the Control Council for Germany, No. 3, Berlin, Jan. 31, 1946, reprinted in BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, 1 AN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A STEP TOWARD WORLD PEACE 488 (1980) [hereinafter
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tional community as criminal offenses against all humankind, from
which there ought to be no impunity. Perpetrators of these horrendous
acts must be prosecuted and held accountable for their crimes.
B. Grave Breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions
Perhaps the clearest articulation of these offenses is found in the
four Geneva Conventions of 1949, in particular the common Article
(50/51/130/147) of those instruments. 31 This provision defines the
"grave breaches" of international humanitarian law that states are required to punish. 32 Common Article 50/51/130/147 of the conventions
also prescribes minimum rules applicable to situations of armed conflict

FERENCZ]; International Military Tribunal for the Far East, proclaimed at Tokyo, Jan. 19,
1946 and amended Apr. 26, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589, 4 Bevans 20; Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal (United
Nations General Assembly Resolution), adopted at New York, Dec. 11, 1946, U.N.G.A.
Res. 95(I), U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1 (1946); Principles of International Law Recognized in the
Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, adopted at Geneva, July 29, 1950, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (no. 12), at 11, U.N. Doc. A11316(1950), 44
AM.J.INT'L L. 126 (1950); Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind: Titles and texts of articles on the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind adopted by the International Law Commission at its forty-eighth session (1996),
U.N. GAOR Int'l Law Comm., 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.532 (1996), July 15, 1996,
revised by U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.532/corr.1, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/L.532/corr.3; Convention on
the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, opened for signature at New York, Nov. 26, 1968, G.A. Res. 2391, U.N. GAOR,
23d Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 40, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2391 (1968), 754 U.N.T.S. 73, 8 I.L.M. 68,
entered into force Nov. 1970; European Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory
Limitations to Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes (Inter-European), signed at
Strasbourg, Jan. 25, 1974, Europe. T.S. No. 82, 13 I.L.M. 540, not yet entered into force;
ICTY Statute, supra note 11, at art. 5; ICTR Statute, supra note 12, at art. 2.
31. As defined in the Geneva Conventions of 1949, supra note 28, certain "grave
breaches" are crimes committed against persons or property protected by the conventions
and include:
(i) Willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment of protected persons;
(ii) Willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health of
protected persons;
(iii) Taking of hostages and extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly;
(iv) Unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected
person;
(v) Compelling a prisoner of war or other protected person to serve in the
forces of a hostile power; and,
(vi) Willfully depriving a prisoner of war or other protected person of the
rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in the Geneva Conventions.
Id. common arts. 50/51/130/147, respectively.
32. Geneva Conventions of 1949, supranote 28, at common art. 3.

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 26:4

that are not international in character. Commission of a grave breach
warrants individual criminal liability, and governments party are
bound by the corresponding duty to prosecute accused offenders. 33
Similarly, parties have the obligation to search for, prosecute, and punish perpetrators of grave breaches, unless they opt to turn such persons
34
over for trial to another state party.
Importantly, the duty to prosecute grave breaches under the Geneva Conventions is limited to international conflicts. The international conflict requirement derives from common article 2 of the four
Geneva Conventions. More recently, the Statute of the international
tribunals for the former Yugoslavia incorporated the essential language
of this common "grave breaches" provision into its Article 2, giving the
tribunal lawful authority to prosecute persons "committing or ordering
to be committed" certain acts that rise to the level of war crimes under
modern international humanitarian law. Thus, at present commission
of any of the following acts, without qualification, may be considered a
war crime:
(a) willful killing;
(b) torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments;
(c) willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or
health;
(d) extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly;
(e) compelling a prisoner of war or a civilian to serve in the forces of
a hostile power;
(f) willfully depriving a prisoner of war or a civilian of the rights of
fair and regular trial;
(g) unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a
civilian;
35
(h) taking civilians as hostages.
Since the violence in Rwanda was more of an ethnic rampage than
an internal war, the Statute for the Rwanda tribunal does not address
"grave breaches" per se. Rather it refers to "violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II."36 In this
33. See VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 64-65 (1995).

TO

THE

34. Geneva Convention I, supra note 28, art. 51; Geneva Convention II, supra note
28, art. 52; Geneva Convention III, supra note 28, art. 131; Geneva Convention IV, supra
note 28, art. 148.
35. ICTY Statute, supra note 11, art. 2. Compare the language cited in common articles 50/51/130/147 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, supra note 28.
36. ICTR Statute, supra note 12, art. 4.

1998

REDRESSING IMPUNITY

regard, violations as enumerated in the Rwanda Statute "include, but
are not limited to," the following acts:
(a) Violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture,
mutilation or any form of corporal punishment.
(b) Collective punishments;
(c) Taking of hostages;
(d) Acts of terrorism;
(e) Outrages against personal dignity, in particular humiliating and
degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution, and any form of indecent assault;
(f) Pillage;
(g) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions
without previous judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted
court, affording all the juridical guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples;
37
(h) Threats to commits any of the foregoing acts.
As initially contained in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and subsequently upgraded in the two international tribunal statutes, accused
offenders of these grave breach prohibitions should be apprehended,
prosecuted and if convicted, duly punished. Put tersely, neither the Geneva Convention nor the Statutes of the two current international
criminal tribunals contain provisions that approve of or guarantee impunity for offenders under special conditions or circumstances. Perpetrators are not to receive absolution for their high crimes, either from a
national court or under a special domestic law. The Geneva Conventions and both the ICTY and ICTR Statutes are action instruments intended to promote prosecution of alleged offenders, not absolve them of
individual responsibility or accountability.
C. Violations of the Laws or Customs of War
Another vital ingredient of international humanitarian law is the
1907 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War
on Land, especially the regulations annexed thereto. 38 The ICTY Statute upgrades and places into a more modern context these prohibitions,
with the assertion that persons should be prosecuted for violating the
laws or customs of war (as derived from the Hague Regulations), in-

37. Id.
38. Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, October 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277.
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cluding, but not restricted to the following:
(a) employment of poisonous weapons or other weapons calculated
to cause unnecessary suffering;
(b) wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation
not justified by military necessity;
(c) attack, bombardment, by whatever means, of undefended towns,
villages, dwellings, or buildings;
(d) seizure of, destruction or willful damage done to institutions
dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, historic monuments and works or art and science;
39
(e) plunder of public or private property.
These provisions originate from Articles 23-28 of the 1907 Hague
Regulations and they are generally regarded today as violations of the
laws of war under international humanitarian law. That is, certain war
crimes might be committed, which states are required to prosecute that
are neither "grave breaches" nor genocide, but nonetheless entail serious depredations of human rights. 40 In particular, the Yugoslavia Tribunal Statute explicitly underscores for the modern context the persistent unlawfulness of acts articulated in the 1907 Hague Regulations
41
and 1949 Geneva. Conventions as grave breaches of international law.
These fiats are intended specifically to dissuade persons from committing such offensive acts. If however, persons do violate these norms,
states party are legally bound to punish those offenders. These regulatory mechanisms aim to punish, not pardon, perpetrators who violate
the normative customs of war. Offenders committing war crimes must
be held accountable for their unlawful acts; they are not to be excused
42
for purposefully violating the laws and customs of war.
D. Genocide
The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide 43 provides an absolute obligation to prosecute persons responsible
39. ICTY Statute, supra note 11, art. 3. See Hague Convention (IV) Annex (Regulations), supra note 38, especially arts. 23, 25, 27, and 28.
40. See generally Diane F. Orentlicher, Responsibilities of States Participating in
Multilateral Operations with Respect to Persons Indicted for War Crimes, in REINING IN
IMPUNITY, supra note 8, at 193.
41. See generally Jordan J. Paust, Applicability of InternationalCriminal Laws to
Events in the Former Yugoslavia, 9 AM. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 499, 511-12 (1994).
42. See generally Public International Law and Policy Group of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Bringing War Criminals to Justice: Obligations; Options;
Recommendations (Sept. 1997), reprinted in REINING IN IMPUNITY, supra note 8, at 549580.
43. See Genocide Convention, supra note 29. The crime of genocide is conceptually
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for committing acts of genocide. As defined in the Convention, genocide
is any of the following acts when committed "with the intent to destroy,
in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as
such":
(a) killing members of the group;
(b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
44
(e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
These provisions, then, enumerate various acts that specifically
qualify as war crimes that are prosecutable as acts of genocide under
modern international law. Further, the Genocide Convention goes on to
stipulate that certain specific actions shall be punishable:
(a) genocide;
(b) conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(d) attempt to commit genocide;
5
(e) complicity to commit genocide.4
The Genocide Convention obligates that persons accused of committing genocide be tried by a "competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed" or an acceptable international tribunal and that parties punish convicted offenders through "effective
penalties."46 The convention does not, however, obligate parties to
prosecute all offenders in their custody, nor does it explicitly address
the prosecution of all such offenders irrespective of their location. Under Article VI of the Genocide Convention, parties are obligated only to
exercise domestic jurisdiction pursuant to the territorial principle, with
offenders possibly being tried by a competent tribunal of the state
where the offense was committed, or by an international penal tribunal

derivative of the crimes against humanity prosecuted by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg and the War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. The General Assembly resolution, adopted unanimously on December 11, 1946, affirmed the
"principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and
the Judgment of the Tribunal." G.A. Res. 96, 1 UN GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/64, at 188 (1946).
44. Id. art. II. Cf. ICTY Statute, supra note 11, art. 4, para. 2.; ICTR Statute, supra
note 12, art. 2, para. 2.
45. Genocide Convention, supra note 29, art. III. Cf. ICTY Statute, supra note 11,
art. 4, para. 3; ICTR Statute, supra note 12, art. 2, para. 3.
46. Genocide Convention, supra note 29, at arts. IV, V, and VI.
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that may have jurisdiction. 47
These qualifications notwithstanding, genocide remains a gross
crime under customary international law and gives rise to universal jurisdiction to the same degree as over war crimes and crimes against
humanity. 48 Indeed, genocide was treated as an offense against the law
of nations even before the Genocide Convention was drafted. The General Assembly adopted resolutions in 1946 affirming the Nuremberg
principles 49 and declaring genocide to be an international crime. 50 Every
state thus has the customary legal right to exercise universal jurisdiction to prosecute offenders for committing genocide, wherever and by
whomever committed. The Genocide Convention does not derogate from
that obligation. Parties to the anti-genocide instrument have merely
obligated themselves to prosecute offenses committed solely within
their territory.
E. Crimes Against Humanity
There has emerged since World War II a customary obligation under international law to prohibit and prosecute crimes against humanity.51 These most egregious of war crimes are committed systematically,
on a massive scale. Consequently, they cause acute revulsion and necessitate a direct international response. There clearly exists international jurisdiction over cases that allege crimes against humanity, and
52
no statutory limitations are permissible.
The criminalization of such acts originates in Article VI of the 1945
Nuremberg Charter. 53 Crimes against humanity are directed at any civilian population, and are prohibited in armed conflict, regardless of its

47. Id. art. 6.
48. See Christopher C. Joyner, Arresting Impunity: The Case for Universal Jurisdiction in Bringing War Criminalsto Accountability, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 153 (1996);
Brigette Stern, Better Interpretation and Enforcement of Universal Jurisdiction, in
REINING IN IMPUNITY, supra note 8, at 175; Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction
Under InternationalLaw, 66 TEXAS L. REV. 785 (1988).
49. Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of
the Nuremberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95, 1 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/64iAdd. 1, at 188
(1946).
50. G.A. Res. 96, 1 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/64, at 188 (1946).
51. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW, 492, 500-01 (1992) [hereinafter BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY];
Carla Edelenbos, Human Rights Violations:A Duty to Prosecute?, LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 5, 15
(Autumn 1994): Orentlicher, SettlingAccounts, supra note 22, at 2585, 2593.
52. This is provided for in the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War crimes and Crimes against Humanity, entered into force Nov. 11, 1970,
754 U.N.T.S. 73, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 68 (1969). See generally BASSIOUNI, CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY, supra note 51.
53. See Charter of the International Tribunal, supra note 25, art. VI para. (c).
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international or internal character. The ICTY Statute stipulates these
critical points in the modern context and enumerates eight categories of
specific acts to be regarded as crimes against humanity: (1) murder; (2)
extermination; (3) enslavement; (4) deportation; (5) imprisonment; (6)
torture; (7) rape; and (8) persecution on political, racial and religious
grounds. A ninth category, "other inhumane acts," was included to
make the list potentially all-inclusive. 54 A significant realization is that
the Statute pertaining to war crimes in the former Yugoslavia improves
on Article VI of the 1945 Nuremberg Charter by specifically designating
two new acts as crimes against humanity: torture and rape.
The condemnation of acts of torture finds explicit expression in the
1984 Convention Against Torture, 55 which is now in force with 105 parties 56 and is accepted as a peremptory norm in human rights law.57 As
defined in the Convention, "torture" means:
[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental,
is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining
from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him
for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any
reason based on discrimination or any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It
does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or inci58
dental to lawful sanctions.
There is no question that many of the most brutal atrocities committed
against victims of human rights abuse include acts of torture under this
definition, which has been elaborated on by other international instru59
ments prohibiting torture.
54. ICTY Statute, supranote 11, art. 5.
55. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, entered into force June 28, 1987, G.A. Res. 39/46,
39 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 51) at 197 (1984).
56. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10 December
1984
(visited
Apr.
29,
1998)
<http:/www.un.orglDepts/Treaty/finallts2/newfiles/part-boo/ivboo/iv_9.html>
[hereinafter Torture Convention].
57. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw CONVENTIONS AND THEIR

PENAL PROVISIONS 489-99 (1997). See also M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes:
Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57 (1996), reprinted
in REINING IN IMPUNITY, supra note 8, at 133.

58. Torture Convention, supra note 56, art. 1.
59. See Treaty on European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Inter-European), opened for signature at Strasbourg, Nov. 26, 1987, Europe. T.S. No. 126, 27 I.L.M. 1152, entered into force Feb. 1, 1989;
Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, done at Cartagena de Indias,
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The Torture Convention obligates each state party to ensure that
60
all acts of torture are made criminal offenses under its domestic law
and to establish its jurisdiction over the offense when, inter alia, the
alleged perpetrator or victim is a national of that state. 61 Moreover, if a
state does not extradite an alleged offender, that government is required to "submit the case to its competent authorities" for prosecution.62 In addition, the Convention prohibits any "exceptional circumstances," including conditions or threats of war, internal political
stability, or public emergencies from being used by a government to justify torture. 63 Nor may an order from a superior officer or public
64
authority be used to justify acts of torture.
The Torture Convention suffers from certain weaknesses in its application, however, especially when contrasted with the Genocide Convention. The Genocide Convention explicitly asserts forthright duties
mandating that offenders "shall be punished," 65 and persons accused of
committing genocide "shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State
in the territory of which the act was committed" or an acceptable international tribunal. 66 Moreover, the state is required to "provide effective
penalties" for persons found guilty of genocide. 67 In contrast, the Torture Convention requires parties only to "submit" cases of alleged torture to their "competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution," and
makes acts of torture punishable simply by "appropriate penalties
which taken into account their grave nature." 68 Regrettably, the antitorture instrument fails explicitly to mandate that prosecution must occur for all alleged cases of torture, or to stipulate that, without exception, severe penalties will be handed down for persons found guilty of a
69
torture offense.
The crime of rape, the criminality of which largely has been overlooked in past wars, assumed great urgency with the reported massive
sexual assaults against women in Bosnia and Herzegovina during 1992

Dec. 9, 1985, AG/Res. 783 (XV-0/85), O.A.S. General Assembly, 15th Sess. IEA/Ser.P.
AGIDoc. 22023/85 rev. 1 at 46-54 (1986), O.A.S. Treaty Series, No. 67, 25 I.L.M. 519, entered into force Feb. 28, 1987.
60. Torture Convention, supra note 56, art. 4, para. 1.
61. Id. art. 5, para. 1.
62. Id. art. 7, para. 4.
63. Id. art. 2, para. 2.
64. Id. art. 2, para. 3.
65. Id. art. IV.

66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. art. VI.
Id. art. V.
Id. art. 7, para. 1; art. 4, para. 2.
See Orentlicher, Settling Accounts, supra note 22, at 2604.
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and 1993.70 By designating rape as a specific crime against humanity,
the gross criminality of that act has been spotlighted as a grave violation of human rights - indeed, a war crime under international law and international concern has been directly focused on the need to
punish perpetrators. Important to note, however, is that crimes against
humanity have not been legally codified into a special ad hoc convention
for the purpose of explicitly outlining and detailing the criminal nature
of acts of genocide and the specific obligations of states in confronting
71
perpetrators.
V. THE DUTY OF ACCOUNTABILITY
Fundamental to the punishment of high human rights crimes is the
principle of individual criminal responsibility. For contemporary international law, a person who plans, instigates, orders, commits or otherwise aids and abets in the planning, preparation or execution of these
acts shall be held individually responsible for the crime. 72 International
criminal law today thus confronts the principle that individuals may be
held criminally liable under international law, even though their conduct might have been sanctioned or even mandated by domestic law.
To enforce the laws of war and prohibitions against genocide and
crimes against humanity only against ordinary soldiers and officers of
low or mid-level rank is not enough. Although "superior orders" is insufficient as a defense against a charge of violating high human rights
crimes, justice still demands that culpability apply throughout the
chain of command. Accountability under international law must, thus,
reach military elite and civilian government officials, as well as individual civilians and paramilitary forces who commit the acts. Indeed, as
set by the Nuremberg precedent and resurrected for modern humanitarian law, the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR both assert:
2. The official position of any accused person, whether as Head of
70. See the discussion in Final Report of the Commission of Experts, supra note 10, at
55-60. In late 1992 and -early 1993, the European Community sent a special mission
headed Dame Ann Warburton to investigate the treatment of Muslim women in the former Yugoslavia. This mission found that the number of women raped might range from
10,000-60,000, and that rape was used by the Serbs as a premeditated strategy to terrorize Muslim populations and to force them to leave their homes. See European Community
investigative mission into the treatment of Muslim women in the former Yugoslavia: Report to EuropeanCommunity ForeignMinisters, U.N. Doc. S/25240 (3 Feb. 1993), Annex I,
at 2; M. Cherif Bassiouni & Marcia McCormick, Sexual Violence: An Invisible Weapon of
War in the Former Yugoslavia, Occasional Paper #1, (DePaul Int'l Hum. Rts. L. Inst.
1996).
71. For the logic demanding such a convention, see M. Cherif Bassiouni, "Crimes
Against Humanity:" The Need for a Specialized Convention, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
457-94 (1994).
72. ICTY Statute, supra note 11, art. 7, para. 1.
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State or Government or as a responsible Government official, shall not
relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.
3. The fact that any of the [criminal] acts.., of the present Statute was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of
criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior
failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such
73
acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.
It is clear, then, that due obedience can not exonerate a perpetrator
from criminal responsibility. The soldier who pulls the trigger; the
commander who gives the order, or knows the crime is going to be
committed and does not use his authority to stop it from occurring; the
civilian decision-maker who makes the policy generating the criminal
act - all these persons are liable for criminal accountability for that offense.
The Tribunals
Member states of the United Nations are obligated to give various
forms of assistance - including but not limited to arrest, detention and
surrender of accused offenders - to international tribunals created by
the Security Council. This obligation derives from Chapter VII of the
Charter, which allocates to the Security Council broad responsibility
"with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of
aggression," with the specific authority to "decide what measures shall
be taken ... to maintain or restore international peace and security."74
The obligation to carry out these measures is explicitly stated in
the UN Charter, which provides that "The action required to carry out
decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international
peace and security shall be taken by all Members of the United Na7
tions." 5
The obligation on states to surrender alleged offenders to these ad
hoc international criminal tribunals is articulated in paragraph 4 of UN
Security Council Resolution 827 (Yugoslavia) and paragraph 2 of Resolution 955 (Rwanda), both of which provide that:
[The Security Council] Decides that all States shall cooperate fully
with the International Tribunal and its organs in accordance with the
present resolution and the Statute of the International Tribunal and
that consequently all States shall take any measures necessary under
73. ICTY Statute, supra note 11, art. 7, paras. 2 & 3; ICTR Statute, supra note 12,
art. 6,paras. 2 & 3.
74. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
75. U.N. CHARTER art. 48, para 1.
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their domestic laws to implement the provisions of the present resolution and the Statute, including the obligation of States to comply with
requests for assistance or orders issued by a Trial Chamber under Article 29 [for Rwanda, Article 281 of the Statute .... 76
Thus, all persons who participate in the planning, preparation or
execution of serious violations of international humanitarian law share
in the commission of the crime and are therefore individually responsible. Both tribunals also hold that principal responsibility for war crimes
pursuant to orders falls to those in authority who gave the orders.
There are no provisions for pardons, amnesties, or impunity laws. Alleged offenders are to be tried for their high crimes, not excused on account of their political power or military rank. The final word on impunity is this: High crimes that violate human rights are evil, vile and
unlawful. Such gross delicts must be not be allowed to escape punishment. There can be no peace without justice, and there can be no justice
without accountability.
Accepting these principles, certain weaknesses of international tribunals have been revealed by the experience of the ICTY and the ICTR
since 1993. Both tribunals have been impotent to enforce arrest warrants and subpoenas. Exercising such means of apprehension remains
in the hands of occupant military forces or local security police. Further,
the tribunals' viability and success depend on continuing political and
support from the United Nations, particularly the Great Powers on the
Security Council. Such dependency obviously invites political considerations to creep in and impair the prospects for effective tribunal operations. Arrest of indictees ultimately depends on the genuine cooperation
of the government in whose territory indicted persons are located,
which this has been difficult to secure. Failure to apprehend the indictees further undercuts the credibility and effectiveness of both tribunals.
Have these international tribunals served justice and contributed
to national reconciliation within the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda?
Yes, but with certain qualifications. Again, these courts have been seriously hamstrung by insufficient funding, inadequate financial and
military support, and only very limited opportunities to demonstrate
76. In relevant part, Article 29 of the Yugoslavia Tribunal Statute and Article 28 of
the Rwanda Tribunal Statute assert that:
1. States shall cooperate with the International Tribunal in the investigation
and prosecution of persons accused of committing serious violations of international humanitarian law.
2. State shall comply without undue delay with any request for assistance or
an order issued by a Trials Chamber, including, but not limited to:
(d) the arrest or detention of persons;
(e) the surrender or the transfer of the accused to the International Tribunal.
ICTY Statute, supra note 11, art. 29; ICTR Statute, supra note 12, art. 28.
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their worthiness.
Truth Commissions
Truth commissions can be successful in fostering peace and national conciliation. 77 Such commissions establish a historical record of
the crimes and context in which they were committed.78 Truth commissions contribute to a sense of closure. For example, the South African
Truth Commission is generally regarded as a successful instrument of
national reconciliation. Its purpose was to rescue South Africa from denial and lies about its past, bestow dignity on those who had suffered,
and extend a magnanimous offer of forgiveness to the perpetrators of
horrible crimes. It granted amnesty to persons who disclosed fully their
crimes during the period of apartheid, but only if their crime was not
disproportionate to its political aim. When combined with prosecutions,
the South African experience since 1995 proffered a unique model that
worked successfully due to the right chemistry of conditions-peace,
genuine political will and functioning local judicial system. 79 But other
facts also remain: Truth commissions do not produce full justice. They
are not intended to. Nor will a truth commission reveal the whole truth.
But, then again, it could not have been expected to. Reconciliation will
stay incomplete, and so, too, will the hope for justice. Forgiveness, not
justice, is the price deemed necessary if a truth commission is to help
heal a society of the pain and suffering brought about by internal war
and violent ethnic strife. And this poses the crux of the dilemma:
Should those who perpetrate the most terrible of crimes escape punishment, at the price only of admitting their guilt and showing remorse?
For the experience chosen by South Africa, the price of peace and reconciliation is "the truth" with amnesty. It is neither justice nor compensation. How well forgiveness actually works as a strategy for fostering
political stability will only be seen in coming years.
Ways and Means of Impunity
There is no question that contemporary international law man77. For a positive view of the role of truth commissions, see Michael P. Scharf, The
Case for a Permanent InternationalTruth Commission, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 375
(1997).
78. See Priscilla B. Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions - 1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study, 16 HUM. RTS Q. 1 (1994); Stephan Landsman, Alternative Responses to Serious
Human Rights Abuses: Of Prosecution and Truth Commissions, 59 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 81 (1996); Jo M. Pasqualucci, The Whole Truth and Nothing But the Truth: Truth
Commissions, Impunity, and the Inter-American Human Rights System, 12 BOSTON U.
INT'L L.J. 321 (1994).
79. Burying South Africa's Past: Of Memory and Forgiveness, THE ECONOMIST 21-23
(Nov. 1, 1997).
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dates that persons who gravely violate human rights enshrined in the
Universal Declaration must pay consequences. Indeed, the normative
framework of modern international law clearly asserts that perpetrators of high human rights crimes should be prosecuted, and if convicted,
punished accordingly. But this all too rarely occurs; the evil of impunity
persists. The reasons for impunity are often couched in the nature of a
country's government and its people's failure to produce a civil society
based on the rule of law.
Impunity takes on factual and normative dimensions. The factual
aspects of impunity refer to the particular circumstances and internal
political-social conditions that permit gross human rights violators to
evade prosecution in some state. The fact is that impunity can be and
often is facilitated by the government.
Gross violations of human rights are often, but not always perpetrated by state security forces, be they military or police agents. Such
depredations can be perpetrated also by unattached militias, paramilitary death squads and remnants of insurgent movements. In societies
torn apart by ethnic hatreds and civil conflict, an extraordinary high
potential for violence exists. In these situations, the possibility for impunity becomes an ever-present likelihood.
Conditions that tolerate impunity are personal; they center on the
victim and demonstrate the intimate, powerless side of victimization.
Such conditions personify being next to an abuser and feeling helpless
at ever being able to obtain justice for the wrongs being perpetrated.
Perhaps even more disheartening for victim survivors is watching as
former perpetrators are subsequently elevated to positions of authority
in the government-a situation that not only permits them to escape
prosecution and punishment, but also enables them to exert even more
power and control over their former victims.
In societies where a turn toward democracy has actually been
made, impunity can become more a problem of looking backward to correct the past - a dilemma of trying to come to terms with past wrongs
done to victims and of juridically evaluating crimes committed by members of the former government, or of their surrogates.
1. Military Justice Systems
The principal normative dimensions of impunity are often tied to
the presence of a military justice system and various national impunity
laws. Military justice systems, well known in Latin American states,
have generated impunity for fellow officers who were alleged to have
committed violations in the name of state security.8 0 There appears to
80. See generally Kai Ambos, Impunity and International Criminal Law, 18 HUM.
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be a logical link between impunity and military justice, which renders
the latter even more of an oxymoron. Military proceedings, especially in
Latin American states, have often been used to facilitate impunity sanctioned by the state and only rarely bring to trial and prosecution military officers accused of serious human rights deprivations.8 1 By the
same token, pervasive efforts by the military to intimidate civil government officials and make direct threats against the judicial branch
and witnesses stand out as real actions intended to produce impunity in
fact, if not in law.
Direct links clearly exist between military justice and impunity.
Military legislation is often crucial for granting impunity to perpetrators, since in many national circumstances, military tribunals hold extensive jurisdiction over human rights conditions in the country. Military courts are composed of military officers, many who may be
sympathetic to accused offenders and may render judgments based on
82
personal loyalties rather than evidence or considerations of justice.
2. National Impunity Laws
The normative dimension also pertains to domestic legal considerations. Certain states have passed laws that are intended to grant impunity. These laws include provisions for amnesty or pardon for certain
human rights violations, and exempt offenders from punishment or impede effective criminal prosecutions against them. An amnesty generally leads to the extinction or erasure of criminal prosecution and execution of a sentence; a pardon extinguishes only the execution of a
sentence. These are direct, immediate forms of impunity, as they formally and factually exempt human rights violators from what most persons would consider just punishment.8 3
Impunity laws are obviously unique to each national situation and
circumstance. Even so, such laws may well violate the principle of
equality and the need for legal remedies to redress criminal acts. From
a policy perspective, there also arises the question of to what extent the
armed forces of a state are willing to accept international legal stan-

RTS L.J. 1 (1997) [hereinafter Ambos].

81. Id. 4-5.
82. See id. at 4, 8-9.
83. Examples of such impunity laws include Ley 104 of Dec. 30, 1993, Regimen Penal
Colombiano envio 36 (februro/abril de 1994) and envio 38 (noviembre de 1994), sections
8122 ff (Colombia); DL [Decree Law] 2.191 of Apr. 18, 1978, Dario Oficial No. 30.042
(Apr. 19, 1978) (Chile); DL 22.924 of Sept. 22, 1983, Legislacion Argentina (1983-B), at
1681 (Argentina). But see Ley 23.040 of Dec. 22, 1983, Legislacion Argentina (1983-B), at
1813; and Ley 26.479 of June 14, 1995, Normas Legales 229 (June 1995), at 143 (Peru).
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dards and the requisite reforms of military law. These are vital considerations if impunity through miscarriages of military "justice" is to be
averted.
The duty to prosecute certain grave human rights violations, derived from international criminal law, clearly implies that criminal acts
subject to such a duty cannot at least in principle be amnestied. While
an international norm affirming the permissibility of amnesties in certain situations does exist,8 4 it does not apply to human rights violations.85 Indeed, the practice of granting self amnesties violate the prohibition against privileging a particular group of people, as well as the
principle of equality.8 6 Such self-serving amnesties usually lack legitimacy, in that they violate the prohibition against acting in one's own
self-interest. Further, amnesties are prohibited when a state of emera
gency is declared. Certain human rights are nonderogable, even under
87
law.
penal
national
under
protected
be
must
and
emergency,
of
state
The question critical here is: Do amnesties actually contribute to
the restoration of peace, national unity and reconciliation as often
claimed by official policy? Or, do they generate new frictions and tensions within society-and thus exacerbate the potential for prolonged
civil conflict-by disregarding the feelings and dignity of victims and
their families? No blanket statement can be made that uniformly answers this conundrum. Obviously, understanding the political context
within which such acts of amnesty might be taken could shed light on a
state legislature's motive in granting amnesty, or even expose the true

84. Not all amnesties are contrary to human rights law. See article 6(5) of Protocol
Additional II to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609,
614 (calling for the "broadest possible amnesty" following non-international armed conflicts). Amnesties are also expressly foreseen in article 6(4) of the International Covenant
on Civil and PoliticalRights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16
at 52, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 302 entered into force Mar. 23, 1976 [hereinafter ICCPR]. The ICCPR has 27 substantive articles addressing various aspects of political and civil rights.
85. See generally Roht-Arriaza, Combating Impunity, supra note 22; Orentlicher, Settling Accounts, supra note 22; Naomi Roht-Arriaza, State Responsibility to Investigate and
Prosecute Grave Human Rights Violations in InternationalLaw, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 449513 (1990); Douglas Cassel, Lessons from the Americas: Guidelines for InternationalResponse to Amnesties for Atrocities, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197 (1996) [hereinafter
Cassel].
86. The United Nations Human Rights Committee reaffirmed this fundamental principle in 1992. See UNHRC, General Comment No. 20 regarding Art. 7 of the Covenant of
Civil and Political Rights, para. 15, UN Doc. CCPRJC/21IRev. 1/Add. 3 (Apr. 7, 1992).
87. See generally Michael P. Scharf, Swapping Amnesty for Peace: Was There a Duty
to Prosecute InternationalCrimes in Haiti?, 31 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1 (1996); Robert 0. Weiner,
Trying to Make Ends Meet: Reconciling the Law and Practiceof Human Rights Amnesties,
26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 857, 867 (1995).
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political motivations behind a certain amnesty decision.88
From a criminal law perspective, recognition of an exemption from
mitigation or punishment depends on the personal blameworthiness of
the perpetrator. If the offender is unaware of the legal wrong, punishment depends on the extent to which that wrong was avoidable. A
wrongful act is presumed to be avoidable if the order was manifestly
illegal. Otherwise, the wrongful act could be deemed unavoidable, and
the subordinate would not deserve punishment.
A directive that grants a pardon is permissible only if it takes effect
after a significant portion of the sentence has been served. 8 9 Other provisions that might impede criminal prosecution, in particular national
statutes of limitation, violate international law if they apply to crimes
against humanity. No statute of limitation exists on such egregious
violations of human rights. Nor do statutes of limitation apply to cases
of disappearance - explicitly so at least in the Organization of American States system.9 0 The admissibility of statutes of limitation in cases
of torture and extralegal executions turns on how these crimes are classified. In any event, their prosecution as crimes against humanity cannot be barred by statute. 9 1
VI. THE BALANCE SHEET
In the aftermath of internal war or ethnic conflict, there is the critical need to foster national reconciliation, deal with war criminals and
rebuild foundations for a society governed by the rule of law. As regards
Article 8 of the Universal Declaration, there is the underlying question
of how to come to terms with serious violations of human rights and
achieve lasting reconciliation. A variety of accountability mechanisms
are available-national apology by head of state, reparations for victims, truth commissions, prosecution by international or national tri92
bunals.
Recognition of the international legal order, especially as regards
human rights obligations, implies the need for strict compliance by governments of that law. As a dynamic legal order, international criminal
law requires the constant adaptation of national laws so as to ensure
their compatibility with the protection of fundamental human rights.

88. See generally Jose Zalaquett, Confronting Human Rights Violations Committed by
Former Governments: Principles Applicable and Political Constraints, in STATE CRIMES:
PUNISHMENT OR PARDON? 23-65 (Aspen Institute, 1989) [hereinafter STATE CRIMES:
PUNISHMENT OR PARDON?]; Cassel, supra note 85.

89.
90.
91.
92.

Ambos, supra note 80, at 7.
Id.
Id.
See generally Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 15-20.
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Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights plainly asserts that victims of gross human rights abuse are entitled to redress.
Individuals responsible for those heinous crimes must be held accountable, especially for war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.
Absent a sense of justice for citizens who have suffered under ruthlessly
abusive regimes or who have been divided by ethnic or civil war, the
prospects for enduring peace and national reconciliation seem severely
93
diminished.
For the most part, internal conflict (i.e., civil war) and ruthless victimization of persons by their government lie beyond international law's
regulation of armed conflicts. That admitted, human rights law has
nonetheless evolved to prohibit war crimes, crimes against humanity,
genocide, and torture by any government against its own citizens or
other people in that state, regardless of the legal context of the conflict. 94
Even so, significant weaknesses persist in state practice with respect to the performance of these normative prescriptions. Especially
notable is the failure by governments to extradite or prosecute and to
cooperate in the investigation, prosecution and adjudication of persons
charged with genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity and
the punishment of those convicted of such crimes. 95 While the duty to
prosecute or extradite is contained in the Genocide Convention and the
Geneva Conventions of 1949,96 it does not exist in international treaty
law for crimes against humanity, simply because there is no special
convention on those crimes.
Under international criminal law, no exemption from punishment
is permitted for so-called international crimes, especially war crimes,
genocide and crimes against humanity. 97 The responsibility of the superior follows from the doctrine of command responsibility, which has
9
been universally recognized under customary international law. 8
93. See Yael Danieli, Justice and Reparation: Steps in the Process of Healing, in
REINING IN IMPUNITY, supra note 8, at 303.
94. See Peter Baehr, How to Deal with the Past, in REINING IN IMPUNITY, supra note
8, at 415.
95. See generally Michael Scharf, The Letter of the Law: The Scope of the International Legal Obligation to Prosecute Human Rights Crimes, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.

41 (1996)
96. See Genocide Convention, supra note 29, art. VII; Geneva Conventions of 1949,
supra note 28, arts. 49/50/129/146, respectively.
97. See generally STATE CRIMES: PUNISHMENT OR PARDON?, supranote 88.
98. See generally Note, Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 82 YALE L. J. 1274
(1973); Hays Parks, Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 62 MILITARY L. REV. 1
(1973); Weston D. Burnett, Command Responsibility and a Case Study of the Criminal
Responsibility of Israeli Military Commanders for the Pogrom at Shatila and Sabra, 107
MILITARY L. REV. 71 (1985); Paul Williams & Norman Cigar, THE BALKAN INST., WAR
CRIMES AND INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY: A PRIMA FACE CASE FOR THE INDICTMENT OF
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Within the context of international criminal law, however, the legal dilemma persists as to whether the superior's conduct qualifies as perpetration or as complicity, which in turn depends on assessment of the
superior's conduct. Often it may be difficult, if not impossible, to determine with precision the nature and degree of the superior's control over
the subordinate.
The extensive use of military justice in cases of human rights violations has tended to contravene obligations derived from international
criminal law, in that most of these proceedings have led to a factual exemption from punishment for perpetrators of serious human rights
violations. Similar is the situation of unrestricted resort to defense of
superior orders, which implies impunity for any act committed in execution of a superior's order. International criminal law has clearly and
unmistakably established that orders leading to the commission of
grave human rights violations are illegal and therefore cannot justify
exemptions from punishment. In certain exceptional cases, though,
punishment of a subordinate might be lessened if he/she had acted under mitigating circumstances, i.e., under coercion or duress. 99
The causes of impunity are more factual than normative. Power
and influence of security forces, particularly the armed forces, are real
conditions in many societies. That these institutions possess certain
privileges that ultimately produce impunity is explained by the facts
and circumstances of situations, rather than the normative instruction
or legal mandate of international criminal law. Thus, impunity derives
not as a right or norm sanctioned by society, but rather more so as the
result of the distribution of political and social power in that society.
Control of that power determines the likelihood of impunity. If the distribution of power in a state changes, the normative character of and
prospects for impunity also will change. 100
It is not, therefore, the law that so greatly shapes power relations
affecting objective considerations of justice; rather, it is the political
power in the state that determines the interpretation and application of
that law, which in turn approves policies of impunity. Hence, the responsibility for authorizing impunity rests with the individuals who
shape, conceptualize, interpret and apply the law. It is they-the governing policy makers-who determine and are accountable for the legal
disposition of human rights violations and effecting redress for vic-

SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC (1995).
99. See the Joinet Principles, supra note 21, principle 29, para. 35 [sic], at 506 (at
most due obedience may be taken into consideration as a mitigating circumstance).

100. Cf. the views of F.M. Lorenz, Combating Impunity: PracticalLimits on the Use of
Military Force, in REINING IN IMPUNITY, supra note 8, at 465.

1998

REDRESSING IMPUNITY

617

As Article 8 of the Universal Declaration affirms, means of redress
must be afforded victims of gross violations of human rights. 102 To this
end, participation of the victim in the criminal proceedings against a
perpetrator can make impunity less likely. A truly fair-trial procedure
must grant a victim adequate judicial remedies. The role of the victim
depends on the national procedural code, and a sympathetic code should
permit the active participation of the victim or his/her family in the
03
case.1
While adequate respect for the interests of the victim during a
criminal trial is necessary, it is not sufficient. Extra-penal means of
compensation and reconciliation should be considered. The attempt
should be made to restore the status quo ante situation of the victims,
i.e., to seek a natural restitution of the victim in society. Restoration
might include compensatory payments, the right of return, and reha-

bilitation. 104

For genuine social reconciliation and peacemaking, serious efforts
must be made to mitigate the pain and emotional suffering of victims
and their families by taking measures that address the psychological
aspects of human rights violations and the inability to return to the
human situation before the violations were perpetrated. Symbolic and
public forms of compensation, such as national truth and reconciliation
commissions, can provide opportunities for such emotional catharsis,
and these should be undertaken when and wherever deemed appropriate. They might assist in clarifying past human rights violations and
bringing the society closer to reconciliation. As a minimum political

101. See generally Theo van Boven, Accountability for InternationalCrimes: The Victim's Perspective, in REINING IN IMPUNITY, supra note 8, at 349 [hereinafter van Boven];
Madeline H. Morris, InternationalGuidelines Against Impunity: FacilitatingAccountability, in id. at 359; Dinah PoKempner, A Few Thoughts on Standards,Practice,and Mechanisms, in id. at 373.
102. See Study concerning the Right to Restitution, Compensation, and Rehabilitation
for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: Final Report Submitted by Mr. Theo van Boven, Special Rapporteur, Commission on Human
Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities,
45th sess., Item 4, UN Doc. E/CN.4/SUB.2/1993/8 (July 2, 1993), reprintedas Appendix C
in 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 283 (1996) [hereinafter the van Boven Principles]. See
also Question of the Human Rights of all Persons Subjected to any Form of Detention or
Imprisonment: Note by the Secretary-General, E1CN.4119971104 (Jan. 16, 1997): Annex:
Note prepared by the former Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission, Mr. Theo van
Boven, in accordance with paragraph 2 of the Subcommission resolution 1996/28 (Jan. 13,
1997), Appendix: Basic Principlesand Guidelines on the Right of Reparation for Victims of
[Gross] Violations of Human Rights and InternationalHumanitarianLaw, (visited Apr. 6,
1998) <http:llwww.unhchr.chhtml/menu4chrrepll0497.htm>.
103. van Boven, supra note 101, at 352.
104. See van Boven Principles, supra note 102, at 344.
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goal, such truth commissions can create conditions that recognize the
l5
past suffering of victims and the perpetrators' criminal wrongdoing.'
But this purging of the truth cannot be a substitute for punishment of
the perpetrators. The search for truth remains a basic prerequisite for
civil society, but it cannot be treated as a panacea to excuse war crimes
10 6
and acts of genocide that offend the conscience of humanity.
Upholding certain rights is critical if impunity is to be denied for
violators of human rights. First, fundamental in this regard is the victim's right to know. This includes the right to learn the truth about
events and circumstances surrounding gross violations, as well the
causes giving rise to specific violations of human rights.10 7 Second,
closely tied to this is the state's (i.e., the government's) duty to remember the history of oppression. Presumably this is to guard against repetition of similar unlawful acts in the future.108 Third, no less critical are
the victims' right to know the truth about the fate of relatives and loved
ones, 10 9 and the victim's fundamental right to justice.110 No just and
lasting reconciliation is possible without an effective response to the
need for justice. If reconciliation is really to happen, an essential prerequisite is forgiveness.1 ' This involves a private act by the victim that
assumes the perpetrators are known and that they are genuinely repentant and remorseful.
Impunity also involves the failure of governments to meet certain
obligations under international law. If Article 8 of the Universal Declaration is to satisfied, governments must undertake to investigate alleged violations, take appropriate measures toward the perpetrators,
and ensure that the latter are prosecuted and tried, and provide victims
with effective remedies. 112 Toward this end, national courts are given
priority jurisdiction, though international tribunals may be used when
national courts are unable to respond satisfactorily to the requirements
113
of justice.
Universal jurisdiction applicable to serious crimes under international and humanitarian law should be included in all human rights instruments dealing with such crimes. 114
105. See generally Juan Mndez, Accountability for Past Abuses, 19 HUM. RTS Q. 255
(1997).
106. See Juan Mndez, The Right to Truth, in REINING IN IMPUNITY, supra note 8, at
255; Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Truth Commissions as Part of a Social Process, in id. at 279.
107. See Joinet Principles, supra note 21, principles 1-17.
108. Id. principle 2.
109. Id. principle 3.
110. Id. principles 18-32.
111. See Joinet Principles, supra note 21, para. 26, at 505.
112. Id. principle 18.
113. Id. principle 19.
114. Id. principle 21.

1998

REDRESSING IMPUNITY

States should take measures in their national law to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction over high crimes under international law
which have been committed outside their territory, irrespective of the
nationality of the victim or the perpetrator." 15
More restrictive measures should be imposed in circumstances
where governments might grant impunity. Legal opportunities that
should be restricted would include:
1. Prescription.The assertion by a government of an authoritative
directive or order granting impunity should not be applicable to high
crimes involving human rights violations, since those violations entail
1 6
such grave offenses to human dignity. 1
2. Amnesty. Perpetrators of gross and systematic violations of human rights should not be included in amnesties so long as the victims
are not able to avail themselves of fair and effective remedies for those
violations."17
3. The right of asylum. States may not lawfully extend the protective status of asylum to persons who are suspected of having committed
high crimes that violate fundamental human rights under international
law.118

4. Extradition. Persons who have perpetrated high crimes that seriously violate human rights may not lawfully seek to be excluded from
extradition on grounds of the political offense exception and the nonextradition of nationals, save in cases where they might be subject to
the death penalty." 19
5. Defense of superior orders. Persons who commit high crimes on
the order of his government or a superior can not be exempt from
criminal responsibility for those violations of human rights. Similarly,
the fact that violations are perpetrated by a subordinate does not excuse his superiors from responsibility if they knew ordered the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to take action to prevent or
120
halt the violations form occurring.
6. Jurisdiction of military courts. In order to preclude military
courts from perpetuating impunity for. human rights violations perpetrated against civilians, military courts must be limited only to trying
offenses committed among military personnel.' 2'

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

principle
principle
principle
principle
principle
principle
principle

22.
24.
25.
26.
27.
29.
31.
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There are also certain basic principles concerning the right to repa122
ration for victims of high crimes involving human rights violations.
Accepting the premise presumed in the Universal Declaration that
every state has the fundamental obligation to ensure respect for human
rights under international humanitarian law, certain duties flow from
that obligation, among them the duties to prevent violations, to investigate violations, to take action against violators, and to afford remedies
and reparations to victims.123 Given this, certain norms must be applied
to ensue respect for international humanitarian law, especially the
right to a remedy. 124 Every state should provide for universal jurisdiction over gross violations of human rights, which constitute high crimes
under international law. 125 Moreover, reparations should be available
for claim directly by the victims of high violations of human rights,
their immediate family, or persons associated closely with the victims.1 26
States have the duty to adopt measures that implement expeditious
and fully effective reparations. The purposes of reparations are to render justice by redressing the consequences of wrongful acts and by preventing or deterring such acts in the future. Forms of reparation should
include restitution, which means restoring the situation for a victim
that existed prior to violations of human rights or international humanitarian law. 127 In addition, there must be compensation for economically assessable damage resulting from human rights violations,
especially for physical or mental harm, lost opportunities, material
damages and loss of earnings, "harm to reputation or dignity," and costs
for legal assistance. 128 Other basic needs include rehabilitationfor le-

122. Id. principles 33-42.
123. See U.N. Doc. A/RES/40134, Dec. 11, 1985, Declarationof Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power. For a relevant discussion, see International
Protection of Victims, 7 NOUVELLEs ETUDES PENALES 1988 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed.
1988). See also Security Council Resolution 808 establishing the ICTY: S.C. Res. 808,
U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993); van Boven Principles, supra note 102.
124. As the van Boven Principles assert,
Every State has a duty to make reparation in case of a breach of the obligation under international law to respect and to ensure respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms. The obligation to ensure respect for human rights includes the duty to prevent violations, the duty to investigate
violations, the duty take appropriate action against the violators, and the
duty to afford remedies to victims. States shall ensure that no person who
may be responsible for gross violations of human rights shall have immunity
for liability for their actions.
van Boven Principles, supranote 102, principle 2.
125. See supra note 48 and sources cited therein.
126. van Boven Principles, supra note 102, principle 6.
127. Id. principle 8.
128. Id. principle 9.
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gal, medical and psychological care 129 and assurances of satisfaction
and guarantees of non-reputation,including the cessation of violations,
verification of the facts, official government restoration of the dignity of
the persecuted victim, apology and acceptance of responsibility, judicial
sanctions against the offenders, and prevention of the recurrence of
violations.130 These are minimum means of redress to give victims remuneration for the suffering they have experienced and provide them
with the basic needs for personal recovery and re-entry into society.
Article 8 of the Universal Declaration calls for the right to an effective remedy by the "competent national tribunals" in order to obtain redress for violations of human rights. What if there exists no "competent
national tribunal" to offer such remedies? International law is now
evolving in anticipation of that situation with the drafting of an international convention for the creation of a permanent International
Criminal Court (ICC) during the summer of 1998.131 If adopted, supported and implemented, such an international criminal tribunal could
try accused perpetrators of "core crimes" (i.e., war crimes, genocide, and
crimes against humanity) that national governments, for one reason or
another, choose not to prosecute. 132 Key to the proposed ICC's operation
is the relationship between it and the legal institutions of states. This
relationship is to be guided by the principle of "complementarity," which
refers to the extent to which a domestic court may assert exclusive ju-

129. Id. principle 10.
'130. Id. principle 11.

131. See Report of the PreparatoryCommittee on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/2/Add.1 (Apr. 14, 1998). For commentaries on
salient facets of an earlier version of this draft, see generally OBSERVATIONS ON THE
CONSOLIDATED ICC TEXT BEFORE THE FINAL SESSION OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE,

13bis NOUVELLES ETUDES PENALES (Leila Sadat Wexler, ed., 1998). See also M. Cherif
Bassiouni, Establishingan InternationalCriminal Court: Historical Survey, 149 MIL. L.
REV. 49 (1995); James Crawford, Prospects for an International Criminal Court, 48
CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 303 (1995); Sandra L. Jamison, A Permanent International
Criminal Court: A Proposalthat Overcomes Past Objections, 23 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
419 (1995); Timothy C. Everred, An International Criminal Court: Recent Proposalsand
American Concern, 6 PACE INT'L L. REV. 121 (1994).

132. See Christopher L. Blakesley, Jurisdiction,Definition of Crimes and Triggering
Mechanism, in The International Criminal Court: Observations and Issues before the
1997-98 Preparatory Committee; and Administrative and Financial Implications, 13 Nouvelles Etudes Penales 1997 177 (Association International de Droit Penal, M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed., 1997). The notion of an international criminal court is not a recent one. See
DRAFT STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (Annex to the Report of the

Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, 31 Aug. 1951), 7 U.N. GAOR Supp. 11,
UN Doc. A/2136 (1952); REVISED DRAFT STATUTE

FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL

COURT (Annex to the Report of the Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, 20
Aug. 1953), 9 U..N. GAOR Supp. 12, U.N. Doc. A/2645 (1954). For an insightful history
and compilation of documents detailing efforts to create such an international tribunal,
see FERENCZ, supra note 30.
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risdiction over a case relevant to the ICC, and vise-versa. 133 Once activated, this permanent international criminal court would come to supplant the activities of the international tribunals currently adjudicating
crimes in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
A permanent ICC notwithstanding, domestic prosecutions of accused war criminals, where available and effective, are generally much
preferred. Even so, genuine attempts at any level to protect and enforce
human rights through prosecution of persons who commit serious violations of humanitarian law are significant and laudable. The success of
any tribunal, whether domestic or international, remains dependent on
the promulgation, interpretation, application and enforcement of the
law. Put tersely, the viability of both peace and justice rests on these
processes and the degree to which they are achieved.
VII. CONCLUSION
Fifty years ago, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was
adopted by the UN General Assembly as the common standard to which
all peoples and states should strive. In an ideal world, the rights and
conditions exhorted in the Universal Declaration would prevail. People
would coexist peacefully, cooperate, and exercise due diligence through
nondiscrimination in their everyday affairs. Miscreants would be apprehended, prosecuted, and punished in accord with the rules of national and international law. Prescriptions for justice would be overriding guidelines for and considerations of law and policy. Every
responsible authority would be held accountable for his or her acts or
omissions. Article 8 of the Universal Declaration would be honored and
upheld.
But we do not live in an ideal world. We live in a world of disparate
sovereign states, governed by humans with selfish ambitions who perceive, formulate and execute policies in the name and under the guise of
national interests, but often for their own private greed and personal
ambitions. In the course of this governing process, the fundamental
human rights of innocent persons are all-too-often brutally victimized
by individuals claiming to act in the name of the state. What makes this
situation all the more vile and repugnant is that in nearly all these
cases the perpetrators have been able to evade prosecution and punishment, even for the most horrendous of crimes. In cases of war crimes,
crimes against humanity, and acts of genocide-crimes that have been
deemed offenses against all mankind and the perpetrators of which are
branded war criminals and enemies of all mankind-most of the guilty
133. See Jeffrey L. Bleich, Esq., Complementarity, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT, supra note 132, at 231; Jeffrey L. Bleich, Esq., Cooperation with National Systems, in id. at 245.
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have gone uncharged, unprosecuted and unpunished. There has been
little remedy for the victims or their family survivors. Where justice
should prevail, the scourge of impunity has reigned.
Impunity, the exemption from punishment for violations of civil
and political rights, is multidimensional. Impunity rarely is generated
by purely normative considerations. Instead impunity stems from a
complex nexus of normative, circumstantial, and situational causes.
Impunity is not a construct normally found in positive law. The normative dimension of impunity is found in special national laws authorizing
impunity in certain circumstances, as well as in the practice of military
justice and codes of law. Impunity laws and the practice of military justice often conflict with international criminal law.
Certain facts and circumstances contribute to impunity. In many
developing countries, political traditions and strongly military dominated civil societies prevail. The weaker a civil government and that society, the deeper the potential intrusion of military justice into affairs
normally reserved for civilian justice. Such circumstances provide the
framework for encouraging impunity for military officials, as well as the
lack of a profound conviction that human rights violators must be
brought to justice.
Clearly, a duty exists for states to prosecute and punish persons
who commit the most serious human rights violations. This comes as
the logical extension of individual responsibility in international humanitarian law concerning grave breaches, as first articulated norma-

tively in the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Thus, international legal obligations to punish grave human rights violations limit national discretion
with regard to impunity. Impunity laws, such as amnesties, are legally
limited in existing international criminal law. While sometimes politically convenient or expeditious, such laws may well be incompatible
with international criminal law. The international lawfulness of such
impunity laws will depend on the prosecutional performance of a state
in any specific case.
Key concerns remain, though. Salient among these is how victims
of serious human rights violations can enforce their rights to remedy by
punishment of the perpetrator. One of the crueler ironies of international human rights protection is that the actual perpetrators of egregious human rights violations nearly always escape punishment. Implementation of the doctrine of individual criminal responsibility,
widely recognized since Nuremberg, should compel individual offenders
to accountability. Yet, the individual victim still lacks the fundamental
right to initiate proceedings against an alleged perpetrator.
Critical problems of compliance and enforcement remain. Reversal
of impunity through prosecution and punishment of perpetrators can
only come about if there exists the resolute political will of governments
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to do so. If governments are unwilling to comply with and enforce laws
against human rights violators, and if governments are willing to tolerate abuses and exacerbate conditions of impunity, then remedies for
victims will remain more fiction than fact, more sieve than substance.
That situation will render Article 8 in the Universal Declaration only so
much empty aspiration.
The fact is that international law is neither automatic nor selfenforcing. Governments must make compliance work by exercising the
necessary political will to punish the guilty-whether it be the soldier
in the field who pulls the trigger, or the militiaman in the countryside
who rapes and pillages, or the officer who gave the orders to perpetrate
unlawful acts, or the leader who made the decision for his armed forces
to commit crimes against humanity. For human rights laws to be
meaningful, the governments of states must institute and implement
national and international laws, support and protect the national judiciary, and uphold and carry out sentences against those who are convicted. To do otherwise is to emasculate the law and perpetrate impunity. Until the requisite political will is demonstrated, particularly by
the Great Powers on the UN Security Council, the international law to
prohibit and punish war crimes, genocide, torture and crimes against
humanity will remain inert and ineffective. Regrettably, so too will the
ability of states to afford victims adequate remedies for human rights
offenses committed unjustly against them.

The Failure of the International Court of
Justice to Effectively Enforce The Genocide
Convention
Geoffrey S. DeWeese*
"Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned"
The Second Coming - William Butler Yeats

PREFACE

The collapse of the UN safe-area of Srebrenica took place over the
course of a few days in July of 1995. Starting with shelling on July 6,1
the Serbs who surrounded the town began to indicate an intent to break
a long stalemate. By July 10 they had control of the southern portion of
the enclave right up to the town's edge. 2 On July 11 the town was
abandoned by both the Muslim inhabitants and the Dutch Peacekeep3
ers assigned to protect it; the safe-area ceased to exist.
What occurred over the next few days is hard to accept, but there is
no hiding from it. The town split up into two groups. Most of the
women, children and elderly walked the two miles up to the Dutch
headquarters in Potocari, on the northern edge of the safe-area. 4 Some
10,000 to 15,000 others, mostly men and boys, both civilians and soldiers, started off in a long column through the mountains and woods of
western Bosnia in hopes of making it to Muslim controlled Tuzla. 5
* The author is a third year law student at the University of Denver College of Law and a
sergeant in the Army Reserves. He would like to thank his wife Melody, who listened to
many draft ideas and helped edit the final version into a coherent article. Thanks also to
his parents for everything.
1. See DAVID ROHDE, ENDGAME: THE BETRAYAL AND FALL OF SREBRENICA, EUROPE'S
WORST MASSACRE SINCE WORLD WAR II 3 (1997).

2.
3.
4.
5.

See id. at 115.
See id. at 161-66.
See id at 163 -64.
See id. at 179-80.
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In Potocari on July 12, the Serbs, led by General Ratko Mladic, began a process of loading the refugees on buses and trucks for transportation to Muslim controlled Bosnia. 6 However, they herded out most of
the men and held them separately. 7 Meanwhile the men trudging their
way through the hillsides came under attack, and soon the long line
8
was spread out and in disarray.
On Friday, July 14, two men found themselves crowded into the
same gymnasium. 9 Mevludin Oric had been part of the march to Tuzla,
but, like so many he had been captured along with his cousin Haris. 10
Hurem Suljic had been one of the old men pulled away from his family
in Potocari on July 12 as the Serbs "evacuated" Srebrenica's civilian
Muslim population to eastern Bosnia. 1 Now they were both held prisoner along with some 1,000 to 1,500 other men. 12 That afternoon General Mladic arrived and conferred with the other Bosnian Serb officers,
3
laughing and smiling.'
Shortly after Mladic left, the Serbs began to herd the prisoners into
a smaller room in groups of fifteen to twenty; within half an hour Oric
and his cousin were part of one such small group to be taken.' 4 They
were blindfolded and put in the back of trucks. 15 After a short ride they
6
were pulled out of the truck; moments later shots began to ring out.'
About five hours later Suljic was taken out of the same gym, blindfolded and put in the back of a truck. 17 As it drove away, Suljic peeked
out from under his blindfolded and was surprised to find that he, at
fifty-five, was the youngest man in the truck.' 8 Looking out the back of
the truck he saw the horrific sight of hundreds of dead bodies laying in
rows with a bulldozer busy digging a mass grave. 19 Taken out of the
truck, the men were herded to the end of a row of bodies, and the Serbs

6. See id. at 204-05.
7. See id.
8. See id. at 225-228.
9. See id. at 272-74.The events described come from interviews conducted with the
two by former Christian Science Monitor journalist David Rohde for his book ENDGAME.
Throughout the book he only recounted events which he could either independently identify (he was one of the first to reach the sites of the mass graves) or which he felt were
trustworthy. See ROHDE, supra note 1, at ix-xi.
10. See Id. at 272-74.
11. See id. at 206-07.
12. See id. at 288.
13. See id. at 289
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id. at 294.
18. See id. at 295.
19. See id.
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began to shoot.20
Somehow neither Oric and Suljic were hit,
amongst the other victims they survived until
found each other and escaped. 21 Oric's cousin,
across his legs all day, and hundreds of others did

and by playing dead
nightfall when they
who's dead body lay
not survive. 22

The story of Mevludin Oric and Hurem Suljic is not the only one
which survives the war in Bosnia. What happened to them and those
with them is typical of the genocide that occurred. According to the Red
Cross, 7,364 people are still missing from Srebrenica alone, with 19,323
listed as missing from the entire war. 23 To put this into perspective, after the ten year Vietnam war period, which involved over two million
24
Americans, there were only 2,097 missing.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Three years before the fall of Srebrenica, on March 6, 1992, President Alija Izetbegovic declared independence for the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina following a national referendum. 25 Exactly one month
later, as war was breaking out in the former Yugoslav republic, the
European Community extended the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovnia recognition as an independent nation. 26 The next day, April 7, Bosnian Serbs anounced their formation of a separate "Serbian Republic of
27
Bosnia and Herzegovina."
Less than a year later, on March 20, 1993, Bosnia and Herzegovina
("Bosnia") 28 filed a complaint with the Registry of the International
Court of Justice (ICJ)instituting proceedings against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) ('Yugoslavia") alleging
violations of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
29
Crime of Genocide.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

See id. at 295-96.
See id. at 291-93, 298-300, 302-304.
See id.
Michael Kelly, Where are the Dead? THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 16, 1998, at 36-37.
Id. at 37.

25. JAN WILLEM HONIG & NORBERT BOTH, SREBRENICA, RECORD OF A WAR CRIME 72

(1996).
26. See Steven J. Woehrel, Bosnia -Herzegovina Background to the Conflict 4, (CRS
Report for Congress No. 93-106 F,1993).
27. See id.
28. In researching for this article I found Herzegovina also to be spelled with a c instead of a z - Hercegovina. Not being a linguist myself, I have simply opted for the former
spelling as it is what is used by the ICJ. In addition, I have tried to stick to using "Bosnia
and Herzegovina" as the Court does, rather than the alternate form of "BosniaHerzegovina."
29. Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Mon-
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The ICJ has yet to reach the merits of the case. Over the course of
the past five years the ICJ has ruled on issues in three main categories:
the indications of provisional measures, 30 preliminary objections to the
Application and to the ICJ's jurisdiction to hear the case, 31 and the
permissibility of counter-claims. 32 It was while the ICJ was dealing
with these procedural issues that Srebrenica was overrun by Bosnian
Serbs, leading to the disappearance and suspected mass murders of so
many Bosnian Muslims. 33 As the case continued to drag on in The
Hague, the war in Bosnia was brought to an uneasy end under the Dayton-Paris Peace Treaty and UN Peacekeepers were replaced by NATO
34
forces.
The Bosnian war and the case it spawned before the ICJ serve as a
reminder that violence in the form of genocide and warfare cannot be
stopped in the courtroom. Perhaps the ICJ is not the place to settle
disputes over issues as pressing as genocide. The procedures of the
Court, and the lack of enforceability of its judgments outside of the actions of the U.N. and good will of the nations who are parties to it, do
not meet the need for swift action when the issue is not only the placing
of blame for acts of genocide, but the prevention of such ongoing acts.
The Convention refers to both Prevention and Punishment, but while
the ICJ ponders who should be punished, it has been utterly ineffective
in the more immediate and more important work of preventing genocide.
To keep the Court's deliberations in perspective, I will spend a portion of this paper reviewing the social and political history of the Balkans and of the war that erupted there as the former communist state
of Yugoslavia disintegrated. I begin by reviewing the history of the region up to the collapse of communist Yugoslavia. With this foundation,
I will then present the holdings that have characterized the three
phases of the litigation before the ICJ so far, along with some of the
commentary from various judges. Next, I will review the events that
were taking place in Bosnia while the case was being drawn out. I will

tenegro)), 1993 I.C.J. 3, 3-4 (Order of Apr. 8, 1993). Hereinafter I will only provide the citation and name of specific issuance rather than name the entire case each time. Therefore all LC.J. references will be to this one case unless otherwise stated.
30. 1993 I.C.J. 3 (Order of Apr. 8, 1993); 1993 I.C.J. 325 (Order of September 13,
1993).
31. Judgment
of
July
11,
1996
(visited
Sept.
2,
1997)
<http://www.law.cornell.edulici/icj4tjudgment.htm>.
32. Order of 17 December 1997 (visited Jan. 15, 1998)
<http://www.icj-cij.org/idocket/ibhy/ibhyorders/ibhyorder971217.html>.
33. See Kelly, supranote 23, at 36-37.
34. See Craig Whitney, "Seize the Chance" Balkan Plan Signed; Real Work Ahead,
THE DENVER POST, Dec. 15, 1995, availablein 1995 WL 10205318.

1998

GENOCIDE CONVENTION

conclude then with some personal observations and questions which I
feel arise from both the case itself and its impact (or lack thereof) on the
people of Bosnia.
II. HISTORYTO 1992
Prior to its acceptance by the world community as an independent
35
state in 1992, there had never been an independent state of Bosnia.
Settled in the seventh century by Slavic peoples, the area in which Bosnia now rests was at the conflux of various world powers over the centuries. 36 To the west lay the Roman Catholic Church which was followed by the Croats, and to the east the Orthodox Church was preeminent and supported by the Serbs. 37 In the fifteenth century the conquest of Bosnia and the surrounding region by the Ottoman Empire
brought Islam into this mix of religious ideals, and many people, both
38
peasants and nobles, converted as a means of keeping their land.
Bosnia was becoming a focal point for international tension as the
Christian nations in Europe came to feel threatened by such a large and
strong Islamic state in Europe itself. In 1875 Slavs in Serbia and Montenegro intervened in an uprising in Bosnia and soon rebellion had
spread throughout the region. 39 Sensing an opportunity to weaken its
Ottoman enemy and gain valuable territory, Russia stepped in to support its Slavic neighbors. 40 In March of 1878 the Treaty of San Stefano
gave the Russian Empire a triumphal victory and freed the Slavic
41
states from Ottoman rule.
The new borders laid out at San Stefano, however, didn't last very
long as the rest of Europe became concerned with Russian expansion.
In June and July of 1878 the lines were once again redrawn and territory redistributed by the Congress of Berlin. 42 As part of the new structure, Bosnia and Herzegovina was given to the Austro-Hungarian Empire to administer. 43 While these new developments disappointed
Russia, they angered Serbia and Montenegro and the Balkans continued to be a source of contention among the European powers. 44
Within the Balkans, religion may have divided the people, but they

35. See Woehrel, supra note 26, at 1.

36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. THE WESTERN HERITAGE SINCE 1300 926 (Donald Kagan et al. eds., 4th ed. 1991).

40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id. at 927.

43. See id.
44. See id.
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were all of Slavic ancestry and spoke variations of the same language. 45
These peoples had found themselves ruled by various nations over the
centuries - Turkey, Austria, Hungary, and Russia. 46 There was a
growing movement of Slavic nationalism at the start of the twentieth
century aimed at a union of the South Slavs (Yugoslavs) into an independent nation.47 Serbia hoped to be the state that would unite these
48
disparate peoples.
In 1908 Turkey began to regain some of its strength which led to
the official annexing of Bosnia by Austria. 49 This angered the Serbs
who had hoped to create a greater Yugoslav state, and it also antagonized Russia.5 0 However, Germany, Austria's partner in the Dual Alliance, tacitly supported the move. 51 In the ensuing years two small wars
broke out in the Balkans and the various alliance that held Europe to a
fragile stability began to strain under the pressure. 52 Finally the assassination of Austrian Archduke Ferdinand, heir to the throne, in Sarajevo in 1914 by a Bosnian Serb nationalist proved to be too much and
like dominoes the various European powers fell victim to their own alli53
ances and one by one were drawn into war.
It is important to understand that during that first decade of the
twentieth century, the Bosnians themselves were divided as to who
they wanted to be aligned with. The Croats (about 18 percent of the
population) wanted to stay a part of the Austrian Empire as a Croatian
state. 54 Most of the Serbs (some 42 percent of the population) supported
uniting with Serbia. 55 The Muslim population, (just over 31 percent of
the population) descendants of those who converted under the Ottoman
occupation, were claimed by both sides as simply being "Islamicized
members of their group." 56 For their part, the Muslims wanted to be returned to the Ottoman Empire.57 Even at this stage division was taking
root within the diverse population of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
At the end of World War I the Serbs achieved their goal as the
Kingdom of Yugoslavia was established to include Croatia, Bosnia,

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

See id. at 931.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 932.
See id. at 932-34.
See id. at 934.
Woehrel, supra note 26, at 2.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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Montenegro, and Serbia.5 8 This new state was by no means without
disharmony, and while the Serbs did provide some religious toleration
and reform of landownership provisions to protect Muslims, many of
them emigrated to Turkey. 59 In 1941 Yugoslavia was conquered by
Germany and it became part of a puppet Croatian state run by Croatian
fascists who stated as a goal the expulsion of a third of Serbs, conversion to Catholicism of another third, and to kill the final third. 60 The
Bosnian Muslims, on the other hand, were treated as potential allies
who simply had to be converted. 61 While many Muslims did side with
the Fascists Ustashe, others turned to the Communist Partisans. Soon
the Ustashe, Partisans, and the royalist Chetniks were fighting each
62
other and hundreds of thousands of soldiers and civilians were killed.
The Partisans were led by Josip Broz, better know by his later
name - Tito.63 In 1943 Churchill determined that Tito was "killing the
most Germans" and so he was given British support which lead to his
Partisans becoming the dominant force in the war and in post-war
Yugoslavia. 64 Tito ran Yugoslavia until his death in 1980, and under
his leadership the republics, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, were
given wide autonomy under the 1974 Constitution. 65 Tito's regime also
recognized the Muslim population as a national group, not just a relig66
ious one.
Following Tito's death, Yugoslavia suffered both economic hardship
and corruption scandals, and by the late 1980s Serbian nationalist Slobodan Milosevic had risen to power. 67 As the 1990s began, the various
republics become more self-assertive with non-Communist governments
in Slovenia and Croatia advocating a loose federation, and Serbia
pushing for more unity. Bosnia saw the formation of multiple parties
from the various ethnic groups, and a coalition government was formed
under Alija Izetbegovic, a Muslim. 68 In 1991 both Slovenia and Croatia
declared independence from Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav People's
Army (YPA) used Bosnia as a staging ground in an attempt to regain
the republics, an act which increased tensions between Croats and
Serbs within Bosnia. 69 Several Serb autonomous regions were declared

58. THE WESTERN HERITAGE, supra note 39, at 955.
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by the Serbian Democratic Party within Bosnia which announced they
would secede should Bosnia claim independence. Croatian regions followed suit, saying they would stay as long as Bosnia didn't become
70
Serb-dominated.
Nevertheless, in December of 1991 Bosnia applied to the European
Community (EC) for recognition as an independent state after the EC
gave the various republics a deadline for such action.7 1 A referendum
was held on February 29 and March 1, 1992, in which independence
was approved by 99.4 percent of the 63.4 percent who turned out for the
72
vote (Serbs, 31 percent of the population, had boycotted the vote).
While the three sides (Muslims, Serbs, and Croats) initially agreed to a
plan to divide Bosnia into separate cantons with wide autonomy, too
many factors remained unresolved and on April 4 Bosnian Serbs, supported by the YPA, began attacks which escalated with EC recognition
of Bosnia and Herzegovina in April. 73 The next day the "Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina" was announced by Serbs and an
army commanded by YPA general Ratko Mladic soon had control of
two-thirds of the new nation's territory. 74 While in May the YPA formally declared it was withdrawing from Bosnia, all Bosnian born YPA
soldiers (nearly 80 percent) were told they could keep their equipment
75
and remain in the new republic.
III.

THE CASE

A. Background
Far from the violence and anarchy of the Balkans, the Peace Palace
in the Hague, Netherlands, provides a luxurious and impressive home
for the ICJ. In 1946, the ICJ was formed as an organ of the United Nations and took over where the Permanent Court of International Justice
left off.76 Two years later the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention) was adopted
by the U.N. General Assembly in December 1948. 77 Unlike the U.N.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See ARTHUR EYFFINGER, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 1946-1996 98-99
(1996). The first sitting of the ICJ occurred on April 18, the same day the League of Nations and the Permanent Court of International Justice voted themselves out of existence.
Id. at 99.
77. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted
December 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force January 12, 1951) [hereinafter
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and the ICJ which both replaced international bodies that had existed
prior to World War II, the Genocide Convention was a reaction to the
horrible events of the war itself.
The Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina
v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)) is the 91st case to come before
the ICJ since its founding, 78 and the second time the ICJ has been
asked to adjudicate on the Genocide Convention. In 1951 the ICJ issued an Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crimes of Genocide. 79 In what Judge
Stephen Schwebel, the current president of the ICJ, has called a "landmark opinion,"80 the ICJ held that the Genocide Convention was "intended by the General Assembly and by the contracting parties to be
definitely universal in scope."8'
Unlike the case of Bosnia v. Yugoslavia, this earlier case was an
advisory opinion only, and it wasn't until Bosnia filed its Application
that jurisdiction was claimed under Article IX of the Genocide Convention.8 2 Under Article IX, "[d]isputes between the Contracting Parties
relating to the interpretation, application or fulfillment of the present
Convention... shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice
83
at the request of any of the parties to the dispute."
B. Ordersfor ProvisionalMeasures - April 8 and September 13, 1993
1. Order of April 8, 1993
In its Application to the Court filed on March 20, 1993, Bosnia
asked the ICJ to make numerous declarations, not all specifically re-

Genocide Convention]. The United States did not ratify the Genocide Convention until
1988, and then only subject to certain reservations, the first being that "before any dispute to which the United States is a party may be submitted to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice under [article IX of the Conventions], the specific consent of
the United States is required in each case." U.S. Reservations and Understandings to the
Genocide Convention, November 25, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 782.
78. See EYFFINGER, supra note 76, at 384.
79. 1951 I.C.J. 15 (May 28).

80. See Stephen M. Schwebel, The Roles of the Security Council and the International
Court of Justice in the Application of InternationalHumanitarianLaw, 27 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. & POL. 731, 734 (1995).
81. Reservations to the Convention, supra note 77, at 23.
82. Genocide Convention, supra note 77, Article IX.
83. Id.
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lating to the Genocide Convention.8 4 In addition to alleging violations
of the Genocide Convention, Bosnia also asked the court to declare that
Yugoslavia had violated the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the Hague
Regulations on Land Warfare of 1907, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the United Nations Charter, and other principles of customary international law.8 5 Further, Bosnia asked the ICJ to declare
that under the circumstances, any Security Council resolutions relating
to the former Yugoslavia should not be construed as preventing Bosnian
self-defense and its right to acquire weapons from other states.8 6 In
light of the violations of the various treaties and customary law, Bosnia
next asked to ICJ to order Yugoslavia to "cease and desist" such violations, specifically from acts such as "ethnic cleansing," mass rapes, destruction of communities and religious institutions, bombardment of civilian populations, the continuing siege of population centers,
starvation of civilian populations, interference with delivery of humanitarian supplies, from all uses of force against, and violations of the sovereignty of Bosnia, and any support of those who were engaging in military actions against Bosnia.8 7 Finally, the ICJ was asked to declare
that Yugoslavia had to pay reparations to Bosnia for the damages it had
88
inflicted.
In addition to the Application, Bosnia also requested that the Court
immediately indicate various provisional measures which would be in
effect while the Court was seized of the case. 89 The provisional measures requested were for Yugoslavia to stop the alleged violations and to
stop providing aid to any group engaged in military actions against
Bosnia, and that the Court declare that Bosnia should be allowed to
procure arms for its self-defense. 90
In response to Bosnia's requests, Yugoslavia asked for provisional
measures of its own, which in many respects mirrored Bosnia's. The
measures asked that Bosnia be ordered to stop any actions aimed at
Serbs living in Bosnia, that Bosnia disband prison camps, stop the destruction of Orthodox churches, observe a cease-fire agreed to on March
28, 1993, and cease the practice of "ethnic cleansing." 91
On April 1 and 2, 1993, the Court heard oral observations from
both sides dealing with the preliminary measures. 92 In its Order the

84. See 1993 I.C.J. 3, 4-8 (Order of April 8, 1993).
85. See id at 4-5.
86. See id. at 5-6.

87.
88.
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Id. at 6-7.
See id. at 7.
See id. at 7-8
See id. at 8.

91. Id. at 9-10.

92. See id. at 10.
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Court noted that
... on a request for provisional measures the Court need not, before
deciding whether or not to indicate them, finally satisfy itself that it
has jurisdiction on the merits of the case, yet it ought not to indicate
such measures unless the provisions invoked by the Applicant or found
in the Statute appear prima facie, to afford a basis on which the jurisdiction of the Court might be established .... 93
Based on this understanding, the Court concluded that it could find
a prima facie basis from the Genocide Convention. 94 It first noted that
Article IX gave the Court jurisdiction to hear disputes relating to the
application of the Convention. 95 Next it determined that both Bosnia
and Yugoslavia had succeeded to the commitments of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which had been a signatory of
96
the Genocide Convention.
Bosnia also presented as an additional basis for jurisdiction a letter
to the President of the Arbitration Commission of the International
Conference for Peace in Yugoslavia from the Presidents of Serbia and
Montenegro. 97 In this letter, the Presidents stated that any legal disputes which could not be settled between the various former Yugoslav
republics should be presented to the ICJ.98 Bosnia maintained that this
meant that any disputes between the former republics should be
brought to the ICJ, but the Court disagreed. Instead, it interpreted the
letter as only dealing with the specific disputes which were before the
Arbitration Commission at that time. 99 As such, it could not be considered to rise to the level of a prima facie basis of jurisdiction. 10 0
Since the Court had established that the Genocide Convention was
the only basis upon which its jurisdiction might be found, its next task
was to determine what provisional measures it could indicate. 01 After
discussing the provisions of the Genocide Convention in light of the
claims of both parties, the Court stated that "the circumstances require
it to indicate provisional measures."1 02 But before laying out its order
the court noted that
the decision given in the present proceedings in no way prejudges the
93. Id. at 11-12.

94. See id. at 16.
95.
96.
97.
98.
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id. at 14. For test of Article IX, see supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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question of the jurisdiction of the court to deal with the merits of the
case, or any questions relating to the admissibility of the Application,
or relating to the merits themselves, and leaves unaffected the right of
the Governments of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Yugoslavia to submit ar103
guments in respect of those questions.
Essentially the court was reassuring both sides that whatever decisions the court made regarding provisional measures, such decisions
would not prejudice either party regarding the claims made at the merits.
The Court unanimously voted first (in paragraph 52 A(1)) that
Yugoslavia should "take all measures within its power to prevent commission of the crime of genocide."'10 4 Next, by a vote of 13 to 1 (Judge
Tarassov against) (paragraph 52 A (2)) the Court declared that Yugoslavia "should in particular ensure" that any military or paramilitary
organization under its control or influence, or supported by it, "do not
commit any acts of genocide" against Bosnian Muslims or anyone
else. 105 Finally the Court, again voting unanimously (in paragraph 52
B), declared that both Yugoslavia and Bosnia "should not take any action and should ensure that no action is taken which may aggravate or
extend the existing dispute over the prevention or punishment of the
10 6
crime of genocide or render it more difficult of solution."
Judge Tarassov stated in an appended Declaration to the Order
that he voted against the second measure due to his fear that it would
be construed as a pre-judgment of Yugoslavia's guilt, despite the courts
earlier declaration that preliminary measures would not bias the merits
of the case. He also dissented because he stated that Yugoslavia may
not have control over all who claimed to be subject to it. 107
2. Order of September 13, 1993
Before long the ICJ found itself once again confronted with issues
of provisional measures. 108 On July 27, 1993, four months after the filing of the Application and its requests for provisional measures, Bosnia
filed a second request for provisional measures which was based upon
the facts alleged in the original request, as well as a few new allegations.10 9 Once again Bosnia asked that the Court immediately order
Yugoslavia to stop providing any type of support to any groups in Bos103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.

Id. at 24 (paragraph 52 A (1)).
Id. (paragraph 52 A (2)).
Id. (paragraph 52 B).
See id. at 26-27.
1993 I.C.J. 325 (Order of September 13, 1993).
See id. at 332.
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nia, that Bosnia be allowed to buy weapons, ammunitions and supplies
from other nations to facilitate its self-defense, and that other nations
be allowed to provide such aid.11 0 The new requests were that all Yugoslavian officials, "especially the President of Serbia, Mr. Slobodan
Milosevic" stop any plans to acquire any territory in Bosnia, that the
Court declare that all contracting parties to the Genocide Convention
have an "obligation" to prevent Genocide in Bosnia, and that United
Nations Peace-Keeping Forces must "do all in their power" to get humanitarian aid to the people of Bosnia.'
Once again Yugoslavia countered with its own request, asking the
Court to order Bosnia "to take all measures within its power to prevent
112
commission of the crime of genocide against the Serb ethnic group."
Before hearings occurred on August 25 and 26, 1993, the two sides were
allowed to appoint judges ad hoc as they did not have representation on
the Court." 3 Bosnia choose Elihu Lauterpacht to represent it, and
114
Yugoslavia appointed Milenko Kreca.
Yugoslavia again objected to Bosnia's standing before the Court,
but the ICJ rejected that contention as having been previously settled
in its Order of April 8.115
The Court next turned its attention to examining the various additional basis of jurisdiction presented by Bosnia to determine if any of
1 6
them established the required prima facie evidence of jurisdiction.
Bosnia presented the Court with a 1919 Treaty signed by the Kingdom
of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes," 7 the letter to the President of the
Arbitration Commission presented in its previous request, 1 8 and various customary and conventional laws of war such as the Geneva Conventions, the Hague Regulations on Land Warfare, and the Nuremberg
Charter, Judgment, and Principles. 1 9 The Court rejected each of these
as not having been shown to provide any basis of a prima facie case
120
upon which provisional measures could be based.

110. See id. at 332-333.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 334.
113. See id. at 335.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 337.
116. See id. at 339.
117. See id. The full name was the Treaty between the Allied and Associated Powers
(the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan) and the
Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, on the Protection of Minorities, signed Sept.
10, 1919.
118. See 1993 I.C.J. 325, 340-41 (Order of September 13). See also supra notes 99-100
and accompanying text.
119. See 1993 I.C.J. 325 (Order of September 13) at 341.
120. See id. at 340-41.
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Bosnia also asked the Court to find jurisdiction based on Yugoslavia's own requests for provisional measures, some of which Bosnia
claimed went beyond the scope of the Genocide Convention. 121 The
Court also rejected this basis noting that subsequent requests had all
stayed within the limits of the Genocide Convention, and further that
Yugoslavia had constantly denied that the Court has jurisdiction on any
basis including the Convention. 122 Under such circumstances the Court
said Yugoslavia's actions cannot be interpreted as an unequivocal and
voluntary acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction.123 The Court concluded
that only the Genocide Convention had been shown to provide a prima
124
facie case basis for jurisdiction.
In filing a second request for provisional measures, Bosnia had to
show that those further measures requested were necessary for the protection of a legal right. 25 However, the Court determined that only one
of the eight legal rights which Bosnia sought to be protected was based
on the Genocide Convention, "the right of the People and State of Bosnia and Herzegovina to be free at all times from genocide and other
genocidal acts perpetrated upon Them by Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), acting together with its agents and surrogates in Bosnia and
elsewhere." 126 Therefore, only measures aimed at this right would be
considered.127
The Court determined first that those measures which sought to
allow or require other nations or entities to provide weapons and supplies to Bosnia, or which were directed to Bosnia's right to receive such
weapons and supplies were essentially attempts to have the Court clarify the role of outside parties and as such were beyond the scope of the
Genocide Convention. 128 Further, the Court determined that requests
aimed at protecting Bosnia's physical territory were not within the
scope of the Genocide Convention which was aimed at protecting people,
not territory. 29 Finally, in examining the last remaining request, that
Yugoslavia stop supporting in any manner to any groups or individuals
in Bosnia, the Court found that it was nearly identical to measures requested in Bosnia's first request, except that it was broader in scope. 130
However, inasmuch as this request did not specifically invoke the Geno-
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639

cide Convention, it was outside the legal scope. 131
In response to Yugoslavia's request that Bosnia be ordered to prevent the genocide of Serbs, the Court did find that the request was directly connected to the Genocide Convention, but that it had already
been met by the Order of April 8 and as the circumstance had not
132
changed, there was no need for more specific measures.
In concluding its examination of the requests of the two parties, the
Court made known its frustration at the continued genocidal actions
taking place in Bosnia. 133 Despite its Order of April 8, the Court noted
that "great suffering and loss of life has been sustained by the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina in circumstances which shock the conscience
of mankind."'134 The Court was clearly frustrated at the continued
fighting taking place, despite numerous Security Council Resolutions
condemning the ethnic cleansing and other violations of international
law, which only aggravated the dispute before it. 135 It flatly stated that
it was "not satisfied that all that might have been done has been done
to prevent commission of the crime of genocide." 136 The Court concluded
that what was required was not new indications of provisional measures, but simply an adherence to the ones already in place. 137 It therefore voted again on the operative paragraphs from its Order of April
8.138 First, by a vote of 13 to 2, the Court reaffirmed paragraph 52 A
(1), next, by a vote of 13 to 2, it reaffirmed paragraph 52 A (2) and finally, by a 14 to 1 vote, the Court reaffirmed paragraph 52 B. 139 Judge
Tarassov changed his vote in favor on the first order to an against vote,
140
and Judge ad hoc Kreca, voted against each one.
While no judges had done so with the Order of April 8, a number of
them did attach opinions to this Order. One issue of interest to the
various judges was whether or not provisional measures are legally
binding. In his Separate Opinion, Judge Shahabuddeen took the view
that they need not be found to be legally binding in order to impart a
duty on a party. 141 He expressed the opinion that a provisional measure
is essentially a "judicial finding" and "any non-implementation, even if
not in breach of a legal obligation, represents an inconsistency with that
131. See id.
132. See id. at 346-47.
133. See id. at 347-49.
134. Id. at 348.
135. See id.
136. Id. at 348-49.
137. See id. at 349.
138. See Id. at 349-50. See supra,notes 104-06 and accompanying text for specifics of
these paragraphs.
139. 1993 I.C.J. 325 (Order of September 13) at 349-50.
140. Id. at 349-50.
141. See id. at 367 (Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen).
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judicial finding."'142 While he admitted that the Court had no power to
penalize non-implementation (which he felt Yugoslavia was guilty of),
he did think the Court should consider such factors when presented for
requests by the non-implementing party (in this case Yugoslavia), and
that "it would not be correct" to act upon requests for measures by such
parties. 143
Judge Weeramantry felt it was important to distinguish the question of whether provisional measures were legally binding from the
question of enforcement.144 He was of the opinion that the question of
enforceability was secondary to that of validity. 145 It is clear in reading
Judge Weeramantry's opinion that he did indeed view the question of
whether such orders are binding as one "whose importance transcends
the matter presently before the Court, important though it be."'146 After
examining various sources for an answer to this question, Judge
Weeramantry concluded that the provisional measures did impose a legal obligation, and that this was especially important as the issues before the Court touched upon "the very existence of a people."'147 Anything short of such an understanding would be "out of tune with the
148
letter and spirit of the Charter and the Statute."'
Faced with non-compliance of the parties as to the first indications
of provisional measures, Judge Ajibola asked, "Must the Court make
orders in vain?"'149 He felt that the first Order of April 8 had not been
complied with, 150 but found the question of its binding effect to be a difficult one. 151 Nevertheless, he agreed with Judge Weeramantry's conclusion that they were binding, for "[1]ogic and common sense would
consider it ridiculous and absurd for the Court to be unable to preserve
the rights of the parties pending the final judgment."'152 After all, he
reasoned, if the Court could not issue binding orders for such measures,
the Court would not have been given such power in the first place by
the Statute and Rules of the Court. 153 As to enforceability, he pointed
out that the Court relies on the Security Council to ensure enforcement. 5 4 Ultimately, he stated that the order "should be binding and
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enforceable, otherwise, ab initio, there may be a good and reasonable
ground to question its being issued at all."' 55
Judge Tarassov dissented because of his view that it was dangerous
to impute responsibility to one nation for the acts of an ethnically homogenous group residing in another nation. 15 6 By his negative votes, he
reaffirmed the apprehensions he had felt when the first request was
presented in Bosnia's Application. 157 He felt the Court should have
made reference to the need of both parties to achieve a peace agreement
58
at negotiations in Geneva.
Judge ad hoc Lauterpacht wrote a Separate Opinion in which he
carefully addressed and defended the merits of each and every measure
requested by Bosnia, as well as the various claims for jurisdiction presented by Bosnia.e 9 His approach to the case was laid out early in his
Opinion: "[T]he circumstances call for a high degree of understanding
of, and sensitivity to, the situation and must exclude any narrow or
160
overly technical approach to the problems involved."'
Judge ad hoc Kreca, for his part, took the opportunity to attack the
Order of April 8 upon which the current Order was based. 16 1 Judge ad
hoc Kreca felt that the request failed to meet the qualifications of the
definition of "people" in the Genocide Convention.' 62 He pointed out
that Bosnia as a nation was actually a mix of ethnic communities, and
as such was not a homogeneous people which could claim to fall under
the Genocide Convention. 63 He further disagreed with the Court over
the existence of any facts which would be the basis for provisional
64
measures or jurisdiction.1
Rather than granting Bosnia any new provisional measures, the
Court only voted to re-affirm the Order it had rendered on April 8,
1993. Considering that the Court seemed to recognize that the earlier
Order did not have the desired effect, it is hard to understand how the
Court expected it to change the situation this time around. The case
dragged on for another three years before the Court determined that it
had jurisdiction to hear the case at all. It was during this time that
Srebrenica fell. The provisional measures had no effect on the thousands who died in the aftermath of the town's end.

155. Id. at 406.
156. See id. at 449 (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tarassov).

157. See id. See also supranote 107 and accompanying text.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

See 1993 I.C.J. 325 (Order of September 13) at 451.
See id. at 407-48 (Separate Opinion of Judge Lauterpacht).

Id.
See
See
See
See

id. at 453.
id. at 454.
id.
id. at 457-58.
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C. Jurisdiction- July 11, 1996
Following the pair of Orders for the indication of provisional measures, the Court granted the parties a series of extensions for the filing
of Bosnia's Memorial and Yugoslavia's Counter-Memorial. 65 However,
by an Order of July 14, 1995166, the proceedings on the merits were suspended when Yugoslavia filed preliminary objections relating to the
admissibility of the Application and to the jurisdiction of the Court. 167
Bosnia was given until November 14, 1995 to present its observations
and statements concerning Yugoslavia's objections. 168 After Bosnia
filed its statement, Yugoslavia submitted to the Court the text of the
General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina
("Dayton-Paris Agreement"). 169 Nearly four months after the uneasy
peace agreement had been signed, public hearings were held on Yugoslavia's Objections between April 29 and May 3, 1996.170
After presenting Bosnia's requests as stated in its Memorial, 171 the
Court laid out seven preliminary objections argued by Yugoslavia. 172
They first attacked the jurisdiction of the court over the case (as well as
the date at which any possible jurisdiction would have begun to run)
and next they attacked the admissibility of Bosnia's Application in the
first place. 173 These objections altered slightly in form at oral arguments, specifically with Yugoslavia dropping one of its objections to
admissibility and expanding on its arguments concerning when any ju165. See 1993 I.C.J. 470 (Order of October 7, 1993) (stating that at the request of Bosnia, it was given a six month extension for the filing of its Memorial to be due on April 15,
1994, and thus extending to 15 April 1995 the time-limit for the filing of a CounterMemorial by Yugoslavia) and 1995 I.C.J. 80 (Order of March 21, 1995) (stating that at the
request of Yugoslavia, over objections by Bosnia, the time-limit for the filing of Yugoslavia's Counter-Memorial was extended to June 30, 1995).
166. 1995 I.C.J. 279, 279-80 (Order of July 14, 1995).
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. See
Judgment
of
July
11,
1996
(visited
Sept.
2,
1997)
<http://www.law.cornell.edu/icj/icj4/judgment.htm>, paragraphs 9 and 10. The DaytonParis Agreement was initialed in Dayton, Ohio on November 21, 1995, and signed in Paris
on December 14.
170. See Judgment of July 11, 1996, supra note 169, at paragraph 12.
171. See id. at para. 14 (On Behalf of the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the
Memorial). Bosnia presented seven requests to the Court, the first five all asking for the
ICJ to adjudge and declare that Yugoslavia was in some manner guilty of violations of the
Genocide Convention, the sixth called upon Yugoslavia to restore the situation which existed before the violations occurred, and the seventh asked to ICJ to require Yugoslavia to
pay reparations to Bosnia for "damages and losses caused." Id. Bosnia also reserved the
right to invoke other basis of jurisdiction should Yugoslavia challenge the Genocide Convention as grounds for jurisdiction. See id.
172. See id. at para. 14 (On Behalf of the Government of Yugoslavia, in the preliminary objections).
173. See id.
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risdiction that may be found in the Genocide Convention would begin. 174
1. Jurisdiction Issues
The ICJ first tackled the issue of whether the two parties were
bound by the Genocide Convention. Yugoslavia was bound, the Court
said, because of its indications to the international community and to
the United Nations that it would assume all the treaty obligations of
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 75 Additionally, since
Yugoslavia had never contested that it was a party to the Genocide
176
Convention, it was therefore bound by the provisions therein.
The larger question presented by Yugoslavia's objections was
whether Bosnia was a party to the Convention. The Court determined
that Bosnia was for two reasons. First, as Bosnia had given to the Secretary-General of the U.N. a Notice of Succession which was accepted
by the Secretary-General as a valid succession by a recognized member
state, it had legally succeeded to the treaty. 177 Second, by way of being
accepted as a member of the United Nations, Bosnia may have been entitled to "automatic succession. " 17 The Court concluded that in either
case it was clear that as of the filing of the Application on March 20,
17 9
1993, Bosnia was a party to the Convention.
This determination led the Court to examine Yugoslavia's contentions that even if Bosnia was considered a party to the Genocide Convention, any actions taken under the Convention would be limited to after Bosnia became a party. 180 Yugoslavia argued that Article XIII of the
Convention required a 90 day wait period before accession would be final, which would put the date at March 29 (90 days after Bosnia gave
its Notice on December 29, 1992). 181 Essentially, Yugoslavia was saying
that Bosnia was not a party to the Convention until after it had submitted its Application, and therefore the Application was invalid. The
Court replied that Article XIII did not matter since Bosnia was determined to have become a party through succession. 182 Further, even if it

174. See id. at para. 15 (On Behalf of the Government of Yugoslavia, At the hearing on
2 May 1996). Another interesting change was that in the written objections Yugoslavia
referred to Bosnia as the "so-called Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina," but in the oral arguments they dropped this caveat and referred simply to "Bosnia-Herzegovina." Compare
para. 14 with para. 15.
175. See id. at para. 17.
176. See id.
177. See id. at paras. 18-20.
178. Id. at para. 21.
179. See id. at para. 23.
180. See id. at para. 24.
181. See id. at para. 24.
182. See id.
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was the case that Bosnia was not actually a party until March 29, that
would only mean that the Application was a few days early, a problem
which Bosnia could have at any time remedied.18 3 The Court said it
would not penalize a party to a dispute over a minor procedural error
18 4
which could have been easily remedied.
Yugoslavia's fifth objection claimed that as the conflicts in Bosnia
were domestic in nature, there was not international dispute, and that
Article IX of the Genocide Convention18 5 did not apply to issues of state
responsibility.18 6 The Court dismissed the first part of this objection by
pointing out that Yugoslavia's part in the genocide was exactly what
was at dispute and such arguments belonged to the merits of the
case.18 7 As to the second part of this objection, the Court disagreed with
Yugoslavia's interpretation of Article IX of the Genocide Convention
and determined that it conferred jurisdiction not only to issues dealing
with a state's obligation to prevent and punish crimes of genocide, but
also to acts of genocide committed by the state or its subsidiaries 188.
Yugoslavia had also argued that if the court were to find jurisdiction based on the Genocide Convention, it could only deal with events
that occurred after the Convention became binding on the parties.1 8 9
However, the Court determined that since there was no indication in
the Convention of a limit to its jurisdiction ratione temporis, and no
such reservations were presented in the Dayton-Paris Agreement, its
jurisdiction extended to the beginning of the conflicts in Bosnia.1 90
Finally, the Court addressed the various additional bases of jurisdiction presented by Bosnia. 191 These were essentially the same bases
which the Court had rejected as not presenting a prima facie basis for
jurisdiction in the Orders of April 8 and September 13, 1993, regarding
provisional measures. 192 The Court again rejected them as being a
bases of any jurisdiction, and concluded that only the Genocide Conven193
tion would apply in this case.

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
text for
193.

See id.
See id. at para. 26.
For text of Article IX, see supra note 82 and accompanying text.
See Judgment of July 11, 1996, supra note 169 at para. 29.
See id. at para. 31.
See id. at para. 32
See id. at para. 34.
See id.
See id. at para. 35.
See id. at paras. 37-39. See also supra notes 97-100, 116-120 and accompanying
ICJ's treatment of these bases in its Orders of April 8 and September 13, 1993.
See Judgment of July 11, 1996, supra note 169, at para. 41.
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2. Admissibility of the Application
Having rejected Yugoslavia's objections to the jurisdiction of the
Court, the ICJ could then turn to the objections based on the admissibility of the Application. 9 4 The first of these dealt with Yugoslavia's
contention that the complaint dealt only with actions that occurred
during a civil war which it was not a part of. 195 However, the Court
pointed out that this was part of the dispute to be resolved on the merits, and therefore rejected this objection for the same reason it had rejected Yugoslavia's fifth objection.196
Yugoslavia's second objection maintained that Bosnian President
Alija Izetbegovic was not the legal president at the time of the filing
197
and as such could not have authorized the filing of the Application.
The Court dismissed this by pointing out that Izetbegovic was recognized as the Head of State by the United Nations as well as the DaytonParis Agreement, and as such was presumed under international law to
be able to act on behalf of his country.198 Therefore the Application was
admissible. 199
3. Votes and Attached Opinions
The Court voted 14 to 1 to dismiss the preliminary objections relating to the admissibility of the Application (Judge ad hoc Kreca voting
against). 2°° The vote was 11 to 4 to dismiss the fifth preliminary objection relating to jurisdiction (Judges Oda, Shi, Vereshchetin and Judge
ad hoc Kreca voting against).2° 1 Next, by 14 to 1 the Court voted to
dismiss the preliminary objections relating to the start of jurisdiction
2° 2
under the Genocide Convention (Judge ad hoc Kreca voting against).
The Court then found that it did have jurisdiction to hear the dispute
based on the Genocide Convention by a vote of 13 to 2 (Judge Oda and
Judge ad hoc Kreca against), and by 14 to 1 it dismissed the additional
bases of jurisdiction presented by Bosnia (Judge ad hoc Lauterpacht
against). 2° 3 Finally, by 13 to 2, the Court found Bosnia's Application to

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

See id. at para. 42.
See id. at para. 43.
See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
See id. at para. 44.
See id.
See id.
See id. at para 47.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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be admissible (Judge Oda and Judge ad hoc Kreca against). 20 4
Much as Judge ad hoc Lauterpacht had proceeded to comment in
detail on each of Bosnia's requests for provisional measures and Bosnia's claimed bases of jurisdiction in his Separate Opinion to the Order
of September 13,205 Judge ad hoc Kreca wrote an extensive Dissenting
Opinion in which he examined and supported each of Yugoslavia's preliminary objections in detail. 20 6 Judge ad hoc Lauterpacht amended a
Declaration stating as he had thought Bosnia's claims for additional basis for jurisdiction presented a prima facie case in his Separate Opinion
of September 13, he found no reason to believe that they were not valid
still.207
Judges Shi and Vereshchetin wrote a Joint Declaration to explain
why they voted against the dismissal of the fifth preliminary objection
concerning jurisdiction. 208 While they agreed that the Court had jurisdiction over cases dealing with the Genocide Convention, they felt that
the Convention should be properly understood at affecting individual
acts, not state acts. 209 Therefore they felt there was not a dispute which
the Convention could address. 2 10 Judge Oda expressed a similar viewpoint in his Declaration. 211 He also felt that the Genocide Convention
was aimed at preventing actions by individuals, not by states, and he
felt that this prevented the Court from exercising jurisdiction as well as
making the Application inadmissible. 212 He did add, however, that his
vote on this matter would not prejudice the position he might take on
213
the merits.
Judge Shahabuddeen's Separate Opinion explained his views on
the issues of treaty succession and forum prorogatum.2 4 Judge ParraAranguren wrote his to express his opinion that in its request for provisional measures Yugoslavia had admitted that Bosnia was a party to
204. Id.
205. See supra, notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
206. See Dissenting Opinion of Judge ad hoc Kreca (visited October 2, 1997)
<http://www.law.cornell.edu/icj/icj4kreca.htm>. Printed off of the internet, his Dissent
filled standard ninety standard 8 1/2 by 11 inch pages.
207. See Declaration of Judge ad hoc Lauterpacht (visited October 2, 1997)
<http://www.law.cornell.edulicj/icj4llauterpa.htm>. See also supra, notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
208. See Joint Declaration of Judge Shi and Judge Vereshcetin (visited October 2,
1997) <http://www.law.cornell.edu/icj/icj4tshiver.htm>.
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. See
Declaration
of
Judge
Oda
(visited
October
2,
1997)
<http://www.law.cornell.edu/icj/icj4toda.htm>.
212. See id.
213. See id.
214. See Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen (visited October 2, 1997)
<http://www.law.cornell.edu/icj/icj4/shaha.htm>.
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the Genocide Convention and that he would have put more emphasis on
the proper manner in which Bosnia succeeded to the Convention due to
the Convention's humanitarian nature. 215 Judge Weeramantry also addressed the issue of automatic succession to treaties in his Separate
21 6
Opinion.
Many legal issues were dealt with in the Court's Judgment concerning Yugoslavia's preliminary measures. Yet however important or
interesting those issues were, they were not helpful to those suffering
the genocide. The Judgment came on July 11, 1996, exactly one year to
the day after Srebrenica's Muslim inhabitants and their UN protectors
had to abandon the town. Was this on the mind of the Court when it
handed down its decision? Was the war on their minds as they approved the various requests for extensions (by both sides it should be
noted) to the time-limits? Nevertheless, the Court was finally ready to
proceed to the merits of the case, the end almost seemed in sight.
D. Counter-Claims- December 17, 1997
On July 22, 1997 Yugoslavia presented its Counter-Memorial to the
ICJ within the time-limit the Court had given it.217 Included in its
Counter-Memorial were various counter-claims which Yugoslavia asked
the Court to adjudge and declare. 218 The Counter-Memorial first asked
that the Court declare that no acts punishable by the Genocide Convention had occurred as either the acts alleged had not happened, or there
was no intention of committing genocide, and/or no acts had been aimed
2 9
at individuals just because of their ethnic or religious affiliation. 1
Second, it asked that the Court reject all of Bosnia's claims since the
alleged acts of genocide were not committed by any organ of Yugoslavia,
nor in Yugoslav territory, nor at the order of Yugoslavia. 220 Third, it
asked that Bosnia be held responsible for acts of genocide against Bosnian Serbs as a violation of the Genocide Convention. 221 Fourth, it
asked that the Court declare that Bosnia has an obligation to punish

215. See Separate Opinion of Judge Parra-Aranguren (visited October 2, 1997)
<http://www.law.cornell.edu/icj/icj4/parra.htm>.
216. See Separate Opinion of Judge Weeramantry (visited October 2, 1997)
<http://www.law.cornell.edu/icj/icj4/weeraman.htm>.
217. See Order of December 17,1997, at para. 5 (visited January 15, 1998)
<http://www.icj-cij.orgidocket/ibhy/ibhyorders/ibhyorder971217.html>.
218. See id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. Yugoslavia gave numerous examples of the genocide it claimed, including the
texts of Bosnian newspapers, one of which printed the following song: "Dear mother, I'm
going to plant willows, / We'll hand Serbs from them. / Dear mother, I'm going to sharpen
knives, / We'll soon fill pits again." Id.
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those responsible for acts of Genocide. 222 Fifth, the Court was asked to
declare that Bosnia must take "necessary measures" so that such "acts
would not be repeated in the future." 223 And Sixth, it requested that
Bosnia be ordered to eliminate all consequences of the violations and
"provide adequate compensation." 224
When Bosnia objected to the counter-claims of Yugoslavia, both
sides were asked to present written observations on the issue to the
Court. 225 Bosnia requested that the portion of the Counter-Memorial
which constituted counter-claims be dismissed as they were not "directly connected ... with the subject-matter of the initial proceedings"
as was required by Article 80 of the Rules of the Court.226 Bosnia
claimed that if Yugoslavia wanted to institute proceedings, it should
file an application through normal channels. 227 Yugoslavia replied that
the counter-claims arose from the same general facts and were founded
on the same jurisdiction, i.e. the Genocide Convention, 228 and therefore
"the counter-claim is directly connected with the subject-matter of the
claim."

2 29

The Court observed that while a claim should normally be made by
means of an application, certain claims are allowed to be introduced as
incidental proceedings in order to "ensure better administration of justice." 230 The Rules of the Court did not define what was meant by "directly connected," and therefore the Court determined it was up to its
"sole discretion" based on "the particular aspects of each case" to determine the answer. 231 The Court concluded that since Yugoslavia would
be relying on the same facts under the Genocide Convention as Bosnia,
the counter-claims were directly connected and as such were admissi232
ble.
The vote was 13 to 1 in favor of allowing the counter-claims and
setting up a time-frame for Bosnia to reply to them and Yugoslavia then
233
to submit a rejoinder (Judge Weeramantry against).
Judge ad hoc Kreca wrote a Declaration in which he expressed concern that when viewed simply as a counter-claim, the claims put forth

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at paras. 6-25.
Id. at para. 10.
See id. at para. 16.
See id. at para. 18.
Id. at para. 24.
Id. at para. 30.
Id. at para. 33.
See id. at paras. 34, 37.
Id. at para. 43.
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by Yugoslavia would therefore be considered "a secondary claim." 234 He

did not like the assumption which might arise that Bosnia's claim
would be looked to as the "principle claim," or the more important
claim. 235

Rather, he would view Yugoslavia's claim as a rival claim,

putting the parties in comparable positions to those involved in a terri236
torial dispute.
Judge Koroma submitted a Separate Opinion detailing his frustration that by approving the counter-claims, the Court was extending further a case which had already lasted too long. 237 As he noted, this case

involved "allegations of grave breaches of the Genocide Convention and
other massive violation[s] of human rights." 238

While he agreed that

the counter-claims were admissible, he wished that the Court could
have taken action to speed up the process so as to not "appear to com239
promise the proper administration of justice."
Judge ad hoc Lauterpacht, while voting with the Court and seemingly against the party that appointed him, wrote in his Separate
Opinion that he felt both parties should have been given the opportunity to present oral arguments. 240 He also voiced his opinion that the
Court could have "exercised its discretion in the present case by declining to join the otherwise admissible counter-claims to the principal
claims."2 4 1 Nevertheless, despite his reluctance to "see the complexity

of this case magnified" by adding the counter-claims, he felt there was
242
no other satisfactory solution.
Weeramantry, now Vice-President Weeramantry, focused on three
areas in his dissent: 1) the meaning of "counter-claim", 2) the Courts
discretion to accept a counter-claim, and 3) involvement of third states
due to the counter-claim. 243 On the first issue, he stressed that a counter-claim must actually counter the original claim, and further, that
such claims are not accepted under criminal law. 24 4 Since genocide is a

crime against humanity, counter-claims are not appropriate when examining such an issue. 245 As to the second issue, Vice-President
Weeramantry echoed his colleague Judge Koroma by maintaining that
the Court could have used its discretion to deny the counter-claims as a
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

Id. at para. 1 (Declaration of Judge ad hoc Kreca).
Id.
Id.
See id. at Separate Opinion of Judge Koroma.

Id.
Id.
See id. at para. 2, Separate Opinion of Judge ad hoc Lauterpacht.
Id. at para. 19.
Id. at para. 22.
Id. at Dissenting Opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry.
See id. at (a) - The meaning of the Term "Counter-Claim."
See id.
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means of moving towards a conclusion to the case.2 46 However, Weeramantry would have used such discretion where Koroma in the end did
not. 247 Finally, the Vice-President expressed his concern that the counter-claims might lead to the necessity of involving Croatia in the case
which could cause further delays. 248 Due to these considerations which
he believed "would have been more in accordance with legal principle
and practical convenience," Vice President Weeramantry would have
proceeded to the completion of the Application, allowing Yugoslavia to
take advantage of its right to file a separate application of its own at a
249
later time.
E. Current Status - January 22, 1998 to ?
As its deadline approached for submitting a Reply to Yugoslavia's
Counter-Claims, Bosnia asked for an extension. 250 The Court granted
Bosnia's request with no objections from Yugoslavia, and by an Order
on January 22, 1998, it extended to April 23, 1998 the time-limit for
Bosnia to file its Reply, and to January 22, 1999 the time-limit for
Yugoslavia to file its Rejoinder. 251 While the case has moved on to the
merits, there is no indication that this stage of the proceedings are in
any way close to reaching a conclusion.
IV

- HISTORY SINCE INDEPENDENCE

Prior to the filing of Bosnia's Application in March of 1993, the war
had progressed steadily. Over the course of the five years since the case
had been before the ICJ, the war in Bosnia continued until an uneasy
peace was finally established under the Dayton-Paris treaty. This next
section will review the course of the war during the course of the case.
By May of 1992 the Serbs had gained control of about sixty percent
of the Bosnia. 25 2 As town after town fell and people were forced to flee,
a pattern began to emerge. 253 First roadblocks manned by YPA troops
would appear around town, followed by a warning for Serb inhabitants
to evacuate. 254 As soon as they left, the remaining Muslims and Croats
found themselves subject to heavy artillery fire, occasionally from posi-

246. See id. at (b) - The Discretion of the Court.
247. See id.
248. See id. at (c) - The Involvement of a Third State.
249. See infra at Conclusion.
250. See Order of January 22 (visited February
cij.orglidocketlibhy/ibhyorders/ibhyorder980122.html>.
251. See id.
252. HONIG & BOTH, supra note 25, at 73.
253. See id.
254. See id.

5,

1998)

<http://www.icj-
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tions across the border. 255 The townspeople left would thereby be forced
into hiding for hours or days, until they were "softened up sufficiently
256
by the [YPA]'s artillery, [and] paramilitary groups would move in."
It seems that these paramilitary groups were effectively run by the
Serbian government, even though they were not directly linked to Belgrade. 257 Even some Serb government officials, perhaps wanting some
credit, emphasized that the paramilitaries could not function without
Serbian support. 258 This seems confirmed by the fact that logistically
they had to be supplied by Yugoslavia or else they would have run out
of ammunition and weapons. 259 As towns and villages were overrun by
the Serbs, detention camps were set up to house the prisoners, and according to one U.N. report, the primary purpose of these camps was the
260
permanent removal of anyone in a leadership position.
By the end of May 1992 the lines seem to stabilize and did not
change much until the summer of 1995.261 In western Bosnia only a few
pockets remained outside the control of the Serbs, including Gorazde,
Srebrenica and Zepa. 262 Over the summer and into autumn people be-

gan fleeing the Serb controlled areas as they methodically "cleansed"
their new holdings, and by the end of the year about two million people
263
were refugees.
Srebrenica was one area that fought back. 264 While they held onto

an enclave around their town, they were soon faced with another problem, they were cut off from the world and needed humanitarian assistance badly. 265 The fighters in Srebrenica, led by twenty-five year old

Naser Oric, who, ironically, had been a bodyguard to Serbian President
Milosevic, continued to do as much damage to the Serbs as possible, and
were responsible for many brutal counter-attacks. 266 Soon, however,
outside help was needed and it came in the form of French General

255. See id.

256. Id. at 73-74.
257. See id. at 75.
258. See id.
259. See id.
260. See Final report of the United Nations Commission of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), para. 175, quoted in HONIG & BOTH, supra
note 25, at 76-77. The report also referred to these camps as "concentration camps," a
name which conjures up images of Hitler's Holocaust. Id.
261. See id. at 77.
262. See id.
263. Id. This number was nearly half the population of Bosnia and was mostly Muslim. Id.
264. See id. at 77-79.
265. See id. at 79-80.
266. See id. at 77-81. He led an attack on the Serbs on Orthodox Christmas that reportedly left over a hundred soldiers and civilians dead in the town of Kravica. Id. at 81.
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Philppe Morillon, UNPROFOR commander for Bosnia. 267 Fearing for
the safety of over 60,000 civilians packed into the small town of Srebrenica, on March 11, 1993, General Morillon made his way into the
268
town without permission from his own superiors back in New York.
While he was in Srebrenica, the shelling had stopped, and when he
tried to leave the next day he was surrounded by the women and children of the town begging him to stay. 269 Finally the French General
gave up trying to leave and proclaimed to all "You are now under the
270
protection of the United Nations ... I will never abandon you."
His actions that day led to the creation of the first U.N. "safe area,"
in Srebrenica and approximately thirty square miles around it when
the Security Council passed Resolution 819 on April 16.271 The Security
Council's action came just in time, Srebrenica had been facing increased
attacks and was near surrender.2 7 2 The next month the Security Council adopted Resolution 824 which extended the safe-area concept to
273
Sarajevo, Zepa, Tuzla, Gorazde and Bihac.
Putting a safe area into place proved to be difficult. At first 34,000
troops were called for, but soon that number was down to some 7,600
troops. 274 Finding nations who were willing to provide the troops
proved to be difficult as well, 275 but finally the Dutch agreed to take on
the job and on March 3, 1994, Dutch forces began to replace the approximately 140 Canadian soldiers in Srebrenica. 276 And so it was that
by the summer of 1995 Srebrenica found itself demilitarized and
"guarded" by some 750 Dutch soldiers in light blue U.N. helmets.
But on July 11, 1995, Srebrenica fell to the Serbs. After the town
was overrun and its citizens either killed or forcefully moved out of the
new Serbian controlled region, the world seemed to renew its interest in
the conflict. The war ground to a halt half a year later when the Dayton-Paris Agreement was signed on December 14, 1995.277 Renewed
NATO airstrikes probably served to help the Muslims and Croats fight

267. See id. at 82-83. UNPROFOR stands for United Nations Protection Force.
UNPROFOR was assigned to all of the former Yugoslavia from February 1992 until April
1995, after which referred only to the forces in Bosnia. ROHDE, supra note 1, at xxi.
268. See id. at xv.
269. See HONIG & BOTH, supra note 25, at 86.
270. See ROHDE, supra note 1, at xv.

271. S.C. Res. 819, U.N. SCOR, 3199th mtg., U.N. Doc S/RES/819 (1993). See ROHDE,
supra note 1, at xv.; HONIG & BOTH, supra note 25, at 95-97.
272. See ROHDE, supra note 1, at xv.
273. S.C. Res. 824, U.N. SCOR, 3208th mtg., U.N. Doc S/RES/824 (1993). See HONIG
& BOTH, supra note 25, at 109.
274. See id. at 116.
275. See id. at 116-17.
276. See id. at 127.
277. See id. at 340-42.
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the Serbs back and end the siege on Sarajevo, thus pushing the Serbs
closer to the bargaining table. 278 Nevertheless, under the Agreement,
the former safe-areas of Srebrenica and Zepa are now under Bosnian
Serb control. 279 Some 60,000 NATO troops were initially sent in to en28 0
force the peace, including some 20,000 Americans.
At the same time that the negotiations were taking place in Dayton
in November, both Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic were indicted by the War Crimes Tribunal for crimes
28 2
28
relating to the massacres of Srebrenica. ' They are still at large.

President Clinton has only recently extended indefinitely the mission of
the United States military in Bosnia, after having already extended the
first deadline he had set for the withdrawal, though by now the US
presence is down to about 8,500 troops. 28 3 While it is clear that the
NATO imposed peace has worked, it is unclear how long it will last
when the troops leave.

28 4

V. CONCLUSION

Why focus so much of a paper on the proceedings of the ICJ on the
history and current state of the war in Bosnia? In reading the ICJ's orders and judgments concerning this case it is too easy to forget what is
really at issue - the lives of thousands of innocent people. Twice in 1993
the ICJ ordered that nothing be done to exacerbate the situation in
Bosnia, yet two years later, a year before the Court was to finally establish its jurisdiction, Srebrenica fell and thousands were killed.
It is the ghastly events which took place in Srebrenica that haunt
me every time I think about the role of the ICJ in the dispute. What
good is the ICJ, I ask myself, if it cannot even get to the merits on a
case of such urgency as this one? In this respect I am comforted to
know that there are those on the Court who share my concern, as expressed by Judge Koroma's Separate Opinion to the Order of 17 December 1997,285 and Vice-President Weeramantry's Dissenting Opinion on

278. See id. at 338-339.

279. See id. at 342.
280. See Whitney, supranote 34.
281. See ROHDE, supra note 1, at 342. While the Tribunal has issued indictments for
74, as of the summer of 1997, only 7 were in custody. John Kim, InternationalInstitutions, 31 INT'L LAW. 671, 675-76 (1997). In November of 1996 the tribunal convicted Drazen Erdemovic, who had pled guilty, for participating in the mass executions of the victims of Srebrenica. Id. at 676.

282. See Kevin Whitelaw, et al., It's Tricky Going In And Trickier Getting Out, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 29, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8333185.
283. See id.
284. See id.
285. See supra notes 204-06 and accompanying text.
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the same Order. 28 6 Yet, even their comments on the need to reach a

conclusion to the case came only after the case had been in The Hague
nearly five years and after the war had been brought to a prayed for
end.
I am not convinced that the Court will ever issue a final ruling on
the merits in the near future. Too many things could happen to further
delay the conclusion of the case, or derail it altogether. But should such
a time arrive, I still hope that by settling through documentation the
responsibility of those who are accused of Genocide, the Court will help
create a permanent record for future generations to learn from. That
was the triumph of Nuremberg, though the hope that by documenting
the genocide of the Holocaust such acts would not be allowed again has
not materialized in light of Bosnia, Rwanda, and Cambodia. Additionally, should the Court find for Bosnia, perhaps it could order Yugoslavia
to pay damages and contribute to the rebuilding of the country, even if
no amount of money could ever undo the nightmares.
Ultimately, the future of the Bosnian people, be they Croat, Serb or
Muslim will rest in the hands of men like Mevludin Oric. Despite the
horror of surviving a mass execution and the fact that of the forty-five
men from his small village outside Srebrenica only 15 survived the trek
to safety, he says he is willing to live again with Serbs. 28 7 What Bosnia
needs is a good dose of men like Oric who are willing to move on and
stop the cycle of bloodshed. It will be courageous men and women like
him who will determine the fate of the Balkans as the new century approaches, not the War Crimes Tribunal, NATO, or even the ICJ.

286. See supranote 213 and accompanying text.
287. ROHDE, supra note 1, at 386. Rohde tells of one night in March of 1996 when Oric
put his arm around the man to left, saying "This man is my greatest friend and he is a
Croat." Doing the same to the man to his right he said, "This man is my greatest friend
and he is a Serb." Pulling them both close he concluded, "This is my Bosnia, this is my
Bosnia." Id.

The Timor Gap: Who Decides Who is in
Control?
BrandiJ. Pummell
I.

FACTS

&

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

East Timor lies just opposite Australia and includes the island of
Atauro, the islet of Jaco, and Oe-Cusse in the Western part of Timor.'
Portugal colonized East Timor in the 16th Century and occupied the
area until 1975.2 The Dutch controlled the Western part of the island
which later became Indonesia. 3 As part of the decolonization process,
the United Nations named Portugal Administering Power over the nonself governing territory of East Timor. 4 As such, Portugal was expected
to protect the interests of East Timor and make regular statistical and
informational reports on the country to the Secretary General of the
United Nations;5 Portugal never fulfilled its duties toward East Timor
and the United Nations. 6 It continued to treat East Timor as an overseas province despite several Security Council resolutions condemning
7
it for failing to implement the United Nations' decolonization policy.
* J.D. Candidate, University of Denver College of Law, 1999. I want to recognize the support of my family and friends, especially Mom and Jodi who took the time to proof-read
this article. I also want to thank Martha Ertman for helping me with my writing.
1. Case Concerning East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, 95 (June 30).
2. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 95.
3. Id.
4. In 1960, the U.N. appointed Portugal the Administering Power of the non-selfgoverning territory of East Timor. G.A. Res. 1542, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. 16, at
30, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960). Some controversy remains about whether Portugal continues to be the Administering Power of East Timor following its withdrawal from East
Timor on April 24, 1974. While U.N. General Assembly Resolutions 3485 and Security
Counsel Resolution 384 referred to Portugal as the Administrating Power in East Timor,
no later resolutions have reconfirmed its status. G.A. Res. 3485, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess.,
2439th plen. mtg. at 1294, U.N. Doc. A/10426 (1975); S.C. Res. 384, U.N. SCOR, 30th
Sess., 1869th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/119915 (1975).
5. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 114.
6. Id.
7. Id. Oda, J. wrote:
In 1963, the Security Counsel.. depreciated the attitudes of the Portuguese Government and its repeated violations of the principle of the
Charter, urgently calling upon Portugal to implement the decolonization policy (resolutions 180 (1963) and 183 (1963)) and in 1965 once
again passed a resolution deploring Portugal's failure to comply with
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Finally, during the Carnation Rebellion of April 1974, Portuguese
authorities abruptly abandoned East Timor after 400 years of colonization, never to return.8 Indonesia eventually restored order to the country by sending a 10,000 man army into East Timor in December of
1975, claiming one of East Timor's leading political parties had requested annexation into Indonesia. 9 Indonesia has remained in control
of East Timor ever since. 10
Alleging that the people of East Timor wanted to join it, Indonesia
annexed East Timor on July 17, 1976.11 The U.N. General Assembly
and Security Council responded with resolutions calling on "all states to
respect the territorial integrity of East Timor as well as the inalienable
right of its people to self-determination" and requesting that Indonesia
remove its forces from the area without delay. 12 The United Nations
also applied for Portuguese assistance in preserving East Timor's right
to self-determination in its capacity as Administering Power of East
Timor. Similar resolutions emerged periodically from the Security
Council until 1976, and from the General Assembly until 1982.13 Despite this ongoing discussion of the plight of East Timor, the United Nations took no action.14
Australia's Minister of Foreign Affairs recognized Indonesia's de
facto incorporation of East Timor with a statement that Indonesia controlled "all major administrative cent[ers] of the territory." 15 Therefore,
it would be "unrealistic to continue to refuse to recognize de facto that
East Timor is part of Indonesia." 16 Nevertheless, Australia continued to
protest the means through which Indonesia acquired control over East
17
Timor.
the previous General Assembly and Security Counsel resolutions
(resolution 218 (1965)).
In 1972, the Security Counsel repeated its condemnation of the persistent refusal of Portugal to implement the earlier resolutions (resolutions 312 (1972) and 3222 (1972)).
8. Id. Interestingly, the Portuguese Constitution never acknowledged the right to
self-determination of the people of East Timor's until after the Carnation Rebellion. Id.
9. Id. See William Branigan, E. Timorese Chafe Under a Foreign Yoke; Indonesia
Resented for 20-Year Rule, WASH. POST, Apr. 27, 1994, at A25.
10. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 114.
11. Id.
12. S.C. Res. 384, U.N. SCOR, 30th Sess., 1869th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. 119915 (1975).
13. Over several years, United Nations' organs passed ten resolutions on this issue.
The most important include: G.A. Res. 3485, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., 2439th plen. mtg. at
1294, U.N. Doc. A/10426 (1975); G.A. Res. 34/40, U.N. GAOR, 34th, Sess., Supp. No. 46, at
206, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979); G.A. Res. 37/30, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at
227, U.N. Doc. A/37/51 (1982). S.C. Res. 384, U.N. SCOR, 30th Sess., U.N. Doc. 1869th
mtg. at 1, S/119915 (1975); and S.C. Res. 398, U.N. SCOR, 30th Sess., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/389 (1976).
14. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 97.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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Australia and Indonesia entered into a continental shelf delineation agreement in 1970-7118 which omitted any reference to the Timor
Gap. 19 It was not until 1979 that Australia and Indonesia addressed the
Timor Gap. The two countries made little progress until the Treaty on
the Zone of Cooperation in an Area Between the Indonesian Province of
East Timor and Northern Australia,20 in which they decided to develop
joint exploration and exploitation of the continental shelf. 21 This treaty

created a zone of cooperation between East Timor and Northern Australia. 22 When Australia took internal steps to implement the treaty,
Portugal, as Administrating Power, brought an application against
Australia before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) challenging the
23
treaties validity.
II.

THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE CASE CONCERNING

EAST TIMOR

The ICJ is open to all states. 24 All members of the United Nations
are ipso facto parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice, and non-members may elect to become parties to the Statute on
conditions to be determined by the General Assembly upon recommendations of the Security Council. 25 In addition, states belonging to neither the U.N. nor the Statute of the ICJ may become parties before the
Court by accepting the jurisdiction 26 of the court in accordance with the
U.N. Charter, Statute and Rules of the Court, and agreeing to assume
18. Agreement Establishing Certain Seabed Boundaries in the Area of Timor and
Arafura Seas 1972, Oct. 9, 1972, Austl.-Indon., 974 U.N.T.S. 319.
19. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 98.
20. Treaty Between Australia and the Republic of Indonesia on the Zone of Cooperation in an Area Between the Indonesian Province of East Timor and Northern Australia,
Dec. 11, 1989, Austl.-Indon., 29 I.L.M. 475 (1990) [hereinafter Treaty on the Zone of Cooperation].
21. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 98. The Zone of Cooperation encompasses a 61,000
square kilometer area with Indonesia and Australia jointly exploiting the Central Zone 'A'
thought to be the most profitable. Exploration done in 1994-95 indicated that oil and gas
wells in the area produce as many as seven thousand barrels of oil a day and the field
may contain two-hundred million barrels of crude oil. Nikki Tait, Oil Muddies Claims to
Timor Sea: Nikki Tait on Implications of a Case Starting at the Hague, THE FINANCIAL
TIMES, Jan. 30, 1995, at 5.
22. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 97.
23. Id. at 90.
24. Public organizations and legal or natural persons cannot be parties before the
ICJ, but the Court can keep them informed about items of interest. GEORGE ELIAN, THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 52 (1971).
25. Id.
26. Jurisdiction has many meanings but it most often refers to the "powers exercised
by a state over persons, property, or events."
MICHAEL AKEHURST, A MODERN
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 104 (6th ed., 1993). However, here we are concerned with the ability of the ICJ to hear the case and issue a judgment that binds Portugal and Australia.
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and fulfill the same duties and conditions created by a decision of the
ICJ as apply to U.N. members. 27 Even members of the U.N. may submit disputes to other tribunals pursuant to past or future agreements,
but if they resort to the ICJ for settlement of their disputes, they must
comply with its decisions. 28 A party wishing to enforce the Court's decisions may seek a recommendation of enforcement from the Security
29
Council.
Because members of the U.N. refused to accept the principle of
compulsory jurisdiction at the San Francisco Conference that created
the United Nations, "a preliminary agreement, called a compromis, establishes the terms under which [a] dispute will be arbitrated by the
Court. 30 This rejection of compulsory jurisdiction results naturally from
the states' desire to preserve their independence. 31 However, parties
sometimes make preliminary agreements to submit certain types of
disputes to the ICJ by treaty provision. 32 The Court has interpreted
such provisions narrowly to preserve its prestige and to ensure that its
33
decisions are complied with.
In 1995, the International Court of Justice considered whether it
had jurisdiction to decide Portugal's case against Australia. Under international law states are independent and equal, so that no state may
exercise jurisdiction over another without its consent. 34 Similarly, ICJ
jurisdiction in contentious proceedings requires consent by all parties
directly affected by an action. 35 Consent can take one of many forms. 36
Normally, parties refer a case to the Court jointly, but nothing precludes each from doing so separately. Once proceedings have started, a
defendant may accept jurisdiction 37 explicitly in the form of an express
statement 38 or implicitly by defending the case on the merits without
challenging the jurisdiction of the Court. 39 In addition, states may exercise the option clause to accept compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ in
advance of a dispute. 40 A recommendation by the Security Council or
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
(1928).

Id. at 52.
Id. at 46.
Id.
ELIAN, supra note 24, at 53.
Id.
Id.
Id.
AKEHURST, supra note 26, at 111.
Id. at 246.
Id.

Id.
Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.) (Merits), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 15-17 (Apr. 9).
Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia (Minorities Schools), 1947-48 P.C.I.J. 20-25

40. AKEHURST, supra note 26, at 247.

2. The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare
that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special
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the ICJ itself will not bind states to the Court's jurisdiction. 4' Furthermore, states accept compulsory jurisdiction only with respect to states
who have accepted the same obligation. 42 This prevents them from
benefiting from a ruling by the ICJ without also being bound by it. Although Australia and Portugal previously accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, the Court concluded it could not exercise jurisdiction over the case because any decision made by the Court would
inextricably affect the rights of Indonesia, a non-consenting third-party
43
to the dispute.
On Feb. 22, 1991, the Portuguese Ambassador to the Netherlands
filed an application to institute proceedings against Australia concerning certain activities with respect to East Timor. 44 Portugal alleged
that Australia had "failed to observe . . . [its] obligation to respect the
duties and powers of [Portugal as] the administrating Power" of East
Timor and the right of its people to self-determination. 4 5 Accordingly,
Portugal asked that the Court order appropriate reparations to Portu46
gal and East Timor.
Portugal and Australia had already acceded to compulsory ICJ jurisdiction, 47 in accordance with the Statute of the International Court of
Justice. 48 However, Indonesia had not. 49 The U.N. immediately comagreement, in relation to any other state the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes...
3. The declarations referred to may be made unconditionally or on
condition of reciprocity on the part of several or certain states, or for a
certain time.
Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No, 933,
3 Bevans 1179, art. 36, paras. 2, 3. By 1993, 47 states (29%) had issued such a statement. AKEHURST, supra note 26, at 247.
41. On the Albanian Acceptance of the Court's Jurisdiction, 1947-48 P.C.I.J. 15, 3132.
42. Id.
43. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 105.
44. Id. at 92.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 95.
47. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. 90. Prior to addressing the merits of a case, the International Court of Justice considers preliminary issues such as: 1) jurisdiction, 2) nationality,
and 3) the exhaustion of local remedies. These issues are usually dealt with separately,
as in this case, before proceeding to the rest of the controversy. Akehurst has characterized jurisdiction as the real difficulty in achieving binding ICJ judgments. Reasons for
this distrust include: 1) the unpredictability of decisions; 2) the impression that decisions
are arbitrary due to the large number of dissents; 3) decisions are precedential; 4) perception that the Court changes the law; or 5) that it is too conservative; 6) blur between legitimate customary law and claims for change in existing law; and 7) concern for international reputation and relations. AKEHURST, supranote 26, at 248-52.
48. Id. Article 36, Paragraph 2 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
provides that:
2. The states party to the present Statute may at any time declare
that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special
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municated the substance of Portugal's application to Australia and all
other interested states entitled to appear before the Court. 50 There
were concerns about the possible impact of any decision on the rights of
51
Indonesia who had not accepted ICJ jurisdiction.
In its counter-memorial filed on June 1, 1992, Australia questioned
the Court's jurisdiction as well as the admissibility of the Application
itself. 52 Because both parties felt these issues were inextricably linked
to the merits of the case, Australia deferred its objection until consideration of the merits of the case pursuant to Article 31 of the Rules of
the Court.5 3 Portugal filed a reply prior to Dec. 1, 1992. The ICJ accepted Australia's rejoinder on July 5, 1993, following an extension of
the deadline until July 1, 199354 and discretionary review of the timeli55
ness of the filing in accordance with its rules.
Next, each party to the proceedings took advantage of the ICJ statute provision allowing parties not already represented by the regular
members of the court to appoint an ad hoc judge to sit on the court for
the duration of the dispute.5 6 Portugal selected Mr. Antonio de Arruda

agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning:
the interpretation of a treaty;
any question of international law;
the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a
breach of an international obligation;
the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an
international obligation.
3 ....

4. Such declarations shall be deposited with the Secretary General of
the United Nations, who shall transmit copies thereof to the parties to
the Statute and to the Registrar of the Court.
5 ....

6. In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction,
the matter shall be settled by the decision of the Court.
Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 933,
3 Bevans 1179, art. 36, para. 2.
49. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 93.
50. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S.
No. 933, 3 Bevans 1179, art. 40, paras. 2-3.
51. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 102.
52. Id. at 91.
53. Id. at 92.
54. Id. at 93.
55. ICJ Rules, art. 44, para. 3.
56. "If the Court includes upon the Bench no judge of the nationality to the parties,
each of these parties may proceed to choose a judge as provided in paragraph two of this
article." Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S.
No. 933, 3 Bevans 1179, art. 31, para. 3. This practice is a survival of the traditional custom of appointing arbitrators and may be necessary to reassure litigants. AKEHURST, supra note 26, at 245.
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Ferrer-Correria and Australia, Sir Ninian Martin Stephen. 57 Unfortunately, Mr. Ferrera-Correria became unable to sit on the Court and notified the ICJ of that fact by a letter dated June 30, 1994.58 Portugal
then appointed Mr. Krysztof Jan Skubiszewski to replace him on July
59
14, 1994.
During oral arguments, Portugal first asked the ICJ to recognize
the rights of the people of East Timor to self-determination, territorial
integrity and unity, and to sovereignty over its wealth and natural resources, and the duties, powers, and rights of Portugal as the Administering Power of East Timor. 60 Then, Portugal argued that by negotiating the Treaty on the Zone of Cooperation to the exclusion of Portugal,
Australia infringed on East Timor's right to self-determination, territorial integrity and unity, and its permanent sovereignty over its natural
wealth and resources. It impeded Portugal in its duties to the people of
East Timor and to the international community and breached an international obligation to cooperate in good faith with the United Nations
61
respecting its policy towards East Timor.
Portugal also wanted the ICJ to find that Australia ignored its duty
to "harmonize" conflicting rights or claims over maritime areas by excluding Portugal from negotiations with respect to the exploration and
exploitation of the continental shelf within the Timor Gap,. 62 Finally,
Portugal requested that the Court order Australia to pay reparations to
the people of East Timor and to Portugal and to order Australia to refrain from implementing the treaty until East Timor exercised its right
to self-determination. 63 Specifically, Portugal wanted Australia to refrain from negotiating, signing, or ratifying any agreement with a State
other than the Administering Power concerning the delimitation, exploration or exploitation of the continental shelf, or the exercise of jurisdiction over that shelf in the areas of the Timor Gap. 64 Essentially, Portugal sought exclusive rights to negotiate with Australia on behalf of East
Timor.
Australia responded with two arguments. First, it claimed the ICJ
lacked jurisdiction to consider the claims or, alternatively, if the ICJ
had jurisdiction the claims submitted for consideration were inadmissi-

57. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 93.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 94. After consulting with both parties, the Court decided that the pleadings
and attached documents should be made available to the public, in accordance with ICJ
Rules, art. 53, paragraph 2, from the beginning of oral proceeding on Jan. 30, 1995. Public
hearings commenced on Jan. 30, and lasted until Feb. 16.
61. Id.
62. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 94.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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ble. 65 Then, it asserted its actions had in no way disregarded Portugal's
rights. 66 No real dispute existed between Australia and Portugal to give
Portugal standing to institute proceedings.6 7 Finally, Australia pointed
out that any ruling on Portugal's Application would require the Court to
68
rule on the rights and obligations of an absent third party, Indonesia.
The Court concluded Indonesia's interest in the Treaty on the Zone
of Cooperationprevented it from addressing the merits of the case.
By refusing to exercise jurisdiction over this dispute the International Court of Justice constructively abandoned the people of East
Timor by failing to consult them and deferring any judgment as to who
controls the Timor Gap. The Court was justifiably concerned with
avoiding any threat to Indonesia's sovereignty, yet, this concern unduly
overshadowed East Timor's right to self-determination; it ignored the
erga omnes 69 principle of self-determination. The Majority expressed
great concern for the effect of any decision on Indonesia's rights, yet,
why should the Court grant Indonesia greater control of the destiny of
East Timor than the people of East Timor themselves? Judge Vereshchetin properly felt that the majority ignored the rights of the most important third party to the dispute, the people of East Timor.
III. CONTINENTAL SHELF DELINEATION

Since Portugal's dispute with Australia involves the exploitation of
the continental shelP 0 in the Timor Gap between East Timor and Australia, a simple overview of the law of the sea is advisable. International law divides the sea into three different zones: a) internal waters,
b) territorial seas/ waters, and the c) high seas. 71 Each zone has its
own rules. Internal waters consist of ports, harbors, rivers, lakes, and
canals. 72 Within its internal waters, a coastal state may apply and en-

65. Id.
66. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 95.
67. Id. at 99.
68. Id.
69. Erga omnes rights are opposable to, and valid against, the whole world and all legal persons irrespective of consent. Concerning Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co.
(Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 306 (Feb. 5) (separate opinion of Ammoun, J.). All states
have an affirmative obligation under customary law to protect the internal selfdetermination of states. Reginald Eztah, The Right to Democracy: A Qualitative Inquiry,
33 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 508 (1997).
70. In most parts of the world, the seabed slopes gently away from the coast for quite
a long distance before it plunges deeply into the great ocean depths. This gently sloping
seabed, covered by shallow water, is called the continental shelf by geologists, and in prehistoric time was dry land. For the purpose of Truman's proclamation, the continental
shelf was defined as being those offshore areas of the seabed which were not more than
100 fathoms deep. AKEHURST, supra note 26, at 188.
71. Id. at 168.
72. Id. at 169.
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force its own laws, and exclude foreign warships. 73 Territorial waters
extend from four to twelve miles beyond a state's internal waters. 74 The
coastal states exercise sovereignty over territorial waters subject only to
the 'right of innocent passage' by foreign vessels. 75 However, territorial
waters never extend more than twelve miles beyond a recognized baseline roughly corresponding to the low-tide mark. 76 The term 'high seas'
covers all waters not included in either the internal or territorial waters
of any state. 77 On the high seas, all ships possess freedom of navigation, fishing, and lying cables and pipeline as well as free access to the
airspace overhead. 78 Vessels on the high seas generally lay beyond the
79
jurisdiction of any but the flag-state.
A number of relatively recent innovations have blurred the distinctions between these three traditional classifications of the sea. Contiguous Zones emerged during the period between the two World Wars
"as a means of rationalizing" conflicting state practices with regard to
the high seas adjacent to territorial waters.80 Despite initial criticism,
the 1958 Geneva Convention on the TerritorialSea and the Contiguous
Zone provides that "a coastal state may act to: [ ] prevent [and punish]
infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary regulations

73. Id. at 170. However, there are a number of exceptions to this general rule:
The coastal state does not exercise exclusive jurisdiction. A vessel's
flag state my try individuals for crimes committed while on board the
ship;
A coastal state should not interfere with a captain's disciplinary action
over his crew;
The flag-state generally deals with those matters not effecting the
good order of the coastal state or its inhabitants; and
A coastal state should not profit from the distress of foreign vessels by
charging harbor duties and taxes in excess of the cost of services provided.
Id.
74. Id. at 171.
75. AKEHURST, supra note 26, at 171. The following rights attach to territorial seas:
1) the exclusive right to fish and exploit seabed resources; 2) sovereignty over the airspace
over territorial waters; 3) the right of cabotage, or the internal transportation of goods
and people; 4) the right to exclude belligerents; 5) the right to regulate navigation, health,
customs, duties and immigration within its territorial waters; 6) the power to arrest occupants of merchant vessels; and concurrent jurisdiction, shared with the flag-ship, over
crimes committed on merchant ships. Id. at 172.
76. Id. at 177-78.
77. Convention on the High Seas, opened for signatureApril 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312,
T.I.A.S. No. 5200 (entered into force Sept. 30, 1962) art. 1.
78. Id. art. 2. Some of these freedoms can be restricted by Exclusive Fishing Zones or
Exclusive Economic Zones. AKEHURST, supra note 26, at 181.
79. AKEHURST, supra note 26, at 182. Exceptions apply to: 1) Exclusive Fishing
Zones, Exclusive Economic Zones, and Contiguous Zones; 2) Stateless ships; 3) Hot pursuit; 4) Right of approach; 5) Treaties; 6) Piracy; 7) Belligerent rights; 8) Self-defense; and
9) United Nations' authorization. Id. at 183-187.
80. Id. at 179.
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within its territory or territorial sea."81 Despite some variation, contiguous zones never extend beyond twelve miles from the territorial sea
82
for a maximum of twenty-four miles from the baseline.
Prior to 1945, states shared access to the seabed and subsoil of the
high seas.8 3 This changed when President Truman proclaimed that the
United States had the exclusive right to resources contained in the continental shelf off the coasts of the United States.8 4 A number of states
followed Truman's example and twenty had made their own continental
shelf claims by 1958.85 The Convention on the Continental Shelf recognizes "sovereign rights" over the natural resources8 6 of the continental
shelf.87 The continental shelf encompasses the seabed and subsoil of

areas adjacent to the territorial sea to a depth of 200 meters, or "where
the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the
natural resources."88 The coastal state has exclusive jurisdiction over
the continental shelf even if it chooses not to explore or exploit its resources. No one else may do so without the express consent of the
coastal state. 89 Furthermore, these rights do not depend on occupation
or an express proclamation of the right. 90 Although a number of states
never signed the Continental Shelf Treaty, the ICJ recognized that it
had become customary international law 9 by 1969 when it decided the
North Seas ContinentalShelf Cases.92
81. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, April 29, 1958, 15
U.S.T. 1606, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
82. AKEHURST, supra note 26, at 179.
83. Id. at 188.
84. Policy of the United States with respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil
and the Seabed of the Continental Shelf, White House Press Release of Sept. 29, 1945, 13
DEPT. OF STATE BULL. 485-86 (July-Dec. 1945).
85. BARRY CARTER & PHILLIP TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 1025 (1995). At least
one author has labeled the Continental Shelf Doctrine a classic case of the formation of a
new rule of customary law, with the U.S. establishing a precedent and others acquiescing
in continental shelf claims. AKEHURST, supra note 26, at 189.
86. Natural resources are the "mineral and other non-living resources of the seabed
and subsoil together with living organisms belonging to sedentary species." Convention
on the Continental Shelf, April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, 499 U.N.T.S. 311, art. 2.
87. CARTER & TRIMBLE, supranote 85, at 1027.
88. Convention on the Continental Shelf, April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, 499 U.N.T.S.
311, art. 1.
89. Id. art. 2.
90. Id.
91. Until recently, international law consisted of customary rules that had evolved
after a long historical process culminating in their recognition by the international community. Customary rules crystallize from usages or practices which have evolved in
roughly 3 circumstances: 1) diplomatic relations among states; 2) the practice of international organs; and 3) state laws, decisions of state courts, and state military or administrative practices that suggest wide acceptance of a general principal of law. J. Starke,
Introduction to InternationalLaw, 34-28, reprinted in CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 85,
at 141-43.
92. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3
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The writers of the Continental Shelf Treaty anticipated disputes
over maritime boundaries among neighboring states. Consequently, the
treaty provides that :
Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the
territories of two or more states whose coasts are opposite each other, the boundary of the continental shelf
appertaining to such states shall be determined by
agreement between them. In the absence of agreement,
and unless another boundary is justified by special circumstances, the boundary is the median line, every
point of which is equidistant from the nearest points of
the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial
93
sea of each state is measured.
94
Nonetheless, the median line is not binding customary law.
Rather, states must negotiate in good faith to reach some type of equitable agreement on continental shelf delineation. 95 However, the desire
of Portugal and Australia to exercise control over the continental shelf
of the Timor Gap conflicted with the people of East Timor's right to selfdetermination.

IV. SELF-DETERMINATION: 96 THE RIGHT TO CONTROL ONE'S OWN
DESTINY

Despite some uncertainty about its origins, 97 legal scholars generally agree that President Wilson "elevate[d]the principle of selfdetermination to an international level"98 through his Fourteen Points,
recognizing "that every people has a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live. . . .' 99 The League of Nations implicitly ac-

(Feb. 20).
93. Convention on the Continental Shelf, April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, 499 U.N.T.S.
311, art. 6(1).
94. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. at 46-54.
95. Id.
96. For a general discussion of the evolution of the right to self-determination see Ved
Nanda, Self-Determination Under International Law: Validity of Claims to Succeed, 13
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L., 257, 265-71 (1981).
97. Some scholars claim the concept of self-determination existed at the time of the
Greek city states. See James Falkowski, Secessionary Self-Determination:A Jeffersonian
Perspective, 9 B.U. INT'L L.J. 209, 212 (1991). Cf., Claudia Saladin, Self-Determination,
Minority Rights and ConstitutionalAccommodation: The Example of the Czech and Sloyak Federal Republic, 13 MICH. J. INT'L L. 172, 173 (1991) (attributing principle of selfdetermination to the French and American revolutions).
98. Halim Morris, Self-Determination: An Affirmative Right or Mere Rhetoric?, 4
ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 201, 203, (1997).
99. President Woodrow Wilson, address before the League to Enforce Peace (May 27,
1916), reprintedin 53 CONG. REC. 8854 (May 29, 1916).
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cepted the principle of self-determination, 0 0 thereby leading to its subsequent incorporation into the United Nations Charter. 10' By the
1960's and '70's, ICJ advisory opinions, 0 2 treaties 0 3 and the charters of
regional organizations 10 4 expressed support for self-determination. Today, the international community considers the right to selfdetermination jus cogens, 105 that imposes binding obligations on all nation states. 06 All peoples possess an affirmative right to selfdetermination which is "seen as a prerequisite to any genuine enjoy07
ment of any of the human rights."'
Nonetheless, confusion remains about the scope and character of
self-determination. Some scholars feel the right extends only to colonies or areas subject to foreign control. 08 This so called 'external selfdetermination' gives people subject to colonization or foreign occupation
the right to govern their own affairs free from outside interference.' 09
Others disagree, saying that the right to self-determination belongs to
all peoples, including minorities and indigenous people living within

100. Ved Nanda, Self-Determination: The Case of Palestine, 82 AM. SOCY INT'L L.
PROC. 334, 335 (1988).
101. The U.N. Charter calls on member states "to develop friendly relations among
nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples .... U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2. It also creates a trusteeship system designed to
"promote the progressive development of the inhabitants of the trust territories toward
self-government or independence, taking into account the freely expressed wishes of the
peoples concerned," and requiring members to become the administering powers and protect the interests of those countries whose people had not yet attained self-government.
U.N. CHARTER art. 76.
102. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971
I.C.J. 16 (June 21); Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16).
103. See, e.g. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art.
1, para. 1, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 1, para. 1, 999 U.N.T.S. 3, 5; Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess.,
Supp. No. 16, at 66-67, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960); Declaration on the Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp.
No. 28, at 123, Doc. A/802 (1970).
104. Charter of the Organization for African Unity, May 25, 1963, African States 479
U.N.T.S. 39.
105. Self-Determination has peremptory normative status (jus cogens) in international
law and can be set aside only by a subsequent peremptory norm of contrary effect. Therefore, the right to self-determination of "all peoples" and nations overrides customary international law. Eztah, supra note 69, at 495.
106. Morris, supra note 98, at 204.
107. Id.
108. See Sam Blay, Self-Determination:A Reassessment in the Post Communist Era, 22
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 275 (1994); Gregory H. Fox, Self-Determination in the Post Cold
War Era:A New InternationalFocus?, 16 MICH.J. INT'L L. 733 (1995).
109. HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE
ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS 49 (1990).

1998

TIMOR GAP

existing countries. 11 0 This broader definition known as 'internal selfdetermination', gives minorities and indigenous people control over
their own destinies."'
While some people believe that the term includes the right to succeed, others advocate no more than the right to
select a representative government using a legitimate political process. 112 Although unclear in this opinion, the Majority appears to adopt
the external self-determination position, possible out of fear of alienating its members with substantial minority populations. Since East
Timor's relationship with Indonesia falls within the narrower category,
a deeper look at external self-determination is warranted.
The U.N. Charter forbids nation states from interfering with the
territorial integrity of other nation states."13 Similarly, external selfdetermination is the right of individuals to be independent and free
from outside interference. 11 4 The U.N. Declarationon the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and People, found the "subjection of
peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation" contrary to
the U.N. Charter and "an impediment to the promotion of world peace
and cooperation."' 1 5 Although external self-determination applies in
both the colonization and foreign domination contexts, colonial claims
rarely arise today. 16 Instead, claims increasingly emerge from the foreign domination of one state over the other, 117 as with the Indonesian
occupation of East Timor.
Part of the increase in external self-determination claims may result from an expansion in the traditional definition of foreign domination to include militaristic domination, such as when the troops of one
country are stationed in another; economic domination, when one or
more countries economically dominate another; and cultural domination, where one culture dominates the other. 1 8 In Self-Determination:
Affirmative Right or Mere Rhetoric?, Halim Morris specifically mentions
the Lebanese objection to the presence of Syrian and Israeli troops in
their country, and American troops in Panama and Okinawa as forms of
militaristic foreign domination."19 Various third world nations view

110. Edward A. Laing, The Norm of Self-Determination, 1941-1991, 22 CAL. W. INT'L
L.J. 209, 248 (1992).
111. Morris, supra note 98, at 205.
112. Compare Nanda, supra note 96, at 275 and Catharine J. Jorns, Indigenous Peoples and Self-Determination: Challenging State Sovereignty, 24 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L.
199, 353 (1993).
113. U.N. Charter art. 2.
114. Henry J. Richardson III, Rights of Self-Determination of People in Established
States: Southern Africa and the Middle East, 85 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 541, 545 (1991).
115. G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. 16, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1961).
116. Morris, supranote 98, at 207.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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economic domination by developed nations as a lack of economic selfdetermination.1 20 Moreover, various ethnic groups throughout the
world have begun to assert a right to cultural self-determination in re21
sponse to foreign domination centering on language and religion.
Morris notes that these claims for external self-determination have
been largely ignored by the international community. 122 Indonesia's
1975 invasion of East Timor was no exception. Despite hundreds of
thousands of deaths attributed to the invasion, the outside world paid
little attention to the area until November of 1991 when Indonesian
forces killed an estimated two-hundred and seventy protestors in a
cemetery in Dili.123
V. THE ICJ DECISION
A. The Majority Opinion
1. Is the Dispute Really between Portugal and Australia?
The ICJ began its evaluation of Portugal's application by addressing Australia's contention that Indonesia was the true focus of the dispute over East Timor. Australia characterized the situation as a ploy
by Portugal to "artificially limit[ ] ... [the case]to the question of the
lawfulness of [it's] conduct" because Portugal and Australia had accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, and Indonesia had
not.124 Furthermore, Australia insisted it had always recognized East
Timor's status as a non-self-governing territory, the corresponding right
of its people to self-determination, and Portugal's status as Administrating Power under the authority of the United Nations. 125 The real
dispute lay between Portugal and Indonesia over who had authority to
negotiate international agreements on behalf of East Timor. 126
At this point, the Court defined dispute as "a disagreement on a
point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or interests between parties." 27 The existence of a dispute requires: 1) that the "claim of one

120. Id.
121. Morris, supra note 98, at 207.
122. Id.
123. See John Pilger, We Resist to Win. It is 20 Years Since Indonesia Invaded East
Timor, THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 2, 1995, at T022.; John Pilger, The Rising of Indonesia, June,
16, 1995 NEW STATESMAN & SoC'Y 14; Timor Trembles, ASIAN WALL ST. J., MAY 20, 1994,

at 8.
124. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 95.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 99. See Mavromatis Palestine Concessions, Judgment No. 2, 1924, P.C.I.J.,
Series A, No. 2, p. 11; Concerning Northern Cameroons, Judgment, 1963 I.C.J. 27 (Dec.
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party [be] positively opposed by the other,"' 28 2) as a matter of objective
determination. 1 29 Here, the Court found the determinative factor not to
be whether the "real dispute" implicated Indonesia rather than Australia, but whether Portugal had correctly alleged complaints of law and
fact against Australia which were denied. 130 Since Australia and Portugal clearly disagreed about whether Australia breached any obligation to Portugal in negotiating, concluding, and implementing Treaty on
the Zone of Cooperation with Indonesia, the Court concluded that a le131
gal dispute existed and dismissed Australia's objection.
Next, the Court considered whether a ruling on Portugal's application necessarily involved a determination of Indonesia's rights and obligations towards East Timor. Australia's argument relied on the ICJ's
holding in Monetary Gold that it could not rule on a case where the
rights of unrepresented third party formed the subject matter of the decision. 132 Under this rational, any decision made with regard to Portugal's Application would necessarily imply a ruling on the lawfulness of
Indonesia's entry and occupation of East Timor since 1974, the validity
of the continental shelf treaty governing the Timor Gap, and consequently, Indonesia's obligations under that treaty, so that the consensual nature of ICJ jurisdiction prevented the Court from exercising ju33
risdiction over the case.'
In contrast, Portugal insisted that the Court could limit its decision
to the objective conduct of Australia in negotiating, concluding, and implementing its treaty with Indonesia. Portugal characterized the dispute as a distinct breach of Australia's obligation to deal with East
Timor as a non-self-governing territory, including Portugal in its capacity as Administering Power. With the objective conduct of Australia
as the only violation of international law, Portugal saw no reason to involve Indonesia in the controversy.
With these arguments in mind, the Majority reminded both parties

2); and Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 21 of the United Nations
Headquarters Agreement of June 26, 1947, Advisory Opinion, 1988 I.C.J. at 27, para. 35.
128. South West Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), Preliminary
Objections, Judgment, 1962 I.C.J. 328 (Mar. 9).
129. Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania, First
Phase, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 65, 74 (Mar. 30).
130. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 100.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Every member of the United Nations automatically becomes a party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice and has access to the court. However, a state
does not grant the Court jurisdiction over any class of cases or any one dispute by becoming a party to the statute. To submit to the Court's jurisdiction, states must make declarations under Article 30 of the ICJ Statute. David M. Reilly & Sarita Ordonez, Effect of
the Jurisprudenceof the InternationalCourt of Justice on National Courts, 28 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 435, 438 (Fall 1995 -Winter 1996).
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that the fundamental principles of the ICJ Statute require the consent
of all parties affected by a dispute for the exercise of jurisdiction.' 34 The
Court pointed out that Portugal's application assumed that its position
as Administering Power gave it exclusive power to negotiate and conclude treaties on behalf of East Timor. 135 However, Australia expressed
a belief that Portugal lost that right with its withdrawal from East
Timor. 136 Australia concluded the Treaty on the Zone of Cooperation
understanding that the right to negotiate on behalf of East Timor had
passed to Indonesia, in accordance with international law, when the latter occupied and later annexed East Timor in 1974.137 The Court decided it could not rule on Australia's behavior without a preliminary determination on Indonesia's authority to negotiate and adopt the treaty
in 1989.138 Since this determination depended on the circumstances
under which Indonesia had entered and occupied East Timor, the ICJ
felt it could not consider the matter without Indonesia's consent. 139
Next, Portugal argued that Australia violated rights erga omnes. 140
Consequently, Portugal could enforce those rights on behalf of East
Timor regardless of whether another state also acted unlawfully. 14' The
Court acknowledged self-determination as a right erga omnes under the
U. N. Charter and contemporary law, but distinguished it from the rule
for consent to jurisdiction. 142 Therefore, the ICJ refused to evaluate any
case which passes judgment on an absent third party, even where
rights erga omnes might be at stake. 43
Finally, Portugal attempted to convince the Court that former General Assembly and Security Council resolutions provided conclusive
proof of Portugal's status as its Administering Power of the non-selfgoverning territory of East Timor. 144 Therefore, the Court need only in-

134. Monetary Gold Removed From Rome in 1943 (Italy v. U.K. & N. Ire. & U.S.), 1954
I.C.J. 32 (June 15). See also Concerning Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/
Malta), Application for Permission to Intervene, Judgment, 1984 I.C.J. 25, para. 40; Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.A.),
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, 1984 I.C.J. 431, para. 88 (Nov. 26); Frontier
Dispute (Burkina Faso! Republic of Mali), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 579, para. 49 (Dec. 22);
Concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/ Honduras),
Application to Intervene, Judgment, 1990 I.C.J. 114-116, paras. 54-56, 112, para. 73
(Sept. 13); and Concerning Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 1992 I.C.J. 259-262, paras. 50-55 (June 26).
135. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 101.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 101-02.
138. Id. at 102.
139. Id.
140. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 102.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 103.
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terpret these resolutions and could avoid ruling upon questions related
to Indonesia's presence in East Timor.1 45 The judges found several
flaws in this argument. First, it ignored the passage of time.1 46 Second,
the U.N. Resolutions relied on by Portugal did not bind the international community. 147 The Court was unprepared to read the resolutions
as preventing other states from recognizing the authority of Indonesia
over East Timor exclusively in favor of Portugal.1 48 As for Portugal and
Australia, East Timor remained a non-self-governing territory.1 49 Furthermore, the U.N. General Assembly and Security Council took no action against Indonesia in response to Portugal's complaint at the conclusion of treaty negotiations in December of 1989.150 Consequently,
the Court felt that it could not rely on the past U. N. resolutions as a
basis for a decision.51 This left the original jurisdictional question unresolved.
Despite its ruling in this case, the ICJ carefully noted that some
circumstances might not prevent the adjudication of matters affecting
non-parties. 152 The distinguishing factor appears to be whether a determination is a prerequisite to the controversy at issue. Here, the
Majority felt the legality of Indonesia's actions would be the very subject matter of the dispute, precluding the ICJ from exercising jurisdiction.153
154

B. Judge Oda's Concurrence

Judge Oda agreed that the ICJ lacked jurisdiction to rule on Portugal's application, but he perceived the true controversy as one between
Portugal and Indonesia over who had the authority to negotiate the
continental shelf treaties on behalf of East Timor. 15 5 Until some determination of Portugal's authority to act on behalf of East Timor, the
state lacked standing to sue Australia for breach of duties in relation to
56
the Treaty on the Zone of Cooperation.

145. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 103.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 104.
150. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 104.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 105.
154. Even though the ICJ decided 14-2 not to exercise jurisdiction over the Case Concerning East Timor, the four concurring judges agreed with the outcome of the case but
not the reasoning behind the Majority's decision. This makes the case less clearly decided
than it initially appears. The four concurring opinions illustrate the diversity of views
concerning the Timor Gap and Portugal's status as Administrative Power.
155. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 107 (Oda, J., separate opinion).
156. Id.
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Furthermore, Oda found no evidence that Australia's actions
1 57
threatened the East Timorian right to self-determination in any way.
Australia merely sought to enter negotiations with a third party representative of East Timor regarding an existing claim to the seabed in the
Timor Gap.158 As explained earlier continental shelf is a legal concept
and they often overlap. Under customary international law, Australia
was "entitled ipso jure to its own continental shelf in the southern part
of the Timorian Sea - - but at the same time a State which has territorial sovereignty over East Timor and which lies opposite to Australia ...has title to the continental shelf off its coast in the northern part
of the 'Timor Gap'."15 9 Australia negotiated with the country across the
water, Indonesia, as provided for by the Law of the Sea 160 and Conti1
nental Shelf Conventions.16
In fact, Oda pointed to Portugal's failure to negotiate delineation of
the Timor Gap during the initial continental shelf talks between Australia and Indonesia in 1970-71 as an indication that Portugal may
have felt it lacked authority to negotiate on behalf of East Timor at that
time.162 Oda did not dispute Portugal's control over East Timor from
the 16th Century until the early 1970's.163 Yet, he argued that Portugal
failed in its duties as Administering Power of East Timor. 164 Following
Portugal's abandonment of East Timor in 1974, few members of the international community regarded Portugal as the representative of East
Timor.1 65 Consequently, anything lost by the people of East Timor in
the Treaty on the Zone of Cooperation belonged to Australia or the state
across the water. 166 If Portugal objected to the treaty, it should have
challenged Indonesia who clearly claimed coastal state status on behalf
of East Timor.1 67 Consequently, Portugal lacked standing to sue Australia until after the claims against Indonesia with regard to East
1 68
Timor had been settled in its favor.
C. Judge Shahabuddeen's Concurrence
In his separate opinion, Judge Shahabuddeen discussed the con157. Id. at 108-12.
158. Id. at 110.

159. Id.
160. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. A/CONF. 62/122, 21 I.L.M.
1261 (1982).
161. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 110 (Oda, J., separate opinion). Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T.471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311.
162. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 111-112 (Oda, J., separate opinion).
163. Id. at 114.
164. Id. at 117-18.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 118.
167. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 112 (Oda, J., separate opinion).
168. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 119 (Shahabuddeen, J., separate opinion).
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sent principle of jurisdiction. 169 Although article 50 of the ICJ statute
makes it clear that ICJ decisions bind only the parties to a dispute, this
does not necessarily permit the Court to disregard the effect of its decisions on unconsenting third parties. 170 The International Court of Justice lacks 'indispensable party' rules to safeguard absent third parties
so Monetary Gold precludes the Court from exercising jurisdiction without the consent of the third party. 171 Since international cases rarely
remain completely bilateral, Monetary Gold sets the line between tolerable and intolerable exercise of jurisdiction, whether the legal interests
72
of a third party "constitute the very subject matter of the dispute."
Monetary Gold has been distinguished but not overruled. 173 For example, Corfu Channel held that the conduct of a third party did not necessarily preclude the exercise of ICJ jurisdiction because the court could
rule on Albania's conduct without making a legal determination about
Yugoslavia's conduct. 74 Although Judge Shahabuddeen insisted that
the ICJ had a responsibility to exercise jurisdiction to the fullest possible extent, he concluded the Court could not exercise jurisdiction over
75
Portugal's application.
The inherent conflict between Indonesia's negotiation of the continental shelf treaty on behalf of East Timor and Portugal's claim of exclusive authority to do so prevented the ICJ from separating the two issues. 76 This concluded the matter except for Portugal's claim that U.
N. resolutions had already conclusively determined the issue. Shahabuddeen disagreed saying that Portugal really wanted the Court to
accept its rendition of those resolutions. 177 In order to interpret the U.
N. resolutions, the Court would have to investigate other matters, such
as whether Indonesia engaged in international responsibility that disqualified it from acquiring treaty-making power for East Timor under
178
general international law.
Even without addressing these issues, a ruling by the ICJ necessarily impacts Indonesia's rights and obligations under the Treaty on

169. Id. Remember, international lawyers and jurists chose not to adopt universal
compulsory jurisdiction because it conflicted with basic ideas of states sovereignty. Instead, the Court exercises jurisdiction over member states only after they have accepted it
under the Optional Clause. STATUTE OF THE COURT art. 36(2). The ICJ Statute gives the
Court the power to decide its own jurisdiction so that states may not contest jurisdiction
in order to avoid a ruling by the ICJ. Reilly & Ordonez, supra note 133, at 441-45.
170. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 119 (Shahabuddeen, J., separate opinion).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 121 (Shahabuddeen, J., separate opinion).
174. Corfu Channel, Merits, 11 AMER. J. INT'L L. 683 (1917).
175. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 122 (Shahabuddeen, J., separate opinion).
176. Id. at 123.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 124.
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the Zone of Cooperation without its consent. 179 If Portugal successfully
enjoined Australia from implementing the treaty, Indonesia would lose
the concrete benefits of the treaty it negotiated for.' 80 The Central
American Court of Justice (CACJ) refused to make this type of ruling in
El Salvador v. Nicaragua where El Salvador asked the ICJ to enjoin
Nicaragua from fulfilling the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty.'81 The CACJ
announced that invalidating the treaty would amount to the adjudication of the rights of another party without its consent to ICJ jurisdiction. 182 Therefore, Shahabuddeen feels the Court could not find that
Indonesia lacked capacity to enter into the treaty. 8 3 The same concerns applied to Portugal's contention that Australia disregarded the
rights of the people of East Timor by negotiating with Indonesia. 8 4 The
impact of a ruling with regard to Australia on Indonesia precluded the
ICJ from exercising its jurisdiction over Portugal's application. 185
D. Judge Ranjeva's Concurrence
In his opinion, Judge Ranjeva expressed disappointment with the
Majority's decision not to use the Case ConcerningEast Timor to clarify
its holding in Monetary Gold and the impact of interested third parties8 6 He saw the Case Concerning East Timor as the inverse of Monetary Gold and urged the court to analyze the details of the doctrine to
avoid future confusion. 187 Portugal's application assumes that its dispute with Australia involves an objective right erga omnes, the right of
the people of East Timor to self-determination.18 8 He wanted the majority to "ponder how far the analysis of the structure of the Court's reasoning... justified a conclusion as to whether.. .it was valid to transpose the jurisprudence of Monetary Gold."'8 9 Does the same principle
apply to preliminary questions of objective law? 90o He asserted that the
majority's use of Monetary Gold without further explanation left too
many unanswered questions.' 91
Similarly he disagreed with the conclusion that the Court would
179. Id.
180. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 124 (Shahabuddeen, J., separate opinion).
181. Memorial of Nicaragua, Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.A.), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, June 30, 1984, para.
257.
182. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 124 (Shahabuddeen, J., separate opinion).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 127-28.
185. Id. at 128.
186. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. 90, 129 (Ranjeva, J., separate opinion).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 132.
191. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. 90, 129 (Ranjeva, J., separate opinion).
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have to adjudicate Indonesia's rights and duties in East Timor to address Portugal's claims. 192 He attributed three objectives to Portugal: 1)
the preservation of right of the People of East Timor to selfdetermination; 2) nullification of the Treaty on the Zone of Cooperation;
193
and 3) denying Indonesia the benefits of its treaty with Australia.
94
Portugal's application involved both objective and subjective rights.'
The objective rights served as the justification for the subjective rights
which were Portugal's ultimate goal.' 95 In order to nullify Australia's
treaty obligations, the ICJ would have to adjudicate directly upon Indonesia's rights. 196 Judge Ranjeva felt the majority should have offered
the parties an appropriate legal framework for limiting the undesirable
effects of such a situation and examined the scope of its prior decisions
97
to avoid future misinterpretation.'
E. Judge Vereshchetin's Concurrence
In Judge Vereshchetin's opinion, the Majority's decision ignored the
rights of the most important third party to the case, the people of East
Timor.' 98 He criticized his colleagues for failing to investigate East
Timor's views on the treaty.' 99 He found this error especially critical
where twenty years of neglect indicated that Portugal lacked the
knowledge about the wishes of the people of East Timor to properly represent it.200 Moreover, the ICJ has a duty to ascertain the will of the
protected people even under ordinary circumstances. 201 Specifically, the
Court should have considered whether Portugal truly represented the
interests of East Timor. 20 2 In this case, neither Portugal, nor Australia
20 3
provided evidence on the views of the people of East Timor.
Although the U.N. General Assembly has occasionally dispensed
with the requisite consultation of the inhabitants of a trust territory,
the practice traditionally applies only to extremely small populations
which do not constitute a 'people', or when special circumstances make
it unnecessary. 204 With East Timor, the General Assembly specifically
commanded the Secretary General to "initiate consultation with all parties" in order to find a solution to the continental shelf problem in the
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id. at 132.
Id.
Id.
Id.
East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 132 (Ranjeva, J., separate opinion).
Id. at 132-33.
East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 135 (Vereshchetin, J., separate opinion).
Id.
Id. at 135-36.
Id. at 135.
Id. at 135-36.
East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 136 (Vereshchetin, J., separate opinion).
Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 33 (Oct. 16).
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'Timor Gap'. 205 The U.N. Charter does not impose a consulting obligation on Administering Powers, but this does not mean that international law can never impose such a duty. 206 In fact, the ICJ recognized
the duty to consult inhabitants in the Western Sahara Advisory Opinion. 20 7 Lack of consent from East Timor played an equally important
role in preventing the ICJ from deciding this case, but the Majority's
208
opinion ignored that aspect of the situation.
209

F. Judge Weeramantry's Dissent

Judge Weeramantry agreed that a controversy existed between
Portugal and Australia and gave unqualified support to East Timor's
right of self-determination. 210 He refused to accept that the jurisdictional question precluded a decision on Portugal's claim and felt the
Majority stopped at threshold of the case. 211 Instead, Weeramantry
found the issues of the case so interconnected that the preliminary matters and merits of the case were inseparable. 212 His dissent discussed
five issues. First, whether Australia's actions breached its duties and
obligations toward East Timor as a non-self governing territory apart
from those of Indonesia. Second, Portugal's standing to institute proceedings on behalf of East Timor and Australia's corresponding obligations toward it. Third, the nature of self-determination and sovereignty
over natural resources and whether Australia respected those principles. Fourth, Australia's self-determination obligations and to what extent they apply to all nations. Finally, he considered whether Portugal's Application constituted a misuse of the ICJ's authority. 213 Overall,
he found Portugal's application was within the competence of the Court
and despite the absence of a possible interested third party. 214
Weeramantry sees jurisdiction as a mixed question of law and
205. G. A. Res. 37/30, U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 227, U.N. Doc.A/37/51
(1982).
206. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 138 (Vereshchetin, J., separate opinion).
207. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. at 33.
208. East Timor 1995 I.C.J. at 138 (Vereshchetin, J., separate opinion).
209. The two dissenting opinions criticized the Majority for refusing to exercise jurisdiction over the Case ConcerningEast Timor. Surprisingly, the two judges expressed contradictory reasoning for their objections, with one finding the procedure and merits inextricably intertwined and the other finding them easily separated. After looking at all of
the opinions in this case it becomes clear that the concurring and dissenting opinion labels deals strictly with the jurisdictional question. The reasoning in the opinions defy
easy categorization. It is necessary to read all of the opinions in this case to truly understand the complexity of the situation presented by Portugal's objection to the Treaty Concerningthe Zone of Cooperation.
210. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 142 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting opinion).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 223 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting opinion).
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the parties' situation plays a central role in the Court's decision
whether to exercise jurisdiction. Consequently, he took judicial notice
of several key facts: 1- although Portugal left East Timor in 1974, the
U.N. considered Portugal, and not Indonesia, its Administering
Power;. 216 2- Australia never sought U.N. approval before entering the
Treaty on the Zone of Cooperation and East Timor never consented to
it;.217 and 3- Australia and East Timor had never entered into a delimitation agreement. Then, he proceeded to discuss the merits of Concerning East Timor.
First, Weeramantry asks whether Australia breached its duties to
East Timor apart from owed to Indonesia. He felt that East Timor's
status as a non-self-governing territory made any adjudication as to Indonesia's rights unnecessary. 21 8 As such, its resources uncontrovertibly
belonged to the people of East Timor. 219 Instead, the ICJ must consider
whether any member states may:
a) enter into a treaty with another state, recognizing
that the territory awaiting self-determination has been
incorporated into another state as a province of that
state; and b) to be a party to arrangements in that
treaty which deal with the resources of that territory
without the consent, either of the people of the territory,
220
or their authorized representative.
The Court need not consider the lawfulness of Indonesia's conduct. 221 If
East Timor is a non-self-governing territory, every nation has a duty to
recognize its right to self-determination as well as permanent sover222
eignty over its natural resources.
The judge discussed whether the ICJ had a duty to revisit questions previously resolved by U.N. resolutions and concluded the ICJ
must defer to the decisions of other U.N. organs absent proof that they
have exceeded their authority. 223 Neither Portugal, nor Australia, presented evidence of such a problem in this case, so the Court had no reason to doubt the validity of existing U.N. resolutions regarding East
Timor. 224 Decreasing support for a position and the passage of time
does not erode the validity of the resolution. 225 Weeramantry rejected

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Id. at 152.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 153.
East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 153 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting opinion).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 154.
Id.
East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 154 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting opinion).
Id. at 155.
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the Majority's concern with Indonesia's rights as an excuse for refusing
to exercise jurisdiction, saying that ICJ rulings always effect third par226
ties.
This opinion also distinguished East Timor from Monetary Gold.
Monetary Gold involved a dispute over gold belonging to Albania who
was not before the Court. In contrast, there was no claim against a
third party here. 227 While resolution of the controversy over East Timor
might effect the interest of Indonesia, it would not form the very subject
matter of the dispute. 228 If the Court were to interpret the interested
third party concept so broadly, the ICJ would also be forced to join the
many parties who dealt with Indonesia in connection with East
20
Timor. 229 This stretches Monetary Gold too far.
In the international arena, the ICJ really serves as the last resort
for the resolution of disputes. 231 Consequently, Monetary Gold's Third
Party Rule cannot be allowed to outweigh the Court's duty to decide
cases. 232 "[A]n international tribunal is master of its own jurisdiction"
and cannot allow doubt to be its reason for declining a case. 233 Such a
234
rigid interpretation would paralyze the international justice system.
The Court has a duty "to give the fullest decision it may in the circumstances." 235 It is not enough that a third party is affected by a decision;
the matter must be the very subject matter of the case. 236 The Court
must make a judicial determination of the responsibilities of a non238
party state. 237 Finally, joint wrongdoers face individual liability.
Moreover, international Law offers a number of other safeguards to
protect the rights of absent third parties. 239 ICJ opinions bind only parties to a dispute, 240 other states may intervene or institute their own
proceedings, 241 no stare decisis applies to international law, and each

226. Id.
227. Id. at 157.
228. Id.
229. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 157 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting opinion).
230. Id.
231. Id. at 160.
232. Id. at 159.
233. Id.
234. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 159 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting opinion).
235. Id. at 159 (citing Continental Shelf (Libya Arab/Malta)).
236. Id. at 168.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 170. (Weeramantry, J., dissenting opinion).
240. STATUTE OF THE COURT art. 59. Cf., Reilly & Orodnez, supra note 133, at 478
("[1It would be difficult to say an ICJ judgment rendered in a dispute between two states
would have a binding effect only upon the parties. This is true despite Article 59 of the
court's statute, especially where the decision involves a territorial dispute concerning... the continental shelf.")
241. STATUTE OF THE COURT art. 62.
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state bears international responsibility for its own wrongdoing. 242
Therefore, the Court cannot appropriately allow one state's nonacceptance of ICJ jurisdiction prevent states accepting its jurisdiction
243
from settling their disputes.
Next, Weeramantry explained the nature of rights erga omnes and
self-determination. "An erga omnes right... is a series of separate
rights singulum, including inter alia, a separate right erga singulum
against Australia and a separate right erga singulum against Indonesia. These rights are in no way dependent upon the other."2 44 Making
Indonesia a necessary party hampers the operation of the erga omnes
doctrine. 245 The U.N. Charter gives all states certain rights and responsibilities that all others must recognize and each must answer for its
own failures. 246 The Court could not allow Indonesia to protect those
countries from treating it as Administrating Power by avoiding being
brought before the Court. 247 Portugal's Application dealt, not with the
lawfulness of the Treaty on the Zone of Cooperation, but the lawfulness
of Australia's conduct in making the treaty.248 Therefore, the invalidity
of the treaty was not a precondition for an ICJ ruling that Australia
249
acted unlawfully.
Weeramantry similarly rejected Australia's argument that Portugal brought its application against the wrong party. He notes that any
claim against Indonesia would question the legality of its occupation of
East Timor. 250 He concludes that the question here concerned whether
Portugal made a supportable legal claim against Australia. 251 The
judge wanted the Court to expand its notion of the consent principle of
25 2
jurisdiction and decide the case.
Weeramantry also refused to accept that Indonesia had replaced
Portugal as Administrative Power of East Timor. Permitting Indonesia
to assume Portugal's position as Administering Power by occupying
East Timor after the latter left would destroy the "sacred trust" created
by the Charter. Weeramantry had three concerns with such an approach. 253 Precedent does not support the idea that a loss of physical
control amounts to a loss of Administering Power status. Administer-

242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 170. (Weeramantry, J., dissenting opinion).
Id. at 171.
Id. at 172.
Id.
East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 173 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting opinion).
Id.
Id. at 174.

Id.
Id. at 176.
East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 176 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting opinion).
Id. at 177.
Id. at 180.
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ing Power means more than physical control. 254 It creates a duty to
protect the welfare of the people of the non-self-governing territory, to
preserve their assets and their rights, and to conserve their right to
permanent sovereignty over their natural resources. 255 Consequently,
Portugal remained Administering Power over East Timor even after it
left in 1974.
The United Nations cannot act as a substitute for a displaced Administrating Power. 256 It lacks the resources to provide the particular
attention envisioned by the Charter 257 . It depends on its members to
transmit information about its trust-territories to the U.N. Secretary
General. 255 Depriving Portugal of its Administering Power status because of its loss of control over East Timor would leave East Timor's
people defenseless and voiceless precisely when those rights are threat259
ened or violated.
Portugal's status was repeatedly recognized by the General Assembly and the Security Council 260 and those resolutions remain in effect
until rescinded or superseded by new resolutions. 261 The Court cannot
unilaterally take it upon itself to grant or withhold Administering
Power status based on a bad colonial record. 262 Portugal's poor colonial
record remained irrelevant until the organs of the U.N. sought to act on
it.263
The General Assembly had the authority to revoke Portugal's
status as Administering Power and chose not to do so. 264 Therefore, the
ICJ could not take away Portugal's ability to intervene on East Timor's
behalf by refusing it standing to appear before the Court. 265 Such a
ruling would defeat the purpose of the Charter's trustee-ship. 266
Weeramantry similarly rejected Portugal's claims that Australia
ignored East Timor's Right to self-determination and sovereignty over
its natural resources? East Timor's right to self-determination and the
principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources form the core
of the East Timor case. 267 The United Nations, Portugal and Australia
254. Id.
255. Id. at 180-81.
256. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 181 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting opinion).
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 187.
261. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 191 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting opinion).
262. Id. at 192.
263. Id. at 187.
264. Id. at 187-88. It was not as if the United Nations had simply overlooked East
Timor. The Committee of 24, the General Assembly's organ overseeing decolonization,
put East Timor on its agenda and referred to it in its committee report to the General Assembly year after year. Id. at 191.
265. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 188 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting opinion).
266. Id.
267. Id. at 193.
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unquestionably recognized East Timor's status as a non-self-governing
territory possessing the right to self-determination. 268 Yet, Australia
argued that the U.N. Charter created no express obligations on states to
promote self-determination in a territory over which they had no control. 269 Instead, Solidarity 270 required only that they assist in actions
taken by the U.N.. without an independent duty to of non-recognition of
Indonesia.271 Furthermore, the international community had expressed
no criticism of Indonesia or the other states which had dealt with Indonesia in relationship to East Timor. 272 Consequently, the Treaty on the
Zone of Cooperationhad no impact on the people of East Timor's right of
self-determination.273 Weeramantry disagreed.
He wrote of the central role self-determination plays in the structure of the U.N. and the concept's recognition by international conventions, customary law, and judicial decisions. 274 The judge found the
right to self-determination central to developing friendly relations 275
among nation states. 276 He reminded the reader that every member of
the United Nations undertook "a solemn contractual... to promote conditions of economic progress and development, based on respect for the
principle of self-determination." 277 The U.N. expects Administering
Powers to make the interests of the people living in the territory paramount, to account for their political aspirations, and to assist them in
278
developing their own political institutions.
The U.N. has adopted a number of resolutions aimed at implementing self-determination at a practical level. For example, it adopted
the Declarationon the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
and Peoples27 9 in 1960 and the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among
States280 in 1970. The ICJ's own decisions have also supported the right
to self-determination. 2 1 In the end, Weeramantry found Portugal's

268. Id.
269. Id. at 194.
270. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 5.
271. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 194 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting opinion).
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. U.N. Charter art. 1(2).
276. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 194 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting opinion).
277. Id. at 195.
278. U.N. Charter art. 73.
279. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,
G.A.Res. 1524, U.N. GOAR, 15th Sess. (1960).
280. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Cooperation Among States, G.A. Res. 2626, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess. (1970).
281. See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970),
Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. at 16; Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. at 12.
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claim that, by becoming party to an agreement recognizing East Timor's
incorporation into Indonesia concerning the exploitation of nonrenewable resources before it could exercise its right to selfdetermination, Australia had violated the principle of self28 2
determination.
Later in his opinion, Weeramantry referred to a fundamental inconsistency between East Timor's right to self-determination and inter28 3
national recognition of Indonesia as its new Administering Power.
He points out several differences between the power exercised by Indonesia and the authority of an Administrating Power. Portugal: 1) acted
as a fiduciary; 2) under U.N. supervision; and 3) its authority was coterminous with its fiduciary status. 28 4 The judge concluded that the
Court should find the Treaty on the Zone of Cooperation'srecognition of
East Timor's incorporation into Indonesia was incompatible with East
Timor's right to self-determination and Australia's duties under inter28 5
national law.
In addressing the clash between the peremptory norm if Australia's
permanent sovereignty over its natural resources and the preemptory
norm of East Timor's right to sovereignty over its natural resources,
Weeramantry said that Australia did not enjoy an absolute right to the
resources in the Timor Gap. 28 6 East Timor claims in the area qualified
those of Australia since their coasts were separated by only 250 miles of
ocean. 28 7 Furthermore, the ICJ lacked competence to decide whether
Australia and Indonesia had created an equitable division of resources
from the standpoint of East Timor. 288 Instead, the decision need only
determine whether the Treaty on the Zone of Cooperationhad been entered into without the consent of East Timor or Portugal, its Adminis28 9
tering Power.
Finally, the Weeramantry concluded that "[w]here a territory had
been acquired in a manner which leaves open the question whether legal sovereignty has been duly acquired, countries entering into treaty
relations.. .have options stretching all the way from de facto recognition... [to] de jure recognition." 290 Australia's treaty with Indonesia reflected one of the highest forms of de jure recognition, making its incompatible with its claims to respect East Timor's rights to self282. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 201 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting opinion). The Treaty
on the Zone of Cooperation explicitly names East Timor an "Indonesian Province" and the
people of East Timor receive no benefits under the treaty. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 203. (Weeramantry, J., dissenting opinion).
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 204. (Weeramantry, J., dissenting opinion).
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29 1
determination and permanent sovereignty over its natural resources.
Consequently, Australia breached its duty to abstain from any action
which nullified or impaired territorial rights to self-determination.

The right of self-determination enjoyed by the people of East Timor
and the corresponding duties placed on members of the international
community emerge from many sources of international law, including
293
treaties 292 and custom. Australia is not exempt from those duties.
Moreover, several Security Council resolutions demanded the collective
support of its members in enforcing East Timor's right to selfdetermination. 294 If East Timor had an erga omnes right to selfdetermination, a fact admitted by Australia, all U.N. members had a
duty to respect that right. 295 This required Australia to do more than
obey specific directions and prohibitions from the United Nations. It
296
was required to conform with the underlying principles of that right.
A number of the Treaty on the Zone of Cooperation provisions violate the spirit of self-determination. The treaty expressly recognized
East Timor as a province of Indonesia, with no evidence that the people
of East Timor chose that status. 297 It dealt with non-renewable resources arguably belonging to the territory and made no mention of
East Timor's rights. 298 In addition, the treaty created no method of repudiation to become effective when East Timor exercised its right to
self-determination in spite of an initial term of 40 years. 299 This created
"a real possibility" that East Timor's natural resources would be exhausted before it gained control over them. 300 The ICJ could not endorse such conduct.
At last, Weeramantry argued that unless the ICJ recognized a dispute in this case, the role of Administering Power would become
empty. 301 An Administering Power must commit to the "sacred trust"
granted to it by the United Nations. 302 If falters in its duties and fails
to take legal action in response to threats to the non-self-governing territory it administers, it violates its basic obligations. Portugal must
have access to the Court to fulfill its obligations to East Timor. 303
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292.
Human
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.

Id.
Weeramantry refers specifically to the U.N. Charter and the two International
Rights Covenants of 1966.
East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 206. (Weeramantry, J., dissenting opinion).

Id.
Id.
Id. at 211.
Id. at 212.
East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 212. (Weeramantry, J., dissenting opinion).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 217.
East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 217. (Weeramantry, J., dissenting opinion),
Id.
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Weeramantry urged his colleagues to entertain Portugal's application
and enforce East Timor's erga omnes rights to self-determination and
304
sovereignty over its natural resources.
G. Judge ad hoc Skubiszewski's Dissent
Although Judge Skubiszewski agreed with the Majority's rejection
of Australia's claim that no dispute existed between Portugal and Australia, he objected to its decision not to exercise jurisdiction because any
decision with regard to East Timor necessarily implicated Indonesia's
interests.3 0 5 In his perspective, the Court could have separated Australia's responsibilities toward Portugal and East Timor from the rights
and obligations of Indonesia. 30 6 In fact, his opinion suggested that the
ICJ shirked its responsibilities by refusing to decide the case, saying it
should refuse to exercise jurisdiction over a case sparingly. 30 7 The
Court could have addressed the request to reaffirm the rights of the
people of East Timor to self-determination,3 0 8 territorial integrity, and
permanent sovereignty over its wealth and natural resources, and Portugal's duties, powers and rights as the Administering Power over East
Timor without overextending itself. 309 Ruling on the rights of Portugal
and the people of East Timor need not indicate an implicit legitimization of Indonesia's annexation of East Timor. 310 Instead, the Court
could have resolved the initial claims without moving onto Portugal's
311
other claims.
Under this analysis, the legal interests of Indonesia would not
"form the very subject matter of the decision", 312 and would not serve as
"a prerequisite" for determining the case between Portugal and Australia. 313 "The claims submitted by Portugal [were] distinct from the alleged rights, duties, and powers of Indonesia. There [ought to be] no
304. Id. at 220.
305. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 226 (Skubiszewski, J., dissenting opinion).
306. Id.
307. Id. at 237.
308. The right to self-determination is the right of a person living in a territory to determine the political and legal status of that territory - for example, by setting up a state
of their own or choosing to become part of another state. Few non-self governing territories existed prior to the end of World War II. Those that it existed were created by treaty.
The situation changed after 1945 with the emergence of the United Nations. The concept
applies to 3 types of trust territories: 1) Mandated Territories - prior German and Turkish colonies administered by the Allies after World War I; 2) Trust Territories - Former
colonies after World War II, only one island in Japan remains; and 3) Non-self Governing
Territories such as East Timor.
AKEHURST, supra note 26, at 290.
309. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 239.
310. Id.
311. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 239 (Skubiszewski, J., dissenting opinion).
312. Monetary Gold, 1954 I.C.J. at 32.
313. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 242 (Skubiszewski, J., dissenting opinion).

1998

TIMOR GAP

685

difficulty in separating the subject matter of the present case from.. .a
theoretical case between Portugal and Indonesia." 31 4 Although the effect of both cases might be the same, 'the rights and duties of Indonesia
and Australia [were] not mutually interdependent." 315 The Court could
not claim an absolute bar on jurisdiction because of possible side effects
on third countries. 316 The ICJ Statute adequately protected Indonesia's
interests with regard to East Timor. 31 7 Consequently, the Court could
properly address Portugal's first claim against Australia, 318 especially
because several U.N. Resolutions supported Portugal's status as Administering Power and the United Nations had never revoked that
31 9
power.
Judge Skubiszewski also found Australia's recognition of East
Timor's right to self-determination inconsistent with its negotiation and
adoption of the Treaty on the Zone of Cooperationwith Indonesia. 320 He
objected to Australia's treatment of Indonesia as a direct replacement
for Portugal. In his view, Portugal possessed a stronger claim on East
Timor because of its (previous?) status as Administering power. 321 The
rights of the East Timor people depended on the efforts of all states "to
promote.. .the realization of the principle of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples in accordance with the provisions of the Charter, and to render assistance to the United Nations in carrying out the
responsibilities
entrusted
to
it
by
the
Charter
regarding... implementation." 322 He dismissed the fact that Australia had to
negotiate with Indonesia or lose its rights in the area, and condemned
its negotiations with Indonesia. 323 Essentially, Australia should have
respected Portugal's status as Administrating Power of East Timor until the United Nations declared otherwise. 324 Portugal's loss of territorial control had no effect on its status as Administrating Power. 325

314. Id. at 249.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 245.
317. Id.
318. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 245 (Skubiszewski, J., dissenting opinion).
319. Id. at 247-48.
320. Id. at 261.
321. Id.
322. The Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations-which is widely regarded as customary international law-expressly makes the
territorial integrity of a state contingent on its possession of a consensual representative
government ...
[Therefore,] the legitimacy of a state government is no longer merely a concern of domestic jurisdiction.
Eztah, supra note 69, at 510.
323. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 264 (Skubiszewski, J., dissenting opinion).
324. Id. at 270-71.
325. Id. at 277.
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GAUGING THE EFFECTS OF THE COURT'S OPINION

The ICJ's decision not to exercise jurisdiction in the Case Concerning East Timor reflects the historical limits placed on the right to selfdetermination by sovereignty and enforcement issues. 326 States jealously guard their sovereignty, making jurisdiction an extremely important issue. 327 The Court must worry about the threat to its credibility
when it makes decisions which no one can enforce. 328 International law
considers humanitarian intervention as a clear "exception to the otherwise 'absolute' right of a state to govern free from the interference of
any foreign state(s)." 329 One scholar attempted to explain the Majority's
decision not to hear the case as a deferral to General Assembly's resolutions granting Portugal status as Administering Power and its inaction
in the face of the Treaty on the Zone of Cooperation. 330 He claimed that
decision in East Timor "implicitly invited the political organs [of the
U.N.] to revisit the issue of East Timor."331 The ICJ has waited long
332
enough for the United Nations to act.

The U.N. Charter urges its members to undertake responsibility for
administering non-self governing "territories whose people have not yet
attained a full measure of self government," to recognize that the interests of their inhabitants "are paramount, and to accept as a sacred trust
the obligation to promote to the utmost...the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories." 333 Yet, the Court's decision not to exercise
326. One scholar finds that self-determination contains "an internal conflict between
state rights to self-determination, and the rights of minorities within states to dismember
or challenge the state in the name of another competing norm of self-determination."
Gerry J. Simpson, The Diffusion of Sovereignty: Self-Determination in the Post-Colonial
Age, 32 STAN. J. INT'L L. 255, 260. (1996). See Nanda, supra note 97, at 263-76 (noting a
number of different arguments advanced by states to resist demands for succession); Michael Reppas, The Lawfulness of HumanitarianIntervention, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 463,
463 (1997) (commenting on the distinct conflict between humanitarian intervention and
the "[tihe supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power" of independent states).
327. ICJ decisions do not bind all members of the United Nations. Reilly & Orodonez,
supra note 133, at 436. As mentioned previously, the ICJ may exercise jurisdiction over a
party if it has accepted jurisdiction under the Optional Clause of the U.N. Charter, art. 36
(2). Furthermore, states can make explicit reservations on the exercise of jurisdiction,
which have reciprocal application on the opposing party. Id.
328. Antonio F. Perez, The Passive Virtues and the World Court: Pro-DialogicAbstention by the InternationalCourt of Justice, 18 MICH. J. IN'L L. 399, 405 (1997). The author
presents a theory that the ICJ uses an arsenal of techniques and devices' to refrain from
acting prematurely and condemning itself to irrelevancy. Id.
329. Reppas, supra note 326, at 463.
330. Perez, supra note 328, at 423.
331. Id. at 424.
332. In considering its provisional agenda for the fifty-second session of the U.N., the
General Assembly again deferred consideration of East Timor. Press Wire, General Assembly Adopts Agenda and Organizationof Work for Fifty-Second Session, Sept. 23, 1997,
available in WESTLAW, INTNEWS database.
333. U.N. CHARTER, art. 73. This provision applies to all colonies and territories which
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jurisdiction abandoned the people of East Timor to the power struggle
between Portugal and Indonesia. 334 This is directly contrary to the aspirational quality of the United Nations. 335 If the right to external selfdetermination has risen to the level of customary law, the Court has a
duty to see that the international community respects that right.
The United Nations' Charter created trust territories to protect
precisely those who find themselves in situations similar to that of East
Timor. 336 Under the non-self governing territory provision, the U.N.
expects an Administering Power:
to ensure, with due respect for the culture of the people concerned,
their political, economic, social, and educational advancement, their
just treatment and their protection against abuses;
to develop self-government, to take due account of the
political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in
the progressive development of their free political institutions according to the particular circumstances of
each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of
advancement;
to further international peace and security;
to promote constructive measure of development...
[and]
to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for information purposes, subject to such limitations as security and constitutional considerations may require... information...relating to economic, social, and
educational conditions in the territories for which they

are respectively responsible .... 337

are geographically separate and distinct ethnically and/ or culturally from the country
exercising administering power, particularly those territories in a subordinate position.
AKEHURST, supra note 26, at 293.
334. Ved Nanda has argued that "severe deprivation of human rights often leaves no
alternative to territorial separation" which ought to allow succession. Nanda, Claims to
Succeed, supra note 97 at 280. The people of East Timor deserve the same level of protection from Portugal.
335. The Permanent Court of International Justice, the ancestor of the ICJ has been
described as an instrument "for securing peace as far as this aim can be achieved through
law."

HERSCH LAUTERPACHT,

THE DEVELOPMENT

OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE

INTERNATIONAL COURT 3 (1985). The international community hoped to encourage nations to bring their disputes to the court instead of resorting to force. Reilly & Ordonez,
supra note 133, at 436.
336. As of 1995, various aspects of international law licensed 185 state to represent,
and some say coerce, the 5,000 nations in their control.
Paul Brietzke, Self-

Determination, or Jurisprudential Confusion: Exacerbating Political Conflict, 14 WIS.
INT'L L.J. 69, 70 (1995).
337. U.N. Charter, art. 73.
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Under this criterion, Portugal failed in its duty as Administering Power
of East Timor.
For example, the General Assembly criticized Portugal on a number of occasions for its failure to submit reports on the conditions in
East Timor to the Secretary General; 338 the Security Council issued
several resolutions condemning it for its failure to implement the
United Nations' decolonization. 339 Nevertheless, Portugal continued to
treat East Timor as an overseas province and neglected to recognize its
right to self-determination until it fled during the Carnation Rebellion
in East Timor after 400 years of colonization. 340 Indonesia finally restored order to the country by sending its army into East Timor in December 1975.341 Indonesia later annexed East Timor, allegedly at the
342
request of one of its leading political parties.
Consequently, after Indonesia's military intervention and the subsequent integration of East Timor into Indonesia during the mid-70's,
few states regarded Portugal as the Administering Power of East
Timor. 343 Given the role of custom 344 in the development of international law, it should not be surprising that states such as Australia considered Indonesia to be East Timor's Administering Power and negoti345
ated treaties on that basis.

It seems inadequate for an aspirational body such as the International Court of Justice to use the compulsory jurisdiction argument to

avoid addressing the needs of East Timor, especially where the fundamental rights of individuals belonging to a non-self governing territory
which the United Nations has pledged to protect are at stake. 346 The
ICJ or other U.N. organizations ought to step in when an Administering
Power is not fulfilling its responsibilities to its trust territory. The Majority's position gives the U.N. and its organs no authority to oversee
the cultural, social, and economic well-being of non-self-governing terri-

338. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 114 (Oda. J., separate opinion).
339. Security Council Resolutions 180 (1963); 183 (1963); 218 (1965; 312 (1972); and
322 (1972).
340. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 115 (Oda, J., separate opinion).
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 118.
344. Until recently, international law consisted of customary rules that had evolved
after a long historical process culminating in their recognition by the international community. Customary rules crystallize from usages or practices which have evolved in
roughly 3 circumstances: 1) diplomatic relations among states; 2) the practice of international organs; and 3) state laws, decisions of state courts, and state military or administrative practices that suggest wide acceptance of a general principal of law. J. Starke,
Introduction to InternationalLaw, 34-28, reprintedin CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 78,
at 141-43.
345. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 110 (Oda, J., separate opinion).
346. I.C.J. Stat. art. 73.

1998

TIMOR GAP

tories once an Administering Power has been appointed. 347 Surely the
writers of the U.N. Charter never expected the international community to abandon a non-self governing territory to the neglect of an irre34
sponsible Administering Power indefinitely. 8
Whether the International Court of Justice had any choice but to
dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction remains uncertain. Part of the
problem resulted from the uncertainty about who should be looking out
for East Timor's interests. Although the U.N. continues to consider
Portugal the Administering Power over the territory, its position was
weakened by Indonesia's occupation of the territory following the Carnation Rebellion. Indonesia began dealing with other nations on behalf
of East Timor and the international community acquiesced in that behavior.
However, it would be equally problematic to blindly recognize Indonesia as the new Administering Power. 349 The international community certainly wishes to avoid an implied authorization of rule by conquest. 35 0 Instead, it must consult with representatives of the people of
East Timor to ascertain their wishes and take action to facilitate their
exercise of self-determination. The ICJ's decision succumbs to the pres35 1
sure to preserve the status quo.
VII. CONCLUSION
In the Case ConcerningEast Timor, the International Court of Jus-

347. See Brian F. Fitzgerald, Portugalv. Australia: Deploying the Missiles of Sovereign
Autonomy and Sovereign Community, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 260 (1996).
348. As Judge Weeramantry notes in his dissent, Portugal faced international liability
if it failed to take action to protect East Timor's rights. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 188
(Weeramantry, J., separate opinion). This indicates that the United Nations continued to
exercise authority over its Administrating Powers. Which international organization is
more suited to perform this duty than the International Court of Justice.
349. A recent article in the Bangkok Post illustrates the horrors inflicted on the people
of East Timor during Indonesia's 'annexation' in the 70's.
In one of the most underreported events in recent history, 60,000 people were killed in the initial days of fighting. Another 140,000 died in
subsequent guerrilla warfare and the accompanying famine, disease
and extra-judicial killings. If Portuguese estimates of the pre-invasion
population are accurate, nearly one in three Timorese died as a direct
result of Indonesia's forced integration.
Bangkok Post, Comment, Remembering a Massacre: An End to Violence is All They Ask,
Nov. 13, 1997, available in WESTLAW, INTNEWS database.
350. The Charter of the United Nations prohibits "the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or any other manner incompatible with the Purposes of the Untied Nations." U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 5.
351. 'Thus, although the judgments support the notion of legal obligations owed erga
omnes, the strong rhetorical weight of sovereign autonomy" makes the international obligations of self-determination little more than an illusion. Fitzgerald, supra note 347, at
37.
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tice recognized a dispute between Portugal and Australia over the nonself governing territory of East Timor, but failed to reach the merits of
the case. Both the Majority and Shahabuddeen felt that the consensual
nature of the ICJ's jurisdiction precluded it from addressing East
Timor's situation because any decision would impact the validity of the
Treaty on the Zone of Cooperation between Australia and Indonesia.
Vereshchetin criticized the Court for its failure to consider the most important third party, the people of East Timor, but agreed that the ICJ
lacked jurisdiction over the case.
Both dissenting judges felt the jurisdictional issues should not prevent the ICJ from hearing the case. Weeramantry found the procedural
issues and the merits of the case so intertwined that they could not be
separated. Consequently, he urged the Court to consider the merits of
East Timor. Judge ad hoc Skubiszewski, on the other hand, felt that
Portugal had successfully restricted its claims against Australia in such
a way that a ruling by the ICJ would not implicate Indonesia's interests.
The Majority's emphasis on the third party rights of Indonesia
while ignoring those of the people of East Timor reflects the inconsistency in the way international law treats nations and non-selfgoverning territories. Does the International Court of Justice really
want to send the message that the rights of a nation such as Indonesia
outweigh those of non-self governing territories such as East Timor?

Sovereignty Versus Globalization:
The International Court of Justice's Advisory
Opinion on the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons
Christyne J. Vachon
I.

INTRODUCTION

In recent history, the interdependence among nations increased.'
Despite the changing world, sovereignty remains a central issue in international affairs. 2 As nation-states conduct their affairs, traditionally
their primary concern has been for the independence of their statehood
or sovereignty. 3 Despite such concerns, issues of war and peace drove
nation-states to build alliances. 4 Modern developments, however, emphasize global concerns placing globalization at the forefront and national sovereignty in peril. 5 With increased globalization of the world
community, the efficacy and, consequently, the validity of the individual
6
nation is greatly weakened unless it acts in concert with other nations.
Thus a sovereign state must establish a balance between selfdetermination and independence on the one hand, and the necessary
1. Miguel De La Madrid H., National Sovereignty and Globalization, 19 Hous. J.
INT'L L. 553, 555 (1997)(discussing the role of increased commercial activity, investments,
financial transactions, tourism, and technological exchanges and their effects on the interconnection of nation-states).
2. John B. Attanasio, Rapporteur's Overview and Conclusions: Of Sovereignty, Globalization, and Courts, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 25 (1996). De La Madrid H., supra
note 1, at 554 (indicating that sovereignty causes great international conflicts).
3. William R. Moomaw, International Environmental Policy and the Softening of
Sovereignty, 21 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 7, 7 (1997)(discussing traditional concerns for
maintaining national sovereignty over one's own territory and defending boundaries from
neighbors).
4. Id. (concluding that "[t]his is not surprising, since the rise of the nation-state was
premised on the concept of territoriality: a particular piece of land was subject to the jurisdiction of a sovereign, who ruled and defended it from both physical encroachment by
other states and undue outside influence in the governance of its internal affairs."). The
U.N. Charter in art. 2 recognizes this concern.
5. Lan Cao, Toward a New Sensibility for International Economic Development, 32
TEX. INT'L L.J. 209, 246-47 (1997); De La Madrid H., supra note 1.
6. John Dunn, Introduction: Crisis of the Nation State, in CONTEMPORARY CRISIS OF
THE NATION STATE? 3, 6 (John Dunn ed., 1995)
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development and strengthening of the international community on the
other. 7 A law, universally accepted by the community of sovereign
states, will define this balance 8 Key to the development of an international rule of law, judicial institutions such as the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) craft customary law into broadly accepted regulations. 9
Increasing globalization and decreasing sovereignty impact the international legal debate 10 on the legality of nuclear weapons. Before the
end of the Cold War, nuclear weapons represented a necessary evil for
nation-state security. However with the advent of increased globalization, nuclear weapons may not be such a necessary or desired security
device.11 The threat or use of nuclear weapons raises a number of global
13
12
threats including: human rights, the environment, and economics.
In fact, with the increase in global concerns of nuclear weapons, the
General Assembly request for the advisory opinion of the ICJ on the legality of the use or threat of nuclear weapons represented a perfect opportunity for the Court to set the standard on the illegality of nuclear
weapons.
Each global threat involves the tug o' war between globalization
and sovereignty. 14 The sovereignty of the nation-state diminishes when
international threats become equally important as national, state, and
local matters. 15 The International Court of Justice addressed these

7. De La Madrid H., supra note 1, at 562.
8. Id.
9. Attanasio, supra note 2, at 26.
10. The international legal debate on nuclear weapons mutually affects and is affected by the international political debate on nuclear weapons.
11. Since the end of the Cold War, the opportunity for globalization has increased and
polarization has decreased. Globalization has increased the amount of regional institutions for economic, political, juridical, and social integration. De La Madrid H., supra note
1. These regional institutions include the European Union, the North American Free
Trade Agreement, the Forum of the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation, and the South
American Common Market. Id. at 555-56. There has been a similar movement on an even
grander international scale. The more universal institutions include: the International
Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization. Id.
12. J. William Futrell, International Environmental Legal Framework, SB79 ALIABA 1, 5 (1997)(indicating that climate change, depletion of the stratospheric ozone, the
world wide spread of persistent organic pollutants, bio diversity depletion, and ocean degradation are listed among the top environmental concerns). I believe the international
exchanges concerning the necessity and legality of nuclear weapons, in turn, increases
globalization and decreases sovereignty.
13. These are not the only sub-topics.
14. Globalization has been identified in terms of economic globalization, political
globalization, and social globalization. De La Madrid H., supranote 1. I believe that these
areas reflect the sub-topics that I have identified.
15. Alex Y. Seita, Globalizationand the Convergence of Values, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
429, 429 (1997)(defining globalization). "Globalization means many things. It is foremost
an economic process. Economic globalization refers to the world-wide integration of markets. ...A paramount consequence of market integration has been increased economic
interdependence among nations." Id. at 429-30. "Globalization is also a political event, as
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global threats as part of its advisory opinion on the legality of the threat
or use of nuclear weapons as requested by the General Assembly. 16 The
implications of the ICJ's decision vary.' 7 However, those issues unanswered by the Court are even more compelling than what the Court ar8
ticulated.'
This piece explores the relationship of the nuclear debate to the
globalization versus sovereignty debate. Central to this exploration is
the ICJ's advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear
weapons and its discussion of global concerns. Part II explains the concepts of globalization and sovereignty. Part III discusses nuclear weapons in general. Part IV explores the ICJ's advisory opinion and any
other relevant opinions and agreements. Finally, Part V analyzes the
implications of the ICJ decision, the issues articulated in the decision
and those that are not. Part VI concludes.
II.
A.

GLOBALIZATION VERSUS SOVEREIGNTY

Sovereignty

In the sixteenth century, a nation-state's concern for it's sovereignty grew out of the divine law of kings and the monarchical struggle
in Western Europe to impose the supremacy of the king on the empire.' 9
The Treaty of Westphalia of 164820 marked a turning point in history.

evidenced by the spread of democracy and human rights among nations." Id. at 430. 'The
ideology of globalization can be broadly divided into substantive and procedural components. The most important procedural element is the rule of law - - the idea that disputes
will be settled and agreements negotiated through the observance of established principles rather than the use of force or the intimidation of power. In turn the substantive
principles, what the rule of law seeks to enforce, are those that nations have selected to
settle disputes and negotiate agreements. The rule of law can be a way of resolving conflicts effectively, peacefully, and cooperatively." Id.
16. Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, July
8, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 809 [hereinafter General Assembly].
17. Antonio F. Perez, The Passive Virtues and the World Court: Pro-DialogicAbstention By the InternationalCourt of Justice, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 399, 430 (1997).
18. Id.
19. Moomaw, supra note 3 (concluding that "[tihis is not surprising, since the rise of
the nation-state was premised on the concept of territoriality: a particular piece of land
was subject to the jurisdiction of a sovereign, who ruled and defended it from both physical encroachment by other states and undue outside influence in the governance of its internal affairs."). De La Madrid H., supranote 1, at 554. The imposition of the supremacy
of the monarchy is termed the doctrinal justification of absolutism. The struggle to impose supremacy of the monarchy resulted in the establishment of the absolutist state. Id.
20. The Treaty of Westphalia ended the Thirty-Years War and provided incentives to
princes of France, Germany, and Sweden to form a loose confederation of independent
states. Matthew D. Peter, The Proposed InternationalCourt: A Commentary on the Legal
and PoliticalDebates Regarding Jurisdiction That Threaten the Establishment of an Effective Court, 24 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 177, 177 n.3 (1997). This treaty initiated
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The supremacy of the state displaced the church and the state asserted
its absolute authority within its territorial boundaries. 2' Furthermore
during the late eighteenth century, some states experienced democratic
revolutions which transposed the political legitimacy of the country
from the king to the people. 22 This process gradually occurred in more
and more states. 23 Finally, modern constitutionalism made its world
debut in the Charter that established the League of Nations and later
the United Nations Charter. 24 Since, the glory of sovereignty of the nation-state continues to inspire the birth of new independent political
units. 25 "Developing countries that were formerly colonies are particularly sensitive to the possibility that relinquishing any of their sover26
eignty would subjugate them to a new form of colonialism."
The sovereignty debate includes issues such as the meaning of sovereignty, the circumstances that characterize sovereignty depending on
the time and geography, and the changing national and international
political structures. 27 By definition a state is a grouping of individuals
who are entirely subject to their "own sovereign legal authority."28 The
most extreme sovereignty, is strict national sovereignty. "[N]ations are
sovereigns over international law .... international law exists only to
the extent that each nation decides to obey it... [and] a nation may
change its mind at any time ... [and] the rule loses its force against

traditional international law with the principles of territory and state autonomy, emphasizing sovereign state actors. Review Essay, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?,
106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2607 (1997).
21. Cao, supra note 5.
22. De La Madrid H., supra note 1, at 554. The democratic revolutions that took place
were sparked primarily by the English constitutional system. The belief that only the
popular will can establish a legitimate and legal state power established the new doctrine
of popular sovereignty. Id. This whole evolution coincided with the development of the
doctrine of the rights of men and the theory of division of powers. Id. The French Revolution is another example of a revolt that toppled a "seemingly entrenched regime." Bruce
Fein & Ward Warren, Failureis Ever an Orphan, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1998, at A16.
23. See, e.g, id (indicating that the Russian Revolution occurred in 1917).
24. De La Madrid H., supra note 1, at 554-55 (indicating that juridical equality of nation-states and the principle of non-intervention are logical results of this process).
25. Id. at 555 (indicating that currently the United Nations, which started with only
51 member states, now has 185 members). The doctrine of sovereignty has pushed the decolonization process as a result of the two World Wars and the disintegration of the Soviet
Empire. Id. In Asia and Africa from 1955 to 1975, the right to independence and selfdetermination for colonial peoples sparked a period of de-colonization. Gerry J. Simpson,
The Diffusion of Sovereignty: Self-Determination in the PostcolonialAge, 32 STAN. J. INT'L
L. 255, 263 (1996). See generally Diane F. Orentlicher, Separation Anxiety: International
Responses to Ethno-SeparatistClaims, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (1998) (discussing ethnic conflict and decolonization in several states).
26. Moomaw, supra note 3, at 13.
27. De La Madrid H., supra note 1, at 554.
28. Dunn, supra note 6, at 3. "A true nation state, therefore, would consist only of
those who belonged to it by birth and of those who were fully subject to its sovereign legal
authority." Id.
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that nation."29 In this case, international law essentially does not exist.30 It has been argued that, in this form, the principles of sovereignty
serve as justifications for violations of international law and extreme
brutality. 31 Sovereignty allows a country to patrol its borders and to require all foreigners desiring to enter the state to stop at the border and
submit to an inspection. 32 When travel by sea on ships was the main
mode of transport, nations were better equipped to control flow across
their borders. 33 However, with the advent of air travel, violations of
sovereignty in the air became a new dilemma. 34 The establishment of
laws that regulate commonly scheduled aircraft and seacraft so that
stops and inspections were not required for each new sovereign airspace
35
entered solved this dilemma.
B. Globalization
Globalization is not a recent phenomenon. 36 The nation-state's independence to control events within in its borders is challenged by
transnational corporations, economic globalization and trade, interna37
tional crime and the rise of global communications and technology.
The validity of the nation-state weakens as the gap grows between the
capabilities of the individual state and the demands placed on the
state. 38 The great appeal of the idea of a nation-state is its "presumed
efficacy." 39 Indeed, the capabilities of most developed states far exceed
their capabilities of years gone by. 40 States are better equipped to
communicate, develop communities, and defend themselves. 41 The question remains whether these capabilities can meet the demand of new
threats to the nation's security.
New security concerns emanate from global threats to human secu-

29. Anthony D'Amato, Human Rights as Part of Customary InternationalLaw: A Plea
for Change of Paradigms,25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 47, 59 (1996).
30. Id.
31. HENRY L. BRETTON, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE NUCLEAR AGE 153 (1986).
32. DAVID W. ZIEGLER, WAR, PEACE, AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 155 (1977).
33. Id. (indicating that border checks would be administered before foreigners disembarked from boats).
34. Id.
35. Id. (indicating that these procedures were worked out in Pairs in 1919 and Chicago in 1944).
36. David P. Fidler, Caught Between Traditions: The Security Council in Philosophical Conundrum, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 411, 444 (1996)(indicating that globalization includes the old liberal belief in economic interdependence and is therefore not so recent).
37. Moomaw, supranote 3.
38. Dunn, supra note 6, at 11.
39. As opposed to the nation-states' actual efficacy. Dunn, supra note 6, at 5.
40. Id. at 11. For a discussion on the development of warfare and the ultimate weapons, see infra notes 68-73and accompanying text.
41. Dunn, supra note 6, at 11.
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rity such as devastation of the environment. 42 Acting alone, individual
nation-states can no longer expect to overcome current national and international problems. 43 This process, described as a crisis for nationstates, challenges a state's sovereignty and requires a change from the
old way. 44 Globalization requires greater cooperation among nationstates. 45 The World Bank's recent reaffirmation of its commitment to
improving the global environment provides evidence of continuing globalization. Pursuant to its articles of incorporation, the World Bank
should not take human rights concerns into account when lending
money. However, the World Bank indicated that improvements in the
global environment directly affect a country's development. 46 Similarly,
the recent international effort to save the troubled Asian economies
demonstrates the necessity of global aid to secure a country from crisis.
As the Asian economies went into a "free fall," the international financial community cringed in fear. 47 The Asian economies ability to pull
48
themselves back together requires international financial assistance.
Going forward it is anticipated that the international community, especially foreign banks, will continue to play an impressive role in the
49
Asian economies.
Globalization increases the need for international institutions to
42. Id. (construing THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT (Andrew
Hurrell & Benedict Kingsbury, eds., 1992)).
43. De La Madrid H., supranote 1, at 560. Dunn, supra note 6, at 4 (discussing that
the nation state crisis is as a result of the inability of the nation state to master its own
problems and the origins of the crisis are from two different shifts: first, the decrease in
appeal of the concept of the individuality of the nation state; second, the increase in
awareness of several global, economic, ecologic, military and political challenges that necessitate world involvement). In order for a nation state to be political active, it needs to
work with other nation states and not individually. Id. at 5.
44. Id. at 1.
45. Attanasio, supra note 2 (indicating that without the existence of international
institutions globalization would continue because capital is exchanged so frequently
across borders that globalization is a necessary evolution). "Japan's support for U.S.
forces, however, expressly excludes weapons and ammunition supplies, although Japan
will transport such materials on behalf of the U.S.. Japan continues to adhere to its 'three
non-nuclear principles' and will not permit nuclear weapons to be brought to Japanese
soil." John R. Schmertz & Mike Meier, Japan and U.S. Further Develop Defense Guidelines to Adapt Them to Post Cold War Conditions, 3 INT'L UPDATE 129 (1997).
46. World Bank Reaffirms Commitment to the Global Environment and a Strong
GEF,M2 PRESSWIRE, April 4, 1998 (indicating that "actions that help the global environment can help enhance national development and reduce poverty").
47. Les Blumenthal, World Bank Head Says U.S. Can't Just Moralize About Asian
Crisis, MORNING NEws TRIBUNE, Mar. 29, 1998, at B13.
48. The United States' $18 billion additional funding to the IMF was at issue. The
World Bank indicated that the U.S. could not "claim to be a world power without contributing." Id. Great Britain proposed a multi-million dollar trust fund to aid the Asian banks
to recover. Eileen Ng, Asia-Europe Trust Fund to be Leading Item on ASEM Agenda,
AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Mar. 29, 1998.
49. Keith B. Richburg, Asia Looks For Cash For Its Ailing Banks; Solution Likely to
Boost Foreign Influence, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 1998, at A21.
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implement limitations and regulations.50 These institutions assist in a
smooth transition from a collection of sovereign states to a global community by establishing universal rules. 5 1 Judicial institutions, such as
52
the ICJ are key to the development of an international rule of law.
The judicial institutions must be able to reliably resolve disputes using
the international rule of law. 53 Through resolution of disputes, judicial
54
institutions will also develop new aspects of the rule of law.
At present, a state needs to accept the jurisdiction of the judicial
institution before the rule of law applies to that state. Acceptance of the
50. Attanasio, supra note 2, at 26. If international institutions are viewed as pervading over nation-states, international institutions should be able to regulate nationstates to ensure the preservation of global interests. This is similar to state government's
ability to regulate businesses which are connected with public health and welfare. As an
exercise of the state government's police power, it has the ability to regulate business. Cf.
DAN R. WILLIAMS & LARRY GOOD, GUIDE TO THE ENERGY POLICY ACT OF 1992 (1994). In
the case of nuclear weapons, international institutions regulating nuclear weapons must
balance between regulating potentially harmful nuclear technology and permitting peaceful uses. Greg Rattray, The Emerging Global Information Infrastructure and National
Security, 21 FALL FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 81, 91 (1997) (indicating that this approach is
called "arms control for everyone'). Even the NPT in Article IV(l) states that parties to
the NPT have an "inalienable right' to develop, research, produce, and use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Seth Grae, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty's Obligation to Transfer Peaceful Nuclear Energy Technology: One Proposal of Technology, 19
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1985, 1985 (1996)(indicating that nuclear technology can be applied
in many ways such as cancer treatment or riding crops of pest infestation or nuclear reactors for peaceful energy production).
51. Attanasio, supra note 2, at 26 (indicating that the attention is directed to judicial
bodies since the rule of law is so important globally).
Various reasons may help to account for why the economic realm may sometimes precede the recognition of decisions of international tribunals in human rights and other areas. If one looks at the incentive that nation-states
possess, there are strong reasons to cooperate in the economics area. Fewer
incentives exist to follow the decisions of international tribunals in the human rights area, in part because their decisions may make nation-states look
bad. Another deterrent may be that human rights cases involve values that
are more fundamental than the utilitarian or efficiency ones that often
dominate cases about economic matters. The fundamentality of human
rights values such as equality or autonomy may render them more central to
a nation-state's culture and sovereignty, consequently making them values
over which nation-states seek to retain their own enforcement power.
Id. at 29.
52. Id. at 26.
53. Id. De La Madrid H., supra note 1, at 556 (indicating that art of the lack of social
and economic development is due to the financial weakness of the World Trade Organization). "The inadequacy of political and social institutions in dealing with the growing
complexity of international social relations, accelerated to a certain extent by the global
demographic explosion of the twentieth century, is also expressed in the generically labeled "ungovernability phenomena ....
Id. at 559-560.
54. Attanasio, supra note 2, at 26. The need to be able to punish international crimes
is apparent with the globalization of drug trafficking. The drug traffic wars has become a
symbol of the ineptitude of nation-states to cooperate to prevent crimes. ). De La Madrid
H., supra note 1, at 560.
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international decision limits the state's sovereignty. 55 However, as the
most viable solution to international concerns, globalization increases
in popularity."Globalization increasingly offers incentives to nationstates to surrender bits of their sovereignty consensually through treaties to fashion advantageous economic arrangements." 56 Once a state
accepts jurisdiction and the international rule of law, the national
57
courts should enforce the international decisions.
III.
A.

WARFARE AND NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY

War

Historically, warfare is characterized by the continuing opposition
of offensive and defensive weapons. 58 Successful defense of territorial
sovereignty always necessitated a strong military, backed by a nation's
resources and economic wealth. 5 9

55. Attanasio, supra note 2, at 26 (indicating that national courts' acceptance of decisions of international institutions is a very important channel through which international law limits state sovereignty).
56. Id. An example is the ECJ. The acceptance of the decisions by the ECJ was gradual. Regionalism is accountable for the success of the ECJ. Another key to the ECJ success was the ability of individuals and not just nation states to bring issues forward. The
ICJ's acceptance may be greatly hindered by the fact that its jurisdiction is exclusive to
nation-states. Id. at 24.
57. Id. at 26. "[N]ational courts have often displayed a reluctance to accept the decisions of international tribunals. National courts frequently have displayed greater reluctance in receiving these decisions as precedents than in enforcing judgments by giving
them res judicata effects." Id. at 27.
58. MICHAEL NACHT, THE AGE OF VULNERABILITY: THREATS TO THE NUCLEAR
STALEMATE 55 (1985)(indicating that this pattern includes: measure, countermeasure and
counter-countermeasure).
59. Moomaw, supra note 3.
TABLE: Nation Statistical Information
Country

Defense Spending
($)

Area
(km,)

Total Population
(thousands)

GDP
Per
Capita (US$)

Life
Expectancy
(years) MIF

United

271,600,000,000

9363520

271648

18635

72.5/80.7

Russia

79,000,000,000

147709

147709

1951

61.7/73.6

China

27,400,000,000

9596961

1243738

440

66.7/70.4

N.Korea

5,300,000,000

99274

45717

8519

67.3/74.9

Iraq

2,600,000,000

438317

21177

2855

64.5/67.5

Iran

2,300,000,000

1633188

71518

1151

67/68

Cuba

270,000,000

110861

11068

1627

73.5/77.5

States

For defense spending statistics, see
htto://www//infomanare.com/nonor'oliferation~usvsworld
com/noni)ioliferation/usvsworld html. For other statistical inforhttt):flwww//inf6mana
1+
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The ability and means by which a State secures itself has direct,
global implications. 60 In the global arena of conflicts between States, a
state confronts an adversary in two ways. The first is "dissuasion by
defense" whereby the defender assembles a strong army and constructs
sturdy battalions. 6' The risks and stakes in the outcome differ for each
country involved. If the costs of war are low, a country will act with less
care then if the costs are high. 62 A country's risk of retaliation increases as it moves closer to winning, especially if the stakes are high.
The greater the risk of retaliation, the greater the country risks its own
63
destruction.
The second approach is "dissuasion by deterrence" in which the defender uses fear of incredible suffering to confront an aggressor. 64 This
approach characterizes warfare as a face-off between countries that oppose each other with deterrent threats. 65 This second approach applies
to nuclear weapons. 66 The deterrent effect of nuclear weapons is contin67
gent upon the willingness of a state to use them.
Historically, the development of several "ultimate" weapons characterized deterrent warfare. 68 With each new "ultimate" weapon, new
technology quickly rendered them obsolete and established a new "ultimate" weapon in its place. 69 Before World War I, it could take a cen-

mation, see http://www.UN.orgfPubs/CyberSchoolBus/menureso.html. It is interesting to
compare the expense a country allocates to maintain the security of its borders to the
amount it spends to maintain the security of its people.
60. SCOTT D. SAGAN & KENNETH N. WALTZ, THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 4

(1995).
61. Id. at 3 (indicating that his is the "defensive ideal" because a defense that no one
believes they could surmount would maintain tranquility in international relations). But
see NACHT, supra note 58, at 56. 'The stone castle, a quintessential defensive weapon,
prompted knights to make offensive forays into the countryside confident that they could
then retreat to their impregnable fortress. In other words, a powerful defensive capability
has often encouraged offensive attack."
62. SAGAN & WALTZ, supra note 60, at 5.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 3 (stating that "[dieterrence is achieved not through the ability to defend
but through the ability to punish.").
65. Id. at 5.
66. Id. at 4. But see NACHT, supra note 58 (indicating that from 1945 to 1985 no nuclear weapon was used in warfare).
67. SAGAN & WALTZ, supra note 60, at 6. As opposed to the acquisition of territory in
warfare, the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons tends to increase a state's security more.
Id .at 5.
68. NACHT, supranote 68, at 56.
[Tihe experience of war from ancient times through the end of World War II
reveals one overriding fact: most shots missed their target. Weapons have
always been categorized by their range, lethality, and accuracy. The history
of military technology is the story of man seeking to perfect weapons of
longer range and greater power and accuracy.
Id. at 57.
69. Id. at 56 (indicating that the twentieth century is particularly noteworthy for the
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tury to classify a new weapon as an "ultimate" weapon. 70 Following
World War I, technological innovation rapidly accelerated the aging of
modern weaponry. 71 The advent of nuclear weapons removed the need
to focus technological efforts on improving accuracy. 72 Instead, direct
confrontation of superpowers hallmarked most of the post World War II
period. 73 In particular, the direct confrontation of the United States
and the Soviet Union, the two superpowers, became known as the Cold
War. The majority of the Cold War occurred in Europe.7 4 However,
disputes also arose over the Pacific region.7 5 Although the superpowers
claimed to be at peace, the risk of nuclear war or accident continued to
mount. 76
A remarkable event, the collapse of the Soviet Union, focused international concern on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.7 7 In order to understand the full import of that event, it is beneficial to briefly describe the history of the Cold War. The Cold War lasted
for approximately forty years. "The Cold War was not a simple case of
Soviet expansionism and American reaction. Realpolitik held sway in
the Kremlin. Ideology played an important role in shaping their perceptions, but Soviet leaders were not focused on promoting worldwide
revolution.
They were concerned mostly with configurations of
78
power .... "
On August 6, 1945, the United States dropped the bomb on Hiroshima. 79 Buildings three kilometers away from the explosion burned;
the bomb incinerated anything within a 500 meters its explosion.8 0 On
August 10, 1945 the United States dropped a second bomb on Na-

rapid pace of technological development).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 57.
73. Peter Hayes & Lyuba Zarsky, Pacific Arms Control and Regional Initiatives, in
THE PACIFIC: PEACE, SECURITY AND THE NUCLEAR ISSUE 73, 73 (Ranginui Walker

& Wil-

liam Sutherland eds., 1988).
74. 'The Cold War was a competition between the United State [sic] and the Soviet
Union over the heads of their West and East European allies." Richard Halloran, The Rising East, FOREIGN POL'Y, Mar. 1, 1996, at 3.
75. Hayes & Zarsky, supra note 73.
76. Id. at 79 (indicating that such factors as "[h]air trigger weapons, rigid and inadequate structures of command and control, sectarian rivalries between military services,
fluid political situations..." combined to create the instability).
77. Rattray, supra note 50 (indicating that the break up of the Soviet Union and the
Gulf War were remarkable events that focused attention on proliferation). Weapons of
mass destruction include nuclear weapons. Id.
78. Melvyn P. Leffler, Inside Enemy Archives: the Cold War Reopened, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, July, 17, 1996, at 120.
79. James Chace, Sharing the Atom Bomb: after Hiroshima, FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Jan.11, 1996, at 129.
80. Id.
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gasaki. 81 The two explosions killed more than 150,000 people and injured over 100,000 others. 82 The results stunned the world. America's
possession and use of the bomb terrorized Stalin, adding to his obses83
sion with the security of the Soviet Union.
The American approach to the bomb eroded the American/Soviet
relationship.8 4 Although the United States considered efforts to appease
the Soviet Union and to integrally involve them in the postwar world,
Truman ultimately abandoned the issue to the international community.8 5 Klaus Fuchs, a German 6migr6, provided the Russians with a
hand-drawn model of the bomb dropped on Nagasaki and theoretical
plans for making the hydrogen bomb.86 The Soviets tested their first
atomic weapon in 1949 and this set Washington and U.S. scientists in
87
motion to build something more powerful than the atomic bomb.
President Truman ardently advocated development of the hydrogen
bomb.88 On November 1, 1952 the United States tested its first hydrogen bomb. 89 The bomb actually catalyzed the Cold War. 90
The struggle over Germany took center stage in the Cold War. 91
Similar struggles ensued in Poland, Hungary, Romania, other European states, and China. 92 The Kremlin sought to gain the respect of and
security from the United States by increasing the Soviet Union's
power. 93 Likewise, the United States increased its power and these attitudes increased the tensions of the Cold War. 94 "[E]ach ...mistook

81. Id.

82. Id.
83. Leffler, supra note 78.
84. One intent was to share the basic scientific information but not the actual bomb
design. Chace, supra note 79.
85. Id. (indicating that Truman was very distrustful of the Soviets but that he recognized the need to inform them of the scientific information and that the issue ultimate;y
ended up with the United Nations for resolution).
86. Richard Stengel, Book Review, Brink of Armageddon, TIME MAG., Aug. 21, 1995,
at vol.146, no.8 (reviewing Richard Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen
Bomb).
87. Id. (discussing the unveiling of the plans for the hydrogen bomb).
88. Id. The administration even toyed with the idea of a preemptive strike on the
Soviets with an armada of U.S. planes carrying more than 100 atom bombs to destroy 70
Soviet cities. Id.
89. Id. (indicating that the resulting force was one thousand times more powerful
than the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima).
90. Gar Alperovitz Kai Bird, The Centrality of the Bomb, FOREIGN POLICY, Mar. 22,
1994, at 3.
91. Leffler, supra note 78.
92. Id.(indicating that although the Soviet Union took action in these countries, no
concrete plans for communist take over have been discovered).
93. Id.
94. Id.(indicating that the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and the Middle East crisis of
1973 characterized these tensions).
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defensive initiatives for aggressive ones."95
In recognition of the tremendous impact of nuclear weapons, multilateral measures existed during the Cold War to control nuclear
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. 96 For example, the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ("NPT") sought to
stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons. 97 Furthermore, it necessitated that all countries with peaceful nuclear technology should transfer it to countries without that technology. 98 The NPT required that
parties who are capable will work together to further develop peaceful
uses of nuclear technology. 99
The Soviet Union's and United States' concern for their security
and the preservation of their borders and allies, emphasizes the central
role of sovereignty at this time. 100 Non superpowers possessed an equal
concern for their sovereignty. In the first fifty years of the nuclear age,
the number of States with nuclear capabilities grew to twelve. 0 1 Between the years 1940 and 1993, the United States nuclear weapons industry produced approximately 60,000 warheads.1 02 The spread of nu95. Id.(construing Lebow and Stein).
96. Rattray, supra note 50.
97. Grae, supra note 50 (indicating that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in Article IV(l) states that parties to the NPT have an "inalienable
right' to develop, research, produce, and use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes).
98. Id.
99. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 7 I.L.M. 809,
art. IV(2) (1968). See generally Rattray, supranote 50.
100. Leffler, supra note 78 (indicating that the Soviet concern for Japan and Germany
were residual from the war and concern for the United States was dictated by the U.S.
wealth and possession of the bomb).
101. SAGAN & WALTZ, supra note 60, at 1. The Soviet Union and the United States
collectively possessed about 60,000 nuclear weapons after only forty years since the first
use of the atomic bomb. NACHT, supra note 68, at 55. In 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed
and four new states - Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan - were "born nuclear,"
inheriting portions of the Soviet nuclear weapons arsenal. In 1991, after the Gulf War,
[the United States] discovered that Iraq had been only two years or so away from making
atomic bombs, before the Desert Storm attack and the subsequent dismantlement by international inspectors of their weapons development facilities. In 1992, Pakistani officials
admitted that they had developed a nuclear weapons capability, after over two decades of
dedicated effort. In 1993, the South African government acknowledged that it had constructed a small nuclear arsenal in the 1980s , but said that it had dismantled and destroyed its weapons. North Korea was in the headlines in 1994, when the Pyongyang
government refused to permit full international inspection of its nuclear facilities and the
CIA presented the White House with its estimate that North Korea had processed enough
plutonium for one or more bombs. What will come next? Other potential nuclear powers
appear on the horizon: leading Japanese politicians no longer rule out acquisition of nuclear weapons and a growing number of developing nations, such as Iran, Libya, and Algeria, seem to have nuclear weapons programs. SAGAN & WALTZ, supra note 60, at vii-viii.
102. Dan W. Reicher, Nuclear Energy and Weapons, in SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW (Celia Campbell-Mohn, et al, 1993). The Department of Energy manages many of the
facilities for production of nuclear weapons. Since the revelation of safety and environmental hazards, the Department of Energy has either cut back or completely halted pro-
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clear weapons is slow, which is useful to help contain the number of
weapons States. 10 3
After the end of the Cold War and without competing superpowers,
the risk of surprise nuclear attacks and the expense of costly arms races
declined. 104 However, only the naive would neglect the ongoing concern
of states with nuclear weapons. 105 Treaties establish international
norms to deal with the misuse of nuclear technologies 106 but the mere
existence of nuclear weapons serves a potential threat to all. 107 "Even if
never used, a handful of nuclear weapons merely in possession of an unfriendly country could change a regional balance of power .. ."108 A nuclear world commands a different type of philosophy applying to conflict. If countries armed with nuclear capabilities participate in war,
they are aware that suffering may be unlimited. 0 9 Instead, the arms
control efforts should focus on achieving the sharing of information
globally on the dissemination of technologies for weapons of mass destruction.110
B.

Nuclear Technology

Understanding the basic functioning of nuclear energy helps to
conceptualize the implications of nuclear technology."' The key to nuclear energy is radiation. 112 The damage to living tissues by radiation
depends on the type of radiation (alpha, beta, or gamma) 113 and the raduction at these facilities.
103. SAGAN & WALTZ, supra note 60, at 1-2.
104. Rattray, supra note 50, at 91.
105. See generally Karsten Prager, China: Waking Up to the Next Superpower, TIME
MAG., Mar.25, 1996, at vol.147, no.13 (discussing China's possible role as the next superpower). Michael Mandelbaum, Lessons of the Next Nuclear War, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Mar.
1, 1995, at 22 (indicating that the collapse of the Soviet Union has increased the demand
for weapons).
106. Rattray, supra note 50, at 92. Warren Christopher, America's Leadership, America's Opportunity, FOREIGN POL'Y, Mar. 22, 1995, at 6.
107. Cf. Phil Williams & Paul N. Woessner, The Real Threat of Nuclear Smuggling,
Scd. AM., Jan. 1996, at 40; Bruce W. Nelan, Formula for Terror, TIME MAG., Aug. 29,
1994, at vol.144, no.9 (indicating that the former Soviet arsenal is leaking into the West,
igniting fears of a brand new nuclear terror).
108. Mandelbaum, supra note 105.
109. SAGAN & WALTZ, supra note 60, at 7.
110. Rattray, supra note 50, at 91.
111. The Department of Energy has attempted to improve the public's understanding
of nuclear technology. U.S Department of Energy, Office of the Press Secretary,
http://apollo.osti.gov/ostii/opennet/document/press/pc8.html.
112. "Some atoms are naturally unstable; their nuclei continuously emit alpha, beta,
or gamma radiation until they achieve a stable state." Reicher, supra note 102.
113. Id. "Alpha radiation consists of positively charged particles made up of two neutrons and two protons, while beta particles are electrons. Gamma rays are essentially
highly energetic X-rays except that they are emitted naturally by radioactive substances
instead of machines." Id.
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diation dose. 114 Scientists consider both of these factors when measur115
ing radiation.
Nuclear energy has several uses. For instance, nuclear power
plants provide twenty percent of the U.S. electrical needs." 6 Although
harnessing nuclear energy has many purposes, in the mid 1980's there
were three focuses of nuclear research and development: developing directed-energy weapons, exploiting space as a theater of war, and creating a third generation of nuclear weapons. 117 Even before the discovery
of nuclear technology, 118 it was clear that once the atom's energy was
harnessed the world would be opened to great risks. 1 9 Since the discovery of nuclear technology, transboundary disputes pervade the industry. 20 Despite the great security nuclear weapons offer for national
2
sovereignty, few states possess them.' '
IV. THE INTERNATIONAL COURT AND IT'S ADVISORY OPINION

A.

InternationalCourt of Justice: General Background
1.

The International Court of Justice

The Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), the precursor
to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) was a product of the 1919
peace settlement. 122 In 1945 the International Court of Justice (ICJ)

114. Id.
115. Id. The unit of measurement for radiation is the rem. Id
116. Id. Nuclear power is second to coal as a source of electricity. Id.
117. NACHT, supra note 68, at 76. President Ronald Reagan emphasized these areas
in his call for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).
118. The artificial fissioning of the uranium atom was discovered by Otto Hahn and
Fritz Strassman in 1938. Reicher, supra note 112.
119. Monica J. Washington, Note, The Practiceof Peer Review in the InternationalNuclear Safety Regime, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV., 430, 430 (1997).
120. Id. But see NACHT, supra note 58, at 57 (discussing the fact that the military
strategy applied to nuclear weapons dates much further back than when the first nuclear
bomb was dropped in 1945 and the essential elements of that strategy can be found in
classics). The work of Sun Tzu from around 500 B.C. establishes that deception is the basis of warfare. Sun Tzu elaborates. The ultimate goal of warfare is victory but warfare
should be a quick as possible to decrease costs. Sun Tzu further discusses the strategy.
Id. at 57-8. Strategy has expanded to include unity of command and emphasizing initiative, concentration of forces, maintaining local superiority and maneuverability, flexibility, and simplicity. Id. at 58.
121. Mandelbaum, supra note 105.
122. J.G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 93 (1984). During the
years of the PCIJ, the Court primarily reflected European values and was a compelling
force in international relations. Id. See also Keith Highet,et al., InternationalCourts and
Tribunals,31 INT'L LAW. 599, 599 (1997);
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succeeded the Permanent Court of Justice. 123 The ICJ has gone through
several crises arising out of a loss of confidence by the international
community in its abilities. 124 To make itself more attractive as a forum
for dispute settlement, the Court revised its rules in 1978.125 The Statute of the Court outlines the rules and regulations of the International
Court of Justice 26 and the processes available to the Court.
The ICJ was designated the principle judiciary body of the United
Nations. 127 Currently, the International Court of Justice is increasingly
involved in dispute resolution. 128 As opposed to its previous role as the
last resort to resolution of disputes, countries often include the ICJ as a
step in normal diplomatic negotiations. 129 The Court has three types of
jurisdiction: 13 0 contentious,' 3' incidental, or advisory. 32 Contentious
jurisdiction is for dispute resolution. Only states may be parties to dis-

123. MERRILLS, supra note 122.
124. Georges Abi-Saab, The InternationalCourt as a World Court, in FIFTY YEARS OF
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 3, 4 (Vaughan Lowe & Malgosia Fitzmaurice,
1996). The first crisis: "the decline of the optional clause," occurred during the late 1940's
into the 1950's as a result of the consistently negative attitude towards the Court by the
Soviet Union and its allies. The USSR refused to submit to the Court's jurisdiction,
whether by acceptance of the optional clause, treaty, or special agreement. Id. The second
crisis was at the start of the 1960's during the move towards decolonization of colonial
territories. After obtaining independence, these former colonies were skeptical of the
Court because it was unfamiliar, complex, and most importantly did not adequately represent their interests. Following this crisis, the Court took inventory and re-adjusted itself to better reflect the changing international community. Id. at 5.
125. Id. at 8-9. The revised Rules incorporated the system of ad hoc Chambers under
Article 17(2). It was the Beagle Channel Case, 15 I.L.M. 634 (1978) in which Chile and
Argentina chose five members of the Court to comprise an arbitral tribunal, that brought
about this change. Following this decision, the Court sought to provide the same opportunity within the Court. The ad hoc chambers allow parties to a dispute to have a temporary member in the ICJ. Id. It was anticipated that the ad hoc capacity would decrease
the stability and continuity of the decisions and increase the risk of non-universality of
judges, (ex: Gulf of Maine) but the ad hoc chambers have not been used frequently. Id. at
10.
126. MERRILLS, supra note 122, at 102-03.
127. Id.; Highet, supra note 122.
128. A new crisis arose in 1986 with the Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27). Some critics claim that, based on this decision, the Western world no longer had confidence in the Court. The fear was that the Court was applying contemporary law with an "anti-Western bias." Abi-Saab, supra note 124, at 6. However, as time passed, the decision in the Nicaraguacases demonstrated the stability and
independence of the Court and thus increased its credibility. Since that time, the Court
has increased its role in dispute settlement. However, it wasn't until 1990 that the Court
allowed itself to be involved in third party intervention. Under Article 62, the Court admitted to intervention in its judgment in the Land, Island, & Maritime Frontier Dispute
(El Salv. v. Hond.) 1990 I.C.J. 92 (Sept. 13). Abi-Saab, supra note 124, at 14.
129. Abi-Saab, supra note 124, at 14.
130. MERRILLS, supra note 122, at 94.
131. Highet, supra note 122.
132. Id.
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putes, 133 with jurisdiction established by consent. 34 Incidental jurisdiction allows the Court, without state consent, to "indicate interim measures of protection, to allow intervention in a case by third parties and to
interpret a previous judgment."' 135 Advisory jurisdiction is the Court's
power to declare advisory opinions at the request of international organizations. 136 Through its preventive methods, the ICJ promotes the
137
UN's goals of peace and security.
2.

The Advisory Jurisdiction of the ICJ

When the Permanent Court was given advisory jurisdiction, 138 it
was a precedent in international law 139 and of uncertain scope.' 40 The
actual Statute of the PCIJ did not provide for advisory jurisdiction in
Article 14.141 After deliberation and attempts to include the provision
in the subsequent versions of Article 14, it was finally included in
1919.142 The PCIJ was very cautious and adopted four articles about the
advisory process. These four articles were a framework for the procedure in advisory cases. The writers were careful to stipulate that the
advisory jurisdiction is an opportunity for parties to settle disputes but

133. MERRILLS, supra note 122, at 94.
134. Id. There are a few ways: 1) Compromissory clause in a treaty before the dispute
arises in multilateral treaties or Subject treaties; 2)by declaration under Article 36(2) of
the Court's Statute, "optional clause" and establishes states' acceptance of jurisdiction on
certain terms and conditions or by special agreement after the dispute has begun. Id. at
94-95. 3) Specialized Agreement. Id. One example of the Court's exercising jurisdiction by
a special agreement is in the Gulf of Maine case. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary
in the Gulf of Maine Area, I.C.J. Reports 1984. Judgment was submitted to the Court and
both sides agreed to comply with the verdict. Canada and the United States wanted jurisdiction over more extensive ocean areas for fishing and the exploration of commercial
offshore oil deposits. Negotiations had broken down a number of times, and strenuous
political opposition in the United States had begun to interfere. "Adjudication in the
Court provided a way for domestic politicians to resolve the controversy with finality in a
way that did not cause political damage to the incumbent American administration or the
U.S. senators who would have had to vote to give their advice and consent to a boundary
settlement treaty." Martin A. Rogoff, International Politics and the Rule of Law: The
United States and the InternationalCourt of Justice, 7 B.U. INT'L L.J. 267, 280-81 (1989).
This special agreement between the U.S. and Canada absolved the Court of any jurisdictional problems that the Court may have had to encounter. The special agreement also
bypassed admissibility requirements and proceeded directly to the merits of the problem.
135. MERRILLS, supranote 122, at 97.
136. Id.
137. Abi-Saab, supranote 124, at 14.
138. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT, art. 14.
139. DHARMA PRATAP, THE ADVISORY JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 1
(1972).
140. Id. at 2.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 2-3. The drafting of the new version of Article 14 was politically motivated.
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the decisions do not bind. 143 The intention of the League of Nations was
to assist the Council and the Assembly in their role, to conciliate and
report on disputes submitted to them, to give authoritative opinions on
144
legal issues, and to respond to request by organizations for opinions.
There were thirteen submissions to the advisory jurisdiction of the ICJ
since the first session in June 1922, and the eleventh session in July
1926. Each submission was admitted whether it was oral or written.' 45
The original version of the provision for the advisory jurisdiction
was written in English. The style of writing implied that the Court had
46
the power to decide which questions it would accept for arbitration.'
It has been determined that "the provision.., provided for giving the
Permanent Court advisory jurisdiction in any dispute or question and
at the same time authorized the Council and the Assembly of the
League of Nations to request an opinion from the Court."' 47 The French
version followed. There was a serious discrepancy between the English
and French versions. While the English text used the word "may", the
French text used the French equivalent of "will give". The French text
would render the advisory jurisdiction as an obligation on the Court.
There would be no element of discretion.' 48 In the decision on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, the ICJ determined that
it was unnecessary to make a pronouncement on the differences be149
tween the English and French versions.
There are certain international and inter-governmental bodies that
have been authorized to request advisory opinions.' 50 Originally, only
two bodies of the League were given the power to request opinions from
the PCIJ.' 5 1 Currently, according to the Charter for the ICJ, only two
principal bodies of the UN are empowered to make this request. There
is a provision in the Charter for other UN bodies and specialized agen15 2
cies to be given authorization as well.

143. Id. at 4.
144. Id. at 5. Since then, there has been a gradual evolution of the advisory procedure.
Id. at 2.
145. Id. at 15.
146. Id. at 4 (indicating that the wording "to hear and determine" allowed for the interpretation that the Court could decide which cases to accept).
147. Id. at 5.
148. Id. at 6. (indicating that the French version was never presented to the Drafting
Committee and therefore changes were not made to make the French version consistent
with the English version).
149. General Assembly, supra note 16, at 819.
150. Id. at 51.
151. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT

152. PRATAP, supra note 139, at 51.
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B. The InternationalCourt of Justiceand It's Advisory Opinion to the
General Assembly
1. Can the ICJ render an Advisory Opinion?
The ICJ rendered an advisory opinion to the U.N. General Assembly on the question: "Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under international law?" The Court performed a
step by step analysis. First, the Court concluded that the General Assembly's request contemplated legal issues. 153 Second, the Court certified that the competence of the General Assembly includes nuclear
weapons. 15 4 The Court concluded that the question had relevance to
several aspects of General Assembly concern "including those relating
to the threat or use of force in international relations, the disarmament
155
process, and the progressive development of international law."
Third, since the competency of the General Assembly was not an issue,
the ICJ could offer an advisory opinion on the legal question presented. 15 6 In paragraph 14 of its' decision, the Court concludes that it
can give an advisory opinion but is not required to pursuant to Article
157
65, paragraph 1 of the ICJ Statute.
Finally, the Court explored whether a "compelling reason" dictated
that a decision not be rendered. 58 The Court acknowledged its role as
the "principal judicial organ of the United Nations" and should not
therefore, in principle, refuse to provide an advisory opinion. 5 9 The
Court articulated the "compelling reason" standard for determining
whether the ICJ should not render an advisory opinion. 60 The Court

153. General Assembly, supra note 16, at 817-18, para. 13. See also Perez, supra note
17, at 429-30.
154. General Assembly, supra note 16, at 817, para. 11. The Court reached this decision by consulting the United Nations Charter articles 10, 11 & 13. See also Perez, supra
note 17, at 429-30.
155. General Assembly, supra note 16, at 817, para. 12.
156. Perez, supranote 17, at 429-30.
157. For a discussion about the difference between whether the Court can or will give
an advisory opinion, see supra note 146 and 149. General Assembly, supra note 16, at
818, para.14.
158. General Assembly, supra note 16, at 818, para. 14 & 15. Perez, supra note 17, at
429-30.
159. General Assembly, supra note 16, at 818, para.14 (construing the United Nations
Charter, art. 92).
160. See e.g., Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the ILO upon Complaints
made against UNESCO, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1956, p. 86; Certain Expenses of
the United Nations, art. 17, para.2 of the Charter, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1962,
p. 155; Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia not withstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J.
Reports 1971, p. 2 7 .
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161
considered the "vague" and "abstract" nature of the original question;
whether the question should be addressed by other U.N. bodies according to express mandate; 162 whether an advisory opinion by the ICJ
would be of practical assistance; whether an advisory opinion would
undermine progress already made or being made on the question presented; 163 and, whether the advisory opinion would be overall contrary
to the interests of the United Nations. 64 The Court concluded that no
"compelling reason" determined that it should not render an advisory
165
opinion.

In the history of the ICJ, the Court has never refused based on its
discretionary power to render an advisory opinion. The PCIJ once declined to render an advisory opinion. The PCIJ declined to advise on
the question because "the question directly concerned an already existing dispute, one of the States parties to which was neither a party to
the Statute of the Permanent Court nor a Member of the League of Nations, objected to the proceedings, and refused to take part in any
66
way."1
2. What Is The Relevant Applicable Law?
Next, the Court determined that the law applicable to the case "is
that relating to the use of force enshrined in the United Nations Charter and the law applicable in armed conflict which regulates the conduct
of hostilities, together with any specific treaties on nuclear weapons
that the Court might determine to be relevant."167 The Court reached
this conclusion by analyzing three issues. First the Court analyzed the
right to life according to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 16 It determined that the right not to be arbitrarily deprived
of one's life applies also in hostilities, such as nuclear war.169 To reach
a determination of an arbitrary deprivation of life, the Court concluded
that it must analyze the "law applicable in armed conflict."' 170 Second,

161.
162.
163.
164.

General Assembly, supra note 16, at 818-19, para. 15.
Id. at 819, para. 18.
Id. at 819, para. 17.
Id. at 819, para.17.

165. Id. at 819, para. 19. The Court voted thirteen votes to one to comply with the request for an advisory opinion. Judge Oda rendered the one vote against. Id. at 831.
166. Id. at 818, para. 14 (discussing Status of Eastern Carelia, P.C.I.J., Series B, No.5).
167. Id. at 821, para. 34.
168. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 6 I.L.M. 368,
art. 6, para. 1 (1967) [hereinafter ICCPR] (guaranteeing the right to life) and art. 4 (indicating that certain provisions may be derogated in times of national emergency).
169. General Assembly, supra note 16, at 820, para. 25.
170. Id. 'Thus whether a particular loss of life, through the use of a certain weapon in
warfare, is to be considered an arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to Article 6 of the
Covenant, can only be decided by reference to the law applicable in armed conflict and not
deduced from the terms of the Covenant itself." id.
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the Court determined that the prohibition against genocide 17 ' applied
172
only when an intent to destroy a particular group existed.
Third, the Court addressed whether certain agreements 173 required
protection for the environment at all times, even during times of war.
The Court acknowledged the pervasive concern for the environment but
concluded the agreement did not intend to restrain the ability of a state
to defend itself.174 The Court determined that the Additional Protocol
I175 provided further protection for the environment from "widespread,
long-term and severe [damage]" and prohibits "methods and means of
warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to cause such damage;" and prohibits "attacks against the natural environment by way of
reprisals."'176 In addition, the Court concluded that the environment
should be considered when implementing the law applicable in armed
conflict. 177 Ultimately the Court concluded, with respect to the environment, that "the existing international law relating to the protection
and safeguarding of the environment does not specifically prohibit the
use of nuclear weapons, it indicates important environmental factors
that are properly to be taken into account in the context of the implementation of the principles and rules of the law applicable in armed
78
conflict."1
3. Unique Characteristics of Nuclear Weapons?
After determining the law applicable in the case, the Court made a
171. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S., art. II (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951) [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
172. General Assembly, supra note 16, at 820, para. 26.
173. The agreements cited for protection of the environment include: Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protocol of Victims
of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), June 8, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1391, art. 35, para. 3
(entered into force Dec. 7, 1978) [hereinafter Additional Protocol I] (prohibiting the employment of "methods or means of warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to
cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment"); the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, May 18, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 88, art. I (prohibiting the use of weapons
which have "widespread, long-lasting or severe effects" on the environment); the Stockholm Declaration of 1972, 11 I.L.M. 1416, principle 21; and the Rio Declaration of 1992,
31 I.L.M. 818, principle 2 (expressing the common conviction of the States concerned with
a duty "to ensure the activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to
the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.").
174. General Assembly, supra note 16, at 821, para. 30. "Respect for the environment
is one of the elements that go to assessing whether an action is in conformity with the
principles of necessity and proportionality."
175. Additional Protocol I, supranote 173, arts. 35, paras. 3, 55.
176. General Assembly, supra note 16, at 821, para. 31.
177. Id. at 821, para. 32 (considering Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed
Conflict, G.A. Res. 47/37, Nov.25, 1992).
178. Id. at 821, para. 33.
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special note to take into account the "unique characteristics of nuclear
weapons."1 79 The Court created a laundry list of the catastrophic capabilities of nuclear weapons including: destruction of civilization, destruction of the planet's ecosystem; negative affects on health, agriculture, natural resources, and demography; damage to future
generations, environment, food and marine ecosystems; cause genetic
defects and illness. 180 In order to render an accurate opinion, the Court
181
indicated that it must take these characteristics into consideration.
4.

82
The Final Verdict'

First, the Court unanimously concluded that "neither customary
nor conventional international law [specifically authorized] the threat
or use of nuclear weapons."' 83 Second, the Court concluded eleven votes
to three that "neither customary nor conventional international law
comprehensive[ly] and universally] prohibit[ed] the threat or use of nuclear weapons as such."' 84 The Court concluded unanimously that:
third, "[a] threat or use of force by means of nuclear weapons that is
contrary to article 2 paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter and
that fails to meet all the requirements of article 51 is unlawful"'185 and
fourth "[a] threat or use of nuclear weapons should also be compatible
with the requirements of the international law applicable in armed conflict, particularly those of the principles and rules of international humanitarian law, as well as with specific obligations under treaties and
other undertakings which expressly deal with nuclear weapons."'186
Fifth the Court concluded seven votes to seven, with the President
casting his vote that:
[iut follows from the above-mentioned requirements that the
threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to
the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and
in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law;
179. Id. at 821-22, para. 35.
180. Id. at 822, para. 35.
181. Id. at 822, para. 36.
182. Highet, supranote 122, at 601.
183. General Assembly, supra note 16, at 831, para. 105, art. (2)(A). See also Richard
A. Falk, Nuclear Weapons, InternationalLaw and the World Court: A Historic Encounter,
91 AM. J. INT'L L. 64, 65 (1997) (citing the Case at para. 98-103). Cf. NACHT, supra note
68, at 118 (indicating that from 1959 to 1974 the United States and Soviet Union created
more than a dozen agreements, some involving other countries; yet there was no significant change in the rapid increase of nuclear weapons around the world). With this situation, it is no wonder that the ICJ cannot make a pronouncement on the legality of nuclear
weapons. Id.
184. General Assembly, supra note 16, at 831, para. 105, art. (2)(B). Judges Shahabuddeen, Weeramantry, and Koroma voted against. Id.
185. Id. at art. (2)(C).
186. Id. at art. (2)(D). The President of the Court, in an unprecedented move, cast the
determining vote.
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[h]owever, in view of the current state of international law, and
of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude
definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would
be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of selfdefense,
in which the very survival of a State would be at
18 7
stake.

Sixth, the Court unanimously determined "[t]here exists an obligation
to pursue in good faith and bring to an conclusion negotiations leading
to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective in188
ternational control."
C. A Relevant ICJ Decision
In 1993, the World Health Organization (W.H.O) requested an advisory opinion from the ICJ. 189 The ICJ made a ground-breaking decision by refusing, for the first time, to issue an advisory opinion. 190 The
W.H.O sought an opinion on the following question: "In view of the
health and environmental effects, would the use of nuclear weapons by
a State in war or other armed conflict be a breach of its obligations under international law including the W.H.O Constitution?"'191 The ICJ
declined to respond to the request, determining that the request was
beyond WHO's competence. 192
The Charter of the United Nations' 93 gave to the W.H.O. the
authority to request advisory opinions from the ICJ. They were limited
to legal questions within the competence of the W.H.O.19 The ICJ
adopted a three part test applicable to requests for an advisory opinion
by a Specialized Agency. First, the Agency must be appropriately empowered according to the U.N. Charter to make that request. Second,
the question at issue in the request must be of a legal nature. Third,
187. Id. at art. (2)(E). Vice-President Schwebel and Judges Oda, Guillaume, Shahabuddeen, Weeramantry, Koroma, Higgens voted against. Id.
188. Id. at art. (2)(F).
189. Legality of the Use By a State of Nuclear Weapons In Armed Conflict, 1993 I.C.J.
467 (Sept. 13) (Request for Advisory Opinion) [hereinafter W.H.O. Request).
190. Maureen Bezuhly, et al, InternationalHealth Law, 31 INT'L LAW. 645, 646 (1996);
Perez, supra note 17, at 426. The ICJ in it's advisory decision to the General Assembly
indicated that:
[t]here has been no refusal, based on the discretionary power of the Court, to
act upon a request for advisory opinion in the history of the present Court; in
the case concerning the Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in
Armed Conflict, the refusal to give the World Health Organization the advisory opinion requested by it was justified by the Court's lack of jurisdiction
in that case.
General Assembly, supra note 16, at 818, para.14.
191. Id. at 468.
192. Id.
193. U.N. CHARTER art. 96, para. 2.
194. U.N. CHARTER art. 96, para. 2.
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the question must pertain to the competence of the Agency making the

request. 195
Refusing to grant jurisdiction, the ICJ determined that the W.H.O.
was requesting an advisory opinion outside the scope of its legal competence. 196 "[T]he ICJ interpreted Article 2 of the W.H.O. Constitution to
give the W.H.O. competence only to 'deal with the effects on health of
the use of nuclear weapons,' and it found that regardless of whether the
use of nuclear weapons was legal, they would have the same consequences on health and the environment."' 197 The Court determined that
the issue presented by the W.H.O represented entirely a legal question
on the use of nuclear weapons 198 and was about their health effects. 199
Pursuant to the Specialized Agency policy, the Court implied that,
therefore, only the General Assembly has the competency to request
00
advisory opinions on these legal questions.2
The dissent argued that the majority of the Court had not understood the question presented by the W.H.O. Judge Shahabudden interpreted the W.H.O's question to ask for an opinion whether the use of
nuclear weapons violated W.H.O's Constitution. 201 Judges Koroma and
Weeramantry found that W.H.O's question did not concern the general
illegality but specifically illegality with regards to W.H.O's activities.
The areas concerned 1) health obligations of the State; 2) environmental
obligations of the State; and 3) obligations imposed on States by the
202
W.H.O Constitution.
V.

DETERMINING THE IMPACT OF THE COURT'S DECISION

"Reaching as far back in history, ranging over as many civilizations
and cultural eras, as it does, international law by its very nature is the
product of change. All law arises from an admixture of social, political,

195. Highet, supra note 122, at 601.
196. John Kim, InternationalInstitutions, 31 INT'L LAW. 671, 674 (1997).
197. Perez, supra note 17, at 426-27 (construing the Agreement between the United
Nations and World Health Organization, G.A. Res. 124(11), U.N. GAOR, 2d. Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/124, art. X, para. 2 (1947) (entered into force July 10, 1948), and the W.H.O.Request at para. 21).
198. Highet, supra note 122, at 602.
199. Bezuhly, supra note 190 (indicating that the Court agreed that the WHO was
authorized to confront the effects on health of the use of nuclear weapons).
200. Perez, supra note 17, at 427 (construing the W.H.O. Request at para. 30 quoting
the Court as saying that "any other conclusion would render virtually meaningless the
notion of a specialized agency") The Court further elaborated on the principle of specialty
by stating that specialized agencies "are invested by the States which create them with
powers, the limits of which are a function of the common interests whose promotion those
States entrust to them." W.H.O. Request at para. 25.
201. Bezuhly, supranote 190.
202. Id.
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203

Sovereignty and nonintervention principles 20 4 change based on
global circumstances. 20 5 Three points in history exist when intervention
was viewed as relatively acceptable: first, the period immediately following the Napoleonic Wars; second, the middle of the nineteenth century; and third, at the close of the nineteenth century. 20 6 In between
these three points, the permissibility of intervention declined, in 1640,
1880, and at the beginning of the twentieth century. 20 7 Then in the
20 8
mid-1960s, the world began to reconsider the legality of intervention.
These periods in time indicate that "system-transforming wars" 20 9 influence the favorably of intervention.
Currently the world is experiencing a change in the dynamics of international relations and the principle of sovereignty; intervention principles depend on the current global circumstances and the definition of
sovereignty. 210 Two factors influenced this change: the end of the Cold
War 2 11 and the change in the nature of conflicts. 212 Today sovereignty
continues to change based on economic interdependence, technological
advances, communication and transportation advances, the power and
range of modern weapons, and the universal threat of nuclear weapons.

213

During the Cold War, the international paradigm differed considerably compared to today. The influence of the superpowers created an
emphasis on deterrence with nuclear weapons. 214 The sovereign of a
215
state sought to increase the ability of the nation-state to win wars.

203. HENRY L. BRETTON, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE NUCLEAR AGE 160-61

(1986).
204. The traditional view is that "sovereignty and nonintervention are part and parcel
of the same 'doctrinal mechanism to express the outer limits of permissible influence that
one state may properly exert upon another."' Charles W. Kegley, Jr., et al, The Rise and
Fall of the Nonintervention Norm: Some Correlates and Potential Consequences, 22
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 81, 82 (1998).

205. Id.
206. Id. at 84.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 84-85 (indicating that "the largest inflection points in this time series appear in the wake of major periods of global instability suggesting that discontinuities have
been precipitated by changes in levels of interstate aggression in the world."). Id. at 85.
210. Id. at 84-85.
211. For a discussion, see infra notes 77-1012 and accompanying text.
212. Robert C. Loehr & Eric M. Wong, The U.N. and HumanitarianAssistance: Ambassador Jan Eliasson, J. INT'L AFF., Winter, 1995, at 491 (indicating that conflicts have
changed in that they "are now concentrated in the realm of civil war and internal conflict.").
213. Bretton, supranote 203, at 165.
214. Jim Falk, War and Peace Studies: Towards a Peace Paradigm, in THE PACIFIC:
PEACE, SECURITY & THE NUCLEAR ISSUE 205, 207 (1988).

215. Id. at 207.
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The global approach treated nation-states as single actors, not as part
2 6
of a functioning whole. 1
Since the end of the Cold War the lack of a bipolar world decreases
the need for nuclear weapons competition. The global community.is
opening its eyes to global human rights, environmental concerns, and
economic issues. In response, nation-states recognize the need to cooperate to address these issues. To achieve this end, an independent body
must facilitate this process by identifying the concerns, the goals, and
the means.
Amomg other things, the lack of a competent system for implementation of international nuclear safety standards leads to faulty international regulation of nuclear weapons. 217 Nation-states cooperated to establish a peer review process to promote domestic implementation of
internationally recognized nuclear safety standards. The peer review
process evaluates the conditions and safety procedures of a nationstate's nuclear power plants. 218 This system is not self enforcing and the
control of violent conflicts resides with the nation-state rather than international institutions. 21 9 Without militia provided by the nationstates, the international institutions are close to powerless to respond to
violent conflicts. 220 Second, the reluctance of nation-states to relinquish
control of standards to an international body maintains the continuing
belief that such decisions should be determined by the national gov221
ernment.
The ICJ, in its advisory opinion to the General Assembly, should
have taken control of the global issue of nuclear weapons. The responsibility of the ICJ is to identify the needs of and concerns of the international community in order to create an international standard. The
Court needs to take a position on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons when a state existence is at stake.
Too many pleas for consistency or against inevitable selectivity
amount to arguing that the United Nations should not intervene anywhere unless it can intervene everywhere... But in
light of genocide, misery , and massive human rights abuses in
war zones around the world, should Pontius Pilate be the model
216. Id. at 208.
217. Washington, supra note 119, at 440.
218. Id. at 430. Nuclear safety has two different forms of peer review. The first involves "the technical, on-site review of nuclear installations by nuclear plant operators.
This method is most frequently used by the International Atomic Energy Agency, the
World Association of Nuclear Operators, and the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations.
The second peer review process monitors state compliance with the provisions of the Convention on Nuclear Safety." Id. at 431.
219. Attanasio, supra note 2.
220. Id. However, international institutions have control over capital which has a
great influence on the nation state. Id. at 26.
221. Washington, supra note 119, at 441.
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for both American and the international response? The fatalism
and isolationism that flow from most objections to humanitarian
intervention are as distressing as the situation in the countries
suffering from ethnic conflict where such an action is required... A purely non interventionist position amounts to abstention from the foreign policy debate. 222
In order to be fair to the international populace and to be a credible
international judicial institution, 223 the ICJ needs to opine. 224
The ICJ determined that ultimately it could not conclude whether
the threat or use of nuclear weapons was illegal under circumstances
when the safety of a state is at stake. The Court fails to realize that
neutrality is a false ideal. 225 The Court's inability to reach a decision
really says a great deal. The Court used neutrality to promote the advancement of the international community's goal towards the obliteration of nuclear weapons. 226 Neutrality is usually applied to the political
ideals of a state. 227 If a state wants to remain autonomous instrumental neutrality is not the way, the state must "promote the autonomous
way of life non-neutrality by guaranteeing that certain valuable options
are made available to its citizens." 228 This analysis should be applied to
the ICJ's neutral position.
Often it is argued that either a state can chose one of two options:
neutrality among conflicting ideals or coercive imposition of its position
on those that do not agree. 229 In this instance, an institution without
enforcement power, like the ICJ, might opt for neutrality and thereby
acknowledge its impotence. However, coercion is not the only means to
solidify power. 230 "[P]romotion of moral ideals can be highly controver-

222. Anne Orford, Locating the International:Military and Monetary Interventions After the Cold War, 38 HARV. INT'L L.J. 443, 448 (1997).
223. See supra notes 217-221 and accompanying text, discussing the role of international judicial institutions.
224. It is suggested that a lack of international law and international engagement
were contributing factors in the crisis in Yugoslavia. Orford, supra note 222, at 444.
225. Cf. Stephen A. Gardbaum, Why the Liberal State Can Promote Moral Ideals After
All, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1350, 1352 (1991).
226. Id. at 1354 (indicating that non-neutral defenses of neutrality is when "the state
seeks to promote a particular way of life by means of its neutrality: This may be termed
instrumentality or weak neutrality, or neutrality as a means.').
227. Id. (construing Joseph Raz).
228. Id. (construing Joseph Raz).
229. Id. at 1364. The argument is construed: "1) the ends of political power must be
justified to those subject to it, and coercion is the opposite of such justification; 2) promotion of a moral ideal is necessarily coercive; 3) therefore neutrality is the only reasonable
response to the fact of pluralism." Id. at 1366.
230. Id. at 1367 (indicating that not every act by a state to promote an ideal needs to
be coercive).
The state can promote or foster a particular way of life in a number of noncoercive ways. For example, the establishment clause's prohibition against
state promotion of religious ways of life is not limited to coercive means of
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sial and, in certain cases, can threaten the basic structure of political
association." 23 ' The abolition of slavery in the United States is an example. 232 The ICJ would increase its role in the international community as a guarantee for redress of wrongs if it takes a stand as "a strong
233
force in place with the means and mandate to thwart."
The Court's decision was not actually neutral. 234 The Court's decision seems very narrow. 235 However, this narrowness misleads because
three out of the six judges did not support the majority simply because
the majority decision did not conclude that existing international law
banned the threat or use of nuclear weapons. "[Tihe absence of a clear
majority reflects the Court's failure fully to resolve the legal status of
nuclear weapons." 236 To reach its decision, the Court considered certain
areas of international law: human rights and genocide, and environmental law. 237 The implication of the Court's "neutrality" on these
global issues is detrimental.
A.

The Case and Environmental Law

With rapid population growth across the globe, the impact that
humans have on the earth increases significantly. 238 Since environmental degradation continous at a remarkable pace, individual nations
can no longer act alone and expect to improve environmental quality. 239

promotion. Thus, such noncoercive ways of promoting religion as tax breaks
and financial aid for parochial schools and placing a creche in a courthouse
have been found unconstitutional.
Id.
231. Id. at 1369 (discussing promotion of ideals by states). I believe it is applicable to
the International Court of Justice as well.
232. Id. at 1369.
233. Orford, supra note 222, at 450 (construing Fernando Teson).
234. Several of the resolutions were adopted with a number of negative votes. With
these negative votes, the ICJ decision is arguably not opinio juris.
235. Highet, supra note 122, at 601.
236. Falk, supranote 183, at 64.
237. Timothy J .Herverin, Case Comment, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons: Environmental and HumanitarianLimits on Self Defense, 72 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1277, 1278 (1997).
238. Futrell, supra note 12 (indicating that "[niew technologies.., have allowed us to
dig deeper, cut faster, and reroute large quantities of water."). De La Madrid H., supra
note 1, at 560 (indicating that the rapid deterioration of the planet and it's natural resources has severe implications for sustainable development as the human population
continues to grow rapidly).
239. Futrell, supra note 12. See also Marcia L. Goldstein, et al., Current Issues in
Bankruptcy and Environmental Law, 474 PLIILit 651, 675 (1993).
The public's concern with the presence of hazardous and toxic waste sites
that endanger the environment and public health has prompted the federal
and numerous state governments to enact a variety of environmental protection legislation. Increasingly, the significant costs of complying with these
regulations are forcing industrial polluters to seek protection under title 11
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Sovereignty will have to be second to the quest to ameliorate environNations
mental problems and create treaties in that direction. 240
should be concerned about the environment not only because it causes
threats to human health and ecosystems in the their nation, 241 but
there are more global concerns that result.242 Instead, nations tend to
hide behind a the cloak of sovereignty and keep their environmental
243
concerns from the rest of the world.
Before 1972, only a few international agreements existed addressing resources shared across borders, such as water or wildlife; setting
liability rules for oil spills; or regulating fisheries and whaling. These
agreements barely influenced nation-states' sovereignty. In 1972, at
the time of the UN-sponsored Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, the global community acknowledged that the nature of the
global environmental problem differed from that of trade and traditional international law. The international community concluded that
244
this required a new approach.
The world recognizes the threat to the environment of nuclear
weapons and nuclear weapons making. 245 The Chernobyl accident in
of the United States Code.... As the federal Environmental Protection
Agency (the "EPA") and various state agencies have sought to enforce environmental protection legislation within these bankruptcy cases, the conflict
between the Bankruptcy Code and federal and state environmental statutes
has become apparent.
Id. Examples of federal environmental statutes are the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C.§§ 9601-57 (1982)
("CERCLA") and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 690187 (1983 & Supp. 1985) ('RCRA").
240. Moomaw, supra note 3, at 8 (concluding that "[miost importantly, national
boundaries are porous to pollution or global environmental degradation, and no amount of
military force or economic power can fully insulate a country from their consequences.
Environmental diplomacy and the negotiation process to create treaty and soft-law regimes often differ from traditional diplomatic practices. International and global environmental problems promote alliances that are often quite different from those formed to
address traditional diplomatic issues. International environmental treaties often commi
[sic] nations to an ongoing process instead of, or in addition to, the achievement of specific
treaty goals. Environmental problems can be classified into four useful categories to
analyze the implications for diplomacy and national sovereignty: 1) domestic, internal issues, 2) common concern assets, 3) transboundary movements of resources, pollution and
migratory species, and 4) global and commons issues.").
241. Futrell, supra note 12 (indicating that the positive side effect of the trouble with
the environment for the United States is that it creates more jobs for environmental engineers and experts in the field).
242. For example, the environmental degradations in the United States have repercussions in other countries. Futrell, supra note 12. As resources across the world decrease in availability, global competition has risen for those scarce resources left. This
could possibly lead to war. Id. Current environmental problems will create bigger problems for future generations. Id.
243. Moomaw, supranote 3, at 14-15.
244. Id. at 8.
245. Kenneth J. Garcia, The Towns the Bomb Built/War Threat Eases-Economic Fall-
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April 1986 helped t open the eyes of the world to the horrors of a nuclear accident. 246 After the Chernobyl incident, some countries even
abandoned plans to develop new nuclear power plants. 247 The international community knows of the dangers of diverting nuclear materials
for the use of nuclear weapons and established international nuclear
248
safeguards to monitor and halt the diversion of nuclear materials.
The ICJ advisory opinion and wide sentiment indicate, that the effects
of a nuclear war would devastate the natural environment. 249 The
every day effect of nuclear testing and nuclear weapons manufacturing
receives less acknowledment. 250 But these threats continue to grow as
nuclear weapons exist.
The Court identified several environmental norms and rules that
address these threats. 251 The Court acknowledged the importance of a
sound environment for the quality of life and health of those born and
unborn; yet, the Court indicated that despite these concerns the norms
established by treaties do not place obligations of total restraint on
countries. 252 The Court concluded "there was no general prohibition on
the threat or use of nuclear weapons." 25 3 In its analysis of the human
right to life, the Court indicated that the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and the Charter of the United Nations, which
uphold this right, apply during times of peace and war. However, the
Court did not consider the International Covenant on Economic, Cultural and Social Rights which guarantee the right to health, 254 among

out Begins, S.F. CHRON., April 11, 1995, at Al.
246. Washington, supra note 119, at 432 (indicating that "under ordinary operating
conditions only negligible amounts of radioactive materials escape from a reactor, more
dangerous quantities of these materials can enter the atmosphere due to accidents or to
the inadequate disposal of nuclear waste").
247. LKSHMAN D. GURUSWAMY, ET AL, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
WORLD ORDER 539 (1994).
248. Washington, supra note 119, at 432 (indicating that the danger of nuclear weapons has been confronted by the international community for some time and the international community is just starting to take steps towards preventing damages by peaceful
uses of nuclear energy). "[N]uclear weapons proliferation is not likely to be halted until
there is a total renunciation of nuclear power for whatever purpose, on the part of the nuclear weapons States especially...." GURUSWAMY, supra note 247.
249. GURUSWAMY, supranote 247, at 985.
250. Id. The damage to the environment is caused by above ground and underground
testing which release radioactive gases into the air and risk contaminating ground water.
Nuclear wastes have long term environmental effects as well.
251. "[T]he Court cited Additional Protocol I of 1977 to the Geneva Convention of 1949
(Protocol I), the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of
Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD), Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration
(RIO 2), and Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration (Stockholm 21)."
252. Herverin, supra note 237, at 1279.
253. Kim, supra note 196, at 674.
254. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1996, 6
I.L.M. 360, art. 12 (1967) [hereinafter ICESC].
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other rights, 255 which nuclear weapons and the externalities thereof
derogate. Nuclear contamination and fall-out impact the human right
256
to health.
Since the ICJ refused to declare the outright illegality of nuclear
weapons no matter the circumstances, it subordinates 1) the long term
survival of our planet (in essence the security of each sovereign nation),
2) the rights encompassed in the ICCPR and the ICESCR, and 3) the
purpose of the United Nations as embodied in the United Nations Charter to the sovereignty concerns of military security of each nation.
B.

The Case and Human Rights

The international community has become more sensitive to global
human rights. 257 The number of international institutions providing for
the safeguard of human rights has increased. 258 Sovereignty and the
principles of nonintervention may excuse countries that violate international human rights laws. 259 However, the international unveiling of
violations of human rights (especially genocide) 260 has greatly reduced
the nation-state's ability to claim, in the name of sovereignty, immunity
from international accountability for domestic actions upon their own
citizens. 26 1 In fact, the majority of threats to human rights occurs at the
262
state or local level.
It is argued that states should take collective action in favor of supporting human rights, even if that action may cause some controversy;
instead of remaining inactive and thus incapable of providing assistance to combat brutality or towards achieving democracy. 263 If older
notions of nation-state sovereignty and non intervention are abandoned
in favor of a more globalist perspective, the international community
264
will be better enabled to aid peoples in need of assistance.

255. Consider also the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific process. Id. at art.
15(1)(b).
256. ICCPR, supra note 168.
257. D'Amato, supra note 29, at 47 (indicating that the "breakthrough events for human rights were the Nuremberg trials following the Second World War (establishing that
genocide was a war crime) and the Genocide Convention of 1948 (establishing genocide as
a crime under international law whether committed in time of war or peace)." Id. De La
Madrid H., supra note 1, at 556 (indicating that the United Nations has postponed economic and social concerns in favor of focusing on peace and international safety).
258. De La Madrid H., supra note 1, at 558.
259. BRETTON, supra note 31.
260. D'Amato, supra note 29, at 47 (quoting Louis Henkin as describing that the list
has expanded beyond genocide to include apartheid, slavery, extra-judicial killing or disappearances, torture, and inhuman treatment).
261. Id.
262. Orford, supra note 222, at 449 (construing Fernando Teson).
263. Orford, supranote 222 (construing Fernando Teson).
264. Orford, supranote 222, at 450 (construing Fernando Teson).
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Nuclear deterrence centers on the idea "that there are certain interests that, if threatened, justify the incineration of hundreds of millions of innocents." 265 Some critics point out that there is a "numbed acceptance" of the moral aspect of the nuclear weapons dilemma. 266 The
ICJ seems to have accepted this numbness by enlisting its neutrality on
the ultimate decision of the legality of nuclear weapons overall.
The Court approached its human rights analysis in two ways.
First, the Court discussed the right to life and second, the Court discussed genocide. When applied to nuclear weapons, the Court determined that human rights norms about the right to life267 must be analyzed under the law of armed conflict. 268 The Court further concluded
that international genocide norms would prohibit the use of nuclear
269
weapons if there was an identifiable intent to destroy human groups.
The Court concluded that with the use of nuclear weapons no such
clearly identifiable intent existed. Overall, the Court reached the decision "there was no general prohibition on the threat or use of nuclear
270
weapons."
The Court determined that it could not reach a conclusion whether
the use or threat of nuclear weapons would be unlawful in the instance
271
of self-defense when a State's existence was at issue.
C.

Economics

The impact of nuclear weapons on human rights and the environment are greatly affected by the economics of a sovereign state because
there is a close link between the economic development of a country and
its military capabilities and strategy. 272 The amount of money spent on
nuclear weapons in one country directly implicates that money as not
being spent for other internal, humanitarian objectives. 273 "There [is]
no need to manufacture new atomic bombs without letup and to appropriate twelve billion dollars for defense in a year in which no military
threat [is] to be expected for the nearest future."274 For example a
265. Richard Tanter, Preconditionsfor De-linking Australia from the Nuclear System,
in THE PACIFIC: PEACE, SECURITY AND THE NUCLEAR ISSUE 141, 148 (Ranginui Walker &

William Sutherland eds., 1988).
266. Id. (indicating that "[alt the heart of the argument is the belief that 1939 will
come again, and only the threat of nuclear annihilation will stop a Hitler.").
267. that "[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life," ICCPR, supranote 168.
268. Herverin, supra note 237, at 1278.
269. Id.
270. Kim, supra note 196.
271. Highet, supra note 122, at 601.
272. Kinhide Mushakoji, Preface, in THE PACIFIC: PEACE, SECURITY AND THE NUCLEAR
ISSUE (Ranginui Walker & William Sutherland eds., 1988).
273. For a international statistical comparison, see supra note 59.
274. ALBERT EINSTEIN, OUT OF MY LATER YEARS: THE SCIENTIST, PHILOSOPHER AND
MAN PORTRAYED THROUGH HIS OWN WORDS 139 (1956).
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study found that American people are concerned with the deficit and
unnecessary government spending; yet, despite the end of the Cold War
and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. currently spends at least
$33 billion a year on nuclear weapons and weapons related activities
about 13 percent of all military spending. 275 Since World War II, nuclear weapons technology has consumed approximately one third of all
U.S. defense spending. 276 This is a result of a lack of strong and consistent Congressional oversight, skewed intelligence estimates, pervasive
277
secrecy, partisan politics and interservice rivalries.
The central challenge to achieving international cooperation is
global economic liberalization. 278 "Compared to the international market, the national market is identified as something that is 'ours,' 'in
here,' and, in that sense, 'private,' and part of our 'national sovereignty.'
In contrast, compared to the national market, the international market
associates with something that is 'theirs,' 'out there,' and, in that sense,
'public,' and a possible intrusion on and menace to our 'national sover-

275. An Ongoing study by the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Cost Study Project, Atomic
Audit: What the U.S. Nuclear Arsenal Really Cost (visited Mar. 5, 1998)
<http://www.brook.edu/PA/PRESSREUISCHWARTZ.HTM>.
Compare this spending to spending on other government programs for the elderly or disabled.
A comparison of Medicare and Medicaid as a function of U.S. Budget
(compared to Unemployment and Compensation)
Health Coverage

1962
$ amt*/% of GDP

1978
$ amt*/ % of GDP

1997
$amt*/ % of GDP

Medicare

$ 0.1/less than 0.05%

$10.7/

$95.6 /1.2%

Medicaid

$0 /0%

$24.3 /1.1%

$207.9 / 2.6%

$3.5 /0.6%

$10.8 /0.5%

$20.6 /0.3%

Unemployment
pensation

0.5%

& Com-

* The amount of money allocated to these programs is in the billions of dollars.
The information obtained for this chart was provided by the Congressional Budget Office
in the Table E-12: Outlays for Entitlements & the Mandatory Spending, Fiscal Years
1962-1997
(as
a
percentage
of
GDP)
(visited
Mar.
3,
1998)
<http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index+319&sequence=O&from=7#e-12> and Table E-13
Outlays for Entitlements and Other Mandatory Spending, Fiscal Years 1962-1997 (in billions of dollars)(visited Mar. 5, 1998)
<http:www.cbo. gov/showdoc.cfm?index+319&sequence=O&from=7#e- 13>.
276. An Ongoing study by the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Cost Study Project, Atomic
Audit: What the U.S. Nuclear Arsenal Really Cost (visited Mar. 5, 1998)
<http://www.brook.edu/PA/PRESSRELJSCHWARTZ.HTM>.
277. Id.
278. Globalization has increased the amount of regional institutions for economic, political, juridical, and social integration. De La Madrid H., supra note 1. These regional
institutions include the European Union, the North American Free Trade Agreement, the
Forum of the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation, and the South American Common
Market. Id. at 555-56. There has been a similar movement on an even grander international scale. The more universal institutions include: the International Monetary Fund,
the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization. Id. at 556.
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eignty.' 27 9 Globalization combines the "old liberal belief in economic interdependence with new technological developments that have intensified the pace of economic interdependence. Globalization shares with
the liberal faith in economic interdependence the goal of eroding state
sovereignty to build connections and interests between people of the
world." 280 "The problem is that economics is still an evolving science.
The possibility of a second Great Depression, this time in a world with
28
nuclear weapons, is simply unacceptable." '
VI. CONCLUSION
Countries have been moving towards disarmament and denuclearization as part of the nation-states' search for a national identity consistent with development and peace. 28 2 Since, the ICJ considered itself
able to address several aspects of the nuclear weapons legality debate;
does it make sense that it could not render the ultimate decision of total
legality of nuclear weapons when the survival of a nation-state is at
stake? The ICJ identified the role of the ICCPR and United Nations
Charter in times of peace and war (leaving out the ICESCR);283 yet
failed to consider the binding Covenants in its final analysis, considering only the law of armed conflict. Surely, if the Court considered these
documents, it would have found itself capable to render an ultimate decision. By not making a determination as to the legality of the threat or
use of nuclear weapons when the survival of a state is at stake, the
Court impliedly admits to its doubt of the effectiveness of its determinations and ultimately of international law in general. For if the Court
was certain that by declaring nuclear weapons completely illegal, that
all states would comply; there would be no reluctance to indicate that
28 4
there is no use of nuclear weapons.
Cyclically, if the ICJ does not make conclusive opinions it diminishes the stability of globalization and in turn a decrease in globaliza-

279. Cao, supra note 5, at 211.
280. Fidler, supra note 36.
281. Theodore P. Seto, Drafting a Federal Balanced Budget Amendment That Does
What It Is Supposed To Do (and No More), 106 YALE L.J. 1449, 1536 (1997).
282. Mushakoji, supra note 272, at xi.
283. It is interesting to note that despite the list of terrible results of nuclear war,
many of which include health risks, the ICJ declined to render an opinion on the WHO's
request for an advisory opinion.
284. In the Dissenting Opinion of Vice President Schwebel, he identifies this thought.
[Als long as what are sometimes styled as 'rogue States' menace the world
(whether they are or are not parties to the NPT), it would be imprudent to
set policy on the basis that the threat or use of nuclear weapons is unlawful
'in any circumstance'. Indeed, it may not only be rogue States but criminals
or fanatics whose threats or acts of terrorism conceivably may require a nuclear deterrent or response.
General Assembly, supra note 16, at 836.
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tion decreases the support for the ICJ. Military technology is constantly
changing. 28 5 The principle of sovereignty constantly changes. 28 6 Global
threats grow and the world recognizes the increasing need to act as a
community. The ICJ should accept this change, and infact advocate
change to improve the global community and environment. "In a world
whose only constant is change and a perpetual realignment of forces
based on response to change, failure to accept the view that nationstates are not like pieces on a chessboard 'with specified roles, set objectives and fixed configurations' seems imprudent."28 7 Although acknowledging the international standard to take measures toward the ultimate extinction of the nuclear weapon, the ICJ failed to take the
strongest step of all, declaring the weapons illegal.

285. NACHT, supra note 68, at 57.
286. It is interesting to note, as Judge Weermantry did in his dissent that the United
Nations Charter was written before the bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. The concepts
articulated in the Charter considered the scourges of war, but not to the extent of the nuclear weapon. This may have a bearing on the interpretation of the nonintervention and
sovereignty principles.
287. Jim Anthony, Introduction, in THE PACIFIC: PEACE, SECURITY AND THE NUCLEAR
ISSUE xvii (Ranginui Walker & William Sutherland eds., 1988).

Maritime Delimitation and Territorial
Questions Between Qatar and Bahrain
Marla C. Reichel
"IT]here is no State so powerful that it may not some time need the
help of others outside itself, either for purposes of trade, or even to
ward off the forces of many foreign nations united against it... [E]ven
the most powerful peoples and sovereigns seek alliances, which are
quite devoid of significance according to the point of view of those who
confine law within the boundaries of States. Most true is the saying
that, all things are uncertain the moment [one] depart[s] from the law."
Hugo Grotius in 1625, Founding Father of International Law
I. INTRODUCTION
The Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between Qatar and Bahrain' poses two main issues to the International Court of Justice: those of admissibility and jurisdiction. Initially, the Court has to decide whether Qatar followed proper procedure
by unilaterally admitting the dispute for adjudication. Did Qatar properly seise the tribunal when it, alone, submitted an application to the
Court's registry? Seisin is the procedural means a State uses to bring
its case before the international tribunal, and it is the act of the Applicant which seises the Court. 2 Qatar and Bahrain argue here over the
proper method of seisin. Qatar assumes the position that unilateral
3
seisin is proper; one party acting alone may bring the entire dispute.
On the other hand, Bahrain argues the Parties must jointly seise the
tribunal. 4 Thus, the Court must determine whether Qatar's unilateral
application adequately brought the dispute before it. Bahrain, arguing
joint seisin, maintains the position that the Parties must seise the
Court by Special Agreement. This method of seisin enables the Parties,

1. Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between Qatar
and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), 1995 I.C.J. 6, 18 (Judgment of February 15) [hereinafter
referred to in text as Case Concerning MaritimeDelimitation].
2. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nic. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 238 (June 27).
3. Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation (Qatar v. Bahrain), 1995 I.C.J. 6, 18
(Judgment of February 15).
4. Id.
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by dual consent, to confer an adjudicatory role upon the Court. 5 Therefore, the Court must determine whether Qatar's unilateral application
adequately brought the dispute before it or whether the Parties had to
jointly seise the tribunal.
In addition to deciding the correct procedural method of seisin, the
Court must decide whether it has jurisdiction over the actual territorial
dispute. Jurisdiction presents special problems for the Court because
its Parties are sovereign states. Only States may invoke the Court's jurisdiction. Indeed, it is implicit in the notion of sovereignty that States
6
may not be subjected to the Court's jurisdiction without their consent.
In the case at hand, Qatar accepts jurisdiction. Bahrain, however, contends jurisdiction over the maritime territorial dispute.7 Bahrain asserts Qatar never properly seised the Court, and alternatively, even if it
had properly seised the Court, then it does not have jurisdiction because Bahrain, as a sovereign, did not consent.8 In response, the Court
asserts another means of invoking jurisdiction, the notion that States
may compulsorily accept jurisdiction through a treaty's provisions. 9 In
the Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation Bahrain argues a treaty
never existed, forcing the Court to determine whether there was a
binding international agreement sufficient to subject Qatar and Bahrain to its jurisdiction. If the Court finds for a binding agreement it
may enforce the provision referring disputes to it, known as a compromissory clause, to bring the case within its jurisdiction.10 In summary, two major issues face the Court in the Case Concerning Maritime
Delimitation: the proper method of seisin and the Court's ability to invoke jurisdiction in order to adjudicate the territorial dispute. This article considers these issues, as well as possible impacts of the Court's
decision and its ability to entertain future disputes.
II.

THE PRINCIPLES OF SEISIN OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE: THE NOTION OF A UNILATERAL APPLICATION

A. Origins of Seisin In The Qatari-BahrainiDispute: The Qatari
Application
In July of 1991, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the State of
Qatar filed an Application in the Court's Registry to institute proceed-

5. Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation in Area Between Greenland and Jan
Mayen, (Den. V. Nor.), 1993 I.C.J. 38, 112 (June 14).
6. Richard E. Levy, InternationalLaw and the Chernobyl Accident: Reflections on an
Important but Imperfect System, 36 KAN. L. REV. 81, 110 (1987).
7. Qatar v. Bahrain, 1995 I.C.J. 6, 8.
8. Id. at 9.
9. Levy, supranote 6, at 110.
10. Id. at 108.
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ings against the State of Bahrain." The Application referred to the
Court disputes between the two States regarding sovereignty over the
Hawar Islands, sovereign rights over the shoals of Dibal and Qi'tat
12
Jaradah and delimitation of the maritime areas of Qatar and Bahrain.
The Qatari Application founded jurisdiction upon letters exchanged between the two Parties in December 1987, and on the December 1990,
Doha Minute agreements that resulted from meetings between the
States.1 3 In a previous judgment the Court determined the letters between the King of Saudi Arabia and the Amir of Qatar, in addition to
the Doha Minutes signed by the respective Ministers for Foreign Affairs, were international agreements that conferred jurisdiction upon
the tribunal. 14 What came to be known as the "Bahraini formula" circumscribed the Court's jurisdiction, defining its subject matter and
scope.15 The "Bahraini formula" stated: "The Parties request the Court
to decide any matter of territorial right or other title or interest which
may be a matter of difference between them; and to draw a single maritime boundary between their respective maritime areas of seabed, subsoil and superjacent waters." 16 Bahrain proposed this formula to Qatar
in December 1988, and in turn Qatar accepted in December 1990. In
the 1995 judgment, analyzed here, the Court bases its jurisdiction on
the "Bahraini formula," yet the main issues are not jurisdictional content but rather the validity of Qatar's unilateral application to seise the
tribunal and whether this action adequately conferred jurisdiction to
entertain the dispute.
Pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Court,
States party to the statute may bring a case before the Court by a written application addressed to the Registrar. 17 In addition to the Statute,
11. Qatar v. Bahrain, 1995 I.C.J. 6.
12. Id. at 8.
13. Qatar v. Bahrain, 1995 I.C.J. 6. The King of Saudi Arabia sent the Amirs of
Qatar and Bahrain letters dated December 19, 1987, in which he put forward new proposals. These proposals included four points: 1) All disputed matters shall be referred to
the International Court of Justice for a final ruling, binding on both parties; 2) maintenance of status quo; 3) formation of a tripartite committee for the purpose of approaching
the Court; and 4) the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will continue its good offices to guarantee
implementation of these terms. The Heads of State of Qatar and Bahrain accepted these
proposals in letters dated 21 and 26 December, 1987. Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), 1994
I.C.J. 112, 116-17 (Judgment of July 1994).
14. Qatar v. Bahrain, 1994 I.C.J. 112, 122.
15. Qatar v. Bahrain, 1995 I.C.J. 6, 9. See Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation
and Territorial Questions Between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), 1994 I.C.J. 112
(Judgment of July 1994), for more detail regarding the letters of December 1987, the Doha
Minutes of December 1990 and the "Bahraini formula."
16. Qatar v. Bahrain, 1994 I.C.J. 112, 118.
17. The Statute provides that, "Cases are brought before the Court, as the case may
be, either by the notification of the special agreement or by a written application addressed to the Registrar. In either case the subject of the dispute and the parties shall be
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the Rules of the Court provide for the initiation of proceedings. In conjunction with Article 40 of the Statute, a State may institute proceedings by means of a unilateral application in accordance with Article
38(1) of the Rules of the Court.' 8 Qatar invoked these provisions to
seise the Court and to commence proceedings against Bahrain regarding maritime delimitation and territorial disputes. Bahrain, in turn,
contested jurisdiction on the basis of Qatar's unilateral application, arguing that the Parties had to jointly seise the Court. 19 Seisin is a procedural step, independent of the basis of jurisdiction invoked, and is
governed by the Statute and Rules of the Court. 20 Bahrain contended
that without mutual seisin the Court lacked jurisdiction over the dispute. 2 1 Mutual, or joint seisin, is the notion that a complementary
agreement is a legal prerequisite for seisin of the Court. 22 In its prior
judgment of July 1, 1994, the Court found the unilateral application of
Bahrain was admissible and afforded to the Parties an opportunity to
submit the whole of the dispute. 23 However, the tribunal did not determine the link between unilateral seisin 24 and jurisdiction in the former judgment.
As noted, Qatar's unilateral application premised jurisdiction upon
two agreements between the Parties concluded in December 1987 and
December 1990. The Court found the letters and Minutes constituted
binding international agreements, 25 bringing the Parties within the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. One form of compulsory jurisdiction occurs when States agree to refer certain legal disputes to the
Court, and the Court may then exercise its jurisdiction on this basis. 26
This type of jurisdiction, treaty-based compulsory jurisdiction, obligates
a State to accept the Court's jurisdiction over a legal dispute the State
expressed in a treaty in force. 27 Article 36(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice references this form of compulsory jurisdicindicated." STATUTE OF THE COURT, art. 40, para. 1.
18. "When proceedings before the Court are instituted by means of an application addressed as specified in Article 40, paragraph 1, of the Statute, the application shall indicate the party making it, the State against which the claim is brought, and the subject of
the dispute." RULES OF THE COURT, art. 38, para. 1.
19. Qatar v. Bahrain, 1995 I.C.J. 6, 8.
20. Id. at 23.
21. Id. at 8.
22. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turk.), 1978 I.C.J. 3, 40 (December
19).
23. See Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between
Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), 1994 I.C.J. 112.
24. Whereas mutual seisin is the idea that both parties to the dispute must agree to
seise the Court, unilateral seisin is the notion that one party, acting alone, may seise the
tribunal. See Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turk.), 1978 I.C.J. 3, 40.
25. Qatar v. Bahrain, 1994 I.C.J. 112, 126.
26. STANIMIR A. ALEXANDROV, RESERVATIONS IN UNILATERAL
ACCEPTING THE COMPULSORY JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 4, 6 (1995).

27. Id.
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tion.28 The article allows States, in connection with the procedures of
Article 40(1), and Article 38(1), supra, to unilaterally bring a dispute
under the Court's compulsory jurisdiction when treaties and conventions in force refer cases. 29 A treaty clause referring a dispute between
States to the Court is known as a "compromissory clause," and it triggers compulsory jurisdiction. Thus, a "compromissory clause" may
bring a case before the Court pursuant to the terms of the treaty between the Parties, which refer to the disputed matters. 30 After deciding
that the December 1987, and December 1990 agreements were treaties
in force, 31 the Court admitted Qatar's Application based upon them,
finding for compulsory jurisdiction. According to the Court's decision,
Qatar effectively seised the Court by unilateral application.
Bahrain contended it had not agreed to refer the whole of the dispute by the letters and Minutes, and that the two Parties must jointly
seise the Court by special agreement. 32 States parties to a dispute may
refer a case to the Court by a special agreement, or compromis. 33 A special agreement, or compromis, is an ad hoc agreement between the parties concerning the specific dispute, and it becomes the legal basis of the
Court's jurisdiction. 34 Bahrain argued that Qatar's unilateral application was insufficient to confer jurisdiction because on grounds of special
agreement some form of agreement between the Parties must exist referring the dispute. The majority replied by stating that, "[T]here
would have been nothing to prevent Bahrain's saying in its reply of 26
December 1987 that its acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction was subject to the conclusion of a special agreement providing for joint seisin of
the Court."35 Since the Parties continued to argue whether Qatar could
unilaterally seise the tribunal or whether it had to be jointly seised, the
Court found it incumbent upon them to resolve this issue.
B. Resolving the Question of the Method of Seisin
In the December 1990 Minutes, paragraph 2, both Qatar and Bah28. The Statute sets forth: "The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which
the parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United
Nations or in treaties and conventions in force" (emphasis added). STATUTE OF THE
COURT, art. 36, para. 1.
29. ALEXANDROV, supra note 26, at 6.
30. Gary L. Scott, Recent Activity Before the International Court of Justice: Trend or
Cycle?, 3 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 22 (1996). See W. Michael Reisman, The Other Shoe
Falls: The Future of Article 36(1) Jurisdiction in Light of Nicaragua, 81 AM. J. INT'L L.
166 (1987), for a discussion of "treaty-based jurisdiction."
31. See Section II of this Article for a discussion on whether the December 1987 and
December 1990 agreements between Qatar and Bahrain were binding in nature.
32. Qatar v. Bahrain, 1995 I.C.J. 6, 17.
33. ALEXANDROV, supra note 26, at 2.
34. Id.
35. Qatar v. Bahrain, 1995 I.C.J. 6, 16.
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rain refer to seisin of the Court. 36 For Qatar, paragraph 2 authorized
unilateral seisin by means of an application filed by one or the other of
the Parties, while for Bahrain the Minutes authorized only joint seisin
of the Court by means of a special agreement. 37 This contention between the two States rests upon the meaning of the expression "altarafan," used in the second sentence of paragraph 2 of the original
Arabic text of the Doha Minutes. Qatar translated the words as "the
Parties" whereas Bahrain translated them as "the two Parties." 38 The
Court found the expression, pursuant to its ordinary meaning, did not
require seisin by both Parties acting in concert pursuant to a special
agreement, but on the contrary allowed unilateral seisin. 39 Thus, the
international tribunal determined Qatar could seise it by unilateral application, so as to bring the dispute within its jurisdiction. However, as
Judge Schwebel notes in his dissent, 40 the government of Oman introduced a preliminary draft of the Doha Minutes at the meeting, and
Bahrain subsequently had them amended.
The draft form read,
"[Ejither of the two parties may submit the matter to the International
Court of Justice." 41 Bahrain then amended the provision to specify in
place of "either of the two Parties" the expression "al-tarafan" meaning
"the two Parties" (emphasis added).4 2 If the Court incorrectly determined the plain meaning of the term, in light of Bahrain's request to
amend the Minutes, then Qatar could not unilaterally seise the tribunal. The Court's jurisdiction, in turn, would be defective.
Indeed, because the Court's basis for compulsory jurisdiction is
treaty-based, it has a duty to accurately determine the meaning of the
so-called binding agreements. As Judge Schwebel states, "[i]f the object
of the Parties - if their common intention - was to make clear that 'both
Qatar and Bahrain had the right to make a unilateral application to the
Court,' the provision that 'either of the two Parties may submit the
matter' would have been left unchanged." 43 It seems the original

36. Paragraph (2) of the Doha Minutes states that,
The good offices of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, King Fahd Ben
Abdul Aziz, shall continue between the two countries until the month of
Shawwal 1 A.H., corresponding to May 1991. Once that period has elapsed,
the two parties may submit the matter to the InternationalCourt of Justice in
accordance with the Bahraini formula, which has been accepted by Qatar,
and with the procedures consequent on it. The good offices of the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia will continue during the period when the matter is under arbitration.
Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
37. Id. at 18.
38. Id.
39. Qatar v. Bahrain, 1995 I.C.J. 6, at 19.
40. Id. at 34.
41. Id.

42. Id.
43. Id.
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wording of the Doha Minutes, proposed by the government of Oman,
would have achieved the goal of allowing unilateral seisin and not the
inverse. Judge Oda, also dissenting, feels that Qatar did not take into
account Bahrain's deletion of the original wording, and that neither the
December 1987, nor the December 1990 agreements, were sufficient to
enable Qatar to unilaterally seize the Court. 44 In fact he states that:
[Neither text confers] jurisdiction upon the Court in the event of a
unilateral application under Article 38, paragraph 1, of the Rules of
Court, and the Court is not empowered to exercise jurisdiction in respect of the relevant disputes unless they are jointly referred to the
Court by a special agreement under Article 39, paragraph 1, of the
45
Rules - which has not been done in this case.
Judge Oda determined the unilateral method of seisin used by
Qatar to invoke the Court's jurisdiction was deficient, and the Parties
should have reached a special agreement under the circumstances. The
Court should have looked more closely at its precedents. For example,
in Fisheries Jurisdiction the United Kingdom proposed to insert in its
agreement the words "at the request of either two Parties," making it
clear either Party could unilaterally seise the Court.46 Looking at the
context of paragraph 2 of the Doha Minutes, and the manner in which
Bahrain altered the wording, it is not clear the Court should have allowed Qatar to unilaterally seise the tribunal.
Indeed, as Qatar's counsel noted:
[The] method of seisin may, to be sure, be agreed between the parties;
but, in the absence of any agreement between [the parties] on that
point, as is the case here, it is for the Court to appreciate the regularity
of the seisin, the mode of submission of a case to the Court being regulated by the provisions of its functioning. 47
When a State seises the international tribunal by means of a unilateral application based on a treaty provision, the Court has a duty to
ensure that the States intended the documents to be a treaty and that
they agreed upon the provision conferring jurisdiction. For example, in

44. Qatar v. Bahrain, 1995 I.C.J. 6, at 49.
45. Id. See Article 39(1) of the Rules of Court which sets forth, "When proceedings
are brought before the Court by the notification of a special agreement, in conformity with
Article 40, paragraph 1, of the Statute, the notification may be effected by the parties
jointly or by any one or more of them. If the notification is not a joint one, a certified copy
of it shall forthwith be communicated by the Registrar to the other party." RULES OF
COURT, art. 39, para. 1.
46. Qatar v. Bahrain, 1995 I.C.J. 6, at 57. (Judge Shahabuddeen quoting Fisheries
Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice) 1973 I.C.J. Reports 11).
47. Id. at 59 (Judge Shahabuddeen quoting Qatar's counsel in Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between Qatar and Bahrain, 1995 I.C.J. 6,
59).
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one other case submitted to the Court by unilateral application based
upon an earlier agreement, the language was clear the two parties intended the agreement to confer jurisdiction. 48 In the TerritorialDispute
Between Libya and Chad the tribunal derived its jurisdiction from a
special agreement between the States that explicitly conferred jurisdiction with respect to the settlement of the territorial dispute. 49 However,
in the dispute between Libya and Chad the Parties submitted a special
agreement expressly stating the "two Parties" agreed to refer the dispute for judgment to the Court, in the absence of an alternative settlement. 50 Thus, there was no contention both Parties desired to bring the
dispute before the tribunal. Yet when intentions appear uncertain, as
between Qatar and Bahrain, the Court should not allow unilateral seisin until fully establishing a binding agreement existed between the
two States.
III. THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE'S JURISDICTION
OVER THE QATARI - BAHRAINI DISPUTE
A. The Court's Basis for Jurisdiction: A Treaty between Two States
The International Court of Justice found for treaty-based compulsory jurisdiction in the Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation.
Treaty-based compulsory jurisdiction arises when a treaty in force contains a clause referring a certain dispute to the international tribunal.
Qatar's unilateral application to seise the Court derived its basis for jurisdiction on the December 1987, letters between the two countries and
on the December 1990, Doha Minutes. 51 The Court determined these
two documents constituted internationally binding agreements, that by
their terms they submitted the whole of the dispute to the Court, and
that the agreements thus conferred jurisdiction upon the Court.52
Bahrain initially contended that, "[e]very State possesses the sovereign right to determine whether it consents to the jurisdiction of the
Court and to determine the limits, conditions and method of implementation of its consent. [In addition], every State possesses the sovereign
right to decline to appear before the Court."5 3 The international tribunal cannot compel jurisdiction, and so States must initially agree to appear before the tribunal before it can entertain a dispute. In order to

48. Scott, supra note 30, at 20.
49. Id. For further information regarding the dispute between Libya and Chad, see
the I.C.J. judgment in the Case Concerning the Territorial Dispute, in 33 I.L.M. 791
(1994).
50. Id.
51. Qatar v. Bahrain, 1995 I.C.J. 6, at 8.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 10-11.
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submit to jurisdiction, States must make a declaration under Article 36
of the Court's Statute, which allows them to be subject to claims or to
submit a dispute for adjudication.5 4 Indeed the idea that, "the Court
can only exercise jurisdiction over a State with its consent" is a well established principle of international law embodied in the Court's Statute.5 5 Article 36(1) of the Statute of the Court sets forth in its first
clause that jurisdiction, "comprises all cases which the Parties refer to
it.. . ."(emphasis added).5 6 The wording indicates the Court has jurisdiction only if both Parties to a dispute refer it, thus ensuring mutual
consent. Indeed, Bahrain's government contended that the July 1994
Judgment finding for jurisdiction did not use the words:
"[e]ither of the Parties" to indicate that one party alone could complete
the process of reference to the court. It is to 'the Parties' and not to either one of them that the Court afforded the opportunity to seise it of
the case. This reflects the Court's adherence to the dominant requirement of the consent of [both] Parties .... 57
The majority itself noted, "[t]here is no doubt that the Court's jurisdiction can only be established on the basis of the will of the Parties,
as evidenced by the relevant texts."58 In The Case ConcerningMaritime
Delimitation,the majority interpreted the December 1987, and December 1990, documents as expressing the will of Qatar and implying the
will of Bahrain, to allow the Court to entertain jurisdiction. 59 Bahrain
argued the explicit consent of both parties would be necessary to confer
jurisdiction upon the Court.60 In fact, Bahrain stated the texts in question expressed only the Parties' consent in principle to seise the Court,
but this consent was subject to the conclusion of a Special Agreement
(setting forth the questions to present to the Court by mutual agree61
ment).
The majority decided to circumvent Bahrain's claim a special
agreement was necessary by finding for treaty based jurisdiction. By
founding its decision on Article 36(2) of the Statute of the Court, the
tribunal could bring the dispute within its jurisdiction. 62 As previously

54. David M. Reilly & Sarita Ordonez, Effect of the Jurisprudenceof the International
Court of Justiceon National Courts, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L. L. & POL. 435, 438-39 (1996).
55. Case of the Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v. France, United
Kingdom and United States), Judgment of June 15, 1954 (Preliminary Question), 1954
I.C.J. Reports 19, 32.
56. STATUTE OF THE COURT, art. 36, para. 1 (1954).

57. Qatar v. Bahrain, 1995 I.C.J. 6, at 11.
58. Id. at 23.
59. Id. at 36-37.
60. Id. at 15-16.
61. Qatar v. Bahrain, 1995 I.C.J. 6, 16.
62. "[A]nd all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or
in treaties and conventions in force (emphasis added)." Id.
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stated, the Court concluded in its Judgment of July 1994, that the letters of December 1987, and the Doha Minutes of December 1990, constituted binding international agreements. 63 In this way, the tribunal
could rationally base its jurisdiction on Article 36(1), compulsory treatybased jurisdiction, in order to hear the dispute. Bahrain based its argument against treaty-based jurisdiction on the Doha Minutes, pointing
out Bahrain never meant the Doha Minutes to become an internationally binding agreement. 64 The Foreign Minister of Bahrain contended
territorial treaties only take effect after becoming law in their country,
and he did not intend to give the Minutes legal effect at the time they
were written. 65 The majority rejected this argument, pointing out that
intent under the circumstances at hand did not matter. 66 Pursuant to
the majority's understanding of compulsory jurisdiction, a State may
express its consent to adjudicate by becoming a party to such a treaty.
In this instance, no further consent is required. 67
Furthermore, the majority reasoned that binding international
agreements can take on a number of diverse forms and can be given any
number of names. 68 According to the Court, the letters between Qatar
and Bahrain and the meeting minutes could thus constitute an international treaty. 69 In the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case, the Court
supported this view by stating that no rule of international law exists
determining joint communiques may not become an internationally
binding agreement. 70 However in the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf
Case, Greece alone asked to base jurisdiction on a joint communiqu6,
and the Court found Turkey's intention was to jointly submit the dispute by means of a Special Agreement.71 So the communiqu6 between
Greece and Turkey was not intended to, and did not, constitute an immediate commitment to unconditionally accept unilateral submission of
63. The Court found:
that the exchanges of letters between the King of Saudi Arabia and the Amir
of Qatar dated 19 and 21 December 1987, and between the King of Saudi
Arabia and the Amir of Bahrain dated 19 and 26 December 1987, and the
document headed "Minutes" and signed at Doha on 25 December 1990 by the
Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Bahrain, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, are international agreements creating rights and obligations for the Parties .....
Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between Qatar and
Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), 1994 I.C.J. 112, 125-26 (Judgment of July 1994).
64. Qatar v. Bahrain, 1994 I.C.J. 112, at 121.
65. Amy M. Campbell, International Law . Maritime Delimitation and Territorial
Dispute - Qatarv. Bahrain, 1994 I.C.J. 112 (July 1), 19 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 573,
575 (1996).
66. Id.
67. ALEXANDROV, supra note 26, at 6.
68. Qatar v. Bahrain, 1994 I.C.J. 112, at 120.
69. Qatar v. Bahrain, 1995 I.C.J. 6, at 14.
70. Qatar v. Bahrain, 1994 I.C.J. 112, at 120-121 (quoting Aegean Sea Continental
Shelf Case (Greece v. Turk.)), 1978 I.C.J. 3, 39, (Dec. 19).
71. ALEXANDROV, supra note 26, at 5.
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the dispute to the tribunal. 72 The Court goes a step further in The Case
Concerning Maritime Delimitation,by reading sufficient intent into the
joint communiqu6s to conclude that together they formed an interna73
tionally binding agreement.
The Court also referred to the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties as one of the governing principles of international law to uphold this conclusion. The Court noted Article 2, paragraph (1)(a) provides that, "'treaty' means an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law,
whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation." 74 The majority
stated the content of the texts expressed the plain meaning that both
Qatar and Bahrain were setting forth the parameters of the dispute, as
well as the decision to submit it to adjudication if they did not come to
75
an agreement themselves.
However, the majority reached this striking decision by inferring
intent, and then concluded the documents constituted a treaty. It was
only by implying intent that the majority could establish treaty-based
compulsory jurisdiction. The question remains, then, whether both
Parties really meant to consent to the Court's jurisdiction. A critical
aspect of international jurisdiction is that sovereign States must consent to the Court's power to hear a disagreement. Even in cases of
compulsory jurisdiction, States must have originally consented to the
Court's jurisdiction in some manner. 76 As Judge Koroma said in his
dissent, "[b]oth legal principles and the fundamental jurisprudence of
the Court have always founded jurisdiction upon the clear and unambiguous consent of the Parties to a dispute."77 Although the documents
relied upon by the majority may have outlined the conflict, it is not
clear that both Parties consented to adjudicate the dispute in them. If
there was no clear consent then there could be no jurisdiction.
B. Arguments of the Dissenting Judges Regarding Whether the Joint
Communiques Formed an InternationallyBinding Agreement
Bahrain and the dissenting judges argue the letters and Minutes do
not form an internationally binding agreement capable of subjecting
Bahrain to compulsory jurisdiction under Article 36(2) of the Statute of
the Court. The opposing view holds forth Bahrain did not intend these
communications to be an internationally binding agreement and with-

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Qatar v. Bahrain, 1994 I.C.J. 112, at 121-22.
Id. at 120-21.
Id. at 126-27.
MARK W. JANIs, AN INTRODUCTION To INTERNATIONAL LAW 126 (2d ed. 1993).
Qatar v. Bahrain, 1995 I.C.J. 6, at 70.
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out intent there can be no treaty.78
Lord McNair in his dissent:
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Vice-President Schwebel quoted

Many references are to be found ... to the primary necessity of giving
effect to the 'plain terms' of a treaty, or construing words according to
their 'general and ordinary meaning'. .. [B]ut this so-called rule of interpretation like others is merely a starting-point, a prima facie guide
and cannot be allowed to obstruct the essential quest in the application
of treaties, namely to search for the real intention of the contracting
79
parties in using the language employed by them (emphasis added).
According to this view, both parties must intend to enter into a binding
international agreement, for if there is no intent then they may enter
into an agreement unwillingly or unknowingly. As a consequence, the
Court may subject them to its jurisdiction without their consent, violating their sovereignty. International legal principles establish that
where the meaning of a treaty is unclear, one must look to the inten80
tions of the Parties to facilitate interpretation.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the primary basis
of international law regarding treaties, provides recourse to preparatory
81
work (travaux preparatoires)to ascertain the intent of the parties.
The Vienna Convention advocates relying on Parties' preparatory work
not only when the treaty's text is ambiguous but also to confirm a text's
unambiguous meaning.8 2 Bahrain argues submitting the dispute to the
Court's jurisdiction was not within its contemplation when it exchanged
letters with Bahrain and when it accepted the Doha Minutes.8 3 In Bahrain's view the provision in the December 1987, letters purporting to
create a Tripartite Committee meant this body would formulate a special agreement, consented to by both Parties, that would confer jurisdiction upon the Court.8 4 Indeed, Vice-President Schwebel points out if the
intention of Bahrain had been to authorize unilateral application to

78. Id. at 28.
79. Id. at 27 (quotingLord McNair, THE LAW OF TREATIES, at 366 (1961)).
80. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 32:
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including
the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in
order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or
to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: (a)
leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is
manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 32, U.N. Doc. AICONF. 39/27 (1969).
81. Id.
82. Maria Frankowska, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Before United
States Courts, 28 VA. J. INT'L L., 281, 333 (1988).
83. Qatar v. Bahrain, 1995 I.C.J. 6, at 32.
84. Id.
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seise the Court, it would not have been necessary to form a committee. 85
The meaning of Parties' intentions in exchanging letters and drafting
minutes at meetings could potentially become a litigious problem under
Article 36(2) treaty-based compulsory jurisdiction. Ifthe Court can infer the intent of a party to enter a binding international agreement, in
order to establish its jurisdiction based on that agreement, then disputes may arise regarding proper intentions. This could further deprive
the validity of the Court's jurisdiction, as it would appear the tribunal
must formulate States' intentions for them so as to hear disputes. Some
judicial scholars believe the Article 36(2) clause, providing treaty-based
86
jurisdiction, should be "permitted to die in peace."
In The Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation, for instance, the
majority construes the Doha Minutes to mean either Party could unilaterally seise the Court, but Judge Schwebel notes this could not have
been the common intention of Qatar and Bahrain. 87 He believes the
Court's construction of the Minutes is at odds with the rules of interpretation set out by the Vienna Convention and does not comport with a
good faith interpretation.88 The travaux preparatoires (preparatory
works) should reveal the Parties' proper intentions and provide the
Court with supplementary material to interpret the meaning of the
texts. If doubt or ambiguity exists regarding the Parties' purpose, the
Court must look to preparatory work before deciding the States have
entered a binding international agreement. As Judge Schwebel advocates, the majority should look to intent and, "[w]here the travaux preparatoiresof a treaty demonstrate the lack of a common intention of the
Parties to confer jurisdiction on the Court, the Court is not entitled to
base its jurisdiction on that treaty."89
In addition to discussing the content of the texts, Judge Oda notes
in his dissent Qatar's failure to register the Agreement of December
1987 with the United Nations Registrar. 90 He then surmises this indi-

85. Id. at 33.
86. See Gary L. Scott & Craig L. Carr, The ICJ and Compulsory Jurisdiction: The
Case for Closing the Clause, 81 AM J. INT'L L. 57, 57 (1987) (discussing the merits of abolishing Article 36(2) compulsory jurisdiction).
87. Qatar v. Bahrain, 1995 I.C.J. 6, at 36.
88. Id. See also, Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, "A
treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose."
Supra, note 12, art. 31, para. 1. Judge Schwebel says that the Court's decision regarding
the Minutes as an internationally binding agreement does not comport with a good faith
interpretation of the treaty's terms "in the light of its object and purpose" because the object and purpose of both parties was not to authorize unilateral recourse to the Court.
Qatar v. Bahrain, 1995 I.C.J. 6, at 36.
89. Qatar v. Bahrain, 1995 I.C.J. 6, at 39.
90. Id. at 44. Article 102 of the United Nations Charter sets forth:,
1. Every treaty and every international agreement entered into by any
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cates doubt the State always regarded the agreement as "a treaty in the
true sense of the word." 91 Although failing to register the documents is
not dispositive that Qatar did not regard them as binding international
agreements, it may indicate the State did not consider them as such until it became necessary to invoke jurisdiction. 92 If the Court is to invoke
treaty-based compulsory jurisdiction, then the terms of the agreement
should clearly set forth that both Parties intend to confer power upon
the tribunal to hear the case.
C. ProblematicJurisdiction:The Failureto Submit the Whole of the
Dispute
In addition to the problem of treaty-based compulsory jurisdiction,
it is problematic the Court allowed Qatar to unilaterally submit the
whole of the dispute without Bahrain's consent. Qatar's unilateral application did not comprise the entire dispute in the eyes of both Parties. 93 As Judge Shahabuddeen notes in his dissent:
If Qatar's unilateral act of November 30, 1994 did not satisfy the
Court's Judgment of July 1, 1994, it follows that all the Court has before it is Qatar's unilateral Application of July 8, 1991. The Court has
already found 'that the subject-matter of [that] Application corresponds
to only part of the dispute contemplated by the 'Bahraini formula' and
94
that this 'was in effect acknowledged by Qatar'.
Thus, the Court may not have had before it the entire subject95
matter of the dispute. This would result in defective jurisdiction.
Judge Shahabuddeen points out:
Bahrain correctly argued that there was no agreement to confer jurisdiction in such a way as to enable the Court to consider part of the dispute without having to consider the remainder at the same time. Since
the Court has only part of the dispute before it, it follows that it has no
96
jurisdiction.

Member of the United Nations after the present Charter comes into force
shall as soon as possible be registered with the Secretariat and published by
it. 2. No party to any such treaty or international agreement which has not
been registered in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article may invoke that treaty or agreement before any organ of the United Nations.
U.N. CHARTER, art. 102, para. 1-2.
91. Id.
92. Qatar v. Bahrain, 1995 I.C.J. 6, at 44.
93. Id. at 10.
94. Id. at 54. (quoting I.C.J. Reports 1994, p. 124, para. 36).
95. Qatar v. Bahrain, 1995 I.C.J. 6, at 55.
96. Id.
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According to Judge Shahabuddeen's dissent, the Parties defined the
subject-matter of the dispute in their 1983 principle as "all matters being complementary and indivisible" (emphasis added). 97 Thus, Bahrain
correctly argued that there was no agreement to confer jurisdiction as
to only part of the dispute. 98 If there are doubts regarding a State's intention to submit a dispute, the Court is bound to take steps to establish whether the State accepts the Court's jurisdiction as far as that
particular dispute is concerned. 99 If the tribunal does not have the
whole of the subject-matter before it, then it follows the Court could not
have jurisdiction over the entire dispute.
In The Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation, the majority decided that the Parties' mutual assent in accepting the "Bahraini formula" put an end to the argument regarding the subject of the dispute
and showed that they concurred on the extent of the Court's jurisdiction.10 0 The "Bahraini formula" defined the disputed area to encompass: (1) the Hawar Islands, including Janan, (2) Fasht al Dibal and
Qit'at Jaradah, (3) the archipelagic baselines, (4) Zubarah, and (5) the
areas for fishing for pearls and for fishing for swimming fish and any
other matters connected with maritime boundaries.'0 1 However, the issue of Zubarah remained a contentious point between the two countries. 10 2 This makes acceptance of the "Bahraini formula," as defining
the extent of jurisdiction, doubtful. Bahrain also argues that the ques0 3
tions to be put to the Court were to derive from a mutual agreement.
The Parties' subsequent conduct revealed this because the work of the
Tripartite Committee was exclusively concerned with forming a Special
Agreement to determine the whole of the dispute. 10 4 Accordingly, in
Bahrain's eyes the whole of the dispute was still at issue.
The majority seems to gloss over this matter by stating it could not
agree with Bahrain, and it was apparent the Parties did not envisage
seising the Court without prior discussion in the Tripartite Committee. 105 The majority went on to opine that the States nonetheless
agreed to submit all of the matters disputed between them, but they did
so without rationalizing this decision. 06 The Court fails to lay a foundation for determining Qatar and Bahrain agreed on all issues sur-

97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Qatar v. Bahrain, 1995 I.C.J. 6, at 55.
99. ALEXANDROV, supra note 26, at 19.
100. Qatar v. Bahrain, 1995 I.C.J. 6, at 17.
101. Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between Qatar
and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), 1995 I.C.J. 83, at 118 (April 18).
102. Qatar v. Bahrain, 1995 I.C.J. 6, at 14.
103. Id at 16.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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rounding the dispute and did not properly conclude they had jurisdiction over all issues in the case. As Judge Koroma's points out in his
dissent, an agreement between both Parties regarding the entire subject-matter of the dispute was a condition precedent for jurisdiction to
be conferred.10 7 Although a Party may unilaterally seise the Court by
means of an application, at the least there should be consent between
them as to what matters to submit. The majority relies upon Qatar's
"Act" of November 1994, wherein the State declared it was submitting
the "whole of the dispute" referred to in the 1990 Doha Minutes and the
"Bahraini formula" to acquire subject-matter jurisdiction over the entire
dispute.108 Yet, Bahrain's "Report of November 1994," made it clear the
State felt the submission of the whole of the dispute to be "consensual
in character, that is, a matter of agreement between the Parties."109
Indeed, Judge Koroma says neither Qatar's "Act" nor Bahrain's "Report" evinced a mutual agreement to submit the whole of the dispute, so
it follows the Court does not have before it the entire dispute, and thus
no jurisdiction.11 0 Absent a clear agreement between Qatar and Bahrain as to the scope of jurisdiction, it is difficult to see how the Court
concludes it has jurisdiction over the whole of the dispute.
IV. THE IMPACT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE'S
DECISION ON THE FUTURE OF ITS ABILITY TO ENTERTAIN A
DISPUTE
A. The Court's Role in InternationalLaw: Aspects of a Successful
Dispute Resolution Mechanism
In The Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation the International
Court of Justice, in exercising its judicial powers, seems to take on the
role of a regular domestic tribunal rather than that of a world court.
For instance, in this case the Court did not merely issue an advisory
opinion. The tribunal interpreted and used international law to arrive
at a decision. This was only the third case in the Court's history where
the issues of admissibility and jurisdiction arose pursuant to a State's
application,l and it gave the Court occasion to adjudicate as an inter-

107. Qatar v. Bahrain, 1995 I.C.J. 6, at 69.
108. Id. at 9.
109. Id. at 10.
110. Qatar v. Bahrain, 1995 I.C.J. 6, at 73.
111. As noted at the Embassy of Columbia, the Hague:
To begin with a question of vital importance for international adjudication,
namely jurisdiction, it is worth noting that, aside from the fact that most of
the cases currently before the Court were submitted by unilateral application, there is another element that is no less important: in most of these
cases, the respondent state consented to litigation and has gone ahead with
the proceedings without resorting to the usual tactic of challenging the
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national lawmaker. It appears that the Court now has precedent to
follow regarding a State's ability to submit a dispute by unilateral seisin.
Moreover, the Court resembled a national adjudicatory body when
it decided the joint communiqu6s between Qatar and Bahrain constituted a binding international agreement. The Court had to interpret
the meaning of the December 1987, letters and the Doha Minutes, before concluding the documents together constituted a binding international treaty. 112 Much like a domestic court decides a contractual issue,
the Court took leeway to interpret the Parties' words and actions to determine a treaty existed. Contractual interpretation is generally within
the province of a domestic court system. Perhaps the Court, behaving
more like a regular domestic court, may draw more cases.
In addition, the Court interpreted case documents under the Vienna Convention which is the major body of international law governing treaties. 113 Under Article 38 of its Statute, the Court correctly referred to the Vienna Convention as a primary source of international
law. 114 By following accepted international law, the Court validated is
decision. This seems to be much like a domestic court following its law
to arrive at a decision. The Court also referred to custom to help interpret the agreements. Customary international law, alongside treaty
law, is one of the two central forms of international law. 115 As one international scholar points out:
The fundamental idea behind the notion of custom as a source of international law is that States in and by their international practice may
implicitly consent to the creation and application of international legal

Court's jurisdiction by entering preliminary objections. Indeed, in only three
of the eight cases instituted by application has it been necessary to open a
preliminary procedure on admissibility and jurisdiction.
J.J. Quintana, Correspondence,86 Am. J. INTL'L. L. 542 (1992). The three cases listed are,
Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988 (Iran v. United States), Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru
(Nauru v. AustrI.). and Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions (Qatar v. Bahrain).
112. Qatar v. Bahrain, 1995 I.C.J. 6, at 2.
113. "The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is accepted by this Court as an
authoritative codification of international law." Qatar v. Bahrain, 1995 I.C.J. 6, at 28.
114. Article 38(1) of the Statute sets forth what principles the Court may use:
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law

such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: (a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized
by the contesting States; (b) international custom, as evidence of a general
practice accepted as law. (c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; (d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and
the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations,
as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
STATUTE OF THE COURT, art. 38, para. 1.
115. JANIS, supra note 76, at 42.
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rules. In this sense, the theory of customary international law is simply an implied side to the contractual theory that explains why treaties
116
are international law.

Under principles of customary international law, the Court may
look to a State's practices, for instance, it may examine statements
made at meetings or conventions, to determine a dispute's outcome. 117
Indeed, the majority in The Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation relied in large part on the statements of the Doha Minutes of December
1990, to find Qatar could unilaterally seise the tribunal. 11s Moreover,
like judges in a domestic court the majority and the dissent employed
precedent, when applicable, to arrive at their respective outcomes regarding the merits of jurisdiction. Normally precedent does not bind
the Court; the rule of stare decisis does not apply.1 19 However, in the
case at hand, the tribunal did apply precedent to establish its decision.
For instance, it revisited the principles of treaty interpretation it used
in the Libyan/Arab-Jamahiriya/ChadTerritorialDispute to determine
120
a text must be interpreted foremost in light of its ordinary meaning.
The Court, as a domestic tribunal, does follow prior decisions to reach
its current conclusion.
The International Court of Justice will be a successful dispute
resolution mechanism if it continues to follow the precedents it has
formed over the years. Although the Court does not have a rule of
precedent, its willingness not to depart from previous cases lends its decisions an aspect of authority.1 21 Indeed, the Court may find that party
States are less willing to accept its adjudication if it wanders from
precedent. This happened in The Case Concerning Maritime Limitation
where it simply inferred Bahrain's intent to establish jurisdiction.
There was no precedent to infer intent, and Bahrain did not accept the
Court's conclusion. States guard their sovereignty jealously and do not
easily accept the Court's decisions. The international tribunal's effort
to follow its own prior cases establishes a consistent pattern of judicial
decision, giving States a greater confidence in its holdings. 122 If the
Court does not follow its previous decisions, unless they are inconsistent, States are unlikely to accept its subsequent decisions.

116. Id. at 42-43.
117. Barbara Kelly, The InternationalCourt of Justice: Its Role in a New world Legal
Order, 3 TOURO. J. TRANSNT'L L. 223, 227 (1992).
118. Qatar v. Bahrain, 1995 I.C.J. 6, at 16-17.
119. Olav A. Haazen, Precedent in the World Court, 38 HARV. INT'L L. J. 587, 588
(1997).
120. Qatar v. Bahrain, 1995 I.C.J. 6, at 18.
121. Haazen, supra note 119, at 590.
122. JANIS, supra note 76, at 140-41.
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B. The Future of the InternationalCourt Oof Justice's Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction is a vital question in international law. The Court is
not a domestic tribunal, and it does not possess the jurisdictional regime of such courts. Therefore, the methods by which it derives jurisdiction must not be highly objectionable, and States must regard the
means by which the Court reaches its decision as valid. It continues to
be necessary to build confidence in the Court. 123 If States' confidence is
well-founded then their acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction and of its
1 24
work will grow.
As noted above, there have only been eight cases in the international tribunal's history instituted by application, and in only three of
these has it been necessary to open a preliminary procedure on admissibility and jurisdiction. 125 The Case ConcerningMaritime Delimitation
126
and TerritorialQuestions Between Qatarand Bahrainis one of these.
The Court may choose to adjudicate whether it has jurisdiction, if the
Parties do not agree, so as to remain consistent with the idea that
States have the right of consent. For, "[ilt is well established in international law that no State can, without its consent, be compelled to
submit its disputes with other States to mediation, arbitration, or any
1 27
other kind of pacific settlement."'
However, in the case at hand, the Court's decision regarding jurisdiction appears to be outcome determinative, in an effort to confer
power to hear the case on the Court. On the bright side, the Court
could have gone even further by determining jurisdiction without adjudicating Bahrain's preliminary objection. Indeed, the Court could have
imposed its jurisdiction. The Court may exercise judicial functions with
regard to a State prior to, and regardless of, any finding of the existence
of valid consent. 128 Indeed, Article 36(6) of the Statute of the Court di29
rectly confers on the tribunal the right to decide its own jurisdiction.1
In the instant case, the Court did not employ this method, perhaps

123. Fred L. Morrison, The Future of InternationalAdjudication, 75 MINN. L. REV. 827,
846 (1991).
124. Id.
125. See supra note 63 and accompanying text, for a discussion of the three cases
where preliminary objections to the International Court of Justice's jurisdiction have been
made.
126. Quintana, supra note 111. The other two cases are, Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988
(Iran v. U.S.) and Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.))
127. ALEXANDROV, supra note 26, at 1 (quoting Status of Eastern Carelia, Reply to request of advisory opinion (July 23, 1923), 1923 P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 5, p. 7, at 27).
128. Stanimir A. Alexandrov, Non-Appearance before the International Court of Justice, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 41, 62 (1995).
129. Id. See Article 36(6) of the I.C.J. Statute which reads, "In the event of a dispute
as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by the decision of the
Court." STATUTE OF THE COURT, art. 36, para. 6.
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in deference to the rights of the Parties. A sovereign State's consent to
give the international tribunal the power to adjudicate is fundamental
under principles of international law. In fact, the majority of the instant opinion notes that, "There is no doubt that the Court's jurisdiction
,130 If
can only be established on the basis of the will of the Parties.
the Court had established jurisdiction based on the will of both Qatar
and Bahrain, then there would be no doubt the tribunal did not employ
extraordinary measures to bring the dispute within its jurisdiction.
However, the Court inferred the intent of Bahrain to submit to jurisdiction, and thus the Court may have acted outside its scope of authority.
This appears to weaken compulsory jurisdiction, particularly treatybased compulsory jurisdiction, in the eyes of States, leaving the future
of the Court's jurisdiction in question. A tribunal adjudicating disputes
between sovereign States must defer to the will of those Parties if it
wishes to succeed in the international legal arena.
V. CONCLUSION
The International Court of Justice, antecedent to the first world
court, is an important international adjudicatory body. However the
tribunal does not exist without problems, such as jurisdiction and international legal procedure. As evidenced by this article, the Court is
still determining proper procedural methods, such as seisin. In addition, it is attempting to formulate the correct methods for bringing a
State party within its jurisdiction and once within deciding the scope of
its jurisdiction. It appears the Court is slowly resolving these issues, as
seen in decisions like The Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation. As
the tribunal solves these problems, it will gain validity as an international lawmaker.
The Court is arriving at a more workable international legal system. It is difficult because States are sovereign creatures, and they
generally do not abide by the Court's decisions with complete willingness. On the other hand, they could refuse to follow its decisions at all.
Yet the Court's future seems bright as the world moves toward interdependence, with States as major actors on the scene. Hopefully, States
will come to employ the tribunal more often, giving it the invaluable
opportunity to continue determining which procedures and substantive
methods work.

130. Qatar v. Bahrain, 1995 I.C.J. 6, 23.

A Golden Opportunity Dismissed: The New
Zealand v. France Nuclear Tests Case
Stephen M. Tokarz*
INTRODUCTION
On September 22, 1995, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) entered an order dismissing New Zealand's claims in the dispute between
New Zealand and France over nuclear testing in the South Pacific. 1
This order was prompted by a request from New Zealand for an examination of the nuclear testing situation in accord with a special provision
contained in a previous 1974 judgment of the ICJ2 The original dispute
between the two countries arose out of France's proposed atmospheric
nuclear tests in the South Pacific and New Zealand's objection to those
tests. After New Zealand received an interim order from the ICJ asking
France to refrain from nuclear testing until the Court considered New
Zealand's substantive claims, 3 France announced that it would halt all
plans for atmospheric nuclear testing. The Court found that this action
rendered the dispute between the parties moot, 4 and consequently dis-

missed New Zealand's claims against France in its judgment of December 20, 1974. 5 Since the case was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds,
the Court never reached New Zealand's substantive international law
claims. However, in an unprecedented move, the Court included within
its decision a special provision in paragraph 63 of its 1974 judgment
that "if the basis of this Judgment were to be affected, [New Zealand]
the situation in accordance with the
could request an examination of
6
provisions of the [ICJ] Statute."
France announced in 1995 that it would conduct a series of eight
underground nuclear weapons tests in the territory of French Polyne"J.D. Candidate, University of Denver College of Law, 1999.
1. Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of
the Court's Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests Case (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1995
I.C.J. 288 (Sept. 22).
2. See Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 457 (Dec. 20).
3. See Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1973 I.C.J. 135 (Interim Protection Order of June
22).
4. STATUTE OF THE COURT, art. 38, para. 1 limits the Court's jurisdiction to "[s]uch
disputes as are submitted to it..." (emphasis added).
5. See 1974 I.C.J. 457.
6. Id. at 477.
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sia. 7 New Zealand used the paragraph 63 special provision to again
protest France's proposed nuclear weapons tests. However, the Court
found that the "basis" of the 1974 judgment had not been affected (as
the language in paragraph 63 required) because that judgment was
based solely on France's promise not to conduct any further atmospheric
nuclear tests and the present situation involved underground nuclear
tests.8 Therefore, the Court again dismissed New Zealand's claims
against France without reaching any of New Zealand's compelling substantive international law claims.
Part One of this article introduces the case by examining the background of the dispute. Part Two examines the Court's judgment and
reasoning in the 1995 New Zealand v. France Nuclear Tests case. Part
Three considers the decision of the Court and argues that by prematurily dismissing New Zealand's claims, the Court missed an opporunity
to advance the development of international law.
PART ONE
The dispute between New Zealand and France that led to the
Court's 1995 judgment originated with New Zealand's objection to
France's proposal in 1973 to conduct a series of atmospheric nuclear
tests in the South Pacific. France proposed atmospheric nuclear testing
at Mururoa and Fangataufa Atolls, 600 miles from Tahiti and 2,500
miles from New Zealand. 9 Both Australia and New Zealand filed Applications in the ICJ claiming breach of legal norms in the testing of atmospheric nuclear weapons, unlawful action by allowing radioactive
fallout to cause atmospheric and marine pollution in their territories,
and interference with maritime and air navigation.10 The Court's jurisdiction was originally invoked on two bases: (1) Articles 36(1) and 37 of
the Statute of the Court and Article 17 of the General Act for the Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes [hereinafter "General Act"], to
which New Zealand and France both had acceded; (2) Articles 36(2) and
36(5) of the Statute of the Court. New Zealand received an interim protection order from the Court on June 22, 1973, which stated that the
French government should avoid conducting any nuclear tests in the
region until the Court had rendered a decision in the case.11
While the case was pending before the Court, France announced

7. See Craig R. Whitney, France PlanningNuclear Tests Despite Opposition, Chirac
Says, N. Y. TIMES, June 14, 1995, at A3, available in 1995 WL 2180971.
8. See Nuclear Tests Case (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1995 I.C.J. 288, 306.
9. See Barbara Kwiatkowska, New Zealand v. France Nuclear Tests: The Dismissed
Case of Lasting Significance, 37 VA. J. INT'L. L. 107, 111 (1996).
10. Id. at 112.
11. Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1973 I.C.J. 135, 142 (Interim Protection Order of June
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that it did not plan to proceed with any atmospheric nuclear testing in
the South Pacific. The Court thereafter dismissed New Zealand's case
without reaching any of the substantive claims. 12 In deciding to dismiss
the case, the Court noted that it is called upon "to resolve existing disputes between States"'13 and that the "circumstances that have since
arisen render any adjudication devoid of purpose." 14 The Court further
explained that "it does not enter into the adjudicatory functions of the
Court to deal with issues in abstracto, once it has reached the conclusion that the merits of the case no longer fall to be determined." 5 However, the Court did leave the door slightly open for New Zealand to return to it in the future when it added paragraph 63 to its judgment.
The court noted in paragraph 63 that it was not its function to speculate on whether France would keep its word, but that "if the basis of
this Judgment were to be affected, the Applicant could request an examination of the situation in accordance with the provisions of the
Statute."' 6 The precise meaning of this paragraph became the focal
point for New Zealand's claims some twenty-one years later.
On June 13, 1995, France announced that it would conduct a series
of eight underground nuclear tests in the territory of French Polynesia
in the South Pacific. 17 The announcement by French President Jacques
Chirac signaled an end to a voluntary three year moratorium on underground nuclear tests.' 8 The decision touched off a worldwide firestorm
of controversy and opposition. Besides internal protests by the French
population,' 9 lawmakers from around the world gathered in Tahiti (just
20
600 miles from the proposed tests) to protest the French decision.
Consumer boycotts of French goods and services were called for in New
Zealand and Australia. 21 Greenpeace dispatched a ship to protest the
French decision to resume testing which was boarded by French commandos on July 9, 1995.22 Undeterred, Greenpeace later announced it
would send a flotilla of up to 30 boats to the area in a coordinated effort

12. Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 456, 478 (Dec. 20).
13. Id. at 476.
14. Id. at 477 quoting Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. U.K.), 1963 I.C.J. 15, 38
(Dec. 2).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See Whitney, supra note 7.
18. See Thousands Gather in Tahiti to Protest France's Planned Nuclear Tests,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 3, 1995, at 23A, available in 1995 WL 9057718 [hereinafter
Thousands Gather in Tahiti].
19. See 3,000 in France Protest Nuclear Tests, PHOENIX GAZETTE, Sept. 12, 1995, at
A7, available in 1995 WL 2827420.
20. See Thousands Gather in Tahiti, supra note 18.
21. See Michael Richardson, Consumers Plan Boycotts Over French Tests, INT'L.
HERALD TRIB., June 17, 1995, available in 1995 WL 7546538.
22. See Craig R. Whitney, ParisDefends Seizing Ship in Atom Test Zone, N.Y. TIMES,
July 11, 1995, at A12,available in 1995 WL 2194745.

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 26:4

23
to stop the nuclear tests.

On August 8, 1995, Prime Minister Bolger of New Zealand announced that he would attempt to stop the French nuclear tests by returning to the ICJ and resuming the New Zealand v. France Nuclear
Tests case. 24 On August 21, 1995, New Zealand again instituted proceedings against France in the ICJ, basing the Court's jurisdiction on
the Court's Judgment of 1974. France's subsequent nuclear test on
September 5, 1995, increased the world's interest in the proceedings
now underway at the Hague. 25 Shortly thereafter, the European Parliament reaffirmed its opposition to all nuclear tests and called on
26
France to cancel the remaining planned tests.
PART TWO
The jurisdiction of the ICJ in contentious cases is based on the consent of the parties. 27 The required consent, under Article 36(1) of the
Statute of the Court, may be either express or implied. 28 A State may
also recognize compulsory jurisdiction under Article 36(2)29 for legal
30
disputes when another State has made a similar declaration.
Since France had denounced the General Act and withdrawn from
the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in 1974, New Zealand had no
jurisdictional basis based on consent on which to bring a new case
against France. 31 New Zealand's only option was to attempt to reopen

23. See Keith Miller, Profile: Protests Against France's Nuclear Tests, NBC NIGHTLY
NEWS, Aug. 26, 1995, availablein 1995 WL 10122216.
24. See Michael Munro, Bolger Seeks to Outlaw Atoll Nuclear Tests, THE TIMES
(LONDON), Aug. 9,1995, availablein 1995 WL 7689486.
25. See William Drozdiak, In Angry Words and Marches, World Condemns French
Test, INT'L. HERALD TRIB., Sept. 7, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, IHT File; Test
and Shout, ECONOMIST, Sept. 9, 1995, at 2, available in 1995 WL 9570473.
26. See Nuclear Tests: European Parliament Expresses Its Wrath Against France,
EUROPEAN REPORT, Sept. 23, 1995, available in 1995 WL 8359349.
27. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES 8 903 cmt. a (1986).
28. STATUTE OF THE COURT, art. 36, para. 1 reads, 'The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the
Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and conventions in force."
29. STATUTE OF THE COURT, art. 36, para. 2 provides, in part, 'The states.. may at
any time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement.. .the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning: the interpretation of
a treaty; any question of international law; the existence of any fact which, if established,
would constitute a breach of an international obligation; the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation."
30. See supra note 27, cmt. b. The requirement of "reciprocity" allows a defendant
state to invoke an exclusion or reservation that exists in the plaintiff state's declaration
but not in its own declaration.
31. See Don MacKay, Nuclear Testing: New Zealand and France in the International
Court of Justice, 19 FORDHAM INT'L. L.J. 1857, 1870 (1996).
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the earlier case. 32 The consensus among legal commentators was that
New Zealand faced a difficult legal task in its attempt to use the unusual paragraph 63 provision to provide a jurisdictional basis for the
Court

33

, Since there was no precedent for reopening a case in the way that
New Zealand was attempting, New Zealand had to choose its method of
proceeding very carefully. 34 New Zealand did not want to use the tradi-

tional Application, as provided for in the Statute 35 and Rules 36 of the

Court, to initiate the case since this would suggest that New Zealand
was attempting to open new proceedings. 37 Other options provided for
in the Statute, including seeking an interpretation 38 or a revision 39 of
the Judgment, were not available since these procedures would be time0
barred4
New Zealand asserted that France's announcement that it would
conduct new underground nuclear tests triggered the provisions of
paragraph 63 of the Court's judgment described above. 41 New Zealand
also asserted that the proposed underground nuclear tests affected the
"basis" of the Court's 1974 judgment. 42 New Zealand carefully framed
the "basis" of the judgment as not being limited to atmospheric nuclear
testing, 43 even though the 1974 Court had specifically referred to atmospheric testing in its decision. 44 New Zealand argued that its origi32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See STATUTE OF THE COURT, art. 40, para. 1 which provides, "Cases are brought
before the Court, as the case may be, either by the notification of the special agreement or
by a written application..."
36. See STATUTE OF THE COURT, art. 35, para. 2 which states, "When a case is brought
before the Court by means of an application, the application must, as laid down in Article
40, paragraph 1, of the Statute, indicate the party making it, the party against whom the
claim is brought and the subject of the dispute."
37. See MacKay, supranote 31, at 1871.
38. STATUTE OF THE COURT, art. 60 provides that all judgments are "[flinal and without appeal." However, a state may request an interpretation of the judgment "[iln the
event of dispute as to the meaning or scope of the judgment."
39. STATUTE OF THE COURT, art. 60, para. 1 states that "[an application for revision
of a judgment may be made only when it is based upon the discovery of some fact of such
a nature as to be a decisive factor, which fact was, when the judgment was given, unknown to the Court and also to the party claiming revision .... "
40. See MacKay, supra note 31, at 1871. Art. 61(5) mandates that "[nlo application
for revision may be made after the lapse of ten years from the date of the judgment."
41. Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1995 I.C.J. 288, 289 (Sept. 22).
42. Id. at 289-90.
43. Id.
44. The Court stated in paragraph 29 of its Judgment, "The Court therefore considers
that, for purposes of this Application, the New Zealand claim is to be interpreted as applying only to atmospheric tests, not to any other form of testing, and as applying only to
atmospheric tests so conducted as to give rise to radio-active fall-out on New Zealand's
territory." Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 457, 466 (Dec. 20).
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nal application did not refer only to atmospheric testing but to any nuclear testing affecting the environment and that the Court "matched"
New Zealand's concern with France's current form of testing. 45 New
Zealand continued its argument by asserting that the Court would not
have matched New Zealand's concern solely to atmospheric testing if
the Court had known in 1974 that underground nuclear testing would
not remove the risks of contamination. 46 Therefore, New Zealand argued that the "basis" of the 1974 judgment, limiting it to atmospheric
testing, had been altered and that it was entitled to a "resumption of
47
the proceedings."
On September 8, 1995, the Court announced that it would hold
hearings only on the "threshold" issue of whether New Zealand's proceedings fell within the provisions of paragraph 63 of the 1974 Judgment. After consideration of this question, the Court announced its Order of September 22, 1995, that New Zealand's request did not fall
within paragraph 63 and consequently New Zealand's claims would be
48
dismissed.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court analyzed the question before
it as requiring the consideration of two independent questions: first,
what types of procedures were envisaged by the Court pursuant to
paragraph 63; and, second, whether the "basis" of the 1974 judgment
had been "affected" within the meaning of paragraph 63.49 On the first
question, the Court concluded that the inclusion of paragraph 63's option for a "request for examination of the situation" could not have been
intended to limit New Zealand to procedures that would otherwise normally be available 5° , and that a "special procedure" is available to New
Zealand if the second question is answered in the affirmative. 51 Proceeding to the second question, the Court concluded that the 1974
Judgment "dealt exclusively with atmospheric nuclear tests" 52 and since
the current situation involves underground nuclear tests, the basis of
the judgment had not been affected as required by paragraph 63.5 By
dismissing the case for this reason, the Court avoided addressing any of
54
New Zealand's substantive claims under international law.

45. 1995 I.C.J. 288, at 290.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 307.
49. Id. at 302.
50. These other procedures include the option to file a new application (Art. 40 of the
I.C.J. statute), request an interpretation (Art. 60), or request a revision (Art. 61). See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
51. 1995 I.C.J. 288, at 303-304.
52. Id. at 306.

53. Id.
54. Specifically, the Court noted it "[clannot, therefore, take account of the arguments
derived by New Zealand... [including] the development of international law in recent dec-
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Although the Court did not reach the merits of New Zealand's
claims, the Court was careful to explain that the decision is "without
prejudice to the obligations of States to respect and protect the natural
environment, obligations to which both New Zealand and France have
in the present instance reaffirmed their commitment." 55 The Judge's
individual opinions in the case contain insightful comments on the
proper role of the Court and the development of international environmental law.
Interestingly, a short, separate opinion from the "Member of the
Court from the only country which has suffered the devastating effects
of nuclear weapons. . ." supported the Court's decision to dismiss New
56
Zealand's claim.
Judge Shahabuddeen, writing separately for the Court, noted the
development of the protection of the natural environment in contemporary international law. 57 However, Judge Shahabuddeen found it particularly salient that New Zealand was requesting substantive relief for
a "new situation" and "new acts."5 8 Judge Shahabuddeen concluded
that paragraph 63 was not intended to cover "fresh matters" and that
there is no "principle of law which entitles the Court to exercise a terminated jurisdiction over fresh acts occurring after the termination. . .. "59
Judges Weeramantry, Koroma, and Judge ad hoc Sir Geoffrey
Palmer each filed a strong dissenting opinion. Judge Weeramantry began by stating his agreement with the Court's conclusion that paragraph 63 was intended to provide New Zealand with a special procedure
not otherwise available. 60 A review of New Zealand's original 1973
complaint showed that there was no explicit reference to atmospheric
nuclear testing, but only a complaint of various types of damage from
radioactive fallout. 61 Most importantly, Judge Weeramantry asserted
that New Zealand's complaint of a violation of international law was
grounded in the fact of the injury - the damage from radioactive contamination - not the specific cause of the injury. 62 This point is emphasized by noting that it would be illogical to believe that New Zealand
would be content to endure damage from radioactive contamination as

ades." Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 310 (Judge Oda). While supporting the dismissal of New Zealand's claim,
Judge Oda concluded by expressing "[mly personal hope that no further tests of any kind
of nuclear weapons will be carried out under any circumstances in the future." Id.
57. Id. at 312.
58. Id. at 315.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 320-21.
61. Id. at 325-26.
62. Id. at 327.
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long as it was not due to atmospheric nuclear testing. 63
Judge Weeramantry continued by pointing out that the state of the
knowledge in 1974 indicated that underground nuclear tests were safe
and therefore that New Zealand's objections to atmospheric nuclear
testing were founded on the belief that they were the only form of unsafe testing. 64 Therefore, New Zealand's claims were actually directed
at unsafe nuclear testing and present knowledge indicates that underground nuclear tests are unsafe in the same ways that atmospheric
tests are unsafe. 65 Judge Weeramantry therefore concluded that the
basis of the 1974 judgment was that harm must not be caused by nuclear tests and that New Zealand was entitled to not be exposed to any
66
radioactive contamination from nuclear tests.
Judge Weeramantry noted that New Zealand must make out a
prima facie case that the dangers that were present in 1973 were present again in 1995 in order to activate the procedures of the Court. 67 In
analyzing this question, Judge Weeramantry proposed two possibilities
for the placement of the burden of proof: (1) to place the burden
squarely on New Zealand and determine whether a prima facie case has
been made out based on the dangers that New Zealand has complained
of; or (2) to use the principles of environmental law and place the burden on France to prove that it will not produce the damage that New
Zealand has alleged. 68 After a complex analysis of the evidence presented before the Court, Judge Weeramantry concluded that New Zealand had made out a strong prima facie case and had succeeded in
showing that the dangers complained of fell within the provisions of

paragraph 63.69
Judge Weeramantry discussed the importance of the principle of
intergenerational equity as a rapidly developing principle of environmental law. 70 Intergenerational equity is a concept of international law
that places a responsibility on countries to "protect and improve the environment for present and future generations." 71 In order to promote
intergenerational equity, the focus must be on preventing damage from
occurring. 72 Although a State has sovereignty over its territory,
intergenerational equity limits the exercise of this sovereignty to the
63. Id.
64. Id. at 328-29.
65. Id. at 330.
66. Id. at 332.
67. Id. at 347.
68. Id. at 348.
69. Id. at 358.
70. Id. at 341.
71. Id. at 342 quoting The Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, principle 1,June 16, 1972.
72. See EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL
LAW, COMMON PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY 84 (1989).
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use and benefit of the resources in its territory only when that use does
not destroy the resources for future generations.7 3 The Court must consider France's responsibility to future generations when it considers
74
whether New Zealand has made out a prima facie case.
The Judge noted how the precautionary principle allows New Zea75
land to bring this case before France has conducted the nuclear tests.
The precautionary principle provides that "[wihere there are threats of
serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should
not be used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent environmental degradation." 76 This principle has now been expressed in at
least seven international treaties and there exists sufficient state practice to conclude that it has gained broad acceptance on the international
level. 77 In this case, New Zealand provided materials that indicate
there is a serious threat of irreversible damage from the proposed underground nuclear tests and therefore the Court should postpone the
tests until a complete evaluation can be completed. 78 A corollary to the
precautionary principle is the requirement of an Environmental Impact
Assessment (EIA) before a state undertakes any activity that "is likely
to significantly affect the environment." 79 The Noumea Convention8 0
contains an explicit obligation to conduct an EIA before beginning any
project which might affect the marine environmentS1
The fundamental principle of modern environmental law that no
nation is entitled by its own activities to cause damage to the environment of any other nation also supports New Zealand's claim against
France. Judge Weeramantry described this principle as "well entrenched in international law."8 2 The origins of this principle can be
73. Id. at 290.
74. See Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1995 I.C.J. 288, 342 (Sept. 22).
75. Id.
76. Id. quoting Bergen ECE Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development,
May 15, 1990, in 1 BASIC DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 558-59
(Harald Hohmann ed., 1992).
77. See Phillipe Sands, The "Greening"ofInternationalLaw: Emerging Principlesand
Rules, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 293, 299-302 (1994).
78. Id. at 343.
79. Id. at 344 quoting UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME (UNEP)
GUIDELINES 187 (1987).

80. Noumea Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment in the South Pacific Region, Nov. 25, 1986, 26 I.L.M. 38 (1987) [hereinafter Noumea
Convention].
81. Art. 16(2) of the Noumea Convention provides, "Each party shall, within its capabilities, assess the potential effects of such projects on the marine environment.
Id. at
art. 16, 26 I.L.M. at 48 (emphasis added).
82. Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1995 I.C.J. 288, 346 (Sept. 22). In its later Advisory
Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 241-42
(July 8), the Court stated, '"The existence of the general obligation of states to ensure that
activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other States of
areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus of international law relating to the
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traced to the Trail Smelter Case8 3 and it is currently embodied in several international instruments.8 4 It is also codified in Section 601 of the
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
85
States.
Weeramantry concluded by stating that New Zealand had made out
a strong prima facie case and that their claims should be given full consideration by the Court since, when two conclusions are possible, the
Court should choose the one that does not shut out enquiry.8 6 He expressed regret that "the Court has not availed itself of the opportunity
to enquire more fully into this matter and of making a contribution to
some of the seminal principles of the evolving corpus of international
87
environmental law."

Judge Koroma's dissent focused on the proper standard that he believes the Court should have used to determine whether New Zealand
had established the legal basis for its Request.88 Judge Koroma believed New Zealand made out a prima facie case and that the Court
should have reached New Zealand's substantive claims.8 9 A close examination of paragraph 63 in its context revealed that the Court in
1974 believed that ending atmospheric testing would end any possible
radioactive contamination of the environment and that formed the basis
of the judgment.90 Judge Koroma indicated that the importance of the
claims presented by the case should cause the Court to resolve any close
questions in favor of the state alleging that the basis of the judgement
had been affected. 91
Koroma noted that there is probably a duty under contemporary international law "not to cause gross or serious damage which can reasonably be avoided, together with a duty not to permit the escape of
dangerous substances."92 He pointed to several international treaties
environment."
83. Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1941).
84. See, e.g., Rio Declaration of the Environment, principle 2 (1992); Noumea Convention, art. 4(6) (1987); Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, principle 21
(1972).
85. Section 601(1)(b) provides that a state is required to take necessary measures to
"ensure that activities within its jurisdiction or control are conducted so as not to cause
significant injury to the environment..."
86. 1995 I.C.J. at 362. Here, Judge Weeramanty differs fundamentally from the majority opinion that "[w]hile judicial settlement may provide a path to international harmony in circumstances of conflict, it is none the less true that the needless continuance of
litigation is an obstacle to such harmony." Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 457,
477 (Dec. 20).
87. Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1995 I.C.J. at 362.
88. Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1995 I.C.J. at 373.
89. Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1995 I.C.J. at 379.
90. Id. at 377-78.
91. Id. at 376.
92. Id. at 378.
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that contain this principle as indicative of a "trend" towards "prohibiting nuclear testing with radioactive effect."93 In Judge Koroma's opinion, the existence of this trend, combined with the evidence of the risk
of radioactive contamination from the French tests, should have caused
the Court to impose interim protective measures as a prelude to pro94
ceeding to a full examination of the situation.
Judge Palmer's dissenting opinion also noted that New Zealand
had made out a prima facie case for an examination of the situation in
accordance with paragraph 63.95 In reaching this conclusion, Judge
Palmer suggested that a risk-benefit analysis should be performed, and,
when applied to the facts of this case, a risk-benefit analysis shows
clearly that a prima facie case has been established. 96 He compared
this analysis to a law of torts calculation and noted that the International Law Commission had recently supported this type of test under
the section of its draft Articles titled "risk of causing significant transboundary harm." 97 Judge Palmer reviewed the development of international environmental law between 1973 and the date of the decision by
first noting that the original 1973 case was commenced shortly after the
international meeting at Stockholm which produced the Stockholm
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment. 98 There has been an explosion of international environmental
agreements in recent years and there currently exist more than a hundred multilateral environmental instruments. 99 Judge Palmer noted
two of the most important developments in international environmental
law have been the development of the precautionary principle and the
environmental impact assessment. 100 Interestingly, there is a corresponding lack of judgments in the area of international environmental
law. 10 1 Judge Palmer advanced his belief that the Court should look to
the current state of the applicable law at the date the Court is called on
to apply it when considering this type of case. 10 2 This is an important
point since international environmental law has been developing very

93. Id. at 378-79.
94. Id. at 379.
95. Id. at 405.
96. Id. at 404-05.
97. Id. at 405. The International Law Commission defined this expression as "the
combined effect of the probability of occurrence of an accident and the magnitude of its
injurious impact." Id. (quoting Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work
of its Forty-Sixth Session, May 2- July 22, 1994, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at
400, U.N. Doc A/49/10 (1994)).
98. Id. at 405.
99. Id. at 407.
100. Id. Judge Palmer pointed to the Rio Declaration of 1992 as the primary instrument that "refined, advanced, sharpened, and developed some of the principles adopted at
Stockholm." Id.
101. Id. at 408.
102. Id. at 413.
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recently and very rapidly and there was a much more limited body of
law to draw upon when the original nuclear tests case was plead in the
mid-1970s. Judge Palmer concluded with his perspective on the proper
role of the ICJ in the world today by first criticizing the "formalistic"
approach taken by the majority of the Court.1 03 He summarized the
majority opinion with his statement that "[tihe law appears as some
disembodied construct that is far removed from the concerns of the real
world." 104 Judge Palmer continued his stinging attack on the majority
by concluding that he "find[s] such an approach to legal reasoning arid
and intellectually unsatisfying." 10 5 Finally, Judge Palmer declared that
"[t]he Court has a responsibility to declare, develop and uphold international law." 10 6
PART THREE
The contrast between the majority opinion and the dissenting
opinions is striking and revealing. The New Zealand v. France nuclear
tests case illustrates a crucial divergence among the Court members on
the proper role of the Court in the development of international law.
The majority opinion, even though it failed to reach New Zealand's substantive claims, can not be criticized as incomplete in its legal analysis.
Indeed, the twenty-page Court opinion illustrates a very thorough
analysis of the pleadings presented and demonstrates the Court's careful consideration of the technical jurisdictional issue presented. However, the Court's conclusion on the jurisdictional issue resulted in the
disappointing decision to dismiss New Zealand's claims without reaching their substance. In dismissing New Zealand's claims, the Court
missed a golden opportunity to advance the development of international law.
The key issue in the Court's decision, whether the "basis" of the
Court's 1974 Judgment had been affected, could have been decided in
favor of New Zealand without compromising the integrity of the Court
and the requirement for jurisdiction. New Zealand, admittedly, was attempting to use a novel approach to gain jurisdiction. However, the
Court recognized the necessity to allow New Zealand to use such a
novel procedure to return to the Court when it included paragraph 63 in
its 1974 Judgment. Paragraph 63 was written in very general terms
and included no mention of atmospheric testing.107 The Court admitted
that New Zealand's application did not specify atmospheric nuclear
testing but simply referred to nuclear tests that "give rise to radioactive

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
Id. at 414.

Id.
Id. at 417.
See Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 457, 477 (Dec. 20).
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fall-out. 10s To make the leap to limit the application to atmospheric
tests, the Court relied on the fact that New Zealand had argued its case
"mainly in relation to atmospheric tests."109 However, as Judge
Weeramantry correctly pointed out, it is illogical to believe New Zealand would have limited its application to atmospheric testing if France
had also been conducting or considering underground nuclear testing.
Considering the fact that underground nuclear testing was not being
conducted at the time and there was insufficient evidence to determine
if such testing would cause radioactive contamination, it was extraordinary for the Court to penalize New Zealand twenty-one years later for
failing to argue an irrelevant issue. However, the Court did exactly
that when it decided to stand-by the proposition that the "basis" of the
1974 Judgment was solely atmospheric nuclear testing.
This result is disheartening to proponents of the increased influence of the rule of international law in relations among States. At the
very least, the Court could reasonably have found the provisions of
paragraph 63 triggered by New Zealand's request so that the important
legal issues raised could have been given a full consideration and
treatment. The Charter of the ICJ defines the Court's function as deciding "in accordance with international law" the disputes that are
submitted to it.110 In describing this function, the Charter requires the
Court to consider international conventions, international custom, and
general principles of law."' By reaching an unnecessary conclusion
limiting the scope of its earlier decision, the Court effectively failed to
undertake a consideration on the merits in accordance with international law and its duty under the Charter.
The process of deciding a case on the merits allows and encourages
further development of international law and further respect for the
role of international law in the often-anarchical world of international
relations. The Court has refused to run from sensitive issues in the
past 1' 2 and it is perplexing and disappointing to see it do so in this
judgment. As Judge Shahabuddeen noted, the Court in the past has
"found opportunity for enterprise and even occasional boldness. Especially where there is doubt, its forward course is helpfully illuminated
by broad notions of justice.""l 3 Hopefully, the future will bring an International Court of Justice with a greater incentive to continue its
"forward course" and develop and strengthen the role of international

108. Id. at 466.
109. Id.
110. STATUTE OF THE COURT, art. 38, para. 1.
111. STATUTE OF THE COURT, art. 38, para. 1.

112. As evidenced by the Court's willingness in the past to consider the politically
charged issues of, among other things, the legality of nuclear weapons and the U.S. support of rebel forces in Nicaragua.
113. Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1995 I.C.J. 288, 316 (Sept. 22).
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An Alternate Role for the International Court
of Justice: Applied to Cameroon v. Nigeria
Joe C. Irwin
I. INTRODUCTION

On March 29, 1994, the Republic of Cameroon (hereinafter "Cameroon") instituted proceedings, via Application, before the International
Court of Justice (hereinafter "ICJ"). These proceedings were initiated
against the Federal Republic of Nigeria (hereinafter "Nigeria") in regard to a dispute described as relating essentially to the question of
sovereignty over the Bakassi Peninsula. 1
Cameroon's Application alleged that Cameroon's title to the Bakassi Peninsula was contested by Nigeria; that since the end of 1993,
this contestation had taken the form of an aggression by Nigeria which
resulted in great prejudice to Cameroon, for which the ICJ was requested to order reparation. 2 Cameroon further alleged that the delimitation of the maritime boundary between the two States had remained
a partial one and despite many attempts to complete it, the two parties
had been unable to do so; and Cameroon requested the ICJ to determine
the course of the maritime boundary between the two States beyond the
line fixed in 1975.3 At the close of the Application, Cameroon reserved
the right to complement, amend, or modify the present Application and
to submit to the Court a request for the indication of provisional meas4
ures should they prove to be necessary.
On June 6, 1994, Cameroon exercised the above right and filed an
Additional Application for the purpose of extending the subject of the
dispute to a further dispute, described in that Additional Application as
relating essentially to the question of sovereignty over a part of the territory of Cameroon in the area of Lake Chad. 5 The Additional Application alleged that Cameroon's title to that part of the territory was contested by Nigeria. 6 Cameroon also requested the ICJ to specify
1. See Land and Maritime Boundary (Cameroon v. Nig.), 1996 I.C.J. 13, 1 (Provisional Measures Order of Mar. 15).
2. Id.

3. Id.
4. Id. at 2.
5. Id.
6. Land and Maritime Boundary (Cameroon v. Nig.), 1996 I.C.J. at 2.
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definitively the frontier between the two States from Lake Chad to the
sea, and asked it to join the two Applications and to examine the whole
7
in a single case.
No objections were raised by Nigeria in treating the Additional Application of Cameroon as an amendment to the initial Application, and
the ICJ also indicated its acceptance of the amendment by its Order of
June 16, 1994.8 Nigeria, however, did raise preliminary objections to
the jurisdiction of the ICJ over the issues raised in both Applications,
and the admissibility of the claims of Cameroon. 9 In response to the
objections raised by Nigeria the ICJ issued the Order of January 10,
1996, which suspended the proceedings on the merits until May 15,
1996, at which time Cameroon was to present a written response to Nigeria's objections. 10
Before Cameroon entered its response to Nigeria's objections, hostilities in the disputed territories increased, and Cameroon then initiated before the ICJ its Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures." After oral statements, the ICJ issued the Order of March 15,
1996.12
II.

INEFFECTIVENESS OF THE PRESENT ROLE OF THE ICJ

The ICJ was created by the U.N. Charter in 1945 and was designed
to be the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. 13 Most of the
cases that have come before the ICJ have been decided by the entire
Court.
The ICJ has jurisdiction over two types of cases: contentious cases
and cases seeking an advisory opinion. 14 While many of its decisions
have been important, the ICJ has not lived up to the hopes of many of
its early supporters; that hope being the ICJ, along with the United Nations, would evolve into an international government. To begin with, 90
cases in almost 50 years is not a heavy caseload (though the ICJ's
docket has become more active recently). 15 Moreover, many of the cases
have not been of great international importance. In more than 20 contentious cases, the ICJ's jurisdiction or the admissibility of an applica7. Id. at 2-3.
8. Id. at 3.
9. Id. at 4.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 9.
13. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 92-96.
14. See STATUTE OF THE COURT, arts. 36-65.
15. See Edith B. Weiss, Judicial Independence and Impartiality: A PreliminaryInquiry, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS 135-39 (L. Damrosch
ed., 1987).
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tion (i.e., the complaint) was challenged, with the ICJ dismissing almost
half of these cases.1 6 When the ICJ did reach a judgment on the merits,
the affected parties have generally complied with it, but there have
17
been exceptions, especially in recent years.
The reason for the ICJ's limited influence are varied. These include
the limits on the ICJ's jurisdiction, its relatively rigid procedure, and
the enforceability of its decrees. On enforceability of decrees, a U.N.
member "undertakes to comply with the decision" of the ICJ if "it is a
party" to the case, and the U.N. Security Council may "decide upon
measures to be taken to give effect to the [ICJ's] judgment."'18
As noted, although states have complied with the ICJ's judgments
in many of the cases, recalcitrant States have on occasion refused to
comply. For example, the ICJ's first decision in a contentious case was
against Albania for mining the Corfu Channel and damaging British
warships. 19 Although the ICJ ruled in 1949 that Albania should pay
monetary damages, Albania has yet to do so. 20 In 1980, Iran refused to
comply with the ICJ's judgment to release the U.S. hostages. 21 Even
the United States continued to support the Nicaraguan Contras in spite
of the ICJ's 1986 decision saying that this support violated international law. 22 Furthermore, the U.N. Security Council, hampered in part
by its veto-wielding members, has yet to take measures to enforce an
ICJ judgment.

III. AN ALTERNATIVE ROLE FOR THE ICJ
In light of the apparent ineffectiveness of the ICJ, it is suggested
that by modifying the study of Fredrich Kratochwil, 23 and applying it to
the role of the ICJ, the ICJ may expand its role and effectiveness in conflict resolution. Kratochwil asserts that one of the main functions of
third-party intervention is to expedite conflict resolution through peaceful means. 24 In any contentious case brought before the ICJ, the ICJ is
in fact a third party intervenor whose function is to expedite the resolution of the contentious case. The ICJ may effectively enhance this function through substantive methods, such as fact-finding or judgments, or
through initiating such procedural methods as good offices and media16. Id.
17. Id.
18. U.N. CHARTER art. 94.
19. See BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 301 (1995).

20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See FREDRICH KRATOCHWIL, ET AL., PEACE
REFLECTIONS ON CONFLICT OVER TERRITORY (1985).

24. Id. at 122.

AND

DISPUTED

SOVEREIGNTY:
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tion.25 By applying Kratochwil's study to the ICJ, the role of the ICJ
may be: explicit, i.e., limiting its role to establishing communications
between the parties or, at the other extreme, involving authoritative
rule application (e.g., adjudication); or, implicit, i.e., using norms and
rules to allow antagonistic parties to take a step back and view their
disagreement more objectively. 26 The critical element remains the belief of the two disputants that the ICJ can help in the achievement of a
settlement or resolution and that its role in both substance and proce27
dure should be considered.
To expedite the contentious case to resolution through peaceful
means, the obvious goal of the ICJ's intervention should be to achieve
an exchange of promises and commitments between the parties (either
legally or informally framed), in writing, that particular actions will be
taken to resolve the source of the dispute. 28 Kratochwil asserts that
trust between the two disputants is crucial to the formulation of settlements; without the faith that the promises exchanged will be carried
out, a peaceful effort to solve the problem will collapse. 29 Likewise, the
ICJ, through the prestige of its office, must maintain trust between the
disputants.
The ICJ may achieve trust and agreements between the parties by
reducing the incongruence of perceptions and/or principles. 30 Kratochwil asserts that incompatible perceptions can be resolved more easily if the parties share common principles to guide resolution; a difference in principles can be sidestepped if there exists a single perception
of reality in which both parties can work to satisfy their interests. 31 By
facilitating agreement on either principles or perceptions, the situation
is reduced to one-step processes towards settlement. However, Kratochwil warns that when principles are so divergent that the process for
resolution becomes an issue itself, interest bargaining usually prevails,
which is neither good nor bad, but may take unwanted forms. 32 The
ICJ, however, by dictating the legal process may ensure the resolution
of incompatible principles.

25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See Thomas R. Colosi, Negotiations in the Public and Private Sectors, AM.
BEHAV. SCI., Nov.-Dec. 1983, 229, 233 (this particular issue of the journal is dedicated to
the issue of negotiation and its behavioral perspectives).
29. KRATOCHWIL, supra note 23, at 123.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. The literature by Fisher an Ury has noted this, distinguishing between position bargaining and interest bargaining.
ROGER FISHER AND WILLIAM URY,
INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION: A WORKING GUIDE (1978); ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY,

GETTING TO YES (1983).
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When the positions of the disputants in contentious cases are diametrically opposed, the ICJ must decrease the incongruence by enhancing the potential for change among the perception and principles of
both parties. 33 The ICJ can raise doubts about the positions held and
34
objectively question issues, assumptions, and facts of either party.
The role of the ICJ should be to point out problems and raise doubts
about the respective positions through legal opinion, not for judgment
and therefore choosing a side, but for the purpose of forcing the parties
35
to legally question their own perceptions and principles.
IV.

ALTERNATIVICE

ROLE APPLIED TO CAMEROON V. NIGERIA

The alternative role of the ICJ and the methods it may utilize for
resolving the boundary and territorial dispute between Cameroon and
Nigeria peacefully, may be achieved through the congruence of perceptions and coping with incongruent principles.
A. Perceptions
The ICJ may motivate and achieve congruence of perceptions between Cameroon and Nigeria by:
encouraging, organizing, and participating in information-generating
activities;

36

requiring both parties to explain and document their perceptions and
37
relevant facts of the conflict;

38
establishing the advantage of priorities among facts and concerns;
39
generating options for the parties to consider in interest negotiations;

encouraging the possibility of partial agreements and interim measures; 40 and

33. KRATOCHWIL, supra note 23, at 123.
34. Colosi, supra note 28, at 235.
35. KRATOCHWIL, supra note 23, at 123.
36. See LALL, MODERN INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATING 9-20 (1966) (even comprehensive studies of negotiating have neglected the role of information, e.g., inquiry is the only
informational aspect among eight different forms of negotiating).
37. KRATOCHWIL, supra note 23, at 124.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 125.
40. Id.
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possibly requiring 41
the inclusion of a group of two or more states in the
resolution process.

Perceptions between Cameroon and Nigeria may be more easily
reconciled if both are working from a co-created common knowledge
base. 42 This knowledge base may be created from geodetic surveys, census-taking in disputed areas, fact-finding commissions, and historic
verifications. Kratochwil cautions however, that such surveys can also
have the effect of aggravating disputes if they reveal facts that compound existing problems. 43 The Peru-Ecuador border conflict is an example in which new information led to greater conflict. 44 Kratochwil
asserts the problem was one of timing and not of the produced information. By having both Cameroon and Nigeria participate in creating the
base of information from which future settlement discussions may stem
allows for the important first step of participation of occur. However,
the ICJ must evaluate the potential for greater conflict versus the value
of the co-collected common knowledge so that a Peru-Ecuador situation
does not ensue.
Finding a firm basis for agreement or disagreement is also a useful
task for ICJ intervention. Complete knowledge of where Cameroon and
Nigeria agree and disagree may be incomplete. One scholar of diplomacy has noted the importance of exploring the parties' awareness of
their counterpart's perceptions, of determining to what extent they are
informed about the opponent's views and how reasonable they find
them. 45 Kratochwil notes that greater awareness may not mean greater
acceptance, but without such knowledge, misinterpretation of each
other's actions is assured. 46 Knowledge between Cameroon's and Nigeria's view may not lead to immediate resolution. But even knowledge of
their differences is an important step to take. In a sense, it is an
agreement to disagree, which is a foundation upon which further
agreement may occur.
Structuring issues to recast the nature of the disagreements and
thus modifying the disputants' perspectives encourages tradeoffs, concessions, and comprehensive perspectives. 47 Identification and the ordering of issues can give the ICJ a clear avenue to crafting a solution.
For example, a complete airing of the concerns of Argentina and Chile
41. Id. at 126.
42. Id. at 124.
43. Id.
44. See BRYCE WOOD, AGGRESSION AND HISTORY: THE CASE OF ECUADOR AND PERU
2-3 (1978).
45. See e.g., GLENN FISHER, INTERCULTURAL NEGOTIATION 24 (1978).
46. KRATOCHWIL, supra note 23, at 124.
47. See DYNAMICS OF THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION: KISSINGER IN THE MIDDLE EAST

28-33 (Jeffrey Z. Rubin ed., 1981).
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in the Beagle Channel dispute might have resulted in a settlement
sooner than the lengthy Papal intervention which salvaged some benefit from the disavowed arbitral award of 1977.48 Though this process
may by objected to by Cameroon and/or Nigeria, by doing this, the ICJ
is able to define the varying importance of different facets of the issues
presented and regulate the manner and timing of when they are to be
presented for resolution. If a particularly contentious issue would
threaten the entire process, then the ICJ could re-focus the attention on
a less contentious issue and thereby initiate a cooling off period. Kratochwil asserts that working towards recognition of the counterpart's
concerns implies no acceptance of these concerns but is likely to yield
49
more pointed and constructive negotiations.
One major downfall in the process of resolution is the potential for
a perceived stalemate or the total dissatisfaction of one party resulting
in a walk-out. To inhibit the potential for these downfalls, the ICJ may
propose or order new options and alternatives whose sole purpose is to
keep the parties in the resolution process. One study of Latin American
conflicts noted that the frustration engendered by unresolved border
problems often leads to armed conflict when all avenues for resolution
appear otherwise blocked. 50 The ICJ must maintain the sense of the
possibility for peaceful resolution during the slow process of judgment
and order. Roger Fisher suggests that by treating the dispute as one
problem and, after understanding the desires and constraints of both
sides, to draft an agreement tailored to the needs of the parties that,
with revisions, is likely to be acceptable to both sides.5 1 Such an approach would keep the focus off the overall conflict by requiring the focus of Cameroon and Nigeria be kept on coordinating perceptions
through the process it entails. For example, were this process to be
used in the Somali-Ethiopian context it might have revealed to what
degree there existed actually compatible ends (Ethiopian security and
Somali land use) rather than incompatible means (sole and sovereign
52
possession of the same territory).
The ICJ should be willing to allow the common perceptions between
Cameroon and Nigeria to be developed in increments. The distinction
has been made between conflict resolution and conflict settlement;53 the
48. See F. A. Vallet, The Beagle ChannelAffair, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 733, 734 (1977).
49. KRATOCHWIL, supra note 23, at 123.
50. See Ruben de Hoyos, Islas Malvinas or Falkland Islands: The Negotiation of a
Conflict, 1945-1982, in CONTROLLING LATIN AMERICAN CONFLICTS 185 (M.A. Morris and

V. Millan eds., 1983).
51. See Roger Fisher, Playing the Wrong Game?, in DYNAMICS OF THIRD PARTY
INTERVENTION: KISSINGER IN THE MIDDLE EAST 128 (Jeffrey Z. Rubin ed., 1981).
52. See TOM FARER, WAR CLOUDS ON THE HORN OF AFRICA 57-58 (1976).
53. See JACOB BERCOVITCH, SOCIAL CONFLICTS AND THIRD PARTIES: STRATEGIES OF

CONFLICT RESOLUTION 11 (1984).
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first occurs when the basic structure of the situation giving rise to behavior has been re-perceived and re-evaluated, the second takes place
when only the destructive behavior has diminished and hostile attitudes have lessened. If the ICJ is unable to completely change the perception of Cameroon and Nigeria (which is more than likely), then conflict settlement must be relied upon. Even though settlement may only
be an initial step and of interim duration, it can provide a cooling off period and growth of trust between the parties as well as confidence in the
third party. 54 At times the interim settlement can have remarkable
longevity: the Trieste settlement of 1954 was not accepted by Italy as an
agreement that extinguished its claims to the territory held by Yugoslavia, but the "Memorandum of Understanding" has settled the issue
for over 40 years. 55 Without mentioning sovereignty, the dispute was
shelved without loss of face to either party: as the American negotiator
said in retrospect of the situation, "nothing is as permanent as the tem56
porary."
While a single intervening third party, such as the ICJ, may sometimes hinder efforts at conflict resolution by taking sides and thereby
changing its role to a conflictual mode with either Cameroon or Nigeria,
a third-party group of states, with the ICJ as the "lead" intervening
party, may influence the negotiations between Cameroon and Nigeria
effectively. In Latin America multi-state third-party interventions have
a long history. They have proposed peace plans and served to guarantee the execution of treaties.5 7 In 1953 when Costa Rica was attacked
by rebels from Nicaragua, the OAS appointed an investigating committee which produced recommendations that were implemented with OAS
support. 58 In 1969, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Guatemala mediated a
dispute between El Salvador and Honduras. 59 The Contadora group
composed of Panama, Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia has persistently attempted to find alternatives to militarization in resolving Cen-

54. For an interesting study on partial settlement as a technique see, Roger Fisher,
Fractioning Conflict, in INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE: THE
CRAIGVILLE PAPERS (Roger Fisher ed., 1964).
55. See SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS: TRIESTE 1954 (John C. Campbell ed., 1976).
56. ROBERT D. MURPHY, in SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS: TRIESTE 1954 141 (John C.
Campbell ed., 1976).
57. Many multilateral agreements for peaceful settlement procedures have been
signed since the Latin nations gained independence in the early 19th century, though few
have had lasting effects. See Juan Carlos Puig, Controlling Latin American Conflicts:
Current Juridical Trends and Perspectives of the Future, in CONTROLLING LATIN
AMERICAN CONFLICTS 185 (M.A. Morris and V. Millan eds., 1983). The influence of the
third party was notably greater in U.N. and other mediation activities when several
states constituted the third party. See also LALL, MODERN INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATING
100 (1966).
58. Puig, supra note 57, at 185.
59. Id. at 186.
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tral American conflicts. 60 The role of the ICJ in defining perceptions of
the problems is crucial in creating cohesion of perceptions between
Cameroon and Nigeria. By utilizing the avenue of including a group of
two or more states in the resolution process, the ICJ gains a wider perspective of the respective views, gains an independent party not perceived by Cameroon and/or Nigeria as a potential conflicting party, and
receives further points where agreement may be established. In keeping with the hopes of the ICJ's original proponents, this is in essence
the ICJ becoming a global court with a global perspective and judgment.
B. Principles
The ICJ may change the perceptions of Cameroon and Nigeria as
new data become accepted among them as "facts". Perception are, however, also based on principles which are normative at their core. Principles may involve both the legal reasoning by which the dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria should be resolved (e.g., belief in the
equidistance principle) and the process mechanisms through which
such reasoning should be determined (e.g., belief in ICJ resolution).
Kratochwil asserts that such principles may be pushed toward congruence through legal and process methods. 6 1 The ICJ may motivate and
achieve congruence in principles between Cameroon and Nigeria by:
creating doubts in the minds of Cameroon and/or Nigeria that a particular principle is the most appropriate for the circumstance;
working toward agreement on microprinciples, disaggregating the issues so as to allow different principles to resolve different issues;
untying the bundle of sovereign rights inherent in sovereignty, potentially implementing several principles simultaneously and allowing for
shared responsibility and multiple national interests; and
notarizing principles in agreements even when they cannot be immedi62
ately and fully implemented.
The ICJ may bring flexibility into the rigid confrontations of principle between Cameroon and Nigeria by raising doubts about its application in the particular issue at hand. 63 Instead of just focusing upon the
legal issues at hand, the ICJ may modify its approach and take a more
60. Id. at 192.
61. KRATOCHWIL, supra note 23, at 133.
62. Id. at 128.
63. Id.
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factual tact. Does the issue properly illustrate the principle? Why are
alternative principles not appropriate? Are the state's interests best
pursued through strict adherence to this principle? How compatible is
the principle with competing patterns of reasoning concerning the dispute? The ICJ may even question the parties separately (if the questions are strictly to that parties principles and does not ask for the
other party's response) raising questions designed to arouse doubts
about the uniqueness of a given principle's applicability to the case. 64
The questioning of the ICJ should focus on the factual bases of perception and the ideological basis of belief of either/or Cameroon and Nigeria should be encouraged, but doubting the values of national identity
or ideology is not productive. Kratochwil cautions that care should be
taken by the ICJ not to question the base values from which adherence
to these principles springs. 65 Questioning Cameroonian or Nigerian
values such as ethnic or linguistic unity, territorial integrity, or historic
entitlement may provoke a defensive, closed mentality in the party. 66
The efficacy of pursuing these values by either Cameroon or Nigeria
through any particular principle is what should be explored by the
ICJ.67 By doing so, the ICJ may effectively avoid stalemate in concessions and encourage the acknowledgment of common interests.
As a correlation to obtaining mutual interests, harmonized principles among Cameroon and Nigeria may be achieved by the ICJ requiring agreement on specific issues before continuation on to others. For
example, such agreement on microprinciples was used by Henry
Kissinger in his Middle East diplomacy. 68 It was a success because it
worked towards settlement even though it attempted no final resolution
of the underlying conflict. 69 Although trust was low and there was very
little room for mediation, Kissinger was still able to harness the immediate common interests of the states in gaining a settlement of the immediate issue of disengagement.70 If Cameroon and Nigeria can formulate mutually beneficial principles for new issue areas, the older
issues may start to yield to creeping coordination. This method differs
from traditional functionalist approaches in that it is not limited to
technical areas. 71 Instead, it encourages spillover into all issue areas on
64. Id.
65. Id.

66. Id.
67. Id.
68. For an analysis of Kissinger's mediation effort see I. William Zartman, Explaining
Disengagement, in DYNAMICS OF THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION: KISSINGER IN THE MIDDLE
EAST 148-67 (Jeffrey Z. Rubin ed., 1981).

69. Id.
70. Id.
71. In comparison with functionalist theory which endeavored to depoliticize matters
of international public policy and spread apolitical cooperation, use of micro-principles
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distinctly political grounds, for the normative base applicable to one is72
sue may be perceived as having wider applicability.
If and when the Cameroon and Nigeria agree on micro-principles to
solve one problem within the larger dispute, the agreement should be
notarized by the ICJ. Kratochwil asserts that progress on solving
smaller issues one at a time can lead to larger settlements; disaggregating the problem into smaller, more definable parts allows for more
specific and appropriate use of principles and eliminates the need to
fight for exclusionary adoption of one principle or another. 73 By doing
so, the ICJ is making the benefits of resolution larger and dividing the
issues to be resolved.
Kratochwil asserts that one of the most useful means to gain congruence of principle between disputants is to separate sovereign
rights. 74 The state system makes for clear definitions of jurisdictions
but hinders resolution of interstate problems of shared resources and
environments. These rights were not always so indivisibly bound; theory in international politics has recognized a "heteronomous sovereignty" in Medieval Europe where powers and rights were a patchwork
of overlapping jurisdictions. 75 The ICJ is not precluded, even when recognizing sovereignty, from requiring shared jurisdiction within the
same geographic area as part of the resolution process between Cameroon and Nigeria. Kratochwil argues that recognition of full jurisdiction
over some area of governance (e.g., social or political affairs) need not
conflict with the reality of an indivisible environment and responsibility
in the community of nations. 76 Such an order may force Cameroon and
Nigeria towards leniency in other issues in dispute
When historic boundaries are inappropriate between Cameroon
and Nigeria for reasons of administrative necessity, the ICJ should divide the responsibilities along the lines of which party is most appropriate to supervise them. This does not mean denying the state rights of
either Cameroon or Nigeria but rather granting or sharing the rights
for mutual benefit until a lasting resolution may be fashioned. This in
itself is denying each Cameroon and Nigeria absolute claim, while at
the same time allowing dual access. The Austrian-Italian agreements
regarding the South Tyrol (or Alto Adige) region exemplify what form
could allow functionally specific norms to be implemented where appropriate, and yet facilitate their spread where desirable. For a discussion of traditional functionalist theory
see PAUL TAYLOR & A.J.R. GROOM,
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1975).
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72. Id.
73. KRATOCHWIL, supra note 23, at 129.

74. Id.
75. John C. Ruggie, Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Towards a
Neorealist Synthesis, 35 WORLD POL. 261, 274-75 (1983).
76. KRATOCHWIL, supra note 23, at 130.
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shared jurisdiction might take. Through bilateral agreements and multilateral resolutions, jurisdictional matters traditionally regarded as
under the purview of domestic affairs were recognized as a legitimate
77
international concern.
As evidenced by the Chinese lease of Hong Kong to the United
Kingdom in the heyday of colonialism 100 years ago, a state does not
alienate it claim to possession of a territory through granting another
state specific rights in the territory for a stated period. The agreement
between Britain and China on the future of Hong Kong initialed on
September 21, 1984 affirmed this, but at the same time re-distributed
some of the rights of sovereignty. Kratochwil asserts this method of dividing sovereignty allows a variety of principles of governance to hold
within a single geographic area, which is what the historic accidents of
colonial borders necessitate for much of the world.78 Such an arrangement initiated by the ICJ would lend flexibility to the political structuring of an agreement between the diverse and shifting ethnic populations of Cameroon and Nigeria, and would be in line with the hope of its
early supporters of playing a major role in global conflict resolution and
initiating a more globally oriented judicial organ.
Kratochwil notes that one method of coping with coordinate principles that remain completely incompatible is to incorporate them in the
agreement settling the dispute but not adhere to them strictly.7 9 If the
ICJ officially recognized in a judicial context the significance of a Cameroonian or Nigerian principle in a circumstance in which it cannot be
fully implemented, both Cameroon and Nigeria may agree to adhere in
principle. Official recognition or notarization of the principle then
would be a bases for continuing the process. Once again, such an action
by the ICJ would be a step upon which a final resolution can later be
fashioned.
This method may have been utilized in the Gulf of Main resolution.8 0 The equidistance principle Canada favored as a method of dividing the Gulf and its wealth of fish and oil resources had been used in
many circumstances around the world, even if it had been specifically
disavowed by the ICJ as customary international law. 81 Because the
U.S. had maintained this principle as the basis for deciding other
pending U.S.-Canadian maritime delimitations and because it was the
most practical, convenient, and certain way of defining the boundary
77. For a more detailed discussion and history of this matter, see H. SIEGLER,
OESTERREICH CHRONIK, 1945-1972 (1973).

78. KRATOCHWIL, supra note 23, at 131.
79. Id. at 132.
80. See Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary of the Gulf of Maine (Can. v. U.S.),
1984 I.C.J. 246 (Oct. 12).
81. Id.
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between adjacent and opposite states, the jurisdictions could arguably
have been divided by this method.82 However, even the widely accepted
logic of the equidistance principle must be notarized, and important circumstances prevented its full implementation. The ICJ's decision in
many ways reflected these considerations.
If the conflict between Cameroon and Nigeria even defies rigid legal
mechanisms, the resolution may still be brought about by the ICJ if it
utilizes interest bargaining. Borders are barometers of power at a particular time and place, and bargaining always requires a power framework which tells each party the limits to its capability.8 3 Negotiations
of interests is still power-based. Therefore, the ICJ should be cautioned
because its goal is peaceful resolution to the boundary and territorial
dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria, and interest bargaining may
well leave relatively weaker parties' interests unsatisfied, sowing the
seeds for future disputes and revanchisme if the power distribution
84
shifts at some later time.
Equity is not necessarily an outcome from the interest bargaining
approach. The role of the ICJ is to present equitable principles set forth
in judicial judgments to reinsert equity into the resolution effort. Extra-legal negotiations by the ICJ can effectively prevent the conflict
from escalating between Cameroon and Nigeria; but the farther resolution moves from the reconciliation of contending principles, the nearer
it moves to power politics. Therefore, Kratochwil suggests that a mid85
point on the continuum is the point to aim for when principles conflict.
V.

CONCLUSION

It has been suggested that in light of the apparent ineffectiveness
of the ICJ, the ICJ should consider an alternative avenue in the conflict
resolution between Cameroon and Nigeria, and modify its role based
upon the study of Fredrich Kratochwil.8 6 Such a modified role would
then not limit the ICJ to a strict legal ruling (which by operation puts
the parties in contention), but would allow the consideration of the opposing perceptions and principles of Cameroon and Nigeria and the

82. For the U.S. preference for equidistance in the Beaufort Sea, Juan de Fuca Strait,

and Dixon Entrance (Near Alaska), see Wang, Canada-UnitedStates Fisheries and Maritime Boundary Negotiations: Diplomacy in Deep Water, 38-39 in WORLD POL. 21, 23
(1981). For a detailed but dated account of U.S.-Canadian arbitral history, see, P.E.
CORBETT, THE SETTLEMENT OF CANADIAN-AMERICAN DISPUTES (1937).

83. See e.g., Anthony Allott, Boundaries and the Law in Africa, in AFRICAN
BOUNDARY PROBLEMS 12 (C.G. Widstrand ed., 1969); Isaiah Bowman, The Strategy of
TerritorialDecisions, 24 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 3, 117-194 (1946).
84. KRATOCHWIL, supra note 23, at 132.

85. Id. at 133.
86. KRATOCHWIL, supra note 23.
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fashioning of a remedy that is conciliatory to both disputants. In Japan, conciliation is the cornerstone of domestic conflict resolution, with
gradations from formal to informal legal mechanisms.87 Accordingly,
with the main function of ICJ intervention being to expedite conflict
resolution through peaceful means,88 conciliation through the harmonization of perceptions and principles is paramount in fashioning a lasting remedy between Cameroon and Nigeria.
This alternative role of the ICJ may be effectively enhanced
through substantive methods, such as fact-finding, or judgments, or
through initiating such procedural methods as good offices and mediation.8 9 Such substantive and procedural methods may be traditionally
viewed as outside the scope of the ICJ, but, to bring a peaceful resolution to so diametrically contentious parties such as Cameroon and Nigeria, any successful role should be utilized. Further, the role of the ICJ
may be: explicit, i.e., limiting its role to establishing communications
between the parties or, at the other extreme, involving authoritative
rule application (e.g., adjudication); or, implicit, i.e., using norms and
rules to allow antagonistic parties to take a step back and view their
disagreement more objectively. 90
The obvious goal of the ICJ in finding a resolution to the dispute
between Cameroon and Nigeria is to achieve an exchange of legally or
informally framed agreements. 91 But without trust, without a meeting
of the minds (a meeting of perceptions and principles), a peaceful resolution, even if judicially ordered, will collapse. 92 The only avenue to facilitate an effective ICJ order to which Cameroon and Nigeria would
agree to be bound, and stand by it, is through first reducing the incon93
gruence of perceptions and/or principles.
Common principles lead to compatible perceptions, which then
leads to a single perception of reality in which both Cameroon and Nigeria can work to satisfy their interests. 94 This process may be required
for each step, each issue, and each interest, one at a time. But the result is a brick to lay in the foundation of final resolution. It is conceded
that some perceptions and principles may be so divergent between
Cameroon and Nigeria that the process for resolution is in itself an issue. In such a case, interest bargaining usually prevails, which may

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

See 1 D.F. HENDERSON, CONCILIATION AND JAPANESE LAW 183-87 (1965).
KRATOCHWIL, supra note 23, at 122.
Id.
Id.
Colosi, supranote 28, at 233.
KRATOCHWIL, supra note 23, at 123.
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have unforeseen consequences. 95 In this situation the legal authority of
the ICJ can at least be modified to ensure resolution with equitable
principles (though probably only to a limited extent because interest
bargaining includes power and the party holding the power usually gets
the better bargain).
However, if the positions of Cameroon and Nigeria are diametrically opposed, the ICJ stands in the perfect position to initiate decrease
in the incongruence by enhancing the potential for change among the
perception and principles of both parties. 96 The ICJ can raise doubts
about the positions held and objectively question issues, assumptions,
and facts of either party. 97 The role of the ICJ should be to point out
problems and raise doubts about the respective positions through legal
judgment. Not for judgment's sake (and thereby choosing a side with no
power to enforce), but rather, by using its legal judgment to facilitate
Cameroon and Nigeria to legally question their own perceptions and
principles. 98 The merging of perception and principle leads to a functioning relationship requiring "mutual accommodation to future contingencies by [Cameroon and Nigeria] rather than a written embodiment
of strict rights and duties, ' 99 which in the pursuit of a peaceful resolution, is a good place for the ICJ to start.

95. Id. The literature by Fisher an Ury has noted this, distinguishing between position bargaining and interest bargaining. ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, INTERNATIONAL
MEDIATION: A WORKING GUIDE (1978); ROGER FISHER AND WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO

YES (1983).
96. KRATOCHWIL, supra note 23, at 123.
97. Colosi, supranote 28, at 235.
98. KRATOCHWIL, supra note 23, at 123.
99. HENDERSON, supra note 87, at 183-87. See also C.M. Kim & C.M. Lawson, Law
of the Subtle Mind: the TraditionalJapanese Conception of Law, INT'L & COMP. L. Q.,
vol. 28 1979, at 491-513.

